An Economic Study of Agrarian Problems in Indochina. by Stelly, Randall
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1956
An Economic Study of Agrarian Problems in
Indochina.
Randall Stelly
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stelly, Randall, "An Economic Study of Agrarian Problems in Indochina." (1956). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 155.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/155
AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF AGRARIAN PROBLEMS IN INDOCHINA
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Agricultural Economics
byRandall Stelly 
B. S., Southwestern Louisiana Institute, 1940 
S., Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, 1947
May, 1956
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Acknowledgment is extended to Dr„ Martin D. Woodin who served 
as major professor and advisor, for guidance and assistance during 
this study. Dr, Bueford M* Gile is also recognized for his help and 
counsel.
Appreciation is extended to the personnel in the Food and Agri­
culture Division of the United States International Cooperation 
Administration, the Operations Missions to Indochina, and the Ministry 
of Agriculture of Cambodia and Vietnam for providing much basic infor­
mation and data without which this study would not have been possible.
To Miss Jo Ann Fedele and Miss Marie Pizzolato the author is 






I. INTRODUCTION...........................................  1
The Purpose and Scope of the Study.....................  5
Sources of Data and Methods of Study...................  6
II. GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, PHYSICAL FEATURES AND RESOURCES
OF INDOCHINA...........................................  9
Location and S i z e .....................................  9
Natural Regions and Topography .........................  11
Climate and Rainfall............................... . 14
River System and Waterways  .............   17
Agricultural Regions  .........................  20
Irrigation, Drainage and Flood Control .................  21
Soil Types and G r o u p s .................................  27
Fisheries and Marine Resources.........................  31
Forest Resources .  ...................................  36
Mineral Resources and the Mining Industry.............. 41
III. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS . 45
Principal Industrial and Population Centers ............ 46
Manufacturing and Extent of Economic Development........  46
Interlocking Directorship ...........................  51
Commercial Development .  .............................  52
Capital Accumulating and the Banking S y s t e m ............ 53
Foreign Trade: Imports and Exports ...................  56
The labor Market: Employment and Working Conditions . . .  59
Transportation and Communication .......................  63
Inland Waterways...................................  66
Ocean and Coastwise Transportation.................  66
Air Transportation.................................  67
Tele-Communication Facilities  .....................  68
IV. POPULATION AND UVING CONDITION.......................  69
Distribution Patterns and Population Density............ 69
Population Movements: Internal Migration . . . . . . . .  70
Land-Man and Rural-Urban R a t i o s .......................  74
Education and Extent of Literacy.........      76
iii
CHAPTER PAGE
V. FARMING METHODS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION............ SI
Crop Production and Agricultural Practices............ S3
Rice . . . . .    . . . . .  S5
Types of Rice Culture .  .......................  S9
Corn............................................... 93
Other Food Crops.............  96
Sweet Potatoes  ...........................  100
Beans  ...............................  100
M a n i o c .........................................  100
Vegetables.....................................  100
F r u i t s .........................................  101
Oil-Bearing Crops .................................  101
Coconuts.................     101
Peanuts.........................................  101
Fiber C r o p s .......................................  102
Coffee............................................. 103
Tob a c c o ...........................................  104
Sugar Cano.......................     104
Sugar Pain  ....................................... 105
Pepper............................................. 106
T e a ............................................... 10 6
Plantation Agriculture...............................  107
History and Development...........................  107
Rubber . . . . . . . . . . . .  .....................  108
Marketing.......................................  115
labor.........    121
livestock and Animal Husbandry  .....................  123
Machines Versus Hand T o o l s ...........................  128
Rice Threshing...................   130
Irrigation.........................................  134
Increasing Agricultural Production ...................  134
Fertilization.....................................  140
Social Problems  ...........................  141
VI. LAI© OWNERSHIP AND TENURE RELATIONS...................  143
Size of Farms and Extent of Farm Land Ownership........ 143
Systems and Types of Tenure and Tenure Relationships . . 151
Farm land V a l u e s ......................................* 156
Farm Incomes and Level of Living  ................ 158
Rice Consumption in Relation to Production............ 160
Tonkin and North Annam.............................  l6l
Cochinchina....................................... 163
Cambodia .  ....................................... 163
Land Taxation and Land Revenue Systems  ...........   . 165
Viet Minh Land T a x .................................  169
iv
CHAPTER PAGE
VII. LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM............................... 174
Need for Agrarian Reform...............................  175
Past Efforts at Reform.................................  175
Social and Economic Importance of Communal Lands . . . 179
Viet Minli and Communist Agrarian R e f o r m ................ 183
Rent Reduction  ................................... 183
Scope of the Program............................   184
The Brcader P r o g r a m .............................  185
Results . .....................    189
Appraisal  .............................  191-
Post-War Efforts at Land R e f o r m .......................  193
Recent Efforts at Agrarian R e f o r m .....................  198
Present Land Reform Program and Laws...................  202
Present Statutes  .............................  203
Adequacy  ........................   206
Possibilities for Success and Recommendations . . . . .  . 209
For Relatively Immediate Implementation . * .......... 210
For Adoption Following Limited Preparation..........  210
For Adoption Following More Extensive Preparations . . 212
Complimentary Measures.............    213
The Refugee Farm Families.....................  213
Present United States Interest .........................  216
Extent of Implementation and Difficulties Encountered . . 216
VIII. AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND PROCESSING.............   219
The Present Marketing System...........................  220
Paddy Assembly and Local Processing.................. 220
Weights and Measures .  .........................  225
Transportation  .....................  22o
Storage Facilities  .......................  229
Financial Arrangements and Prices at Various Points
in the Rice Trade.........     232
Prices.............    233
Functions of Supplies and the Wholesale Price of Rice . 236
Taxes in Rice Marketing Operations.................  240
Milling and Processing.............................  241
Grade and Quality  .................  243
Defects in the Marketing System.........   247
At the Farm Level  .................   247
Transportation Problems  ................ 248
Rice Kills .  ..........................   249
Storage  ...................     249
Pricing Mechanism on the Domestic Market.......... 249
Too Many Middlemen  .................  250





AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES.............................  252
History of Cooperatives................................ 252
Cambodia...........................................  2 55
Reasons for Failure..................................... 256
Extent and Adequacy Under the French  .......... 260
Recent Activities and Government Interest .............. 261
The Hew Program................................... . 262
Present Cooperative Statutes   . . . . .  2o4
Admission.......................................  26 4
Capital Stock and S h a r e s ....................... 264
Administration.........      2o5
General Director and Board of Controllers . . . . .  265
General .Assembly and Voting  ............  2o5
Division of Surplus.............................  266
Ad e quacy..................................... . 26 6
Accomplishments  .......................... . 266
V i e t n a m ............................................ 272
Current Program of Activities........... 260
Basic Roouirements for Success and Recommended Action . . 281
a1GRICULTURAL CREDIT...................................  284
Traditional Sources...................................  285
French Efforts .......................................  28?
Mutual Loan Associations...........................  288
Credit Agricole Populaire .......................... 239
Credit Agricole I-Iutuel  .....................   292
Adequacy of the System: Reasons for F a i l u r e .......... 293
Inadequacy of the System  .......................... 296
Flistory of the Organization and Activities of
Agricultural Credit Agencies .......................... 299
Agricultural Credit to Individuals in Cochinchina . . 300
SICAM............................................ 300
Provincial Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks
of Indochina . . . . . . . . .....................  303
Coordination Commission for Rice Production . . . .  305
Mutual Agricultural Credit in Cambodia, Annam
and Tonkin.........    306
Popular Credit Office  ...................... 306
Provincial Mutual Credit Office for Annam
and Tonkin  .................................  308
Mutual Agricultural Credit in Cambodia...........  309
Post-War Situation..................................   314
Recent Developments...................................  314
Cambodia  .......................................  315
Vietnam.........................................   319
The Present Program...................................  328
Conclusions and Recommendations for an Effective
Program  ...............     335
vi
CHAPTER PAGE
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  ...........     338
A Program of Reform 3I>7
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY  .............    3^3
APPENDIX A.........    377
APPENDIX  ...............................................  h09
APPENDIX  ...............................................  1*13




1, Climatic Data for Selected Stations in Indochina; Average,
1928-A8................................................. 16
2* Salt Production and Export from Indochina, 1936-51 . . . .  34
3. Forested Area, Forest Reserves, as of December 31* 1940,
and Output of Forest Products in Indochina during 1940 . . 3$
4. Forest Production in Indochina, 1936-50 .................  40
5* Value of Mine Production, Indochina, 1913-4$...........  42
6. Coal Production and Export, from Indochina, 1936-50 . . . .  43
7. Prices and Indices of Prices in Cochinchina for Selected
Years (1939 = 1 0 0 ) .......................   57
8. Area, Population and Population Density in Indochina by
State, 1946 .  .....................    71
9. Rice Acreage, Yield and Production, in Indochina, 1936-52 . $7
10. Rice Exports from Indochina, 1935-54    $$
11. Rice Acreage, Yield, Prodiiction, and Production per Capita,
in Indochina, by State, 1942-43 .........................  90
12. Comparisons of Rice Acreage, Yields, Pi-oduction, and
Production per Capita of Indochina with Other Asiatic Rice- 
Producing Countries, Average, 3.935-36 to 1939-40   90
13. Acreage, Yield, Production and Exports of Corn in Indochina,
for Selected Years, 1936-51 ...........    94
14. Acreage in Minor Crops, in Indochina, Annual 1936-3$, 1940,
1942-44 ................................................. 97
15. Acreage in Minor Crops in Indochina, by State, Compared
vdth Area in Rice, Rubber and Corn, 1942 . . . . . . . . .  9$
16. Production of Minor Crops, in Indochina, Annual 1936-3$,
1940, 1942-44........................................... 99
17. Number of Domain Concessions in Indochina, by State,
December 31, 1942  .........     109
viii
TABLE PAGE
18. Area of Domain Concessions in Indochina, by State,
January 1, 1940  ...........................   13.0
19. Area Planted to Rubber, Area Exploited and Total Pro­
duction of Rubber in Indochina, 1938-54 •  .............   314
20. Rubber Exports from Indochina by Country of Destination
and by Quality, 1954    3J.S
21. Monthly Exports of Rubber from Vietnam, 1954   3.19
22. Land Owners in Indochina Classified According to the Size
of Their Holdings.......................................  145
23. Schedule of Taxes Imposed upon Farmers by Communist
Viet Minh Authorities...................................  171
24. Comparison of the Production of the Various Products Out- 
Turned from Rough Rice between Rice Kills in the United
States and in Indochina  .....................   245
25. Lending Operations of the Mutual Agricultural Credit
Societies of Cochinchina from 1924-30 . .................. 302
26. Number and Amount of Loans made by the Provincial Mutual
Agricultural Credit Banks of Cochinchina, 1939-45 ........ 304
27. Extent of Operations of the Agricultural Credit Offices
in Cambodia, Annam and Tonkin, 1928-40   311
28. Amount of Money Loaned by the Provincial Agricultural 
Credit Offices to Cooperatives in Tonkin, Annam, and
Cambodia in 1938, 1939 and 1940......................   312
29. Balance of Accounts of Provincial Agricultural Credit
Offices as of December 31* 1944....... ................... 313
30. Source and Disposition of Funds for Agricultural and Other
Loans, January 1, 1955   327
LIST OF FIGURES
IGURE PA <33
I* Geographic Location of Indochina ...............  . . . .  10
II. Indochina Generalised Type of Farming A r e a s ...........  22
III. Location of Principal Rubber Plantations in Indochina . . 112
IV. Rubber Plantation Established on land that was Jungle Ten
Years Previously.......................................  113
V. Rubber Exports from Indochina, Average 1935-39, Yearly
1 9 5 0 - 5 4 ...............................................  116
VI. Crude Agricultural Hand Tools used by Indochina Farmers . 129
VII. Land Preparation and Rice Transplanting in Indochina . . . 131
VIII. One Method of Rice Threshing and Cleaning Employed
Extensively in Some Sections of Indochina..............  133
IX. Comparison of Threshing Rice by the Traditional Method and
with the use of a Portable Foot-Operated Threshing Machine 135
X. Methods of Lifting Irrigation Water Commonly Practices in
Indochina...................................    136
XI. Effects of Commercial Fertilizer on Rice in Indochina . . 13$
XII. Physical Patterns of Rice Fields in South and North
V i e t n a m ...............................................  144
XIII. Allocating Parcels of Land to Farm Families Displaced by
the War in Indochina . . . . . . . . . .  ................ 200
XIV. Rural Rice Mills in V i e t n a m ...........................  223
XV. Junes used in Transporting Rice and Other Commodities in
Indochina.........      22S
XVI. Fanners Cooperative Rice Storage Facilities in Indochina . 270
XVII. Two Methods of Drying Leaf Tobacco in Cambodia.......... 279
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes economic conditions of Indochina as related to 
agrarian problems and indicates the nature of reforms necessary to im­
prove the economic and social well-being of rural people* The study is 
based on available official and unofficial reports and on data developed 
by the author during four years as an agricultural economist in Indochina* 
Indochina comprises the states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, which 
in 1952, emerged as free nations after 75 years of French colonial 
administration* Indochina is largely agricultural and is faced with the 
serious agrarian problems characteristic of the Far East* About 90 
percent of the 23 million inhabitants are engaged in farming, rice being 
the major crop. While agricultural products constitute nine tenths of 
the country's total production, less than one tenth of the land area is 
cultivated. Most farming is carried on in the deltas of the Mekong and 
Red rivers which support extremely large populations per square mile*
In general, farms are small, living standards near the subsistence level, 
and most families heavily and continuously in debt* Nearly all agriculture 
is conducted by natives, although rubber, coffee, and some tea and rice 
plantations are French owned* Farming methods are primitive, yields 
relatively poor, and production per worker low* There is very little 
mechanical equipment and the use of draft animals is restricted because 
they compete with man for the limited food supply* Problems of land 
ownership and tenure relations include the large number of fanners on 
the available land, the pa realization of land holdings in North and 
Central Vietnam, and the share-cropper system, absentee landlords,
3d.
insecurity of tenure and low percentage of farraer-owners in the south* 
The need for agrarian reforms arises from the very unequal distri­
bution of landholdings with a large percentage of the farm land in 
possession of a small percentage of the people, exorbitantly high land 
rental rates, usurious interest rates charged by moneylenders and 
merchants for loans, and the disorganized and unsystematic manner in 
which agricultural commodities are marketed* Ineffective government 
action in relieving these conditions results in social and political 
unrest*
Programs designed to improve the economic wall-being of Indochinese 
peasants and, consequently, the national economy should emphasize in­
creasing land productivity and farmer efficiency, and be accompanied by 
measures to assure equitable distribution of production* To fulfill 
these aims a reform program should:
1. Provide credit to farmers at reasonable interest rates to 
decrease farmers reliance on merchants and moneylenders*
2* Immediately effectuate reduction of land rent, establish
greater security of tenure and formalize rights of squatters 
and displaced farmers on abandoned lands, and eventually 
redistribute lands more equitably*
3* Improve the agricultural marketing system by encouraging
village farmer credit, marketing, and purchase cooperatives, 
reestablishing storage and basic processing facilities in rural 
areas, providing adequate market information, and revising 
taxation and credit policies.
xii
4* Strengthen the government Agricultural Service to include a
farmer education, information or agricultural extension section 
to acquaint fanners with possible benefits through improved 
crop production and harvesting.
5* Give greater emphasis to government rural education and health 
improvement programs.
6. Provide opportunities for more employment outside agriculture 
and reduce excess farm population.
7. Foster improvements in transportation, especially repairing war 
damage to facilities and building more faxm-to-market roads.
8. Place greater emphasis on improving irrigation methods and 
water-control devices.
To implement such a program of agrarian reform will require the 
active participation of governmental organizations at national, provincial, 
and local levels. Government action to be effective must provide a 
greater opportunity for participation and self expression by the rural 




France established itself in Indochina during the second half of 
the last century. The first contacts with the natives were made by 
French missionaries during the early part of the seventeenth century. 
French traders became interested in the area during the middle of the 
eighteenth century when the French East India Company sent specialists 
to Indochina to survey the country’s resources and to draw up plans 
for their development. The first French territorial acquisition 
occurred in 1787 when, by special treaty providing for French support 
of the Etaiperor of Annam, France was permitted to acquire the city of 
Tourane and the island of Paulo Condore, off the Cochinchina coast.'*'
Persecution of the French missionaries by the Annamites during 
the early part of the nineteenth century opened the way for energetic 
action by France. After a series of military engagements a special 
French military force captured the city of Saigon in 1859> and by 
1867 the whole area known as Cochinchina became established under 
French rule. The Kingdom of Cambodia accepted French protection in 
1863, and by 1884 the French became firmly entranched din the Mekong 
River delta when by a special agreement the broad outlines of French 
political and administrative controls were formulated.
Charles Robequain. Le Developpement F^onomiqna de L'Indochine 
Francaise. (Translated by Isabel A. Ward under the title The Economic 
Development of French Indochina, New York: Oxford University Press,
19447, p. 3.
France at first became interested in Tonkin primarily from a 
desire to open a road into China* Following a series of military 
activities, beginning In 1873 and ending in the treaties of 1884 and 
1885, a French Protectorate was definitely and firmly established 
over Tonkin and Annam*
Lao3 was the last state to become part of French Indochina* 
Through its influence exerted from Cambodia to the south and Annam 
and Tonkin to the east, France made peaceful expansions into Laos.
The Franco-Siamese treaty of 1893 established a French Protectorate 
over Laos whose king had turned voluntarily toward France for protec­
tion against Siam and Vietnam* French Indochina thus became five 
states and three peoples plus several ethnic minority groups*
2France immediately declared Indochina an "assimilated" colony. 
While Cochinchina was governed directly as a colony, native rulers 
remained in nominal control over most of the country. However, French 
colonial power was always dominant and indirect rule was used for 
administrative expediency.^
The French administration lost little time in consolidating its 
administrative powers for French economic gains. Indochina soon 
became a protected market for French industries and, in addition, 
through special customs systems and tariff duties, contributed sub­
stantially to furnishing France the raw materials for its growing
2"Assimilated" is a term used by the French to define the re­
lations between France and other members of the French Union.
oErich H. Jacoby. Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1949)>P» 134.
industries* It was in fact advocated by high public officials in 
France that "colonial production be limited to supplying the mother 
country with raw materials or other non-competitive products".^ A 
very healthy atmosphere was thus created for profits to French capital.
With time, however, the political and economic situation changed 
to the detrement of the French. Political leaders began agitating 
for more freedom and greater independence. After World War II France 
was forced to give Cambodia and Laos and the newly-named state of 
Vietnam greater autonomy. The French Governor General was reduced to 
the rank of High Commissioner, the Indochinese government officials 
were given greater control over the internal and external affairs of 
the area, a greater degree of independence was granted by France in 
1950 and finally complete independence in 1952.
In Vietnam, especially, the fever of independence ran high.
Under the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, dissident groups began battling 
French forces openly soon after the war and, with Communist support, 
succeeded in gaining control of that part of Vietnam north of the 17th 
parallel. Nationalists in the South, tuider the leadership of President 
Ngo Diem, moved further away from French rule and influence by taking 
control of a larger portion of the economic, political, financial and 
social affairs of the country.
Thus, after seventy-five years of French rule the three states 
of Indochina were granted independence within the French Union with 
the freedom to choose their own form of government. Cambodia and
^feline (Director of the French Industry and Agriculture 
Association) as quoted by Robequain, op. cit., p. 129.
Laos are presently under a constitutional monarchy form of government 
and South Vietnam, through popular referendum, recently chose a 
democratic republic government and rejected the former French-imposed 
Monarchy of Emperor Bao Dai.
Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, Indochina has not 
developed to any great extent economically and industrially under 
French rule and administration. As a result, the economy of the area 
is still based almost entirely on agriculture which is conducted under 
primitive methods of cultivation for the most part. In the agricul­
tural economy of Indochina rice production predominates to such a 
degree that it can be referred to as an example of monoculture. About 
ninety percent of the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, and 
about ninety percent of the total production of the area comes from 
agriculture and forestry. Most peasant farms are small and the farmers 
and their families have a very low standard of living and are usually 
heavily in debt.
Nearly all fanning is carried on by native farmers, although 
rubber and coffee plantations and a number of tea and a few rice 
plantations are in French hands. Except on the European rubber plan­
tations, yields per acre are low due primarily to the primitive 
production practices followed.
As in most Asiatic countries, the diet of the Indochinese con­
sists mostly of plant foods, primarily rice. Fish is by far the most 
important of the animal products. Since production statistics are 
unreliable and many fairly important crops are excluded from official 
production statistics, it is impossible to prepare a satisfactory food 
balance for Indochina. However, the per capita food consumption of the
average rural peasant is very low.
Besides the French, the Chinese and Indians play a leading role 
in the internal economy of Indochina. The Indians have become well 
established in the retail trade while the Chinese can be said to 
practically dominate the internal rice marketing and milling and the 
forest industries, and also play a leading role in the fields of 
agricultural credit and transportation.
The Purpose and Scope of Study
World War II brought to light a recognition and appreciation by 
the Western world of the strategic and economic importance of that 
geographic area of the world often referred to as Southeast Asia. 
Japanese occupation and control of the area for a brief period during 
the war gave that country control of over 95 percent (over one billion 
bushels) of the world rice production and a six million ton annual rice 
surplus. In addition, the 150 million people living in that area 
produce over 75 percent of the world’s natural rubber. Geographically, 
the area forms the "cross-roads'1 into Asia. From a location stand­
point the area is strategic because most communication between the 
Orient and the western part of the world pass through Southeast Asia.
Indochina forms part of this general area; in fact, it is located 
in the approximate center of Southeast Asia. As is the case of other 
countries of the area. Indochina’s economy is basically agricultural, 
and it is upon the prosperity and stability of the agriculture that 
the economic well-being of all the people depends. Agrarian unrest 
has been rampant in all of Southeast Asia for the past ten years or 
so, and especially so in Indochina.
Very little information has been published in the English language 
about agricultural and agrarian conditions in Indochina. The few 
published works on the subject are in the French language for the most 
part.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the economic conditions 
of Indochina as related to agricultural and agrarian reform in order 
that intelligent and positive lines of action may be recommended to 
improve the social and economic position of the country*s agricultural 
population and thereby insure future stability and prosperity in that 
important area of the world. In general this analysis is divided into 
three steps: (1) a general survey and summary of conditions as they
exist at the present time; (2) a critical appraisal and analysis of 
the situation; and (3) recommendations and suggestions for practical 
actions and policies deemed necessary to bring about desired improve­
ments in the levels of living, productivity and stability of the rural 
population.
The ideas contained and conclusions reached in this study are not 
intended as final and only answers to the problems facing the rural 
population of Indochina. They should, however, serve as a basis or 
"guide-lines” for action programs and policies designed to contribute 
towards a political, economic and social atmosphere which will be in 
the interest of individual freedom and happiness.
Sources of Data and Methods of Study
The data used in this study were obtained from official and non­
official sources. Official sources include Vietnamese and Cambodian 
government reports and bulletins, census data, government agricultural
statistics, and official reports of various government agencies* From 
the United States, official sources include selected State Department 
dispatches, reports to the United States Congress, and special Activity 
Reports of the United States Operations Mission to Indochina* Unoffi- 
cal sources include published works of French economists on the agri­
cultural economy of Indochina, theses, unpublished pamphlets and 
articles, and trade and industry reports, magazines and bulletins*
The author has also drawn widely upon his experiences and observations 
while serving in the capacity of Agricultural Economist with the United 
States Operations Mission to Indochina*
Extensive vise was made of material published in French and contained 
in the libraries of the Vietnamese and Cambodian Ministries of Agriculture, 
and of the French High Commissioner for Indochina. The Office of Foreign 
Agricultural Relations of the United States Department of Agriculture, 
the United States International Cooperation Administration, and the 
library of the United States Embassy to Vietnam also provided valuable 
material.
In this study, considerable use has been made of comparative, 
deductive and inductive methods of reasoning. The comparative method 
of reasoning makes it possible to analyze programs and policies in 
neighboring areas and offer suggestion for their application to the 
country under study under similar conditions* By considering the 
applications to similar conditions it is possible to offer suggestions 
and tentative theories leading toward remedial action, definite ends 
and positive results.
The deductive method proves useful in formulating some basis for 
policy programs through analysis of existing conditions in Indochina.
Unreliability and incompleteness of a large part of the data available 
makes it necessary to resort to apriori reasoning, thereby making it 
possible to put some reliance on logical reasoning. However, failure 
of the course of events or the actions of people to follow what logic 
indicates should normally happen may put definite limits to the validity 
of arriving at conclusions by apriori reasoning alone. It is because 
of this that deductions made at a particular time may later need to 
be modified in the light of time and circumstances then prevailing.
The inductive method of reasoning may well be the most useful in 
analyzing the actual conditions and also in making positive recommenda­
tions. The number of published books, pamphlets, theses and other works 
of an economic nature dealing with the problems of agriculture in 
Indochina serve to give a fairly accurate picture of the actual conditions 
and to indicate past activities and occurrences. These are very useful 
in formulating ideas as to the cause of historical events and conditions, 
and serve as a basis from which to arrive at conclusions and to offer 
recommendations for improvements.
CHAPTER H
GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, PHYSICAL FEATURES AND 
RESOURCES OF INDOCHINA
This study is concerned primarily with the econondc situation of 
the Associated States of Indochina. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the agricultural economy as related to agrarian reform, agricultural 
credit and farmers cooperative organizations. It is proper, therefore, 
that an analysis be made of the geographic position of the area. The 
physical features and the geographic location are related to the dis­
tribution and occupation of the people, and the natural resources 
indicate the state of the economy and possibilities for future economic 
expansion and progress.
Location and Size
Indochina comprises the three States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
and forms the eastern portion of the Indochinese peninsula. It lies 
between 8° 30* and 23° 25T north latitude and 100° and 109° 20* east 
longitude, and stretches approximately 1,000 miles from north to south. 
It is bounded on the north by China; on the east and southeast by the 
Gulf of Tonkin and the China Sea; on the west by the Gulf of Thailand 
and Thailand; and on the northwest by Burma. Figure I shows the 
geographic location of Indochina.
The total area of Indochina is approximately 285*000 square miles 
or about 182 million acres. Vietnam, with 126,000 square miles is the 
largest of the three states. About 44,000 square miles is included in 
Tonkin, 57*000 square miles in Annam and 25*000 square miles in 










FIGURE I. GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF INDOCHINA
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terms of the 1954 Geneva Convention is about 60,000 square miles and 
includes all of Vietnam north of the seventeenth parallel. Cambodia 
comprises an area of about 70>000 square miles and Laos about 39,000 
square miles.
Natural Regions and Topography
Indochina is made up of several very distinct regions. By far 
the most important of these from an economic standpoint are the Tonkin 
Delta in the north and the Mekong Delta in the south (which form part 
of Cochinchina, now known as South Vietnam, and Cambodia). These two 
delta areas lie at both ends of the Annamese chain of mountains and 
for this reason the country is sometimes referred to as "two baskets 
of rice balanced on both ends of a pole". The northern and northwestern 
parts of the country are occupied by the mountains of upper Tonkin, now 
known as North Vietnam, and upper Laos. Much of this part of the 
country consists of sandstone hills and limestone plateaux. Parallel 
to the east coast from the Gulf of Tonkin to the North to the delta of 
the Mekong River in the South runs the Annamese chain of mountains, 
which at some point reaches the coast to form numerous enclosed bays. 
This chain of mountains has steep slopes on the eastern side, but 
descends in gentle steps on the western side to the plateaux of Loas 
and to the Mekong River. The Cardamon Mountains in Southeastern 
Cambodia stretch along the Thailand frontier and the Elephant Chain, 
also in southwestern Cambodia, reach the Gulf of Thailand not far from 
the Mekong delta. The mountain region of Cambodia is the rainest and 
most unhealthful district in Indochina and is almost completely devoid 
of human habitation. Other mountain areas are only very thinly popu­
lated.
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The plains of Indochina occupy almost one-half of the country1 s 
total area. The plains along the east, although they are small in 
area and fragmentary in distribution, contain a majority of the popu­
lation. Intensive cultivation and recent alluvial deposits of high 
fertility permit the existance of a dense population. In these small, 
numerous plains and valleys along the east coast over ninety percent 
of the land area is utilized by man for crop and livestock production; 
no other area in the country approaches this figure. The two broader 
plains of Indochina are located on the Gulf of Tonkin and on the South 
China Sea. The northern plain, known as the Red River Delta, comprise 
an area of 5,400 square miles. In this area live more than seven 
million inhabitants and is considered as one of the most densely 
populated regions of the world.
The other great plain to the east is the Mekong Delta with an 
area of 15,400 square miles. This plain is usually referred to as the 
breadbasket of Indochina because in normal years the bulk of the 
country’s surplus rice is produced there.
Other important plains are the floodplains and tablelands of the 
middle and upper Mekong River and the Toule Sap basin in central and 
western Cambodia. Unlike the plains of the east, the western lowlands 
occupy a vast, contiguous area and are drained by a single great river, 
the Mekong. Unfortunately, however, not all of this extensive lowland 
region is overlain with recent sedimentary deposits as is the case with 
the Red and Mekong River delta plains.
The broad tableland of the upper Mekong basin extend from the 
Western slopes of the Annam Mountains westward to the Mekong. Undulating 
gently this tableland attains moderately high altitudes in the east
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but along the Mekong River the upland surface is seldom above 500 feet. 
Sandstone beds cover much of the area, with the exception of the 
Vientiane plain where rather recent sediments of high fertility pre­
dominate. It is in this area where the greatest concentration of
population is found in all of Laos and the upper Mekong river.
The Toule Sap, or Great Lake, in Cambodia is a shallow body of 
water surrounded by alluvial material of rather high fertility. The 
flow of water into and out of the lake is almost entirely dependent
upon the rise and fall of the water level in the Mekong River. During
periods of low river level (December to June) the lake drains into the 
lower Mekong. During this period the lake is approximately 1,000 
square ndles in area. During the period of high water (June to November) 
the Mekong River drains partly into the lake, reversing the flow of 
the connecting water channel between the Mekong and the lake. During 
this period of the year water pours into the lake, enlarging its area 
to over 3*800 square miles and enriching the periodically inundated 
border land which is planted to rice when the water begins to recede.
Two other areas in Indochina deserve special mention because of 
their importance from an agricultural standpoint. One of these is the 
Plateau des Bolevens in Southern Loas which comprises an area of about 
1,500 square miles of tableland of high fertility. This plateau has 
received special attention by French agricultural interests who have 
established coffee plantations in the area. The other area of con­
siderable importance is the tableland area of northeastern Cambodia and 
northern Cochinchina. This area is overlain with recent sediments and 
alluvial materials. Much of this deposit consists of basaltic material 
carried down from erosion on mountain slopes to the North and East.
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This area is commonly referred to a3 the "red soils'1 and the "grey 
soils", and, because of its relative fertility, constitutes the most 
useful agricultural portion of all the Indochinese highlands* In 
this area are found the large rubber plantations and tea plantings 
developed by the French.
Climate and Rainfall
Indochina is a warm country* At sea level there is no cold month. 
All of Indochina lies south of the Tropic of Cancer and the coldest 
month - January - at Hanoi, in the north, has a mean temperature of 
63 degrees. Only a few tropical crops, such as rubber, cocoa and oil 
palm are excluded from the extreme northern part of the country, but 
in all the plains and lower valleys of Indochina harvests can ripen 
during any month of the year. The annual mean temperature is 74 degrees 
at Hanoi in the north, 77 degrees at Hue in the center, and 80 degrees 
in Saigon, all of which are close to sea level.
The longitudinal Annam chain of mountains as well as the mountains 
of southwestern Cambodia constitute important barriers to winds, and 
thus influence considerably the temperature and precipitation of a 
large part of Indochina. For example, west of the Annam chain the 
temperattire variation between the hottest and the coldest months is 
only five to six degrees Fahrenheit; while east of the mountains, in 
Tonkin and northern Annam, the temperature differences between the 
hottest and coldest months are more than twenty degrees. In the winter 
the temperature sometime falls to as low as 42 degrees Fahrenheit.
Along the east coast of Indochina there are variations of as much as
15
18 degrees in 24 hours, a3 well as large variations from year to year 
in the northeasternmost part.
From an agricultural standpoint variation in temperature is less 
significant than the distribution and amount of rainfall, which is 
determined primarily by the monsoons. The monsoons are of two types, 
depending upon their direction and period of the year. The southwest 
monsoons blow from April to November and, since they travel over large 
bodies of water, hit the south Indochina coast laden with moisture and 
bring heavy radnfally and storms over much of the country. The north­
east monsoons blow from November to April and bring dry weather. The 
exception to this general rule is eastern Annam where the northeastern 
winds, having crossed a large expanse of water before reaching the 
coast and adjacent mountain slopes, contain large amounts of moisture 
which is precipitated on the land. For this reason central Annam 
receives most of its rainfall during the winter months.
There is considerable variation in total annual rainfall from year 
to year as well as from station to station within the country. This 
is readily seen in Table 1 which shows the temperature variations as 
well as the precipitation at several locations in Indochina. A study 
of the distribution of precipitation indicates further that there are 
four regions of relatively high rainfall (more than 120 inches) and 
three relatively low (less than 60 inches). The rainy areas are:
(l) the mountains of southwest Cambodia, (2) the Bolevens Plateau of 
southern Loas, (3) the Djiring Plateau of south Annam, and (4) the 
higher portions of the central and northern Annam chain of mountains. 
The 1owen-than-average rainfall areas are: (l) the plains of Cambodia
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Table 1. Climatic Data for Selected Stations in Indochinaj Average, 
1928-48
• • • •
: Dalat : Hanoi










Mean of warmest 
month 70 84 84 86 36 82
Mean of coldest 
month 63 63 70 78 79 69
Annual average 66 74 77 81 82 77
Precipitation
(inches)
January .4 .9 3.8 .3 .9 .2 1.5
February 1.1 1.4 2.5 .4 .1 *. G 1.6
March 2.1 1.8 3.2 1.6 .3 1.4 5.6
April 7.0 3.5 1.8 3.0 1.7 3.9 8.1
May 8.0 8.4 3.8 5.2 8.3 10.5 20.5
June 6.3 9.9 3.2 6.0 12,6 11.8 28.4
July 9.9 13.1 3.7 6.7 11.1 10.4 40.9
August 8.4 13.2 4.1 6.2 11.0 11.4 40.1
September 12.2 10.8 16.8 r-•to 13.3 11.8 30.5
October 8.7 4.5 25.9 9.0 11.1 4.2 18.2
November 3.5 1.8 25.8 5.0 3.7 .6 9.2
December .9 1.1 23.7 1.3 3.1 .1 2.6
Year 68.5 70.4 118.3 53.9 77.2 66.9 207.2
Sources: Annuaire Statistique de 1’ Indochine, 1947-1948, pp. 5-13j
Pierre Gourou, L 1Utilization du Sol en Indochine Francaise: 
Paris: Hartmann, 1940, pp. 66-67.
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and the Mekong delta, (2) the coastal lowland of south Annam, and 
(3) the upper Mekong valley of western loas.
High rates of evaporation throughout the country have rendered 
areas of only moderate rainfall unsuitable for cultivation and large 
areas of southern Indochina average less than 55 inches a year* Still 
vaster areas have extremely dry winter and spring months which make 
crop and livestock production difficult* With the evaporation ratio 
for the area varying between 12.5 inches and 27.5 inches, years of 
below-average rainfall often leave parched fields behind them in the 
drier areas.
River System and Waterways
The rivers of Indochina, along with the man-made waterways and 
canals, play a dominant role in the economy of the country. In fact, 
it can be said that rivers and canals are the life-blood of the country 
from the standpoint of both agricultural production (irrigation and 
drainage) and transportation and communication. In some areas of 
Indochina, particularly in the Mekong and Red River deltas, river and 
canal traffic account for probably more than eighty percent of the 
total local traffic, with roads and highways and water-buffalo trails 
carrying the remaining twenty percent.
There are two principal rivers in Indochina, each branching out 
into several tributaries close to the sea. The Mekong River is one of 
the great rivers of the world from the standpoint of volume of water it 
carries out to the sea, the size of the territory it drains, its length, 
and the volume of water traffic. It has its source in Tibet and 
descends in steps for 1,900 miles toward its delta through the plateaux
and plains of southwestern China, western Loas, and Cambodia to 
Cochinchina and the South China Sea. Its principal tributaries are 
the Cisbassac, the Transbassac and the Vaico rivers* The Red River 
descends from the mountains of Yunnan in China, cutting through deep 
and inaccessable gorges before it reaches its delta in Tonkin. Its 
two chief tributaries are the Black River, which flows from the plateaux 
on the northwest, and the Clear River whose tributaries flow from the 
Ba-be Lakes in China.
Other important rivers are the Toule Sap in Cambodia which connects 
the Great Lake to the Mekong River and the Saigon River which has its 
source in the mountains to the northeast of Saigon, flows past the city 
of Saigon and empties into the China Sea sixty miles south of the city 
at Cap St. Jacques. The Saigon River carries all the maritime traffic 
of the port of Saigon which is one of the great ports of the Orient.
The general climatic, soil, and relief features of the regions 
give to the rivers of Indochina certain common characteristics. As a 
result of the monsoons which bring heavy rains for six months of the 
year, and a period of dry weather for the following six months, the 
rivers are swollen to overflowing in the fall and early winter and 
extremely low in the spring and early summer. Many rapids and cascades 
in the areas above the deltas prohibit through navigation on the rivers 
beyond the plains. In addition, there is an enormous amount of erosion 
caused by the rivers in the mountains and highlands with the result 
that when the rivers overflow in the deltas during the high waters fertile 
alluvial material is deposited over much of the two main deltas. It is 
this periodic deposit of earth material that has made it possible to 
produce a rice crop without much fertilization year after year for
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centuries in the Tonkin or Red River delta, and it is the deposits of the 
Mekong River which is responsible for the forming of the Cochinchina 
delta lands.
Numerous other smaller, less important rivers are found along the 
entire length of the Annam, or central Vietnam, coast* These all 
originate 3hort distances inland in the Annam mountains and flow into 
the China Sea. These smaller rivers also overflow their banks during 
the rainy season and are the cause of the many small deltas in that 
area. Throughout the length of the Annam coast population centers and 
farming are found at the mouths and along most of those rivers for short 
distances from the sea.
The Red and Mekong River deltas represent a very complicated 
pattern of canals crossing and cris-crossing one another and the smaller 
rivers at irregular intervals. In the Tonkin delta irrigation and 
control of the water in the Red River were the main reasons for building 
canals. The first projects were undertaken by the natives centuries 
ago and under French Administration the canal and dike systems were 
improved and enlarged. However, the means of communication afforded 
by the canals and dikes is today probably as Important as their function 
of water control. The dikes provide footpaths for man and water buffalo 
while the canals and ditches alongside the dikes furnish a means of 
transportation by canoes or sampans and small, sailboats.
It is estimated that approximately 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) 
of man-made canals presently exist in the Mekong delta. ' Most of these
5Robequain, ot>. cit.. p. 111.
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canals were dug under French administration. The original purpose of 
digging the main canals in Cochinchina was to afford a means of com­
munication to the swampy rice lands of the interior. Secondary cuts 
branching off the main canals have made permanent rice cultivation 
possible over almost the entire delta. Settlement of the interior 
followed the dredging of canals, with new colonists building their 
huts on the earth piled up by the dredges— the plains away from the 
canal banks being flooded with from two to four feet of water for a 
period of five to six months each year. For that reason a typical 
Cochinchina rural conmunity represents a row of straw huts strung on 
both sides of the canal banks.
With the exception of two primary roads and a few secondary ones, 
the only means of surface transportation in the interior of Cochinchina 
is by means of sampans on the canals, ditches and riverB. It is estimated 
that just prior to World War II the total tonnage traveling over the 
most frequented Cochinchina waterways was in excess of eight million 
tons annually. ̂  More recently, during the period of military activity 
those canals afforded about the only means of army transportation and 
movement in the interior, and both the French and Nationalist forces 
made extensive use of troop landing crafts and other shallow-draft boats 
in their military operations.
Agricultural Regions 
Broadly speaking, the cultivation of crops in Indochina is carried
^Robequain, op. cit., p. 112.
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on in seven principal agricultural regions or areas. These are: the Red
River delta in Tonkinj the numerous small valleys and deltas along the 
Annam coast, the Mekong River delta, the Great Lake region in Cambodia, 
the plateau des Bolevens in Southern Loas, the red and grey tablelands 
north and northeast of Saigon, and the Dalat-Djiring-Ban MeThout 
triangle. Rice is by far the most important crop grown in both the Red 
River and Mekong River deltas. Com, cotton, sweetpotatoes, and vegetables 
are crops of lesser importance in the Red River or Tonkin delta. Secondary 
crops include sugar cane, peanuts, tropical fruits, coffee, manioc, and 
tea. The Dalat area is the source of most of the fresh vegetables consumed 
in the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan area, while tea cultivation predominates 
in the Djiring area. The plateau des Bolevens produces most the coffee 
of Indochina. On the red and grey soils area of Cochinchina and north­
eastern Cambodia are found most of the rubber plantations. Figure II 
indicates the major types of farming areas in Indochina,
Irrigation. Drainage and Flood Control
Chiefly because of the wide variation in rainfall from year to year 
and the uncertain seasonal distribution, irrigation is necessary to insure 
stable production of rice and other crops, in spite of the generally 
heavy rainfall in Indochina. However, in the past, protection of the 
crops against the disastrous floods has taken precedence over irrigation 
in Annam and the Tonkin deltas. As noted previously, the construction of 
canals for transportation of paddy to the Saigon-Cholon area, to encourage 
settlement of the area and to drain large expanses of marshy land has 
been given greatest emphasis in the Mekong delta, but these canals also 
serve as a basis for an irrigation system.
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Only about nine percent of the total land area in Indochina is planted to crops.
In the Tonkin delta the work of protecting the rice fields against 
the ravages of the floods has been going on for centuries. With the 
exception of the highest alluvial lands and the lowlands in the region 
between Hanoi and Haiphong, where the floods are not to be feared and 
irrigation functions automatically by the action of the tides, cultiva­
tion of rice in the delta is possible only through irrigation and control 
of the water through a system of dikes. Thus, construction of dikes and 
efforts at water control in most of the delta have been going on as long 
as agriculture has been practiced. However, with the use of only simple 
hand tools the natives in this area never were able to build dikes of 
sufficient strength to sustain the high waters, with the result that 
breakages occurred frequently flooding large areas.
In 1926 the French began an extensive program of dike improvement 
throughout the delta. The outlines of the old dikes were straightened, 
the earthen embankments were made wider, higher and more solid by means 
of an admisture of rocks and by reenforcing the foundation with tempered 
clay. The big dikes, which also serve as roads, and behind which huddle 
the villages, are an inseparable part of the landscape of much of the 
delta.^
At the turn of the century the French became interested in building 
a modern irrigation system in the Tonkin delta. But this could be done 
only within the framework of the existing flood control dikes. Between 
1905 and 193S several canal systems were built, each of which consisted 
of a witholding dam, a primary canal, and secondary and tertiary canals,
^The Agriculture of Indochina. (Washington: U.S.D.A., Office
of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Economic Cooperation Administration, 
August, 1950), p. 19.
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all of -which brought water to the rice fields by gravity alone. In 192# 
a mechanized pumping station was constructed on the Red River above Hanoi 
which, when completed, raised the irrigation water a total of sixteen 
feet and distributed it by canals to some 25,000 acres of rice land*
Beginning in 1931 work was begun on a network of canals to carry 
off excess water from the Red River and to bring in water for irrigation.
At the same time improvements were made in the pattern of dikes parallel­
ing the river. Irrigation systems have been completed in the delta covering 
an area of over 600,000 acres, and plans for similar projects were made 
before the war which would cover an area of about 1.3 million acres. In 
Annam, irrigation projects already completed cover an area of about
275,000 acres and similar systems are now under construction or planned 
which would ultimately irrigate an addition 440,000 acres.
In Cochinchina it is estimated that over five million acres of farm 
land have been created by means of drainage. Acreage under rice cultivation 
increased four times from 1880 to the beginning of the war, and rice exports 
from Saigon were five times as great before the war as in 1880. Irrigation 
has taken a less important place in Cochinchina than in Tonkin or Annam 
because the pressure of population on the land is not as great and farm 
families have not been forced to cultivate the lower grade lands.
There are over 800 miles of main canals with an upper width of 70 
feet and a depth of more than 6 feet below the level of the lowest dry- 
season tides in Cochinchina— the remaining mileage of canals is composed 
of secondary and tertiary canals serving as branches and connection links 
between the main canals. However, the building of these secondary connect­
ing canals has lagged behind the building of the main canals and with 
relatively little effort native farmers could extend the beneficial effects
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of the changes in water levels resulting from the tides flowing up and 
down the main canals into their own rice plots* These changes in the 
water level due to changing tides act as a natural regulator and make 
it possible, merely by operating floodgates, either to remove excess 
water during low tides or apply irrigation water during high tides* Up 
to the present time, however, only a small number of rice fields benefit 
fully from the changing tide levels.
It is estimated that there are about two million acres of swamp 
land in Cochinchina which is unfit for crop production. Of this, about 
1.6 million could be improved sufficiently for rice cultivation through 
proper drainage. The French administration developed engineering plans 
to drain these lands and actual work was begun, but with the outbreak 
of World War II all activity ceased.
French modernization plans before the war also called for the con­
struction of several irrigation systems in Cambodia which would benefit 
about 320,OCX) acres. Very little effort has been made in water con­
trol and irrigation in Laos.
With the exception of the irrigation plant on the Red River 
mentioned above, a smaller plant in Annam capable of irrigation about
1,200 acres of rice land and thirteen small motorized pumps suitable for 
irrigation about 75 to 100 acres each, all lifting of irrigating water 
in Indochina is performed by primitive hand methods. The equipment newly 
installed in the large plant on the Red River and the plants and pumps 
mentioned above were all furnished under American aid programs. The two 
most conmon methods of lifting irrigation water by hand consist of one 
person balancing a bamboo bucket on a tri-pod and dipping the bucket in 
the water at the lower level and dumping it into the field being irrigated
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or two persons balancing a bamboo bucket between two ropes and dipping 
the bucket into a low level field or ditch, then dumping the water into 
the field being irrigated. These primitive methods of lifting irrigation 
water place great restriction on both the surface area one is able to 
irrigate and the height (3 to k feet) to which the water can be lifted.
In some areas in Tonkin and Annam water must be elevated three times 
before the level of the field being irrigated is reached.
In irrigating upland crops, such as peanuts and tobacco, during 
the dry season in areas removed from a stream, farmers make use of the 
practice of digging holes in the ground by hand to the level of the water 
at depths of from 20 to 30 feet. These holes are usually from four to 
six feet in diameter. The water is lifted from the hole into the fields 
in bamboo buckets attached to the end of a long bamboo pole.
The economic possibilities of greatly expanding the cropland through 
these primitive irrigation methods are very limited. The solution rather 
appears to be in making greater use of small and medium mechanical water- 
lifting pumps on a cooperative basis. Through American aid a start in 
this direction has been made. But the surface so far has only been 
scratched, and it is probable that an additional four to five million 
acres of cropland could be made suitable for double cropping by increasing 
and improving the water-lifting devices and wells. This appears especially 
feasible when it is considered that the temperature in Indochina is ideal 
for growing most tropical and semi-tropical crops twelve months of the 
year.
Some progress is being made with the help of American aid to con­
struct water-retention works in Cambodia and South and Central Vietnam 
that will inpound rain water in the higher elevated areas during the
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rainy season for distribution into rice fields below during the diy season. 
Such water control works would make it possible to grow a crop of rice 
during the dry season as well as during the rainy season. It is estimated 
that it is feasible, within economic limits, to dam up water sufficient 
for irrigating from 2.0 to 2.5 million acres.
The emphasis by the United States Government in helping Indochina to 
improve and expand its irrigation facilities and water-control works is 
reflected in the fact that for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, 
American aid funds earmarked for irrigation amounted to $1,525,000 for 
South Vietnam alone. Of this amount, $125,000 is destined to procure 
earth-moving equipment and water pumps from the United States, and 
$1,400,000 constitute local counterpart currency to pay the internal 
costs of operating this equipment and of constructing dams and distributing 
canals.
Soil Types and Groups
There are no sufficiently complete soils studies to enable a detailed 
description of the various soil types. But the few general surveys that 
have been made indicate that in general the soils of Indochina are rela- 
tively poor from an agricultural point of view.
The soils of Indochina are acid for the most part, poor in assimilable 
phosphorus, lime, potassium, magnesium, and in humus. This is generally 
true of most tropical soils. Climate is the principal factor influencing
g
Pierre Gourou, L'Utilization djj Sol en Indochine Francaise:
(Paris: Hartmann, 1940). Translation by Isabel A. Ward, (New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), PP* 77-&B.
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soil formation over the greater part of the country. Abundant precipita­
tion, almost everywhere exceeding the rate of evaporation, hastens the 
process of leaching out the soluble substances from the soil surface. 
Laterization^ is rapid in most areas. But the process of laterization 
is definitely retarded by forest cover, and when forest land is cleared 
for farming minerals are soon leached out of the soil. In a year or two 
these soils become relatively infertile. Under these circumstances, a 
system of shifting or "ray” cultivation is practiced over a large part 
of the mountain and hilly regions of Indochina.^ The ill effects of 
shifting cultivation is not limited to laterization, but soil erosion 
becomes a serious problem when the forest cover is constantly being 
destroyed. Upland soils are exposed to the violent actions of the rains 
and denudation advances at a very rapid pace causing the waters of the 
swollen rivers to contain large amounts of silt and sediment. Robequain 
estimates that one cubic meter of Red River water contains 500 grams 
of silt during the dry season and as much as three and one-half kilograms 
during the floods.^
Generally speaking, only the recent soils of the low alluvial plains 
of Indochina are able to support a crop year after year in the form of
Laterization is the process of forming iron oxides in insoluble 
rock form by water and rain dissolving the silica in soils containing 
little humus more rapidly than the alumina.
^"Ray” cultivation is a primitive method of shifting cultivation 
in which the forest cover in mountainous and hilly areas is burned to 
clear the land for raising crops for a year or two, the soil being ferti­
lized by the ashes, then allowed to return to its natural state over a 
period of 13 to 20 years of idleness after which the cover is again burned 
to clear the land for cultivation.
in> J2R« d t .. p. 107.
wet-field rice. The grey soils of old allumiura and the residual soils 
resulting from the decomposition of rocks in mountain regions do not 
lend themselves to the cultivation of dry-field annual food crops on 
a large scale. Once deprived of tree cover, they are threatened with 
rapid exhaustion, laterization and erosion. Irrigated rice fields can 
sometimes be established there, but the physical conditions allow this 
only for small areas. Even poorer soils are found in the alluminized 
zone of the centrally located Plaine des Joncques to the west of Saigon 
and adjacent areas to the north and west. These '‘grey’1 soils are 
products of the alluvial residue of a former delta and are elevated 
several feet above the level plain below. Dry native crops and, more 
recently, rubber plantings have made use of these older alluvial soils, 
but future exploitation, it appears, will have to be confined to a few 
tree and bush crops.
The soils of the Tonkin delta are composed of fine particles, or 
silts, which when dried are so hard it is difficult to break them up 
with a plow. These delta soils as a whole are of only medium fertility 
except along the river banks. The upper delta soils deteriorate through 
leaching and decomposition; therefore, the oldest soils are usually the 
least fertile. Despite the fact that the soils of the Tonkin delta are 
relatively poor, they have the great virtue of lending themselves to 
the cultivation of wet-field rice because of their slight depth and 
impervious sub-soil. The differences in the fertility of the soils 
are reflected in the density of the population, which usually reaches 
its naxiraum on the richest soils and not necessarily on the longest- 
settled regions.
Notwithstanding the fact that the grey soils of old alluvium and 
the residual upland soils are unable to sustain continuous paddy cul­
tivation, and that rapid erosion, leaching and laterization preclude 
their utilization for upland crops except under favorable local 
conditions, there are some soils in the hilly areas which have a special 
fertility* These are the ’’Terre rouges” or red soils formed from the 
decomposition of basalt* The vast extent of these soils, coupled with 
their relative fertility make them of prime interest to those seeking 
efficient utilization of Indochina’s soil resources. Altogether they 
cover an area about 13,500 square miles (S.6 million acres) of which 
70 percent may be classified as agriculturally usable, equivalent to 
roughly half of the existing rice area of Indochina. Despite their 
well-known aversion to hilly lands, the Annamese have long cultivated 
many of the fertile red soils of Annam and northern Cochinchina* In 
recent years the crescent of the basaltic soils extending from the
southern edge of the Annam chain has been the site of important plantings
of Hevea rubber trees. Cleared of their dense vegetation, these lands 
are supplying the major part of the rubber production of Indochina.
Coffee and tea plantations are also found on these lands. Diversified 
dry crops are grown on some basaltic patches of ground; in some such 
areas gardens of palms, bananas, pineapples, tea bushes, etc., are 
grown. Large areas of this land are still unpopulated and uncultivated. 
Lack of means of communication to the interior appears to be the main 
drawback to colonization and fuller exploitation of this vast land 
resource. These red soils could carry fruitful plantations of tropical
and sub-tropical crops and represent one of the most important poten­
tially rich agricultural areas of Indochina.
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The general poverty of most of Indochina’s upland and mountain 
soils needs to be reemphasized. The relatively fertile red lands 
represent only six percent of the total hill and mountain area; the 
remainder is composed of relatively infertile grey soils, all lateritic 
in character* Except for a few areas in the redlands, there is little 
or no permanent crop cultivation. Recent alluvium and, to a lesser 
extent, the grey soils of older alluvium appear destined to continue 
to support the vast majority of the Indochinese population.
Fisheries and Marine Resources
The fishing industry holds a leading place in the economy of 
Indochina, since fish with its various by-products forms an indispensable 
item in the diet of the people. There are no accurate statistics 
available on the production of fi3h for the country as a whole. Trade 
statistics serve only limited usefulness in indicating the volume of 
the total catch, because such a large proportion of the catch is consumed 
locally and never enters the market channels. However, all authorities 
agree that fisheries are second only to rice in importance to the native 
economy. Fishing is a part-time occupation for almost the entire rural 
population and is carried on in the spare time between rice planting 
and harvesting when all the fresh waterways, lakes and rice fields are 
fished energetically. Although there are no available statistics to 
verify this conclusion, it appears that fresh-water fishing is by far 
more important than salt-water fishing because stocks of fish in the 
surrounding seas are meager and Indochinese do not have a sea-faring 
tradition.
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Before the war estimates of Indochinese fish catches varied between
300,000 and 410,000 metric tons annually and exports of fish and fish 
products averaged about 35,000 metric tons. This would represent an 
annual per capita consumption of over 16 kilograms, although it is 
difficult to determine accurately the utilization of the catch. Some 
is consumed in the fresh state, a part of the catch is dried and a 
large proportion is consumed in the form of nuoc mam, a fish paste or 
sauce used to give added flavor to the daily rice diet. The following 
represents the most reliable estimates as to utilization:
Fishery products take an important place in Indochinese exports.
In 1937, fish ranked fifth in the value of the principal goods exported 
from the country. The main part of these exports consists of salted 
and smoked fish caught mainly in the Tonle Sap area of Cambodia.
Singapore usually provides the principal market for these export ship­
ments. Dried shrimp, fish and shrimp paste and fish oil make up most 
of the remainder of these exports. As a result of the war the exports 
of fish and fish products dwindled almost to the vanishing point. Very 
little export activity has been forthcoming in the last few years. In 
1951, less than 3,000 metric tons of fish and fish products were exported,
about twenty-five percent of it in the form of salted, dried or smoked
12fish, and the remainder in the form of fish oil and grease.
Nuoc mam
Salted, dried and smoked fish 
Fish oil and meal 
Fresh fish




Economiaue du Vietnam No. 10. (Saigon: October,1952), p. 521.
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The most intensive commercial fishing in Indochina is carried on 
in the Great Lake of Cambodia where some 30,000 persons are engaged in 
conmercial fishing a body of water only 3>&00 square miles during high- 
water stage and only 1,000 square miles during the low-water stage. 
Production is estimated at about 120,000 metric tons in a normal year, 
with a large percentage of this being caught by the trawling method.
Of this production less than one-half enters the market in the fresh 
state, the remainder is either dried or smoked before it is marketed. 
About 1,500 metric tons of fish oil is prepared annually from fish 
wastes. Fish and its various by-products constitute one of Cambodia*s 
most important sources of income,
A large program is presently underway in South Vietnam to expand 
the raising of fish in the flooded rice fields. Special efforts are 
being made by the Vietnamese government to expand the breeding of the 
* thelipia ’ fish (a rapid-breeding and rapid-growing type of fish which 
thrives exceedingly well in shallow water and flooded rice fields).
On its most ambitious side this program envisions having every rice 
farm family dig a home fish-pond of sufficient size to supply its own 
fish needs. The United States Economic Mission to Indochina has been 
most interested in this program for increasing the production of this 
all-important food item, A total of $355,000 has been set aside by 
American officials for the purpose of helping local farmers defray the 
expenses of constructing home fish ponds, and for the importation of 
additional breeding stock from Thailand and other Asian countries.
Besides fish and fish by-products another important marine industry 
in Indochina is salt. Before World War II Indochina was one of the 
major producers of salt in East Asia. Slightly less than 200,000
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metric tons of salt was produced annually on about 4>100 hectares 
(9,000 acres) of marine salt beds. Table 2 indicates the annual pro­
duction of salt by regions and annual exports.
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1936 29.1 65.1 43.3 51.2 188.7 93.0
1937 27.9 66.4 55.5 43.8 193.6 93.3
1938 35.6 67.1 40.4 35.9 180.0 68.5
1939 25.3 86.1 44.2 57.8 2 23.5 44.2
1940 . 28.0 83.8 83.5 54.0 189.4 20.0
19412/ 316.6 28.0
1942 275.9 7.0
1943 39.0 67.5 51.2 47.5 205.1 —
1944 29.7 50.1 17.7 60.6 158.1 .3
1945 39.0 14.4 18.0 29.7 101.0 —
1946 —- — 14.7 — —
1947 .2 10.2 13.5 17.9 41.3 20.0
1948 1.2 40.5 19.5 4.1 65.4 23.1
1949 113.6 40.31950 81.5 —
1951 103.8
Sources: Annuaire Statistiaue de l’Indochine 1943-46, 1947-48;
Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique d'Outre-Mer 1951,
Bull.etin Statistiaue Mensuel 1950-51J
Bulletin Econonique du Vietnam. No. 10, October 1952.
^  Monopoly salt only.
2 /-/ Production data by state are unavailable for 1941 and 1942 and for 
the years since 1948.
The greater part of this salt was produced by Indochinese using 
a variety of relatively inefficient methods. The remainder was produced 
by one large French salt-producing corporation or ’monopoly* producing 
primarily for export. Success of the operation of this large corporation 
with salt beds in southern Annam offers an example of modern technology
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successfully applied to a native industry resulting in more efficient 
production and better quality of the product.
Salt production from sea water is carried on in three areas. One 
of these areas is in North Annam, but because of the excessive humidity 
and precipitation and the pollution effect of numerous streams and 
rivers the operations are confined to small plots and the production 
is all consumed locally. In Cochinchina there are two 3alt fields 
which produce over one-half all the salt in Indochina. However, In 
this area humidity, precipitation, and pollution of the coastal water 
also hamper efficient operations. The most productive operations are 
carried in in the southern coast of Annam. It is In this area that 
the large French corporation mentioned above is located on a 360- 
hectare tract (300 acres) and produces the highest quality salt in 
Indochina by employing the pure "solar" process. With the exception 
of the salt produced by this French corporation, all salt in Indochina 
is subject to government monopoly in its sales.
There i3 no salt refining industry in Indochina. The natives use 
raw salt for human consumption and in salting fish. The small amount 
of refined salt used in the country is all imported from France. As 
Table 2 indicates, a large percentage of the raw salt produced in 
Indochina is exported, with almost the entire exports going to Japan 
before World War II. Due to insecurity and abandonment of many salt 
beds during the recent internal hostilities production has decreased 
considerably. With the reestablishment of peaceful conditions pro­
duction will probably return to pre-war level in the near future.
Foreat Resources
Of the total land area In Indochina, about 74 percent is classi­
fied as forest land. However, only about half of this may be 
considered true forest; the remainder is largely savanna and brushland. 
Rich forests (those supporting a volume of timber of more than 300 
cubic meters per hectare,^ one-third of which is composed of highest- 
grade timber) cover only about 17 percent of the true forest lands; 
another 20 percent may be termed definitely inferior (supporting a 
volume of only 100 to 150 cubic meters per hectare, a very small pro­
portion of which is high-grade timber). The bulk of the forests are 
intermediate in character from the standpoint of volume of timber and 
grade.
Although the trees of the savanna forest lands are generally 
small, a high proportion are suitable for certain industrial and 
manufacturing needs. These rich savannas support a volume density of 
100 to 150 cubic meters per hectare. Inferior types contain less than 
100 cubic meters of firewood per hectare. Other forests and savanna 
lands contain only brush and bamboo. Differences in the definition 
of the term ’forest* probably account for differences in the estimates 
of the total forested area of the country, which vary from 74 million 
acres (about 40 percent of the total area of the country), to over 104 
million acres (about 57 percent). In general, however, It can be said 
that the rich and average forests plus the better savannas comprise 
about 57 percent of the total land area while the poor forests and 
savannas account for about 17 percent.
13One cubic meter of timber contains 424 board feet.
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Table 3 indicates the forested area by state in 1940 (no later 
figures are available), as well as the amount included in the forest 
reserves, and the output of the principal forest products* It will 
be noted that almost half of the forested area is in Loas, the least 
populated state, but that the total amount of forest that has been 
placed in reserves is negligible* Only a small part of the forests 
of Indochina, chiefly the inaccessable areas, is genuine virgin forest.
A government forestry service was established in 1901 for the 
purpose of supervising timber cutting and preventing the further deple­
tion of the forests through wasteful cutting methods. In 1942, the 
conservation and improvement of Indochina's forest resources was placed 
under the supervision and responsibility of the Director General of 
the Forests and Waters Service within the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Apparently this agency has not been too successful in its task. It 
has been criticized as being little more than another fiscal agent 
concerned primarily with taxing the lumber coming into the consumption 
centers from the interior.
The most pressing problem facing forestry officials has been the 
constant depletion and deterioration of the many useful forests and 
wood species. Uncontrolled timber cutting has denuded large stands in 
the upland border’s of the delta plains. In addition, the destructive 
method of shifting cultivation, or "ray", also has devastated large 
portions of fine tropical forests, giving rise to dense woodlands over 
large areas but all without any valuable species remaining. Today, 
many of Indochina's forests are virtually exhausted and soil erosion 
has become a serious matter in some areas. It is in an effort to 
control the wasteful exploitation methods that the Forest Service has
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^  1 stere » 35.31658 cu. ft.
■=/ 1 metric ton * 2.2046 pounds.
<2/ The total production of Annam and Laos was 2,000 metric tons.
Source: Annuaire Statistique de P Indochine. 1939-40, p. 87.
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recently established large, protected forest reserves throughout the 
country. However, wasteful cutting practices continue and shifting 
cultivation in the mountain areas has not diminished to any great 
extent.
All of the 13.5 million hectares of forest in Vietnam are owned 
by the government and administered by the Forest Service. Two con­
cessions of about 30,000 hectares each were granted about 30 years 
ago. These two concessions furnish the logs for the largest sawmill 
in Indochina. Of the 14.6 million hectares of forests on Laos, 14 
million hectares are owned by the government and 600,000 hectares 
constitute the Royal Domain. The concession to exploit the Royal 
Domain has been granted to a French firm which has the exclusive right 
to cut timber in that area.
As a consumption item, bamboo is utilized to a much greater extent 
than dimensional lumber by the Indochinese. The reason for this is 
that bamboo poles suffice for the construction of straw huts, are more 
easily transported and cut to desired lengths, and cost less than 
lumber. It has been estimated that the per capita consumption of 
lumber in France is 19 times more than in Indochina."^ The high cost 
of lumber compared with bamboo in the population centers of Indochina 
is due primarily to the fact that facilities for transporting timber 
from the forest areas to the milling and consuming centers are for the 
most part undeveloped. Another factor is that only a very small portion 
of the sawmilling industry is mechanized. It has been estimated by
"^Unpublished report on the Forest Industry of Indochina by 
G. N. Brown, Forestry Expert, United States Operations Mission to 
Indochina.
40
Brown that close to 80 percent of the logs cut into dimensional lumber 
in Indochina is sawed by hand. This results in a low capacity of the 
sawndlling industry and in high-cost lumber even in localities on the 
edge of large forest areas. This is the reason why the output of wood 
for commercial and constructional purposes has always lagged behind 
that of firewood, as is indicated by Table 4. With the exception of
Table 4. Forest Production in Indochina, 1936-52
Constructional
timber Firewood Total
(1.000 cubic meters)— ^
1936 661 1538 2199
193# 872 1834 2756
1940 865 1946 2811
1941 1076 1520 2596
1943 1214 3276 4490
1944 1013 3143 4156
1946 229 1023 1252
1947 203 951 1154
1943 276 1047 1323
1949 253 917 1170
1950 265 1008 1272
1952 685 416 1101
1 cubic meter = 35«34 cubic feet or 424 board feet of lumber.
Sources: Annuaire Stati3tiaue de l tIndochine 1943-46, 1947-48J
Bulletin Mensuel Statistiaue 1950-51J George N. Brown, 
op. cit.
one rather large sawmill located near the city of Saigon and the teak 
wood exploitation in Laos (both operated by French), most mechanical 
sawmills in Indochina are owned and operated by Chinese. For the most 
part, sawmills owned and operated by Indochinese are not mechanized, 
and generally consist simply of a few blocks and lift jacks (either 
under a grass shed or in the open) and several workers with hand saws
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working on the same log. Output per man under these primitive con­
ditions is extremely low. Actually these native wood sawing operations 
are not sawmills in the true concept of the term but are given the 
classification of "saw-pits" in lumbering terminology.
Mineral Resources and the Mining Industry
Indochina has a great variety of mineral resources, among which 
coal, tin, zinc, tungsten, gold, and precious stones are the most 
important. Most of these minerals were prospected by the Annamese and 
Chinese before French occupation, but production has been of a con­
siderable amount only during the past half-century. Except the coal 
deposits, most of these minerals are located in the mountainous areas, 
and the impenetrable nature of the interior, unhealthy climatic con­
ditions, and poor communication facilities have hampered extensive 
development of these resources.
For a number of years prior to World War II exploitation of mineral 
resources, except for coal, was largely confined to small-scale operations 
carried on for the benefit of France rather than as an adjunct to the 
Indochinese economy. Until 1940, mining concessions were entirely in 
French hands, foreigners being prohibited from owning or controlling 
any mining enterprise.
Total production from mines in 1940 was valued at about 30 million 
piasters ($8,000,000 at 1940 exchange rates). Tonkin accounted for 
about five-sixths of that amount; most of the remainder was produced 
in Cambodia and Laos. Coal is by far the most important mineral pro­
duced in Indochina and prior to World War II accounted for about 60 
percent of the total value of all minerals mined in the country.
Table 5 indicates the value of mine production in Indochina, and Table 
6 shows the coal production and exports* Pre-war production of coal 
amounted to about 2.4 million metric tons annually, of which 98 percent
Table 5. Value of Mine Production, Indochina, 1913-48
Year Value
1913


















The very large Increase in piaster value of output during 1948 is 
due more to devaluation of the currency than to increased output of 
mineral products.
Source: Annuaire Statistique de ltIndochine 1943-46, 1947-48, p. 111.
was anthracite. Practically all the coal deposits of the country are 
located in the Hon Gay area north of the city of Haiphong in eastern 
Tonkin. A large portion of these are open-pit deposits and coal reserves 
are estimated at over one billion tons. At the time this area was 
turned over to the communists in 1954 the French had just completed 
installing large quantities of mechanical mining equipment to facilitate







Anthracite : Bituminous and 





1936 2186 2186 913 1725
1937 2264 —  2308 43 2308 808 1550
1938 2280 -- 2276 60 2335 672 1581
1939 2524 10 2534 80 2615 673 1791
1940 Pi,14 86 2500 479 1566
1941 ppy* 79 2327 515 1338
1942 1163 80 1243 249 337
1943 954 66 1020 . 152 180
1944 499 38 537 — 1
1945 218 13 231 —
1946 262 — 262 — —
1947 249 11 260 / 24
1948 359 — 359I/ 25 69
1949 330 376 64 73
1950 495 41 59
In 1948 local consumption amounted to 262,700 tons divided as follows: water and electric! ty- 
42#, manufacturing industries-30#, Marine navigation-13#, railroads-6#.
Sources: Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique D1 outre-Mer 1951: Bulletin Statistique Mensuel 1950-51: 
Annuaire Statistique de 1* Indo-China 1943-4*3. 1947-48, p. 112.
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their mining operations* Since most of Indochina's thermal energy is 
derived from coal, the generating of electricity has always been 
dependent upon production from the coal mines* With the coal mines 
in Communist hands the rest of Indochina is now dependent upon 
foreign sources for its coal supplies.
CHAPTER III
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND COMMUNICATIONS
The economy of Indochina is largely agrarian and industrial 
development is consequently in a relatively infant stage. Next to 
open-strip coal mining in Tonkin mentioned in the previous Chapter, 
cement manufacturing is the most important single industry in the 
country. Production of cement in 1948 amounted to 97,300 metric tons 
as against 266,400 metric tons in 1938, but rose successively to
202,200 tons in 1951, 235,200 tons in 1952 and over 300,000 tons in 
1954, Other industries include two medium-size cotton mills in 
Tonkin, small industrial plants in North and South Vietnam, such as 
ship yards for small crafts, rubber processing and rubber products 
manufacturing (except tires), tire recapping, paint manufacturing, 
shoe making, match manufact tiring, and food processing. In addition 
to the above-mentioned industrial enterprises, cigarette, smoking 
tobacco and cigar manufacturing is a relatively important industry in 
the city of Saigon,
Also relatively important enterprises include a number of small 
breweries making beer and alcohol, sugar refining, native basket work, 
soap making, salt mining, and oxygen and acetylene works. Outside of 
the few industrial enterprises, almost all locally-produced supplies 
and equipment are manufactured in cottage-type industries employing 
less than 10 persons, or in centers where artisans of various trades 
gather to produce their goods and market their products. An important 
industry is represented hy local rice mills, which, before the war,
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were scattered throughout the rice-producing areas of the Tonkin and 
Mekong deltas* Most of the small country rice mills have been 
destroyed by war activities and at present the rice milling enterprises 
are practically all centralized in the cities of Saigon and Pnom Penh.
A more detailed analysis of the rice milling industry is made in 
Chapter VIII.
Principal Industrial and Population Centers
The largest population center of Indochina is Saigon-Cholon with
an estimated two million persons. Hanoi is second in population with
about 300,000 persons* Haiphong, the main seaport in Tonkin, and
located 50 miles from Hanoi, has a population estimated at 200,000
persons, while Pnon Penh, the capital city of Cambodia, numbers about
150,000. Other relatively important centers of population include
Nam Dinh and Haidoung in Tonkin, Hue, Tourane and Nhatrang in Annam,
and Mytho, Cantho and Longxuyen in Cochinchina. In Cambodia, Kompong
Cham and Battambang are also relatively important centers of population.
The most important centers of population in Laos are Vientiane, the
15capital city, Savannakhet and Luang-Prabang.
Manufacturing and Extent of Economic Development
Although the profit motive and French economic gain were probably 
behind most French efforts at industrialization and development of 
Indochina, the fact remains that fifty years ago there were a very
^Annuaire Statistique de ltIndochine. Summary, 1952, pp. 20—31.
small number of industries in the real sense of the word* Most of 
the non-agricultural production was carried on by artisanal workers 
under small sheds using rudimentary production methods and primitive 
hand tools. It has been estimated that the seasonal and permanent 
labor force engaged outside agriculture in all Indochina amounted 
to about one million during that period. A large number of workers 
included in this figure consisted of farm people who worked at different 
trades during the slack period of labor requirement in the rice fields.
It has already been noted that the mining industry was developed under 
French control and supervision at the turn of the century. The rubber 
production and processing industry was also developed by the French 
during the past 30 years. The French are also responsible for 
establishing the first mechanical sawmill in Indochina, as well as the 
first mechanical rice mill. The textile mills in Tonkin, as well as 
the bottling works and breweries and alcohol plants in Saigon, Hanoi, 
Haiphong, Tourane, Pnom Penh and other cities, were all established 
by the French.
Among the rural industries, those connected with the preparation 
of food, such as rice husking, the manufacture of rice paste and cakes, 
starch, oils and molasses, the distillation of alcohol, etc., undoubtedly 
employ the greatest number of workers, but it is difficult to distinguish 
between moral industries working solely for home consumption and those 
producing for sale.
^First Report of the French Modemization Commission. Saigon 
November, 1943, p. 23.
The textile industries probably come next in the number of people 
employed, although there are no reliable statistics available to veriiy 
this statement. Throughout the country there are many primitive looms 
on which women and children weave cloth, which, though coarse, is 
strong and valued highly by Indochinese peasants. A considerable amount 
of silk is still woven by hand on primitive looms. With the textile 
industry may be included embroidery, lace making, the manufacture of 
fishing nets, hammocks, and rope and twine from jute or ramie. Basket 
weaving is likewise a widespread home industry.
Masons, stone cutters, and brick makers are all members of the 
building industry. There are a few village blacksmiths and artisans 
who make copper and brass articles, and cart wheels and plow shares, 
but the average Indochinese peasant uses little metal. Pottery is 
also a special craft in a few localities. These are the traditional 
industries and are found mainly in the Tonkin delta area. In many 
localities these rural and family industries are primarily handicraft 
industries that supplement agriculture and make use of that portion of 
the peasant’s time left after his primary occupation in the fields.
The extractive and mining industries were considered in the
previous chapter under "Natural Resources". The importance and position
of coal mining cannot be too greatly emphasized. Aside from furnishing
Indochina with almost all its thermal energy and accounting for a large
percentage of all industries, it also accounted for the employment of
close to'50,000 natives and about 300 Frenchmen at the outbreak of 
17World War II. After the war the number of workers in the coal mines
17Annuaire Bleu. (Institut de la Statistique due Vietnam, 
Saigon: 1950), p. 21.
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decreased due to decreased volume of production and the fact that the
mines were more fully mechanized with American mining equipment
ISfurnished by American Aid.
Next in importance as a French production and industrial venture 
in Indochina is the rubber industry. The economic situation of the 
rubber industry is treated under a separate heading in Chapter V.
Using primarily labor imported from the Tonkin delta the French are 
responsible for having established this industry second in importance 
only to rice as a source of foreign revenue. The first extensive 
rubber plantings were established during the late 1920*s and early 
1930’s, and immediately prior to World War II the plantations of 
Indochina were employing a total of 70,000 Indochinese. In 1945 the 
number of natives on rubber plantations stood at 60,000 but by 1953 
had decreased to 35,000. The primary reasons for this decrease are:
(1) the production rate decreased during that period and many 
laborers left the plantations to join the rebel array; (2) new plant­
ings were not being undertaken by plantation owners; and (3) many 
other plantations greatly mechanized their operations, thus reducing 
the amount of hand labor required for sustained production.
Undoubtedly, regulations imposed by France and tariff legislation 
favoring special French interests have contributed many of the features 
of Indochina’s present economy, and particularly explain the slow 
development of industries as compared with agriculture. In the ■words
ISSee United States Special Technical and Economic Mission, 
Activity Report through June, 1953, in which it is stated that almost 
two million dollars of U. S. equipment were made available to one 
large coal mining company during the first two years of American Aid 
to Indochina.
50
of one Frenchman of authority ’’the free development of industry has
never been allowed........... even the possibility of such development
19was long considered paradoxical, almost inconceivable". It is quite 
evident that if foreign capital and ingenuity had been allowed to 
freely seek employment in the country, the resources of Indochina would 
have by now attained a greater degree of development and industrilization 
would have at least kept pace with other segments of the economy.
Cotton spinning is another rather important industry carried on 
a reasonably large scale by the French in Indochina. The two spinning 
mills, both located in the Tonkin delta, employed a total of more than 
10,OCX) native men and women and produced an annual output of about 
15*000 tons of cotton cloth and y a m  until it was taken over by 
Communist forces during the early part of 1954.
Cigarette and cigar manufacturing is completely in French hands.
All four cigarette manufacturing plants are located in the city of 
Saigon-Cholon and process an average of 7,000 tons of leaf tobacco 
into cigarettes and cigars annually and employ approximately 1,800 
men and women.
The French have also secured a monopoly in sugar refining. The 
four plants in South Vietnam, all French-owned, process all the refined 
sugar produced in Indochina. There are numerous small, open-kettle 
syrup and sugar mills scattered through the southern part of Indochina, 
however. All of these are owned either by Indochinese (Vietnamese or 
Cambodians) and Chinese. These small sugar mills are of course unable 
to produce refined sugar but are limited to the production of syrup
19Robequain, op. cit., p. 269.
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and very coarse brown sugar most of which is consumed in that state 
by natives, but part of their production is sold to the French 
refineries.
Rice milling is about the only large-scale mechanical industry
in Indochina not dominated by or under the exclusive control of French
nationals. In the field of rice marketing and processing Frenchmen
prefer to concentrate on the wholesale and export phase (since they
have a virtual monopoly on shipping) and appear to have left the field
open for dominance by Chinese. For example, out of 191 rice mills in
operation in the interior provinces of South Vietnam in the fall of
1952, only two were French-owned, the remainder were in the hands of
Vietnamese and Chinese. In the city of Saigon-Cholon during this same
period there were a total of 41 rice mills in operation. Of this
number 31 were Chinese—owned, seven were owned by Vietnamese and only
20three were in French hands. In Cambodia, another center of rice 
milling, during the spring of 1953 there was a total of 108 rice 
mills in operation. However, most of these were small, huller-type 
rice mills with a capacity of less than 1,000 pounds of paddy per 
hour. Of the six rice mills with a capacity of 20 tons per hour or 
more, four were owned by one French firm and the other two by Chinese.
Interlocking Directorship. A very particular feature of French 
firms engaged in business and commercial and industrial activities in 
Indochina is that of interlocking directorships* It is very seldom 
that one large commercial establishment is engaged only in one or two
20Bulletin Economique du Vietnam No. 10. Saigon: October,
1952, p. 511-514.
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fields of activities, or that one fairly large industrial and/or manu­
facturing plant is owned by one single firm. Though it is not generally 
known by the public, the management of one of the largest conmercial 
establishments in Indochina once admitted to the writer that his firm 
was holding both financial and management interests in rice mills, 
sugar mills, vegetable oil refining, bottling works and a glass factory, 
ice plants and breweries, in addition to being one of the largest import 
and export establishments in the French Empire, and also the owner of 
a large part of the shipping sailing under the French flag* Another 
example could be cited of a group of large rubber plantations having 
as members of the board of directors the managers of an import-export 
firm, a cigarette manufacturing plant, a salt mine, a rice milling com­
pany, and a petroleum company* Probably the only exception to this 
sort of arrangement among the larger French enterprises in Indochina 
is the cotton spinning and weaving industry, which, as far as can be 
ascertained, is under independent ownership and directorship.
Commercial Development
The basic unit of currency of Indochina is the piaster of 100 
centimes. The parity of the piaster is tied to the French Franc.
Since 1953 the parity between the two currencies has been fixed by 
mutual agreement by the governments of France and the Indochinese at 
the ratio of 10 French francs to one Indochinese piaster. Exchange 
rates between the piaster and other currencies are based on the Paris 
official market franc rate, presently fixed at 348 francs to the United 
States dollar. Calculated at this rate one United States dollar equals 
34*8 piasters* However, like most currencies in the world, there is
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usually a large difference between this official rate and the free, or 
open—market rate of exchange for the United States dollar; recent free, 
or open-market rates for the Indochinese piaster have varied between 
70 and 80 for one United States dollar. Foreign trade of Indochina 
is conducted at the official rate instead of the averages between the 
official and the free rates. Exchange transactions are closely con­
trolled and U, S, dollar exchange is granted only for the purchase of 
items deemed essential by the Indochinese government for the economic 
requirements and rehabilitation of the country.
French expansion in Indochina was made possible only by the
entrance and circulation of capital. According to Robequain, the
major portion of these funds was raised within the country in the form
21of taxes and duties, or as loans almost entirely subscribed in France.
All the budgets, both national and local, are financed this way. Private 
business, on the other hand, had to find new capital, occasionally 
within the count ty but more generally in France. It appears that 
foreign capital (non-French), with the exception of Chinese capital, 
has formed a very small percentage of the capital investment in Indochina.
The period immediately following World War I is the one in which 
French investments in Indochina were at their highest level. In the 
seven years, from 1924 to 1930 French companies operating in Indochina 
floated loans totaling slightly more than 3.3 billion francs. This is 
the period during which French business men became actively engaged in
Capital Accumulation and the Banking System
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carving our rubber plantations out of the jungle, and the tempo of 
activities is reflected in the fact that about one-third of the loans 
made during that period were in the field of agriculture. This was 
also a period of great development of the Hongay coal mines and of
In 193^ an equivalent of 464 million dollars were invested in
Indochina, of which 382 millions were in business enterprises. Western
capital (95 percent French) amounted to 302 million dollars, and
Chinese capital 80 millions. More than one-third of the French capital
was invested in agriculture, the remainder in processing industries,
mining, trade and banking. Most of French agricultural investment
represents investments in rubber plantation which, before the war was
23estimated at 45 million dollars.
.rivate capital, therefore, whether obtained through loans, or 
capital subscription by private investors, can be said to have played 
a leading role in the commercial and economic development of Indochina 
to its present level. Both the size and the form which investment will 
take in the future will probably be closely linked up with monetary, 
economic and political problems which cannot be solved by private 
initiative alone. Having passed through periods characterized first 
by agricultural endeavors and then by the capitalists, Indochina*s 
development in the future may well be marked by ever-increasing govern­
ment intervention, especially in the field of credit, monetary controls
the building and allied industries. 22
^Helmut G. Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia. (New 




There are eight banking corporations operating in Indochina, 
with offices in the principal cities. French, Chinese, Indian, and 
British interests predominate in the banking business of the country.
The central bank for all the three states is the Institute d ,Emmission. 
which, as the name indicates, is the Bank of Issue for all of Indochina. 
This bank of issue was created in 1952 for the purpose of taking over 
the functions of (l) issuing bank and Treasury notes, (2) supervise 
foreign exchange control, (3) acting as a depository for the National 
Treasury and the various public and governmental offices, and (4) 
making loans and advances to the National Treasury against its short­
term bond issues which are guaranteed by the Institute and sold to 
the banks locally.
The amount.of money in circulation in Indochina has increased 
at a tremendous rate since 1940 when 280 million piasters were in 
circulation. (During that year the official rate of exchange was 3.5 
piasters to one U. S. dollar). In 1948 the amount of money in circula­
tion amounted to 3.2 billion piasters, and by the spring of 1954 this
25had increased to 8.5 billion piasters.
It appears that the general level of prices kept pace with the 
presses printing the currency. The government Bureau of Statistics 
publishes monthly and annual indices of wholesale and retail prices of 
both industrial and consumption goods, as well as price indices of
^*The role of credit and the credit system as related to agri­
cultural enterprises is treated more extensively in Chapter X.
25Annuaire Bleu, op. cit.. p. 3«
imported and local goods. The Bureau also publishes monthly and annual
indices on the cost-of-living for both Europeans and natives. Based
upon prices in 1939 as 100, the index of wholesale prices in 1951 was
2,450; the index of food items consumed by natives was 4,280, and
26the index of food items consumed by Europeans was 4,350. It appears 
that the level of prices in metropolitan France just about kept pace 
with inflation in Indochina. The same source indicates the general 
level of wholesale prices in France stood at 2,525 at the end of 1951. 
Table 7 shows the general movement of prices in Indochina for selected 
years since 1939.
27Foreign Trade: Imports and Exports
Indochina is primarily an exporter of raw materials and an importer 
of manufacturer goods. The foreign trade of the country has been 
characterized by a substantial excess of imports over exports, by an 
increasing tendency for imports to rise appreciably and for exports to 
remain stable or fall slightly in recent years.
The value of Indochina's exports in 1952 amounted to over 4 billion 
piasters (117 mi]lion dollars). Three agricultural commodities accounted 
for 71 percent of the total, distributed as follows: rubber, 36 percent;
rice, 33 percent; and com, 2 percent. Other exports in order of
26Tableau de l1Evolution des Prix en Indochine. Bureau de la 
Statistique, 1952.
27Data used in this section were obtained mostly from the 
following documents: (l) Etudes et Documents. Institut d'Emission,
No. 4, December, 1953, (2) Summary of Basic Economic Information.
American Embassy, Saigon, July, 1953.
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Table 7. Prices and Indices of Prices in Cochinchina for Selected 
Years. (1939 - 100)
: 1929 : 
« • 1939 i 1949 ■ ! 1950 • I 1951 •
Wholesale Prices in Saigon
General index 94 100 2,100 2,070 2,450
Local products 74 100 2,100 1,960 2,390
Imported products 
Family Consumption Items
116 100 2,090 2,100 2,480
European
General index 104 100 2,880 3,n o 3,590
Index of food items 87 100 3,910 3,780 4,350
Vietnamese (working class)
General index 103 100 4,130 4,230 4,770
Index of food items
Prices of Selected Products in 
Saigon (Piasters pr 100 kg)
103 100 4,130 3,940 4,280
Paddy
Milled rice (No. 1, 25%
7.1 5.6 168 144 155
broken)
Milled rice (No. 2, k0%
11.6 9.3 262 220 232
broken) 11.1 8.6 237 203 220
C o m
Index of Wholesale Prices 
in France
6.9 7.8 217 126 147
General index 89 100 1,826 2,063 2,525
Food products SB 100 1,702 1,823 2,037
Industrial products 89 100 1,922 2,265 3,050
Source: Tableau de l'Evolution des Prix en Cochlnchine. Bureau de la
Statistique, 1952.
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importance were feathers, coal, hides, and skins, pepper, kapok, and 
dried vegetables. Metric tonnage of some of the leading conmodities 
exported in 1952 are as follows; with annual pre-war averages shown 
in parentheses: rice, 245,000 (1.5 million; rubber, 63,000 (60,000);
com, 28,000 (500,000); pepper, 550 (5,000); coal, 213,000 (1.6 million). 
The chief countries of destination with percentages of the total value 
of exports taken by each, in 1952, were as follows: France, 30.3J
Hong Kong, 12.75 United States, 10.6; Singapore, 9*4; and Indonesia,
8.5.
Total imports during 1952 were valued at 15.7 billion piasters 
(449 million dollars) resulting in an unfavorable balance of trade 
amounting to 11.6 billion piasters (333 million dollars), or a little 
less than twice the deficit of 1951 of 170 million dollars, compared 
with 40 million dollars in 1937. The chief items imported in 1952, 
in order of importance, were: cotton and other textiles, metal goods,
machinery, iron and steel, automobiles and motor accessories, 
pharmaceuticals, wines and liquors, sugar, silk products, electrical 
equipment and appliances, and paper and rubber products. France is by 
far the leading supplier of goods imported in Indochina, with 78 percent 
of total imports during 1952 origination in that country; the United 
States supplied only 5 percent of Indochina’s imports that year.
In 1939 and 1940, an export excess of 100 and 190 million piasters 
(28 and 54 million dollars) respectively, was achieved, while the average 
during the 1930’s was only about 60 million piasters (17 million dollars). 
Even this considerable export excess, however, was normally not sufficient 
to cover the annual transfers of commercial profits into French francs 
(averaging about 700 million francs, or 70 million piasters). For
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several years this resulted in a deficit in the balance of payments
and not until an excess of exports of about one billion francs was
reached in 1937 did & surplus in the balance of payments appear for
the first time. Payments were balanced by new capital imports, since
the heavy transfers of profit prohibited the accumulation of capital
in Indochina. Callis concludes that the development of Indochina has
been characterized by increasing indebtedness, with little organic
28growth of capital equipment.
The Labor Market: Employment and Working Conditions
In a country such as Indochina, the position of the laboring 
class is conditioned mainly by the general low level of living of that 
part of the population engaged in agriculture. Improvements through 
labor legislation can be obtained only when social conditions in general 
are improved at the same time. In Indochina, the problem of labor is 
not alone the uneven distribution of the population; the demand for 
labor on the rubber plantations in the South create yet another special 
problem.
In the previous chapter mention was made of the approximate number 
of workers employed in the various industries of Indochina. With the 
exception of workers on the rubber plantations, the Indochinese laborers 
live in the cities and towns where their employment is located. They 
work regular hours and receive a definite rate of pay for their work.
In most industries the usual number of hours of work is 10 hours per
2^Callis, op. cit., p. 84.
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day, six days per week* Although there is a minimum wage law and standard
work week, social legislation is not enforced* The general level of
wages for both unskilled and skilled laborers is low compared with western
standards* During 1948, the last year for which reliable statistics
are available, the average rate of pay for unskilled men workers was
16 piasters per day, and for women, 11 piasters. The average rate of
pay for skilled laborers was 18*4 piasters per day during the same 
29year* The official exchange rate of the Indochinese piaster during 
1948 was 17 piasters for one United States dollar, which would indicate 
that unskilled men workers received about ninety cents per 10-hour 
day, women 68 cents, and skilled workers about $1.09* However, it 
must be remembered that the free rate of the piaster vis-a-vis the 
U. S* dollar during that year was about 40 piasters to the dollar, which 
means that the purchasing power of the piasters received for ten hours 
of work amounted to about 40 cents for unskilled men workers, 30 cents 
for women workers, and 46 cents for skilled workers.
There is in Indochina a Labor Inspection Service whose main function 
is to arbitrate in labor disputes, but siding more often with the 
employer than with the employee. During 1948 there were a total of 
696 individual work stoppages, of which 573 cases were settled by the 
Labor Inspection Service and 123 settled by a special Conciliation 
Commission. During the same year there were also a total of 57 work 
stoppages by groups of workers. Forty-two of these were settled by 
the Labor Inspection Service and the remaining 15 were settled by the
29Annuaire Statistique de L’Indochine, 1947-48, pp. 253-259.
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Conciliation Commission. The unionization of labor has not made much 
progress in Indochina.
The use of 'contract labor' is still the rule on most large rubber 
plantations. Most of the workers hired on contracts on the plantations 
were recruited in the Tonkin delta where an excess supply of labor has 
existed for centuries. At first the government administration did not 
enter into the labor recruiting business, with the result that planta­
tion owners used special hiring agents who were paid so much per laborer 
recruited. Thompson reports that the majority of these hiring agents 
were unscrupulous, made gross misrepresentation of the hiring contracts
and, in many cases, used drugs in getting the coolies to submit to
30conditions which were virtually three years of forced slavery.
Special legislation passed in the late 1930's resulted in improvements 
in the methods used in hiring and also in the conditions under which 
plantation laborers worked and lived. Supervision of hirings was 
placed in the hands of civil administrative authorities, and contracts 
had to guarantee a minimum of well-being to the laborer! such as three 
years employment, ten hours daily work, rest periods, stipulated wage 
rates, provisions for dependents, suitable housing, food rations, and 
a compulsory deferred pay system (5 percent wage deduction) designed 
to encourage savings.
Camus estimates that at the peak of activities, in 1939 > rubber 
plantations afforded the livlihood for a total of 140,000 men, women 
and children, and that the value of salaries paid and food furnished
30Virginia Thompson, labor Conditions in Indochina, (New York: 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945)} p. 153•
represented probably 25 percent of the total wages paid labor in 
Indochina.^  Working and living conditions have materially improved 
during the past decade. Sanitary conditions have been imp roved, free 
medical care and hospitalization is provided on most plantations, 
adequate housing for the laborer and his family is furnished and the 
free food ration now include meat and fish, fresh vegetables, salt, 
tea, and ’nuoc mam* (fish paste). Free schooling for dependents and 
churches or pagodas are also provided on most plantations. In addi­
tion, recreation facilities and village markets with controlled retail 
prices are also provided. Contracts also stipulate that free trans­
portation for the worker and dependents to their original village will 
be provided at termination of the contract. As result of these improve­
ments turnover of contract labor on rubber plantations has greatly 
decreased during the past few years. Notwithstanding the number of 
laborers who left the plantations to join the guerillas during the 
early part of rebel activities, it is estimated that about 70 percent 
of the workers renewed their contracts at the end of the first three 
years period, and some workers have remained voluntairly on the same
OOplantation for twenty or more years. More recently, It appears that 
one of the greatest drawback to keeping contract laborers (most of 
which are Tonkinese) on the plantations for a long period of time is 
the changed environments in which the laborer finds himself on the 
plantations. Robequain concludes that miserable as his life in the
31J. J. Camus, L10euvre Humaine et So dale dans les Plantations 
de Caoutchouc d1Indochina. (Saigon: 19497, p. 1.
^^Camus, op. cit., p. 6.
north was, the Tonkinese on the rubber plantation is still home-sick
for his native village. The dicipline of the plantation depresses
him. He cannot get used to the forests and hills which hem him in 
33from all sides. In many cases the Tonkinese laborer seems to be 
the victim of his own shiftlessness.
Transportation and Communication
Probably the greatest mark that will be left by the French in 
the development of Indochina will be the progress made in the field 
of transportation and comnunication during the past few decades. As 
noted in Chapter II, through French initiative and under French super­
vision great progress has been made in digging canals to drain rice 
lands and irrigate other areas, with the result that the present rather 
extensive system of canals in the delta areas of Indochina affords a 
means of communication and transportation in the interior provinces which 
was not available before the canals were dug.
However, results of French efforts go far beyond the existing 
canals. On the eve of World War II there was a total of over 33,000 
kilometers of hard-surfaced (asphalt) roads; although there is not a 
single mile of concrete road in all of Indochina. Close to 15,000 
kilometers consisted of gravel roads, and the remainder, or approximately
13,000 kilometers, were dirt roads. It should be kept in mind that at 
the turn of the century Indochina was without any improved roads in the 
true sense of the word. Although the road surfaces and the road beds 
are not up to United States standards, carving out the right-of-ways
Robequain, op. cit., p. 218.
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and the road beds out of jungle forests, mountainous areas and low, 
swampy land usually called for a large amount of effort*
Ten years of war resulted in the destruction of a large percentage 
of the road mileage in Indochina. Lack of security prevented proper 
maintenance and repairs in many areas, especially in North and Central 
Vietnam and in Laos. In addition, demolition of bridges by the Communist 
rebels was so extensive that very few of the numerous bridges remained 
intact. It has been estimated that a total of 13,000 of the 33*000 
kilometers of roads in existence at the beginning of the war were unfit 
for automobile travel in 1950. A great road rebuilding and bridge 
repair program is now underway in Indochina, with most of the asphalt, 
steel and concrete being furnished by the United States under the 
foreign aid program.
Under the French control and administration a total of over 3*000 
kilometers (1,800 miles) of railroad was built in Indochina; about 
400 kilometers of which consists of a rail line from the city of Pnom 
Penh to the border of Thailand to the west. In Vietnam the French 
extended a railroad from the banks of the Mekong river in the south to 
the border of China in the north, thus linking the two most important 
deltas and regions of Indochina. It has been stated that "there was a 
wholly understandable ambition on the part of the French to use rail 
transportation to attract as much as possible of the trade of South 
China.^ There is little doubt that the interest of France and of 
French enterprises were given first consideration in the construction 
of the single railroad the whole length of the eastern seaboard.
However, the fact remains that the railroad was constructed through
exceedingly rough terrain, necessitating many excavations, tunnels,
and numerous bridges. The first railroad was constructed in 1890 and
the linking of the southern line and the one from the north was not
accomplished until 1936, or 40 years later. Most of the work of building
the railroad, as is still the case in building roads and highways, was
done by hand. Robequain cites a case of 60,000 laborers working at
one time on a single section of the rail line in the north close to
35the Chinese border. ^
The operation of the railroads in Indochina is under government 
control and direction. Guerrilla activities during the past few years 
resulted in the destruction of about one-third of the total railroad 
mileage. At the end of 194& only 1,300 kilometers of railroad remained 
in operation. Throughout the period of 1950 to 1954 railroad traffic 
was possible only with armored cars, and every train was preceded by a 
pilot locomotive to test the bridges ahead for mines. Throughout the 
area controlled by the guerrillas in the north and central part of 
Vietnam most of the rails were removed and the metal used by them for 
ammunition. The same use was made of the steel ties in those areas 
(the French have an aversion to utilizing wood ties on railroad beds). 
This gives some indication of the tremendous rebuilding job to be done 
in Indochina to bring the roads and railroads to the same condition 
that existed before the war.
35Robequain, op. cit.. p. 91.
Inland Waterways
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With the numerous rivers and smaller streams in the country, and 
the network of canals dug throughout both the Mekong and Red River 
deltas, Indochina had a very efficient system of inland waterways in 
prewar days* Mention has already been made of the importance of this 
inland waterway system in the development of the interior section of 
Cochinchina* During the war activities, however, the rebels, in their 
effort to block military and civilian traffic on the canals and smaller 
streams, erected numerous barriers across those waterways* In addition, 
the fast military craft operating up and down the canals caused a 
large percentage of the canal banks to wash away* This, and the fact 
that the barriers built by the rebels prevented the usual flow of 
current in many canals, resulted in heavy silting* Thus, many of the 
inland waterways are badly in need of dredging and repair before the 
larger sampans and river boats can safely navigate them.
Ocean and Coastwise Transportation
There are no free zones or ports in Indochina. The two principal 
ports are Saigon in the south and Haiphong in the north. Other important 
coastal ports in Vietnam are Hongay, Bangoi, Tourane and Nhatrang. In 
Cambodia the most important port is Pnom Penh on the Mekong River.
Another port in Cambodia, but of secondary importance, is Kampot which 
is located on the Gulf of Thailand in the southern part of Cambodia. 
Saigon is by far the most important port, handling 1,116 steamship 
cargoes in 1952 totaling approximately 1.5 million tons. In the same 
year Haiphong handled 500,000 metric tons. Whereas the Chinese
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predominate the inland or river shipping, the coastal shipping is 
almost exclusively a French monopoly. Normally about one third of the 
ocean-going ships calling at Indochinese ports are of French registry#
During 1950, for example, out of 731 ships entering the port of Saigon
36a total of 474 were French.
Air Transportation
Both external and internal aviation activities have increased
considerably during the past few years; the latter primarily because
of lack of security on highways, railways and internal waterways. As
a result, regular air service is provided between all of the principal
cities and population centers by one or more of the five air transport
companies operating in Indochina. A large number of airports and
runways built by the French for Army Air Force use are also opened to
civilian air traffic.
The extent of internal air traffic is indicated by citing statistics
for the year 1950— considered an average year since 194®. In that year
there were a total of 31*710 internal commercial civilian flights in
Vietnam alone. These flights carried a total of 276,800 passengers and
30,140 metric tons of freight. Total passenger or freight mileage is
not available. During that same year there were a total of 1,623
international flights in and out of Vietnam, carrying 30,000 passengers
37and 2,300 metric tons of freight.
Bulletin Economique du Vietnam. Etudes et Documents. No. 
Saigon, December, 1953.
37Annuaire Bleu, op. cit., p. 10.
Tele-Communlcat!on Facilities
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While there are telephone exchanges and inter-urban conmunications 
in the larger cities of Indochina and their immediate surroundings> all 
inter-city and foreign communication is by radio. A government organi­
zation in each of the three states operates the telephonic, radio, and 
telegraphic networks of Indochina. Outside of the larger population 
centers, tele-communication is not very extensively developed. There 
are about 8,500 telephone subscribers in Indochina today, compared with
5,000 in 19k& and 10,000 in 1939.
CHAPTER IV
POPULATION AND LIVING CONDITIONS
There has never been a really satisfactory census taken of the 
population in Indochina. Best estimates place the present total 
population at about 28 million people with 22.6 million people in 
Vietnam, 1.6 million in Laos and 3.5 million in Cambodia. There are 
approximately 9.8 million people in North Vietnam (commonly referred 
to as Tonkin), 7.2 million in Central Vietnam (the former Annamite 
Empire) and approximately 5.6 million in South Vietnam (formerly known 
as Cochinchina).
Distribution Patterns and Population Density
It is estimated that over 80 percent of the population live on 
slightly less than 13 percent of the total land area. Population data 
available are sufficient to show the extremely uneven distribution of 
the population. The most heavily populated areas are the alluvial 
plains close to the sea. These areas are:
(l) The Red River delta, 5>790 square miles, with 7.5 
million people or 1,295 per square milej (2) the coastal plains of 
Central Vietnam, 5,790 square miles, with 4.6 million people or 795 
per square mile; (3) Central Cochinchina, 6,180 square miles, with 
3*2 million people or 520 per square mile; (4) Western Cochinchina, 
7,720 square miles, with one million people or 130 per square mile;
(5) Southern Cambodia, 12,350 square miles, 2.4 million people or 195 
per square mile. The towns and cities are included in these figures.
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As is indicated by Table 8 the rest of the country also shows 
significant differences in population densities. Large areas of Laos, 
Northern Cambodia, and the hilly and mountainous areas of Central 
Vietnam are virtually unpopulated. On the other hand, parts of the 
Red River delta are among the most densely populated agricultural 
areas of the world, having a population density of over 3*000 people 
per square mile.
Population Movements t Internal Migration
The growing population of Indochina includes a great number of
ethnic groups which are also very unevenly distributed. Of the total
population, the Annamites are by far the largest number, representing
38about 72 percent of the population. About one-half of the Annamites 
live in the Tonkin delta, the rest of them in Annam and Cochinchina 
and a few in Cambodia and Laos. In Vietnam they amount to about 88 
percent of the population, whereas in Cambodia and Laos they represent 
only six and three percent of the population respectively. The 
Cambodians are the second most numerous ethnic group in Indochina, 
representing 12 percent of the total population.
Of the remaining 14 percent of the population, about 2 percent 
are foreigners and 12 percent other natives of a great many ethnic 
groups. Most numerous among them are the Thai who represent about 6 
percent of the population and are divided about equally between Laos
^T)ata on population movement and migration are obtained for 
the most part from the Annuaire Statistiaue de lfIndochine. 1947-1948, 
pp. 19-30, and from Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in Indochina, pp. 
47-73.
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Table 3. Area, population and population density in Indochina by state, 
1946





tAverage oftMost densely:Least densely 
: entire : populated . : populated 
s state : province^/ : source
1,000 
sq. mi. Thousands - ---- People per square mile--- —
Tonkin (North 
Vietnam)1/ 44.7 9,851 220 3,193 3
Annam (Central 
Vietnam)1/ 57.3 7,134 124 2,973 10
Cochinchina (South 
Vietnam) 24.7 5,579 226 1,116 13
Total Vietnam 127.2 22,614 178 3,193 3
Cambodia 53.7^ 3,227 60 350 3
Laos 91.4^ 1,139^/ 13 23 5
Total Indochina 272.3^ 27,030^ 99 3,193 3
^  1943 figures for Tonkin and Annam.
Does not include cities.
3/^  Not including the territory ceded to Siam in 1943 and returned after 
the war.
^  Not including the population of the territory ceded to Siam in 1943 
and returned after the war.
Source: Annuaire Statistiaue de ltIndochine< 1943-46, pp. 27-23.
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and Tonkin. This ethnic group make up about 56 percent of the total 
population of Laos. Another important ethnic group is the Moi who 
live mostly in the plateau areas of South Annam and Laos; they represent 
about 4.5 percent of the population.
The largest group among the foreigners is the Chinese who number 
about 610,000. The majority of these reside in the city of Saigon- 
Cholon which has about 320,000. The Chinese population in Cambodia 
numbers about 144*000. The importance of the Chinese in the economy 
of Indochina far exceeds their numerical strength. In fact they have 
a firm hold on a large segment of the country’s econony, and form somewhat 
of a link between the native population and the French. The typical 
Chinese in Indochina is the merchant, primarily rice merchant, although 
upon first entering the country he may engage as a laborer or enter in 
some special type of agricultural enterprise, such as peppery-growing 
in Cambodia. In his profession as a rice merchant he is able to exploit 
the native’s perennial need for credit and lack of capital.
Through his connections as a merchant, the typical Chinese in 
Indochina probably makes as much or greater profits through lending 
money at usurious rates of interest as he does in his rice merchandising 
business. Although hi3 tactics are resented by most natives, the 
Chinese is rather admired by them for his success; furthermore, he is 
usually able and willing to grant a loan to a peasant when no one else 
will.
Another important group of foreigners in Indochina is the Hindu, 
or British Indiana, as they are sometimes referred to. They number 
about 6,000, of which about 300 are in Cambodia, 200 in Tonkin and the 
remainder, or 2,500, reside in South Vietnam. A large percentage of
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them are engaged in the retail trade, usually specializing in dry 
goods retailing. However, they also engage in short-term money lending, 
and in certain areas give the Chinese stiff competition in this field. 
These Indian money lenders are called ’Chettyar’ by the natives. The 
majority of them concentrate their money-lending activities in the rural 
areas and they usually lend money on harsher terms than the Chinese,
For this reason they are probably disliked more by the farming population 
than are the Chinese,
Migration of Asians into Indochina is still quite heavy. In the 
year 1943 a total of 45,000 Chinese entered the country. The number of 
Indians coming in that same year was slightly over 400, Migration into 
South Vietnam has been heavier than into other parts of Indochina in 
recent years. However, there has no doubt been quite heavy migration 
of Chinese into the Tonkin area during the past few months since the 
Communists took control of that part of Vietnam,
At the beginning of 1949 there was a total of 71,000 French nationals 
in Indochina, of which about 6,000 were ’assimilees* or Eurasians who 
enjoyed full French citizenship privileges. About 22,000 resided in 
the immediate vicinity of Saigon, 10,000 were in Tonkin, and about 5,000 
in Cambodia, These figures do not include members of the armed forces. 
French nationals have been leaving Indochina for metropolitan France 
in great numbers during the past year or two, and, although no reliable 
statistics are available for verification, the present number is probably 
only 60 percent of what it was in 1949. Very few Frenchmen remained in 
North Vietnam following the partioning of the country in 1954.
Land-Man and Rural-Urban Ratios
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The people of Indochina, the vast majority of whom are peasants, 
maintain a high population density in some rural areas only by intensive 
use of the land* Therefore, climate, soil, and agricultural practices 
play a great part in the pattern of distribution of the population. It 
is conmonly agreed that a further important factor determining population 
distribution is the prevalence of malaria in most of the hilly and 
mountainous regions.
For the country as a whole, population density, being slightly 
under 100 per square mile, does not appear to be a problem of great 
significance until one makes an analysis of the pattern of distribution. 
The fact that 30 percent of the total population lives on less than 
13 percent of the total land area, and that between 80 and 90 percent
of the people are farmers greatly intensifies the pressure of the
population upon the land in varying degrees in certain areas.
In the Tonkin delta the population problem is very serious. In 
the rural areas, population densities of more than 1,900 persons per 
square mile are not uncommon, and even higher densities than that are 
encountered in some provinces, such as Hadong with 2,900, Yenbay with
3,000, and in Quang Yen with a total of 6,000 inhabitants per square
mile. These figures take on a more meaningful aspect when it is con­
sidered that in the rural provinces of Tonkin about 95 percent of the 
people are engaged in direct agricultural pursuits. Pierre Gourou 
hesitates to apply the term ’excess population' to the rural areas in 
Tonkin but states instead that the agricultural techniques applied on
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39the land in Tonkin require a large farming population. However, the 
fact remains that the normal rice ration in Tonkin is only about 136 
kilograms per capita per year compared with an average of about 250 
kilograms in the rest of Indochina* Problems arising from an excess 
of people on the land also are common in other parts of Indochina, 
especially in the coastal farming areas of central and northern Annam, 
where land holdings are small and the population density is very high*
The pressure of population on the available land is much less in South 
Vietnam, and decreases yet more in Cambodia and Laos* Indochina can 
be cited as a good example of maldistribution of population* While the 
Tonkin delta region passed the saturation point many decades ago, other 
agricultural regions present quite different circumstances*
According to careful abstracts of vital statistics, the annual 
birth rate in the principal cities in Indochina is about AO per thousand, 
while the death rate averages approximately 30 per thousand, indicating 
a rate of population increase of one percent per year.^ No statistical 
information is available which would give an indication of the average 
population increase in the interior, rural areas of the country, but in 
South Vietnam and Cambodia the birth rate is probably higher than in the 
cities and the death rate not higher resulting in a rate of population 
increase probably higher than one percent in those areas* Infant 
mortality is still high but the great number of children spilling out 
of every rural village is an amazement to most foreigners Contrary,
39Gourou, Land Ut.-i nr> in Indochina. p* 276.
^Rapports au Consiel des Interets Economiques et Financieres 
Hanoi, 1938, p* 288.
^See Robequain, op. cit.. p. 47* in which he states that half 
the deaths are of children under 15 and that the mortality rate for in­
fants in their first year averages 20 to 30 percent of the number of births.
the rate of population increase is probably less than average in the 
Tonkin delta area* The birth rate in that region is probably as high 
or higher than in other areas of the country but conditions of famine 
and disease are definite and almost constant checks to further increases 
in population,
Malthus, from his two basic concepts —  "food is necessary for 
the existence of man" and "the power and inclination of man to reproduce 
his kind greatly exceeds his power to produce food" deduced that the 
interaction of the two would create disturbing population pressure. His 
gloomy preductions have found criticisms in the western world where 
man’s capacity to produce food has often more than kept pace with 
population increases* However, in certain parts of Asia Malthus* 
postulates can be said to be very much in existence* Probably in no 
other place on the globe is the pressure of population upon the land 
supply greater than in the Tonkin delta* The recent evacuation of 
about one million people from Communist North Vietnam to the south has 
no doubt eased the problem somewhat but it would be exaggerating to 
think that this has resulted in materially solving it.
Education and Extent of Literacy
Until 1945, formal classroom education in Indochina was restricted 
to the larger towns and major cities, and to the children of the privi­
leged, It is only during the past few years that government-operated 
schools have been established in the smaller, rural villages and 
communities; even these were established only in "secure" areas of the 
controlled zones. There are no official statistics indicating the 
degree of literacy in all Indochina* However, the percentage of
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illiteracy among the rural population is without doubt extremely large, 
running probably as high as 75 percent of the adult population.
Although formal education, even at the lower levels, is confined 
to the larger cities primarily, the extent of schooling in both public 
and private schools is indicated in analyzing the percent of the total 
population attending school. According to official statistics only 28 
persons per 1,000 inhabitants attending school at the outbreak of 
World War II; in 1947 the figure dropped in 8.6 per 1,000 persons; and 
in 194S a total of 10*3 persons per 1,000 inhabitants were attended 
school. These official statistics indicate that as recently as 1948
s'
only about one percent of the total population received formal schooling 
of any kLnd*^
In Indochina the rate of death at birth and early childhood is 
very high while the longevity of life is short. The result is that 
the children of school age (between the 6 and 18 age group) are esti­
mated to represent approximately 40 percent of the total population of 
28 million. These statistics indicate that only one out of 40 children 
of school age attended school in 1943. The other 39 either worked in 
the rice paddies, roamed the streets and countryside, begged for food, 
helped the guerillas in sabotage activities, or went fishing.
The University of Hanoi is the only institution in Indochina 
offering courses at the college level. However, compared to western 
size and standards its activities are limited. In 1943 there were 
only 32 professors on the faculty with 769 students in attendance.
^Annuaire Statistiaue de lfIndochine. 1947-48, pp. 55-73.
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A large number of the sons and daughters of the wealthy and Influential 
Indochinese attend universities and high schools in France, Also, in 
1947 a total of 71 scholarships were granted by the French Government 
for higher education in France,
Private and religious (Catholic) schools play a prominent role 
in education at the lower and intermediate levels. In 1943, the extent 
of private schooling, most of which was located in cities, was as 
follows:
French; Number of schools Number of students
High schools 11 3>293
Grade schools 13 2,872
Vietnamese;
High schools 22 4>093
Private schools 209 14>054
In addition, 42,000 Chinese children received schooling in 309 
private Chinese schools.
In the public school system in 1947-43 there were 17 high schools 
and 900 grade schools employing 292 French teachers and 4,133 Vietnamese 
teachers (of which 2,400 were serving in the capacity of "auxiliary 
instructors”) • At that time there was a total of 5,159 high school 
students enrolled in public high schools— but only 2,350 were Indo­
chinese, the others were either French, Chinese, Indian, or other 
nationalities. There were some 174,000 students enrolled in public 
grade schools and 79,000 in kindergarten.
With the exception of the larger grade and high schools in the 
larger cities, public schools as a rule are very poorly equipped from
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the standpoint of both supplies and material facilities and instructors* 
In the rural areas a grass shack without walls nor floor, one small 
board for the instructor, bamboo benches and half-naked students is the 
rule* Books and other supplies are very scarce or non-existant*
Some improvements have been made in recent years in the field of 
education. More schools have been built especially in the rural areas, 
more and better teaching equipment and supplies has been furnished, 
and there has been special efforts made on the part of the governments 
to encourage more young people to qualify themselves and enter the 
teaching profession* However, greater progress has been witnessed in 
the field of adult or '’mass" education. Under a program sponsored by 
American aid it is estimated that approximately 2 million adult Indo­
chinese have been made "literate"; i.e., taught to read and write 
during the course of the past four years. This program of activity 
is still going on.
In the field of agricultural education there was a total of 59 
students enrolled in agriculture, veterinary science, and forestry in 
1941-42. In addition, an average of 10 students received scholarships 
each year from the government for study in agriculture and related 
fields in French universities* Courses offered at the University of 
Hanoi were primarily in the basic sciences, such as, agronomy, plant 
pathology, etc. and very little, if any, courses were offered in such 
fields as Agricultural Education, Agricultural Economics, etc. In­
evitably only a very small percentage of the agriculture graduates 
remained actively engaged in their profession, either in government, 
teaching or private enterprise after completing the college courses.
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The University of Hanoi is now closed to all Indochinese students 
except those residing in Communist North Vietnam* Plans are now under 
way to establish a general university in Saigon. In addition, American 
aid is being furnished to establish an agricultural college in South 
Vietnam wherein it is anticipated that agricultural education and 
extension will comprise the larger portion of the curriculum* At the 
same time efforts are being made to establish an agricultural extension 
system modeled after the U* S* system. The extent of American aid in 
this field of agricultural education and extension is expressed in the 
amount of $228,000 for supplies and equipment (primarily vehicles for 
the extension service personnel) and one million dollars of local 
counterpart currency with which to erect the buildings, furnish local 
supplies, pay the personnel, etc. It is anticipated that the new 
extension service will supplement the old French system of having a 
provincial nursery in every province supervised by a government agri­
cultural agent operated on government funds, but serving the sole 
purpose of furnishing fresh fruit and vegetables, and flowers for the 
Chief of Province and other high government officials.
CHAPTER V
FARMING METHCDS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
Best estimates place the total amount of land under permanent 
cultivation in Indochina at between 15 and 16 million acres.^ This 
comprises only about nine percent of the total land area. Dense forest 
land comprises about 115 million acres, or 60 percent of the total 
area* Approximately 53 million acres, or about 30 percent of the land, 
constitute what is commonly referred to as "open land”, that is, land 
on which there is very thin forest vegetation, and/or open grass land. 
The remaining two million acres comprise swamp land which is unfit for 
crop production at the present time.
It is estimated by Gourou that 20 million acres of the land 
classified as "open land” could be brought into cultivation without 
unduly large land clearing efforts. Most of this land is of a 
slightly rolling topography, has a high natural fertility and would 
be very well suited to the growing of cotton, corn, and other "high­
land11 crops.^ In addition, approximately BO percent of the two 
million acres, or 1.6 million acres, of the presently uncultivated 
swanp land could be drained sufficiently for rice cultivation.
^ No complete and reliable estimate of land use was ever made 
for Indochina. The best studies available in this field are those 
of Pierre Gourou entitled Lar̂ d Ut.-t 1-iza.tlon in Indochina. Institute 
of Pacific Relations, New York, 1945j and Yves Henry, Economic 
Agricole de I ^ndochine, Ideo Presse, Hanoi, 1932. Land use data are 
obtained from these two studies for the most part.
^According to Indochinese and French terminology, high-land 
crops, or "cultures de haute terre", designate those crops grown 




A major part of the cultivated land, about 11 million acres, is 
in Vietnam. In Laos only about 1.5 million acres are under cultivation; 
in Cambodia about 3.3 million acres. In addition, roughly 4 million 
acres in the hilly and mountainous region of Vietnam are used for 
shifting (ray) cultivation. The amount of grass land used for pastures 
is very small.
Rice is by far the most important crop grown in Indochina and
takes first place in economic importance. Irrigated rice fields cover
approximately 12.5 million acres of a total cultivated area of about
A*)15*5 million acres. Only about 1.0 of the 15.5 million acres under 
permanent cultivation are in the hilly and mountainous regions. Roughly, 
only about 2 million acres of the valleys and coastal plains are planted 
to crops besides rice, namely com, cotton, peanuts, sugar cane, and 
.vegetables.
Agricultural production is largely confined to the broad level 
volleys of the Mekong River in Cambodia and South Vietnam and the Red 
River in North Vietnam, the Western province of Battambang and the area 
surrounding the great lake of Tonle Sap in Cambodia, and the small, 
isolated river valleys along the east coast of Vietnam.
Approximately 8 million acres, or roughly 53 percent of the total 
cultivated area of Indochina, is located in the Mekong River delta.
ACAbout 1.9 million acres of rice land in Indochina bear two 
crops of rice per year. Available water during the dry seasons being 
the limiting factor such two crop lands are located along low river 
banks and are flooded during the dry season by the rise of the water 
level in the rivers caused by rising tides. Therefore, while the 
total area under permanent cultivation is in the neighborhood of 15 to 
16 million acres, the total crop area is probably between 17 and 18 
million acres.
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About 3.5 million acres are cultivated in the Red River delta. The 
Tonle Sap and Battambang region of Cambodia comprises about 1.0 million 
acres, and approximately 2.3 million acres of cultivated land is located 
along the east coast of Vietnam.
Crop Production and Agricultural Practices
For the most part crop production in Indochina is conducted under 
very primitive farming practices. The most intensive use of human 
labor is still the predominant way of land cultivation; therefore, labor 
requirements in crop production are extremely large. Mechanical agri­
cultural equipment is relatively unknown and the use of draft animals 
is very limited in certain densely populated areas, especially in the 
Tonkin delta and the Annam Coastal areas, because they compete with 
man for the meager food supply. In the Tonkin delta it is reported
| z
that an hourfs work by a water buffalo is worth two hours of man labor. 
The intensive use of labor in agriculture has somewhat of a concealing 
effect of excess population and partly explains why in certain rural 
areas with high population densities there may actually be a shortage 
of labor during periods of peak labor requirements, such as rice 
transplanting and harvesting.
Crop cultivation is typically small-scale with the farm family 
furnishing most of the labor required. This is the case even on large 
estates (except rubber), because most large landowners still prefer to 
make use of primitive methods of cultivation and divide their holdings
^See Gourou, op. cit.. p. 241.
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into small plots for hand cultivation by the large supply of farm 
laborers available.
Although the average Indochinese farmer can be classified as 
a skillful cultivator by Asiatic standards, his productivity is very 
lew. Furthermore, he has from experience become resigned to the 
relative uselessness of his labor and makes very little attempt to 
increase labor productivity. This rather fatalistic attitude on the 
part of fanners in general is not conducive to improvements in agri­
culture, and serves to demonstrate that improvements are difficult to 
achieve in an agricultural economy based on a depressed farming 
population.
Due primarily to lack of improved seed stock, hand cultivation 
and the absence of proper equipment, and very restricted use of ferti­
lizer, the average crop yield in Indochina is low by any standard of 
comparison. Lack of standardization and, in general, low quality of 
produce are reflected in the relatively low prices usually paid for
I M
Indochina farm products (particularly idee) in foreign markets.
There have been very few efforts made in the past by the govern­
ment to bring about improvements in crop production methods. Under 
French administration experimental stations or gardens were established 
in almost every province but these served primarily the purpose of 
furnishing fruit, vegetables and flowers for the chiefs of provinces*
A number of seed zdce improvement stations also were established in 
various parts of Indochina, However, not much progress was made in
^This subject is dealt with more extensively in Chapter VIII 
Agricultural Marketing and Processing.
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improving rice varieties* The small amounts of proven varieties that 
were brought out were either sold to the large plantation owners or 
bottled up on laboratory shelves. The average Vietnam peasant rice 
farmer has seldom had the opportunity to plant selected rice seed 
because improved seed was not distributed to farmers by the "Office 
Indochinoise de Riz".
However, improvements through technical advice on proper production
methods, practical education, seed selection, and other procedures can
meet with only limited success even if well carried out so long as
agricultural education work is not conducted in coordination with
positive measures for the solution of other urgent agricultural
problems - mainly agricultural credit.^ Robequain points out for
example that it is useless to explain proper fertilization practices
to fanners so long as the price of fertilizer is beyond the economic
capacity of the peasant and so long as credit with which to purchase
L9fertilizer is unobtainable at reasonable rates*
Rices
Rice is by far the most important product of Indochina* The 
inhabitants of the area give first place in their thoughts and actions 
to the cultivation of rice and rice fields cover over 80 percent of the 
cultivated area of the country* Rice takes first place as food and also 
is the most important export item* Almost all agricultural enterprises 
undertaken in the country are adjusted according to the requirements
^Agricultural credit problems are treated in some detail in 
Chapter X, Agricultural Credit.
U9Robequain, op. cit*. p, 228,
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of rice culture, and all other crop cultivation is subordinate to it* 
Aside from its importance as a food item in the diet of the people the 
main reasons for the predominance of rice cultivation are: (l) there
is no other crop produced in the area that can give as large per acre 
yields under the same conditions of climate, soil fertility, and 
cultivation; (2) on a large percentage of the area now under cultivation 
rice is about the only crop that can be grown at all; (3) flooded rice 
is the only food plant in Indochina the cultivation of which can be 
continuously pursued year after year without the yields decreasing to 
unprofitable levels* Rice, therefore, is the single great factor 
in Indochinese civilization and rice cultivation has made possible the 
high population densities existing in the Tonkin delta and certain 
parts of Annam.
These advantages and the importance of the rice crop have led 
the peasants of Indochina to adapt themselves to natural conditions 
as regards its cultivation. Bach agricultural region in the country, 
with its individual soil characteristics and peculiar irrigation 
situation, grows special varieties of rice and at the most opportune 
period of the year* As a result of this multiplicity of adaptations 
there is no month of the year during which some rice is not being 
harvested in some rice-growing district* Figure U  indicates the 
more important rice-producing regions of Indochina, and Table 9 gives
estimates of the acreage, yield and production of rice from 1936-37
50to 1954* These estimates serve the purpose of giving some indication
^®It must be kept in mind that the statistics available on rice 
and all other agricultural production in Indochina are grossly inadequate 
and have several shortcomings, and that whatever the source of those 
given, one must remember that they represent rough estimates based on 
insufficient information in many cases.
87
Table 9* Rice Acreage, Yield and Production, in Indochina, 1936-52
Year Acreage^ Yield per acre ProductionS/
(1,000 acres) (pounds) (1,000 metric tons)
Averages
1936-1940 14,306 1,006 6,530
1941-1945 13,000 987 5,817
Annual
1946 8,970 1,060 4,286
1947 9,890 970 4,797
1948 12,900 1,012 5,919
1949 13,500 950 5,817
1950 12,000 1,012 5,511
1951 9,680 1,000 4,441
1952 10,500 970 4,600
1/~ In Tonkin and Annam where two crops of rice are grown annually on 
the same land such acreage is counted twice.
—/ In terms of rough rice.
Sources: U.S.D.A., Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Foreign
Crops and Markets, Washingtons Miay 29, 1950j
Annuaire Statistiaue de l*Indochine. 1948-49, Saigon, 1950;
Biillft-Hn Econondoue du Vietnam. No. 10. Saigon, October, 1952$
Rice Office of Indochina, Yearly Rice Acreage and Production 
Statistics.
of production trends, the relative importance of the various products, 
and their importance from the standpoint of the national econony as a 
whole.
The acreage in rice declined considerably during the war period, 
and decreased yet further during the post-war years of internal rebel 
activities. Although production was still sufficient to meet domestic 
requirements, post-war exports have been small compared with the pre-war
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period (Table 10). Thig decline in production and exports was the 
result of many rural regions being under the control of rebel forces 
which prevented free movement of paddy from the interior to the Saigon- 
Cholon rice mills. In addition, many farmers fled their local villages 
for the safety of the larger cities resulting in a large acreage being 
left uncultivated, and, many other farm families restricted rice pro­
duction to the amount needed for home consumption and local demand.
Now that internal security has been established it can be expected
Table 10. Rice Exports from Indochina, 1935-54
Year Paddv
Milled rice and 
rice products Total
1,000 metric tons
1935 318 1,430 1,748
1936 224 1,539 1,763
1937 140 1,389 1,529
1938 38 1,016 1,054
1939 322 1,350 1,672
1940 60 1,526 1,586
1941 — 944 944
1942 — 974 974
1943 6 1,017 1,023
1944 — 498 498
1945 1 44 45
1946 109 109
1947 1 90 91
1948 — 233 233
1949 — 140 140
1950 — 125 125
1951 — 361 3611952 — 240 240
1953 — 207 207
1954 387 387
Sources: Syndicat des Exportateurs Francais dtIndochine, Annual 
Reports: Customs Statistics for Indochina.
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that rice production will soon return to pre-war levels* However, 
unless there are significant increases in per acre yields over pre-war 
averages it is doubtful that pre-war volume of rice exports from Indochina 
will be forthcoming. It must be kept in mind that with an average 
annual increase in population of one percent domestic requirements have 
increased about 15 percent since the pre-war period, and assuming no 
change in the pre-war per capita rate of consumption, over one million 
metric tonB more would be required for domestic consumption than before 
the war.
Go chin china is by far the most important rice-producing area in 
Indochina. This region has the largest acreage in rice fields, the 
highest yield per acre, the highest total production, and the highest 
production per capita than any other area. Cochinchina and Cambodia 
are the only regions of Indochina which normally produce an exportable 
supply of rice* Table 11 shows the distribution of rice production 
among the various regions or states*
Relative low soil fertility, lack of proper fertilization, 
primitive production methods, inefficient water control, and high 
losses before harvesting all combine to give Indochina very low per- 
acre yields of rice and one of the lowest per-capita productions of 
those engaged in its culture of all rice-producing countries (Table 12).
In the pre-war period yields in Japan were almost three and a half times 
as high as those in Indochina.
51Types of Rice Culture; By far the greater part of the rice grown
51Most of the fact m l  information contained in this section was 
obtained from material prepared for the Economic Cooperation Administra­
tion by the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the United 
States Department of Agriculture and reported in The Agriculture of 
French Indochina.
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Table 11. Rice Acreage, Yield, Production, and Production per Capita, 
in Indochina, by State, 1942-43
•
State : Acreage
• • • *






























Indochina-!/ 15,244 1,051 7,270 628
—^ In terms of rough rice.
o/—' Not including the area ceded to Siam in 1941, and returned to Indo­
china after the war*
Source: Annuaire Statistiaue de 1*Indochina. 1941-42. Saigon: 1943. 
pp. 87-83.
Table 12. Comparisons of Rice Acreage, Yields, Production, and Pro­
duction per Capita of Indochina with Other Asiatic Rice- 
Producing Countries, Average 1935-36 to 1939-40
Country : Acreage
• « • «






































-J Computed by use of population statistics for 1937* as published in 
FAO, Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics. Rome, 1948.
^  Average 1931-37*
If Average 1936-37 to 1939-40*
Source: Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Foreign Crops and
Markets, Washingtons May 29, 1950, except for last column 
which was computed as indicated in \/.
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in Indochina is wet-rice. although in the mountain regions dry or 
upland rice is grown, chiefly under the ray system of cultivation.
The cultivation of wet-rice presents each geographical region with 
its own particular 3et of problems. The major difference between the 
problems of rice cultivation in the Tonkin and Mekong Deltas is the fact 
that the Red River rises rapidly and endangers the rice fields by wide­
spread and destructive floods, whereas the annual floods of the Mekong 
River come very slowly and are never as high as those of the Red River. 
Furthermore, the Mekong River rises only once each year, after which 
the water recedes, whereas the Red River may have three or four high 
floods during the course of the rainy season. Thus, in the Tonkin 
delta the chief water problem is protection of the land against floods, 
whereas in the Mekong Delta the chief problem is drainage.
In Tonkin and Annam there are two distinct rice crops grown, one 
known as the fifth-month crop (grown in the dry season and harvested in 
June, the fifth month of the Annamese calendar) and the other the 
tenth-month crop (grown in the wet season and harvested in November). 
Low-lying land usually bear only the first crop; rice land with medium 
elevation usually bear both crops; and the uplands of the northern and 
central parts of the delta usually bear only the wet-season crop. It 
is estimated that about 45 percent of the rice land in Tonkin bear both 
the fifth-month crop and the tenth-month crops of rice, and in Annam 
about one-third of the rice land area is double cropped.
Through generations of practice the farmers of Tonkin and Annam 
have developed a great facility for selecting varieties of rice best 
adapted to particular conditions of soil and water, and for extracting 
every possible advantage from transplanting rice seedlings* As in most
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of Asia, the rice seed is first planted in seed-beds which are very 
carefully cultivated* In some of the higher areas transplanting is 
absolutely essential to the cultivation of wet-rice because the fields 
cannot be kept flooded for the entire period of growth from 3eed to seed*
In Cochinchina three types of rice cultivation is carried on: Rice
that is transplanted only once, rice that requires two transplantings, 
and rice that is seeded directly into the field* These three types of 
adaptations to environmental conditions differ in labor requirements, 
length of growing season and yield. Almost 75 percent of the total 
rice area in Cochinchina is planted to rice which i3 transplanted 
only once. There are considerable variations in types, their harvests 
varying from late October to early January, but the largest part consists 
of the so-called "half-season” rice, which is seeded in June, transplanted 
in August, and harvested in December.
Rice fields with two transplantings are found close to the rivers 
and are subject to floods. They are not provided with dikes so that 
the flood waters can flow evenly over the area* The depth of the water 
(reaching up to 18 inches in October) require the transplanting of 
strong rice seedlings. Two transplantings are necessary to provide 
strong plants of the necessary height to stand above the water level 
and to withstand being smothered by the weeds* Twice-transplanted rice 
has a longer growing season; it is seeded in June and harvested in 
February*
Floating rice is found along the banks of the Bassac River in 
Cochinchina and around the Great Lake in Cambodia and the borders of 
the Mekong River. Rice follows corn in the rotation which is sown to 
reach maturity just before the flood, and the rice is planted between
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the rows. The only requirement is that the rise in water level be 
sufficiently gradual so that the rice will not be submerged. The 
stems, which attain lengths of 12 feet or more, settle on the mud when 
the water recedes, and new roots start at the upper nodes. One seedling 
thus can produce a number of heads. The crop is harvested during 
December-January.
The larger part of the rice fields in Cambodia are rainy season 
fields, flooded solely by rain water held in by small dikes. Character­
istic of the Cambodian landscape are these rice fields which become very 
dry during the winter and which are dominated at intervals by clusters 
of sugar palms.
In addition to this rainy-season rice and floating rice, the 
Cambodians also cultivate a dry-season rice sometimes called "falling- 
water" rice by the natives. When the river floods recede from the land, 
the farmer plants rice which he is often obliged to irrigate by primitive 
hand methods. In some areas the rice is planted out in stages with the 
first planted plots being the first harvested.
The Tribal population of Laos, Tonkin, and Annam, practice ray 
cultivation of dry or upland rice. After the forest has been burned 
and cleared rice and corn are planted by merely dropping the seeds into 
holes made with a stick. There is no land tilling, no cultivation, 
no fertilization, and no farm implement of any kind is used. In this 
type of culture the most important task between seed planting and 
harvesting consists of guarding the fields against wild animals.
C o m :
Indochina*s only other cereal of importance is corn. While it 
had been cultivated by the natives for many years it was a secondary
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food crop fifty years ago and was a negligible item in Indochina’s 
foreign trade. Plantings were encouraged by the French to provide 
animal feed for export mainly to France, and by the 1930’s it had 
become one of Indochina’s most important exports*, from 1932 to 1936 
it was the second most important export product in terms of value, 
although far behind rice. This was largely due to the French policy 
of protecting colonial products by increased tariffs on foreign grain. 
C o m  has not, however, become an important product for domestic con­
sumption, as the natives prefer rice, and during the period preceding 
World War II about 85 percent of the c om produced was exported.
Table 13 shows the official figures for area yield, production and 
exports of com. For the most part the data are inconplete, especially 
for the period since 1944 when they appear to cover only Cambodia. As
Table 13. Acreage, Yield, Production and Exports of Corn in Indochina, 
for Selected Years, 1936-51
Year * Acreage * Yield per acre : Production * | Exports «
1,000 acres Pounds 1,000 metric tons 1,000 metric tons
1936 1,235 1,071 600 467
1937 1,235 1,071 600 563
1933 1,235 1,160 650 548
1940 1,036 767 370 276
1942 741 812 273 125
1943 694 689 217 99
1944 613 741 206 18
194S 300 810 110 47
1949 45S 850 177 29
1950 461 845 175 40
1951 452 900 185 64
Sourcest Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine. Vols. VT to XI, 1934-36 
to 1943-467 Vol. XII, 1946-48.
Direction de 1 ’Agricueture du Vietnam, (Special Report). 
Saigont January 15, 1954.
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the data indicate, corn has become a much less important product for 
Indochina than it was before the war. In Cambodia, for example, which 
was relatively free from internal rebel activities, it is obvious that 
the decline in production is due to other causes. In 1949 the low 
world price for corn in relation to high production costs in Indochina 
was undoubtedly an important factor contributing to reduced acreage.
It is reported that in 1949 France paid approximately 20 francs per 
kilogram more than the then current world price for corn imported from 
Indochina. As is indicated by Table 13, corn exports from Indochina 
since the war have been small compared with pre-war exports. France 
and the French Union continue to be the most important market for 
Indochina's c om exports. In general, c o m  for export is not given 
the proper care that it should receive. Very often it is not carefully 
sorted and graded, and is packed and shipped before being dried to the 
moisture content necessary for safe storage, with the result that there 
frequently is excessive molding and weevil damage.
In Cambodia corn Is grown along the river banks and in the flood 
beds of the Mekong. The seed sown at the beginning of the rainy season 
in May or June is harvested just before the high floods. In some areas 
com is grown as a dry-season crop also, and it is possible to grow 
two crops of corn a year, but this practice is not very widespread.
Unlike rice and pepper, the Chinese merchant is almost completely 
absent from the corn marketing picture*— leaving this activity to the 
French, and now more recently, the Cambodians themselves. It has been 
stated that the increase in corn production in Cambodia which occurred 
during the late thirties was partly attributable to the interest taken
l
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by the Cambodian farmers in a crop whose sale was not as thoroughly
controlled by the Chinese middlemen as certain other crops* such as
rice and pepper*
Other Food Crons:
Among the more important food crops, in addition to rice and corn,
are sweet potatoes, sugar cane, manioc, taro and various other root
52crops, beans, and a rather large variety of fruits and vegetables.
Reliable statistics relating to the acreage and production of these 
minor crops are more difficult to obtain than those for rice and corn 
because they are grown on even more scattered plots and are often inter- 
planted with one another. Furthermore, the acreage planted from year to 
year varies greatly depending upon the supply of water and climatic 
conditions. Since these crops are essentially dry-season crops the 
availability of water is the critical factor. In most areas dry-season 
crops are planted immediately after the rice harvest on rice land, and 
since irrigation is usually necessary toward the maturity stage the 
amount of land a farm family can cultivate is very small because practically 
all water lifting is done by primitive hand methods. However, improvements
52The most reliable statistics available concerning the production, 
acreage, and exports of the minor crops are contained in the following 
tables (1) Table 14 Area in Minor Crops; (2) Table 15 Area in Minor Crops, 
by State, Compared with the Area in Rice, Rubber, and Corn; (3) Table lo 
Production of Minor Crops,
No data with any degree of reliability are available for ndnor 
crops for the years of intensive rebel activities (since the end of World 
War II), Only gross estimates by people not too well informed have been 
made of acreage and production of those crops for those years. The fact 
that such a large proportion of the producing areas was located in those 
parts of the country occupied by Communist rebels probably resulted in 
large reductions in both acreage and production since large numbers of 
fanners left the countryside for the safety of the cities and thus quit 
farming.
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Table 14* Acreage in Minor Crops, in Indochina, Annual 1936-38, 1940, 
1942-44
Crop ! 1936 
• ; 1937 ! 1938 * : 1940 ; # • 1942 ! 1943 • ! 1944 *
. ---- 1 ,000 acres - - ■
Cotton 37 37 37 37 47 83 123Jute 0.3 0.5 0.5 2 9 38 43Ramie n.a. n*&* n.a. n.a. 3 2 3
Peanuts 37 37 57 57 123 119 116
Castor seed 10 10 10 15 24 49 74
Sesame 10 10 10 10 12 15 17
Coconut 62 74 74 74 62 72 69
Tung n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9 9 9
Sugar cane 99 99 99 99 87 36 89
Tobacco 49 54 49 37 38 54 a
Coffee 25 25 25 30 26 30 n.a.Tea 49 49 49 62 43 43 n.a.
Pepper 4 4 4 7 9 5 n.a.
Kapok 9 10 10 10 14 14 13
Mulberry n.a. 7 7 12 17 27 35
Lac 17 17 17 15 15 15 15
Total area
in minor crops 403 434 449 467 538 661 652
Source: Annual re Statistiaue de l^ndo chine. Vols. VI to XI, 1934-36
to 1943-461
Table 15. Acreage in Minor Crops, in Indochina, by State, Compared 
















-----1, 000 acres -
Cotton 2 11 3 30 1 47
Jute 7 1 1 0 0 9
Ramie 1 2 negl. 0 negl. 3
Peanuts 12 59 37 15 0 123
Castor seed 21 2 negl. 1 0 24
Sesame 3 7 1 1 0 12
Coconut 0 10 52 0 0 62
Tung 2 5 0 0 2 9
Sugar cane 15 35 37 0 0 87
Tobacco 7 15 8 7 1 38
Coffee 5 16 3 0 2 26
Tea 27 14 2 0 0 43
Pepper 0 1 1 7 0 9
Kapok 0 1 3 10 0 14Mulberry 7 8 1 1 0 17
lac 15 0 0 0 0 15
Total minor
crops 124 187 149 72 6 538
Ricei/ 3,674P 2,338^ 5,690 2,439 1,102 15,243^C o m Z13 64 44 371 49 7 a
Rubber 0 4 255 71 negl. 330
Total crop 





In Tonkin and Annam, where two crops are obtained from much of the 
area, such acreage is counted twice.
In addition to these crops, a number of others are cultivated in 
small plots for home use in most sections of Indochina. Before 
World War II the area planted to those other crops amounted to 
about 485,000 acres of which 250,000 acres were devoted to sweet 
potatoes, 170,000 acres to beans and 65,000 acres were planted 
to manioc.
Source: Annuaire Statietiaue de l^ndochine. 1941-42.
Table 16. Production of Minor Crops, in Indochina, Annual 1936-38, 
1940, 1943-44
Product I 1936 I 1937 I 1938 *. 1940 I 1942 ; 1943 I 1944
1,000 metric tons








205/ 2 ? ^ 2 ^
Castor seed 5 5 5 4.2 2.9 4.7 12.8
Sesame 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.6 1.7 1.5













Tobacco 14 15 15 14 13.2 17.6 14.3
Coffee 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 4 4.3 n.a.
Tea 15 15 15 17 10.5 10.4 n.a.
Pepper
Kapok 3*5!/2.51/ a ?
3.5 , 
3.51/ 31/ 9.42/ 2*5o/10.02/
n.a. ,
7.72/














Brown and white sugar combined. Does not include amount consumed 
as cane, which is form in which sugar is consumed in Tonkin.
Source: Annuaire Statlsticme de l 1 Indochina. 1934-36 to 1943-46,
Report No. 60. American Consulate, Saigon, February 14, 1950.
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in methods of irrigation which could make it possible to extend the area 
under cultivation of high-land or dry-season crops would probably result 
in greater plantings of rice, since, the Indochinese farmer normally 
prefers rice cultivation to any other crop whenever there is water 
available.
Sweet Potatoes : This crop is produced in most sections of Indochina
but it is only in the Tonkin delta that it is considered an important 
crop. In this region, where the winter precipitation is reasonably 
dependable, sweet potatoes are extensively grown as the second crop 
following the rice crop. Before the war the area devoted to the 
cultivation of sweet potatoes amounted to about 250,000 acres annually.
Beans: This crop is grown everywhere in the country. Annual
acreage normally amounts to about 170,000 acres and production is 
usually sufficient to meet domestic demands, with slight exportable 
surpluses during good years. Pre-war exports averaged approximately
2,000 metric tons per year. In 194&, an exceptionally heavy crop 
year, exports of dry edible beans amounted to more than 6,000 metric 
tons.
Manioc t This root crop forms a relatively important item in the 
diet of part of the population, especially the Tonkinese in the north. 
Normally about 65,000 acres are planted to this crop annually.
Vegetables: With the exception of beans, manioc and potatoes, 
vegetables do not play a very important part in the diet of the natives 
of Indochina. However, the production of vegetables is carried on in 
almost all the villages. Production of vegetables by native farm 
families is almost exclusively for sale in the nearby towns and cities 
where the output is consumed by the European and Chinese population.
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The only concentrated area of production is located at Dalat, located 
in the hilly region about 100 miles east of Saigon, where both European 
and Chinese varieties of cabbages, cucumbers, tomatoes, lettuce, shallots, 
onions, garlic, etc*, are grown for the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan 
market. Soy beans are also an important crop grown in this area.
Fruits: Fruits are grown on a small scale throughout the country
wherever soil and climatic conditions permit, but only a few small 
areas can be classified as centers of fruit production. Bananas are 
grown rather extensively in the Hue area in Annam. Other areas along 
the Annam coast are also noted for the production of oranges, tangerines, 
grapefruit, pineapples, and other tropical fruits. Statistics on the 
acreage and production of fruits and vegetables are veiy meager and 
those available are grossly unreliable for the most part.
Oil-Bearing Crons:
Of the oil-bearing crops, coconuts and peanuts, are by far the 
most important and are about the only two grown on a commercial scale 
in Indochina.
Coconuts: According to official statistics, the total acreage in
coconut trees before the war amounted to 74>000 acres and the total 
annual production averaged 30,000 metric tons of copra. During that 
period about 8,000 metric tons of copra and 500 metric tons of coconut 
oil were exported annually. Cochinchina has by far the largest acreage 
in coconut trees, most of which is located in the provinces of Bentre and 
ffytho along the Mekong River. Coconut trees are also grown in Annam 
along the coast and in Cambodia where some 7,000 acres are found.
Peanuts: Peanuts are probably the second most important oilseed
crop grown in Indochina. Total acreage in peanuts before the war was
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estimated at 75*000 acres and the total production of shelled peanuts 
amounted to about 22,000 metric tons annually, of which an average of 
2,700 metric tons was exported.
Peanuts are grown in every section of Indochina except Laos, with 
the most important producing areas in Cochinchina and Annam. Peanuts 
are consumed locally by the natives either roasted or in the form of 
oil. Most of the peanut oil is pressed by the farmers themselves, but 
there are a few scattered small commercial peanut oil presses in most 
of the larger producing areas.
Fiber Crons:
The fiber crops produced in Indochina are cotton, jute, ramie and 
kapok. Of the four, cotton is the most important. The chief cotton 
producing area is Cambodia which has approximately 60 percent of the 
total acreage. It is grown mostly by native farmers in small garden- 
size plots. Most families who grow a few cotton plants spin and weave 
cotton for their own family use.
According to official statistics, the acreage in cotton in Indochina 
before the war was about 37,000 acres, with an annual production of 
approximately 1,200 metric tons of lint. Under Japanese occupation 
acreage increased to 123,000 acres and production to 6,200 metric tons 
in 1944 (Tables 14 and 16). This average yield of about 100 pounds 
per acre is much lower than that of other commercial cotton-producing 
countries of the world. For this reason French efforts to fill part 
of their domestic needs for cotton in Indochina was a complete failure, 
with production costs per pound of lint cotton produced being much too 
high to bring any financial returns to growers. The basic causes of 
low yields are (l) cotton can be grown only during the dry season and
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then the plants suffer from lack of moisture, and (2) when cotton 
reaches maturity during the beginning of the rainy season the boles 
and fiber are frequently damaged by the daily rain3. Also, the fact 
that the sale of lint cotton is done almost exclusively through Chinese 
middlemen who take a large share of the profits is another important 
factor deterring the natives from cultivating cotton on a commercial 
scale. This also partly explains the fact that Indochina normally 
imports approximately 20,000 bales of lint cotton each year to be spun 
by French-owned textile nails located in the northern part of the 
country.
Of the other fiber crops grown in Indochina, jute is cultivated 
principally in Tonkin; kapok in Cambodia; and ramie in Annam. Most 
reliable statistics indicate pre-war production of 800 metric tons of 
jute, 3,000 tons of kapok, and about 500 metric tons of ramie (Table 16), 
Coffeet
Coffee plantations have been established on the red lands of 
South Annam, on the Plateau des Bolevens in Laos, and in a few small, 
areas in Northern Cochinchina. Although the natives cultivated coffee 
plants before the advent of the French in the country, most plantations 
have been developed by the French and the coffee produced at the present 
time comes almost exclusively from these plantations. According to 
official statistics, the total pre-war acreage in coffee trees amounted 
to approximately 25,000 acres with annual production between 2,500 and 
3,500 metric tons. Annual pre-war exports, almost all to France, 
averaged about 700 metric tons. Most of the crop is sold for domestic 
consumption, although some part of the Loatian production is exported 
across the Mekong River into Thailand.
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Tobacco:
Tobacco is cultivated to some extent in almost all sections of 
Indochina, but production is not sufficient to meet domestic needs, 
resulting in net imports into the country of about 2,300 metric tons of 
leaf tobacco and tobacco products annually. Tobacco growing is almost 
exclusively a native enterprise, and about 90 percent of the production 
consists of strong varieties used for domestic consumption by Indochinese. 
The remaining 10 percent is light tobacco produced for consumption by 
Europeans. Most of the tobacco grown is planted in small plots right 
after the rice harvest. The plants are very carefully tended as a rule 
and irrigation is mostly by the ‘bucket-method*.
The total area in tobacco during the period 1936-40 averaged
37,000 acres annually and total annual production approximately 14,000 
metric tons. The French have made recent efforts at establishing 
tobacco plantations in the Vientienne area in Laos, but results have 
not been very satisfactory from the standpoint of yield and quality.
Sugar Cane?
Over 80 percent of the sugar cane produced in Indochina is grown 
by native farmers under primitive, inefficient hand methods on scattered 
small plots of ground. The remaining 20 percent of production is pro­
vided by rather large French-owned plantations. As a result, per acre 
yields of sugar cane are exceptionally low. For example, the average 
yields in Java are approximately three times those of Indochina. Sugar 
cane is planted in all of the major agricultural regions of Indochina, 
but Cochinchina and southern Annam account for most of the output of 
sugar. The per capita consumption of sugar in Indochina is low, and 
most of it is in the form of molasses or syrup. Therefore, while
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producing almost solely for the domestic native market very little 
effort is made by native growers to improve the quality. With the 
exception of two rather large French-owned sugar refineries, most of 
the sugar and syrup produced in the country is grinded and processed 
by small country syrup mills located in the centers of sugar cane 
producing areas and utilizing antequated production methods.
The total area in sugar cane before the war averaged about 100,000 
acres and production averaged almost 70,000 tons of brown and white 
sugar, and syrup and molasses converted in terms of brown sugar. This 
does not include the amount consumed as cane, in which form most of 
the sugar produced in the Tonkin delta is consumed locally.
As a result of French efforts in producing and processing white, 
granulated sugar, Indochina was a net exporter of sugar for a short 
period before the war. However, in recent years Indochina has depended 
upon imports for a very large percentage of its sugar requirements 
because domestic consumption has increased and domestic production has 
declined. Present import needs of the country is estimated by the 
director of the largest French sugar refinery in Indochina at about
45,000 metric tons per year. In contrast, imports of sugar amounted 
to 10,000 tons in 1947, 11,000 tons in 194S, and 19,000 tons in 1949. 
Sugar Palm:
In Cambodia, the sugar palm is grown rather than 3ugar cane. In 
addition to its fruit, its sap is collected in bamboo pots to be consumed 
either in the fresh state, fermented (as wine), distilled, or, more 
often, it is boiled down for the production of palm sugar. This sugar 
has a strong molasses flavor, and, although considered inferior to cane 
sugar, is cheaper and is consumed in large quantities by the Cambodians.
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Before the war there were probably about 500,000 sugar palm trees In 
Cambodia producing close to 6,000 metric tons of sugar annually. It 
does not appear that this quantity has diminished during the recent 
year3 of rebel activities.
Pepper:
Unlike the various crops discussed above, pepper is not a product 
of native Indochinese agriculture; its cultivation, carried on in the 
southern part of Cambodia, is almost exclusively in the hands of Chinese. 
Although it constitutes only a small portion of the total value of all 
agricultural commodities produced, it is considered an important crop 
because it ranks high on the list of foreign exchange earners for 
the country. Indochina ranks high in the world as a pepper producer, 
and almost the entire output is exported to France. Approximately
7,000 acres were devoted to the production of pepper before the war, 
and production averaged approximately 4,000 metric tons per year. The 
chief problem of pepper growers has been that of producing more than 
the available market required. Protective tariffs have been established 
within the French Union to alleviate the hardships, but on occasions 
production quotas have had to be enforced. Year-to-year variations 
in market conditions have made for unstability in prices, with the 
result that production is decreasing.
Tea:
Although there are a few large European tea plantations in Indochina, 
native tea production is still much more important than that of the 
plantations. According to official statistics, approximately 62,000 
acres were planted to tea before the war; European plantations accounted 
to about 7,500 acres of this area. Production was approximately 17,000
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metric tons* The largest acreage is located in Tonkin, but the Mol 
Plateau in southern Annam is also an important area of production.
The French have made efforts to establish tea plantations in 
the hilly areas of the red soils of southern Annam. However, these 
ventures proved a failure as cost of production on those plantations 
turned out to be much higher than in the lowland areas where the natives 
are engaged in tea cultivation.
Plantation Agriculture
History and Development: As has been the case in other tropical
countries, an important feature of Indochina’s colonization by Europeans 
has been the establishment of agricultural enterprises financed mostly 
by foreign capital and employing native labor* At first, French agri­
cultural endeavors were primarily concerned with rice in Cochinchina, 
and coffee and tea in Annam and Tonkin. During the early years of 
colonization efforts it was the opinion of most French agriculturalists 
that rice production would be the most profitable venture. It is primarily 
for this reason that the French undertook large drainage works in the 
Mekong delta of Cochinchina. Miany French concessionaires moved into 
Cochinchina and established rice plantations* At the turn of the 
century almost 250,000 hectares (600,000 acres) of rice land in 
Cochinchina was under French control. This was about 33 percent of all 
rice concessions in that state. However, a large percentage of that 
land was never put into cultivation by the concessionaires, since much 
of it was never drained sufficiently.
Strictly speaking, in the real concept of the word, rice concessions 
never were, and are not now, true plantations, since they are almost
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all cultivated by native share-croppers. Whatever the nationality of 
the landlord, it has very little bearing on the method of cultivation 
and the equipment employed by the peasants cultivating rice land in 
Cochinchina. There are still some landlords who own rice concessions 
and pay their labor daily wages and employ many overseers in the fields, 
but this system of operation is very seldom found.
Coffee was among the earliest of the plantation crops to be grovm 
in Indochina, with plantings having started in Tonkin before 1900.
Coffee cultivation has since spread south and at the present time the 
center of production is in the red lands of southern Annam and northern 
Cochinchina where plantings are of rather medium size— the majority 
of plantations being under 250 acres.
Only during the past thirty years have large tea plantations 
been established under French management. These are also located on 
the red soils of southern Annam, but production on French-owned 
plantations represent only a small portion of the total tea output 
of the country.
Rubber:
It is in the field of rubber production that French colonization 
has made its greatest imprint* There is little doubt that rubber is 
the most successful plantation crop in Indochina. Table 17 indicates 
the number of concessions existing in Indochina at the beginning of 
World War II, and Table 18 shows the area in each state included in 
those concessions. The majority of the concessions are located in 
Cochinchina where the largest increases in cultivated acreage have 
occurred during the French administration. This is because large 
areas were made tillable through the clearing of forest land and the
Table 17. Number of Domain Concessions in Indochina, by State, December 31* 1942
s Europeans and companies Indochinese
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Total French Indochina 1,125 3,120 4,245 17,240 146,368 163,608
land concessions were originally granted on a provisional basis for a period of 10 years. Conditions 
provided that land not brought under cultivation at the end of 10 years would revert to the public domain. 
However, there has been no enforcement of this provision because, to date, no such land has reverted to 
public domain.
^  Concessions less than 5*000 acres.
Source: Annuaire Statistioue de l^Indochine. 1941-42, p. 92.
Table 10. Area of Domain Concessions in Indochina, by State, January 1, 1940
*• Euroneans and comnanies • Indochinese
















----  1,000 acres - - - -
Tonkin 30 251 281 111 107 108 215 55
Annam 185 200 385 96 48 93 2U6 64
Cochinchina 335 1,003 1,332 1,112 326 2,713 3,039 2,718Combodia 163 77 240 78 12 29 41 30
Laos 7 2 9 3 2 10 12 7
Total French 
Indochina 714 1,533 2,247 1,400 495 2,958 3,453 2,874
Source: Annuaire Statistioue de ltIndochine. 1941-42, p. 92.
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drainage of swamps. It is primarily as a result of these efforts that 
the area of tillable rice land increased by over 4 million acres from 
1880 to 1940. The 175,000 acres presently in producing rubber trees 
is also a result of French effort in clearing forest land for cultivation.
Almost all of the rubber plantings in Indochina are restricted to 
an area consisting of grey and red soils in the provinces of Baria,
Bien Hoa, Thu Dau Mot, and Tayninh in South Vietnam, and in the provinces 
of Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham and Kratie in Cambodia. Exceptions to 
this general area of production are about 2,500 acres in the Ban Me 
Thout area and three small plantations occupying about 1,500 acres in 
the vicinity of Nhatrang along the southeast coast (Figure III). No 
rubber trees are found further north of latitude 12°45' nor at altitudes 
higher than 1,600 feet. The hevea rubber tree (the variety in commercial 
production in Indochina) grows best on well-drained soils and no pro­
ducing rubber trees are found on lands suitable for rice.
The rubber industry of Indochina is of recent origin. Most lands 
now in production were cleared and planted to rubber trees between 
1920 and 1939* Almost without exception the large plantations were 
established on government concessions, or on land grants to private 
individuals who undertook the task of clearing the area of jungle 
growth and planting young hevea saplings (Figure IV). Most of the 
work of jungle clearing and planting was done by hand with the use of 
coolie laborers imported from North Vietnam vender three-year contracts.
Once started, rubber plantings increased rapidly to about 281,500 
acres by 1938 and to 342,800 acres by 1945* However, with the Japanese 
occupation in March, 1945, followed by years of Vietmin activities, 
the area in rubber trees decreased by about one-third and in 1952 only 
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Figure III. Location of Principal Rubber Plantations in Indochina.
Almost all of the rubber plantings in Indochina are restricted to the 
areas of gray and red soils, one area located north of Saigon on the 
Cambodia-Cochinchina border and the other east of Saigon.
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Figure IV* Rubber Plantation (lower picture) Established on Land That 
Was Jungle (upper picture) Ten Years Previously*
The establishment of rubber plantations is probably the 
greatest contribution of the French to the agricultural 
economy of Indochina*
214
Table 19 shows the area planted to rubber, the area exploited or 
tapped and in actual production, and the total yearly production* The 
differences between the area planted and the area exploitable reflect 
primarily the area planted to young trees not yet of producing age*
The differences between the exploitable and the exploited area gives 
an indication of the acreage planted to trees of producing age but 
which was not in actual production in each respective year because of 
security conditions*
Table 19. Area Planted to Rubber, Area Exploited and Total Production 
of Rubber in Indochina, 193£-54
•• Area - (hectares )i/ iProduction (’metric tons')
Year : Planted : Exploitable : Exploited : Smoked sheets : Total






1944 139,000 105,200 105,200 48,853 61,362
1945 , 140,000 106,000 . . . . 12,00019462/ 58,614 16,055 20,296
1947 102,253 £6,536 46,317 29,061 38,560
1948 102,253 88,901 47,338 28,000 43,700
1949 102,452 91,227 51,136 28,456 43,026
1950 101,719 96,900 50,500 31,008 48,984
1951 101,000 93,626 53,200 35,280 52,956
3-952, 100,000 87,157 73,380 33,935 62,000
19532/ 72,000 65,000 60,000 42,000 74,000
1954 75,000 68,000 64,000 42,500 73,000
One hectare « 2*47 acres.
2 / From 1945, statistics include only those plantations 500 ha., which 
plantations before the war produced about 85% of the total, and 
presently produce about 98% of the total rubber.
^/ Acreage data for 1953 and 1954 includes Vietnam only.
Sources Syndicat of Rubber Planters of Indochina, Yearly Reports on 
Rubber Situation. Saigon.
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Total production of rubber in any one year is closely related to 
the acreage exploited, and years during "which a larger area was exploited 
resulted in increased total production. Since most of the acreage 
left unexploited for security reasons during war activities consisted 
of trees of producing age, these were put back into production in a 
very short time following improvements in security. This has resulted 
in a rapid increase in total production from 1953 to the end of 1954 
when production reached the 1940-44 average of slightly over 70,000 
metric tons*
Most of the present producing plantations are owned by French 
and other foreign interests. A large percentage of the trees now 
producing were planted between 1930 and 1939. Therefore, many trees 
are now nearing the end of their period of maximum production. In 
order to assure future and continued production at the present rate 
those trees should be replaced with young saplings. This is being 
done on a few larger and older plantations. However, analyzing the 
available statistics on area planted, area exploitable, and area 
actually exploited gives an indication that plantings of young trees 
have not kept pace with the destruction of old trees. Such a situation, 
if continued, will without doubt result in a reduced area exploitable 
as well as exploited in a few years.
Marketing: Approximately 98 percent of the rubber produced in
Indochina is exported; only two percent is processed locally into 
consumer items by one small rubber manufacturing plant in Saigon 
(Figure V).
Until 1950 France was the primary market for Indochina rubber, 
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Figure V. Rubber Exports from Indochina, Average 1935-39, Yearly 1950-54.
Almost all rubber produced in Indochina is exported. Shipments are 
made soon after the rubber is processed on the plantations*
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has recently become the major market. During 1954 exports to the 
United States were three times the exports to France and accounted 
for approximately 70 percent of total exports from Vietnam (Table 20). 
Smoked sheets and crepe make up most of the production and exports.
Rubber is the best (and about the only) source of dollar earnings 
for Indochina. During 1950 the total tonnage of all exports to the 
United States from Indochina amounted to 24,200 tonsj rubber alone 
accounted for 23,900 tons, or about 99 percent of the total. In that 
year, the best post-World War II year up to that time, dollar earnings 
through rubber exports to the United States were more than $16*5 million. 
It Is estimated that for the 12 months of 1954 rubber exports from 
Vietnam alone to the United States amounted to slightly over $21.5 
million.
One interesting aspect of the dollars earned through rubber exports
' to the United States is that the exporters are allowed to retain 15
percent of those dollars for their own account in the United States 
with the remaining 85 percent being reserved by the governments of 
Vietnam and Cambodia for governmental balance of payment purposes.
No large stocks of smoked sheets or crepe rubber are stored and
accumulated within Indochina at any one time. Shipments out of Saigon 
normally follow processing at the plantations, after about a 60-day 
period. Monthly exports from Indochina are usually heaviest from 
July to January followed by a lower level of movements during the spring 
and summer months (Table 21). Exports from Indochina into the world 
market comprise such a small percentage of the total rubber trade 
that it has very little or no effect on world prices of raw rubber.
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France 4,30S 6,609 1,539 22 12,498U. S. A. 29,192 6,808 122 1 36,123
England 2,056 10 2,066
Singapore 300 367 1,204 1,891





Mexico 60S 28 6 642
Algeria 5 5Canada 65 85
Venezuela 15 15
Egypt 2 2
Total 3S,220 13,968 2,865 29 55,082
For Vietnam only. Total exports of rubber from a U  Indochina in 
1954 amounted to 72,600 metric tons.
Sources: Rubber Statistical BuUetin, Saigon: 1954; Trade data supplied
by the syndicat of Rubber Planters of Indochina.
Furthermore, v/it-h. the exception of the production from the Michelan 
Rubber Company^ plantations, Indochina rubber apparently enjoys very 
little favoratism in the French trade. Thus, Indochinese rubber must 
sell on a strictly competitive basis, pricewise, with other natural 
rubber export countries.
A disturbing element amongst rubber interests of Indochina during 
recent years has been the instability of prices received for rubber. 
During 1952, for example, prices dropped from about 15 piasters per 
kilogram during February to 10.50 piasters during October. Prices
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c tons) - -
January 5,269 362 722 162 .4 6,515February 2,405 182 749 65 3,401
March 1,404 94 924 67 2,489
April 1,923 171 797 180 3,091
May 2,564 251 770 271 2.3 3,858June 2,335 394 593 193 4*9 3,519July 4,007 368 1,132 280 5,788
August 3,043 322 754 319 4.3 4,442September 3,630 329 1,029 166 9.7 5,216
October 3,651 405 801 419 5,277
November 2,735 295 761 138 .4 3,930
December 5,252 442 1,270 603 7.3 7,575
Total 38,219 3,667 10,301 2,865 29.5 55,082
** Data obtained from Indochina Rubber Planters Syndicat.
went up to 15 piasters again during late January 1953 but dropped to 
11*50 piasters during the summer of that year. With high original 
development and installation costs, increased production costs (security, 
mobile guards, inflation, etc.) rubber producers complain about this 
price fluctuation and instability* In view of increased production 
of synthetic rubber and the internal political situation, there is very 
little incentive to expand output or to plant new seedlings. Further­
more, plantation owners are hesitant to embark upon a program of large- 
scale replacement of old trees with young seedlings (a very costly 
transformation) in view of the present political situation in South 
Vietnam. Native Vietnamese activities in rubber tree plantings have 
never played a very important part from the standpoint of total pro­
duction. A few small and scattered plantations were established by
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Vietnamese interests before World War H ,  but production from these 
never exceeded five percent of the Total. For the most part small 
owners were unable financially to afford armed guards to the extent 
that the larger plantation owners did during Vietminh activities with 
the result that most of the smaller plantations remain in complete 
ruin today. In fact, since 1945 production statistics include the 
production of only those plantations above 1,300 acres in size, it 
being estimated that the output of all plantations below 1,300 acres 
does not exceed two percent of the total. This serves to point up 
the size of individual holdings by foreigners— with one syndicated 
group owning over 54,000 acres.
Thus, contrary to Malaya and other Southeast Asia rubber areas, 
large-scale plantations, developed by foreigners, with large capital 
investment in equipment, processing plants, buildings, transportation 
equipment, etc., is the rule. It is without doubt that such large- 
scale operations contribute to both efficiency in production and control 
of quality of the product. It has been suggested by responsible Indo­
chinese authorities that the large rubber estates be broken up into 
small plots and allocated to the laborers presently working on those 
plantations. However desirable such a move might appear to be from a 
sociological and political viewpoint, it would be a tragic and costly 
mistake financially for several reasons. In the first place, the 
large plantations practice what is termed "controlled bleeding" of the 
trees, thus effectuate both uniformity and controlled quality of the 
latex and preservation of the trees for a longer period of profitable 
production. Secondly, only by having full control of the liquid latex
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at its source can the larger processing plants be operated efficiently 
and profitably with the resulting uniformity of the finished smoked 
sheet rubber* In the third instance, plantation owners have invested 
heavily in land clearing and cultivation equipment since the war in an 
effort to overcome the labor shortage caused by the war; it is doubtftil 
if this equipment could be profitably operated on small, sub-divided, 
individual holdings* Finally, removal of foreign owners can be expected 
to result in a managerial vacuum in most instances which would be most 
detrimental to continued production and marketing efficiency and would 
result in high production costs and poor quality rubber.
Labor: As previously noted, contract coolie labor (mostly Tonkinese)
played a very important role in the early days of rubber development 
in Indochina. Though animal power (mostly elephants) and fire were used 
in the original land clearing, human labor was used almost exclusively 
in planting and cultivating the trees. Before World War II "immigrant" 
laborers on rubber plantations amounted to about 70,000, but this number 
was considered by rubber plantation managers insufficient to fully 
exploit the acreage then exploitable and rubber plantations have always 
had a demand for laborers larger than the supply available. During 1945, 
the number of laborers on rubber plantation stood at 60,000, but following 
eruption of the Vietminh rebel activities this labor force decreased 
rapidly and by November, 1952 only 35,000 remained. Undoubtedly, many 
plantation laborers joined the rebel ranks.
Several reports have been written about plantation laborers— some 
by plantation owners themselves and others by disinterested parties—  
all endeavoring to point up the position of the laborers, their standard
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of living, health and housing conditions, etc. labor recruiting has 
always been a big problem facing plantations. Since no recruiting is 
permissable without governmental authorization, the government of 
Vietnam has always been in a position to greatly influence the labor 
force on the plantations. The most recent authorization to recruit 
labor was granted by the government on June 1, 1951* However, because 
of war conditions this authorization did not result in any large-scale 
recruiting. With government authorization, the greatest handicaps to 
labor recruiting have been the hesitancy to move, or the immobility of 
the Tonkinese, and the difference in wages and cost of living between 
north and south Vietnam. A laborer woxild not move from the north 
unless he was guaranteed as high or higher wages as he received when 
working in Tonkin, notwithstanding the many benefits he received when 
working on the plantations and the lower cost of living.
Present conditions may not always have existed, but the extra 
benefits (in addition to wages) furnished laborers and their families 
by the larger plantations in Indochina could well serve as a standard 
for Southeast Asia. A visit to the area should convince even the most 
skeptical that the housing, school, medical care, recreational oppor­
tunities, basic food items, and other benefits furnished by plantation 
owners, either free or at a nominal charge, affords plantation workers 
with a living standard far superior to that of the average Vietnamese 
family.
Though the labor force has decreased greatly during recent years 
and plantation owners complain of a perpetual shortage of labor, it is 
obvious that the actual need for laborers on plantations has decreased. 
This is because the former method of hand clearing of land and the
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hand method of cultivation and care have to a large extent been 
replaced by mechanical equipment in which most plantation have invested 
heavily. On many plantations about the only operation still done 
wholly by hand is "bleeding" the rubber trees. In addition, moderni­
zation of the processing plants on the plantations also has contributed 
to reducing the number of laborers required and increasing the efficiency 
of production.
There have been serious discussions in various circles about 
moving a substantial number of Tonkinese war refugees onto rubber 
plantations and thus help relieve the refugee resettlement problem. 
However, it is doubtful if, under the circumstances noted above, any 
large number of refugee families could be profitably and effectively 
employed on the rubber plantations.
Livestock and Animal Husbandry
The scarcity of draft animals is one of the main problems that
fanners in Indochina are faced with today. This is especially the case
in Vietnam. Cambodian farmers are established husbandrymen for the
most part, and under normal conditions Cambodia is a source of both
meat and draft animals for Vietnam. At the end of World War II
Cambodia had approximately 600,000 head of water buffaloes and 1.2 
53million cattle. ^ The movement of draft animals from Cambodia into 
Vietnam in 1949 amounted to 37*000 cattle and about 10,000 water buffa­
loes. It is estimated that the animal population in Cambodia has remained
^ Annuaire Statistique de l fIndochine. 1947-4#* p. 102.
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54about the same since 1947. All official statistics concerning animals 
in Indochina are rough estimates at best and they are so labeled in the 
official publications in which they are published.
In all of Vietnam the total number of both cattle and water 
buffaloes was about 2.4 millions in 1947j out of that number, 1.4 
millions consisted of water buffaloes. Thus, in 1947 there was one 
head of cattle or water buffalo for every two farm families. It is 
estimated that 75 percent of those an.imal3 were actually draft animals. 
However, guerilla warfare in most of the country resulted in a large 
decrease in the animal population and in 1951 it was estimated that 
not over 373,000 cattle and water buffaloes remained in Vietnam. Of 
this number about 91*000 were in the Tonkin delta, 103,000 in Aimam, 
and about 179,000 in Cochinchina.^ This would indicate a ratio of 
one head of cattle or water buffalo for every 12 farm families for all 
of Vietnam, and a ratio of one for every 15 farm families in the Tonkin 
delta. If 75 percent of the animals were being used for draft purposes, 
this would indicate a ratio of one draft animal for every 15 farm 
families in Vietnam and one for every 20 farm families in Tonkin.
Elevate en Indochine. Supplement au Bulletin de Reseignement 
Economioue. Saigon: April, 1947«
55^Annuaire Bleu, op. cjt., p. 102.
56Government authorities estimate five persons as being the 
average number of people per rural household. This is the estimate 
most frequently given for all of Indochina and no distinction is made 
between various regions— north, central, or south. However, from 
numerous personal observations of the large number of children spilling 
out of almost every straw hut (pailotte) in all rural areas of Indochina, 
this figure appears to be a gross under*-estimate.
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The need for draft animals is so acute and the part that they 
could play in the rehabilitation of abandoned rice lands is so great, 
especially in Cochinchina, that a total of $350,000 of American aid 
funds were allocated to Vietnam for the purchase of draft animals 
in Thailand for importation into the country during the fiscal year 
1955-56. In addition, a total of $225,000 of American aid funds is 
earmarked for the importation of breeding animal stock. In addition, 
about $500,000 of local counterpart currency is being provided to 
expand the Vietnamese animal breeding program during that same period. 
This amounts to about $1.1 million of American aid funds destined 
to contribute to an increased livestock population.
Producing a crop of rice ■without the use of either animal or 
mechanical power is not a new or recent experience to Tonkinese fanners. 
Even during the pre-war years when the animal population was at its 
highest level there was only one draft animal for every three farm 
families in that region. The traditional method of plowing and land 
cultivation there has always been and still remains, human power on the 
end of a hoe handle. The reason for this situation is quite simple to 
determine. Rural population density in that area is so great, the 
average size of land holding is so small and fields are so subdivided 
that there is literally no place for cattle or water buffaloes. There 
is no grass or pasturage available for animals. A small amount of 
grass may occasionally grow on the snail dikes and levees bordering 
the fields but these dikes are so narrow and so trespassed upon by man 
(in many areas they are the only dry paths available for communication) 
that grass growth is greatly restricted.
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The situation with respect to pasturage for draft animals improves 
somewhat in Annam and Cochinchina where sufficient grass is usually 
available during the rainy season to keep draft animals alive. But 
during the long dry season, finding forage for animals becomes quite 
an important problem even for farmers with relatively large holdings, 
because during this period of drought very little green grass is to 
be found anywhere in Indochina.
There is an animal husbandry service (Servd.ce d’Elevage)
established under French Administration in each of the three states
within the Department of Agriculture, and under the supervision of
a Chief of Service, who is a veterinarian. The organization also
cemprises chiefs of districts and a provincial agent in each province.
This service agency has accomplished very little toward improving
the livestock situation in Indochina. Its functions call for little
more than enumeration and vaccination, but it has done very little
of either of these functions except livestock vaccination during 
57epedimics. This agency has under its control and supervision one 
livestock "experimental" station and two poultry stations. Pure breeds 
of animal and poultry were imported from Australia, Thailand and other 
neighboring countries for the expressed purpose of breeding and dis­
tribution of offspring to farms. However, up to the present very 
little breeding or distribution has been forthcoming. These stations 
are little more than show places designed to impress dignitaries who
■^See the 1952 report by J. VI. Patton, Veterinary Officer with 
the United States Special Technical and Economic Mission to Indochina, 
on the Functions and Accompli shments of the Veterinary Service in 
Indochina.
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are brought periodically to visit and "inspect”• The poultiy stations1 
main contribution has probably been furnishing fresh eggs for chiefs 
of provinces and other high governmental officials —  with very little 
distribution of hatching eggs or baby chicks to farmers except on rare 
occasions of visits by government officials to those stations.
Although the extent of range land in the plateaux and hilly areas 
comprise a very large portion of the total land area of Indochina, 
it is unlikely that animal production on a large commercial scale will 
ever be established. The main reason for this is that for an average 
period of about five months every year drouth conditions prevent grass 
growth over most of the country and, except for rice, very little feed 
grain is grown. Even with increased production of corn in Cambodia 
sufficient for livestock feeding, the cost of transporting it to the 
upper plateaux and hilly range areas would make it uneconomical and 
prohibitive for use as livestock feed* There have been some attempts 
by French interests to establish commercial livestock production in 
these hilly areas but most of these have met with financial failure. 
During 1955 the owner of the only remaining French livestock ranch 
in Indochina offered all of his meat and draft cattle for sale to the 
American Aid fiLssion because expenses of keeping cattle during the dry 
period were too high to make commercial cattle raising a profitable 
venture in that area*
The diet of the average Indochinese family contains very little 
animal products. The per capita meat consumption is estimated at H  
kilograms (24.2 pounds) per year of which duck and pork make up 
probably 75 percent. The duck population in the rice areas outnumbers 
chickens by as much as ten to one* There are no official or unofficial
12a
estimates of the swine population, however, it probably ranks second to
the number of ducks* Usually every rural household has at least one
pig* The best available indication of the relative importance of hogs
and cattle is the official statistics concerning controlled slaughtering
of animals in government-supervised slaughter houses. Latest official
data available are for the year 1943 when 117,000 cattle and water
53buffaloes were slaughtered compared with 553,000 hogs. However, 
while these figures are probably fairly accurate for cattle and water 
buffaloes, since very few of those are slaughtered without government 
control, they probably grossly understate the total number of hogs 
slaughtered in the countiy. A large number of hogs are slaughtered 
on the farms by fanners themselves without government control or 
supervision and are not represented in government statistics.
Machines Versus Hand Tools
The Indochinese peasant has no machinery and very little metal 
at his disposal. Simple and rudimentary agricultural hand tools are 
relatively inexpensive, and the peasant farmer often makes most of 
them himself. Over much of the older, over-populated regions of the 
country, the only pieces of metal to be found are crude plow shares, 
spades and hoes, and small scythes used for cutting the rice heads at 
harvest time (Figure VI).
Me chanination:
Mechanization is unknown except on the large rice and rubber 
^Annuaire Statistjque de 1'Indochina« 1947-43, p. 103.
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Figure VI. Crude Agricultural Hand TooIb Used by Indochina Farmers.
A large proportion of the land cultivation work in Indochina 
is performed by hand, utilizing primitive tools.
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plantations. A large portion of the land in the newly—settled flooded 
plains of the Mekong River delta in Cochinchina is never plowed. Prep­
aration of the land for rice consists simply of cutting the grass just 
below the water level with a long knife, winnowing the grass in the 
center of the field and transplanting rice seedlings directly into the 
mud among the stubble (Figure VII). Over much of the remaining rice 
land the hoe and spade are the only implements utilized in land prep­
aration. Lack of proper land preparation and cultivation accounts 
partly for the relatively low rice yields obtained in Indochina. The 
fact that proper land preparation through the use of more and better 
equipment and machinery would result in increased rice yields is obvious.
In Cochinchina, there is the possibility for utilizing mechanical 
equipment on a cooperative ownership and use, or on a rental basis.
In that section of the countiy some of the larger farms and plantations 
are already relativelj7- highly mechanized. However, because of the 
extremely high degree of land parcelization in many areas of Tonkin and 
Annam, it is doubtful if mechanical cultivation of the land will ever 
be feasible. In those areas, hand cultivation and/or plowing in very 
close quarters with one water buffalo and a small plow appear to be 
there to stay.
Over 95 percent of the rice produced in Indochina is cut by hand, 
threshed by hand, spread out on mats to dry and cleaned on the farms 
by hand. Also, about the same amount is transported to the "delivery 
point", usually by the side of a local road or barge landing along a 
canal or stream, on human backs.
Rice Threshing: There are three methods most commonly employed
in threshing rice by hand in Indochina. One of these consists of simply
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Figure VII. Land Preparation and Rice Transplanting in Indochina.
In some areas rice land is never plowed prior to planting 
the crop. Land preparation consists of cutting the previous 
year's rice stubbles and weeds just below the water level. 
Rice seedlings are then transplanted directly into the mud.
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beating the heads of rice against a piece of wood or stone and letting 
the heads of rice fall either on the ground or on mats spread out for 
that purpose. Another method consists of beating the heads against 
wooden slats at the bottom of a large bamboo basket and letting the 
grain fall into the basket. The third method is practiced widely by 
farmers who have draft animals available and consists of piling the 
heads of rice in a circular row and walking the animals over the grain 
until they separate from the straw. Cleaning of rice is all done by 
winnowing. Figure VIII shows one of the various methods used by 
Indochinese rice farmers for rice threshing and cleaning. No estimates 
have been made of the percentage of losses occurring in these primitive 
threshing and cleaning methods but undoubtedly losses are quite high.
Minimizing these losses occasioned by the hand methods of threshing 
rice would contribute materially to the net yields and total quantity of 
rice produced. There is very little place in Indochina for large rice 
combines, (except on a few large plantations where they are already 
introduced) because: (l) a large portion of the total rice land is cut 
up into very small fields bordered by narrow, hand-made dikes, which 
would make it very uneconomical to utilize combines, and (2) over a 
large portion of the area where large plots of rice land are found, 
water normally stands two to three feet in depth on rice land at harvest 
time, and about the only method feasible for cutting the rice is the one 
presently used— i.e., standing in water up to the waist and cutting the 
rice with a tend scythe.
However, there is a place in Indochina for snail, hand-operated or 
motor-driven mechanized rice threshers of the types manufactured in 
Japan. This type of equipment is being introduced and used in some
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Figure VIII, One Method of Rice Threshing and Cleaning Employed 
Extensively In Some Sections of Indochina*
Methods employed in rice harvesting and threshing are 
primitive. In addition to the practice of letting oxen 
pull bamboo rollers over the rice as shown here, other 
methods of separating the paddy from the straw consist 
of beating the grain against slats in a large bamboo 
basket or against rocks or other objects, Paddy cleaning 
on the farm is done by the winnowing method and most on- 
the-farm storage consists of bamboo bins pictured above.
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areas. It has so far proven to be an economic asset especially when 
utilized on a cooperative basis by several neighboring farmers (Figure 
IX). Both private individuals and government agencies plan the 
importation from Japan of this equipment in greater quantities but the 
main drawback to quantity imports lies in the absence of foreign currency 
exchange.
Irrigation: Improvements and progress that can be and are being
made in the irrigation system and water-lifting devices have been 
mentioned previously. Need for such improvements is real and urgent 
(Figure X). However, lacking private capital and initiative, the 
governments of Indochina must of necessity step in and help in this 
needed function. Present plans call for government ownership, control, 
supervision and maintenance of the water reservoir and distributing 
systems and the larger pumping stations being established. Under this 
plan, benefitting farmers will pay to the government one-fifth of the 
rice crop for the use of water from these government irrigation systems. 
It is anticipated that &' number of smaller water pumps will be furnished 
at cost by the government to small groups of fanners who will utilize 
those pumps on a cooperative basis. Reimbursement to the government 
of the price of the pumps will be made over a period of years out of a 
water-use tax; assessed against the benefitting farmers on a per-acre 
basis.
Increasing Agricultural Production
A very comprehensive study of the possibilities for increasing per 
acre yields as well, as total agricultural production in Indochina was 
made for the French High Commissioner General by a group of agricultural
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Figure IX* Threshing Rice by the Traditional Method and with the Use of 
a Portable, Foot-operated Threshing Machine,
Small, portable rice threshing machines manufactured in Japan 
are a great improvement over the method of beating the grains 
against slats in a bamboo basket now prevalent in Indochina.
More Japanese-type thresters are needed and their use by farmers 
on a cooperative basis should be encouraged*
13 6
Figure X, Methods of Lifting Irrigation Water Commonly Practiced in 
Indochina*
Human power is utilized almost exclusively in lifting irriga­
tion water in Indochina* Primitive methods are inefficient, 
time-consuming and a great waste of human energy* Improving 
the methods of irrigation and water-lifting would contribute 
materially to increased total rice output*
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5Qtechnicians during 1947 and 194#.'' This group of technicians made 
its evaluations of crop production and agricultural expansion possibil­
ities on the basis of two consecutive five-year programs beginning in 
194# and ending in 195#. In regard to rice production, emphasis was 
placed on further development of irrigation and water control facilities 
including the completion of the system of larger canals begun by the 
French in both the Mekong and Red River deltas and in Cambodia with 
government funds and resources. The program also would get property 
ovmers to complete the system of secondary canals on their land at their 
own expense and with their own means. According to this plan the area 
of tillable rice land in Indochina would be increased from 5.7 to 6.0 
million hectares (l6 million acres) by the end of the second five-year 
period in 195#.
As an additional means of increasing the total production of rice 
the greater use of commercial fertilisers, rat control and wider use 
of improved seed rice is recommended. As a result of these measures 
an increase in total rice production from 6.5 million tons before the 
war to 7.9 million tons at the end of the 10-year period (195#) is 
considered by the study to be feasible (Figure XI). Howpver, the report 
points out that it is very unlikely that total rice exports will exceed 
pre-war levels because of greater domestic consumption as a result of 
increased population and greater purchasing power of the laboring class, 
particularly if some further industrilization occurs.
^Premier Rapport de la Sous-Commission de Modernization de 
l!Indochinet Presidence du Consiel, Saigon; November, 194#.
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Figure XI* Effects of Commercial Fertilizer on Rice Growth in Indochina*
Most of the cultivated soils in Indochina are deficient in the 
basic plant nutrients, especially nitrogen* Relatively low 
farm prices received for paddy makes it almost inpossible for 
farmers to utilize commercial fertilizers profitably. Wider 
use needs to be made of green manure crops, compost and rich 
alluvial mud from the canals and shallow rivers*
The effects that improvements in irrigation and water control 
facilities would have on rice acreage expansion and increased rice 
production have been dealt with in the previous section. Undoubtedly, 
the one area in which the greatest, most rapid, and most profitable 
improvements could be achieved in Indochina is that of increasing 
output per acre of land now under cultivation. Increases in the yield 
per acre of rice land offer the greatest possibilities because about 
85 percent of the total land area under permanent cultivation is used 
for rice production, and rice yields in Indochina compare unfavorably 
with the yields obtained in other rice producing countri.es in Southeast 
Asia. By comparison, in Japan rough rice yields average about 3j400 
pounds per acre; in Thailand 1,400 pounds; whereas during the best 
pre-war years the average in Indochina was only about 1,000 pounds. 
Japanese rice yields are about three and one-half times as high as those 
of Indochina.
Proper fertilization of rice lands, better farming practices 
including proper land preparation, use of improved and higher-yielding 
seed stock and an adequate supply of irrigation water would all con­
tribute to increasing per acre yields of rice. In addition, better 
conservation and utilization of rice produced cotild be obtained through 
better methods of harvesting, especially rice threshing, and proper 
storage after harvest. Each year large amounts of rice are lost from 
rain and rodents damage of paddy stored in the primitive and very 
inadequate bamboo bins. Gourou estimated before World War II that as 
much as 10 percent of the rice harvest was destroyed each year by rats
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60in Indochina. Since very little ef fort toward controlling rodents 
has been made since the war and interior storage facilities have 
deteriorated, it is probable that the losses have increased considerably*
Fertiliser: It is estimated that about 50 percent of the cultivated 
land in Indochina is deficient in both nitrogen and phosphorus, and 
about 30 percent deficient in potassium for satisfactory crop production. 
However, in normal years only about five percent of the cultivated land 
receives any chemical fertilizers. In the reports of Gourou and the 
Subcommission on the Modernization of Indochina it is pointed out that 
the high cost of fertilizers in relation to rice prices limits its 
use.^ But the availability of chemical fertilizer at relatively low 
cost xidll still not make it possible in most cases for peasant farmers 
to utilize it to any great extent as long as fluids needed for its 
purchase can be obtained only at usurous rates of interest.
During the years immediately preceding World War II an average of
11.000 metric tons of chemical fertilizers were imported into Indochina 
each year, of which about 6,000 tons consisted of nitrogen fertilizer,
3.000 tons of phosphates, and about 2,000 metric tons of potash fer­
tilizers. Imports of fertilizer are almost exclusively under French 
control, and most of the chemical fertilizers are utilized on the 
larger plantations, especially those owned by Frenchmen.
The average peasant farmer usually makes an effort to obtain all 
of the fertilizer he can without any cash outlay. Wide uses are made 
of human excrements and animal manure, ashes from the rice straw burned
^Gourou, op. cit. . p. 390.
^^Premier Rapport de la Sons-Commission de Modernization de 
_!* In do chine, op. cit., p. 130.
HI
for fuel, and mud froa ponds and ditches. Other forms of fertilizers 
produced locally are oilcake and fish paste.
Thex'e ax's rather important deposits of phosphate rock in North 
Vietnam but very little effort has been made to fully exploit these 
resources and manufacture ground phosphate fertilizer. Realizing the 
importance of the part chemical fertilizers could play in contributing 
to increased rice yields in Indochina, the French Modernization Commission 
included a few projects for the production of nitrogenous and phosphatic 
fertilizers within the country. However, it appears that the most 
feasible way in which the fertility of the land owned and cultivated by 
Indochinese peasants could be increased is not through the wider use of 
chemical fertilizers but through increased cultivation of green manure 
cropsf making more extensive use of compost, greater utilization of mud 
from the canals and ponds, using rice straw for the production of compost 
rather than burning it as fuel, and providing ground limestone obtained 
from the hilly areas at a low price to the peasant farmers.
Social Problems: Improving yields and increasing the productivity
of the average farm family will not in itself offer the full remedy for 
miserable farm life in Indochina. Even during good crop years the 
average farm family usually is unable to retain a sufficient part of 
what it produces to avoid some degree of malnutrition.
A way must be found, through improvements in the credit, land 
tenure, landlord-tenant relationships, and marketing systems, to make 
it possible for the average farm family to be able to retain a larger 
portion of the harvest for its own consumption and benefit. The pro­
blem of equitable distribution of the produce of the land is as grave
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as is the problem of low productivity. To be sure, improving productivity 
per farm worker through more efficient production methods and greater 
yields will lessen the acuteness of the problem but this alone will 
never solve the agrarian problems of Indochina.
CHAPTER VI
LAND OWNERSHIP AND TENURE RELATIONS
The intensity of the problems of land ownership and tenure relations 
varies in the different regions and states of Indochina. In the Tonkin 
delta farming area the problem relates primarily to the large number of 
farm families upon the available land supply, the intensive subdivision 
and parcelization of land holdings and the extremely small amount of 
land available to the average farm family. This situation improves 
only slightly in Central Vietnam. The problem of absentee ownership 
is not as acute in the north and central parts of Vietnam and Cambodia 
as it is in South Vietnam. In South Vietnam the problem revolves around 
the share-cropper system of crop production, absentee landlords, insecurity 
of tenure, and the fact that only a relatively small percentage of the 
farmers own the land they cultivate.
Size of Farms and Extent of Farm Land Ownership
The degree of subdivision of agricultural land and the pressure 
of population in the various parts of the country are best illustrated 
by Table 22 which classifies the landowners of North, Central, and 
South Vietnam and Cambodia according to the size of their holdings.
In the deltas of North and Central Vietnam, the Annamese custom 
of dividing property equally among all of the children has resulted in 
very small-sized land holdings, which in the majority of instances, 
are divided up into many tiny parcels (Figure XII). In North Vietnam 
62 percent of land-owning farm families have less than 0.9 acre of land 
from which they attempt to make their living, and an additional 30
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3ill*.
Figure XII. Physical Patterns of Rice Fields in South and North Vietnam.
The practice of subdividing the land equally among each 
member of the family has resulted in very small landholdings 
and excessive parcelization of the land in North Vietnam. In 
South Vietnam large landholdings usually are divided into small 
plots and rented out to sharecroppers*
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Table 22. Land Owners in Indochina Classified According to Size of 
Their Holdings!/












North Vietnam Central Vietnam
2/Under 1 acrer- 594,000 61.6 450,000 63.7
1-5 acres 283,000 29.9 165,000 25.2
5-10 acres 60,000 6.2 31,000 4.7
10-50 acres 21,000 2.2 3,500 1.3
50-100 acres 800 0.1 300 0.1
Over 100 acres 200 negl. 50 negl.
Total 964,000 100.0 654,350 100.0
South Vietnam Cambodia^
Under 2.5 acres 66,000 33.7 25,000 20.9
2.5-12.5 acres 97,000 33.0 72,000 60.2
12.5-25 acres 33,000 14.9 13,000 15.0
25-125 acres 23,000 11.0 4,400 3.7
125-250 acres 3,600 1.4 100 0.1
250-1250 acres 2,400 0.9 40 negl.
Over 1250 acres 200 0.1 10 negl.
Total 255,200 100.0 119,550 100.0
This classification is obtained from Henry Ives’ study of 1932 
■which is still considered by the governments of Indochina as the 
official one.
— The original size class was in tenns of mau which in North Vietnam 
equals 0.39 acre and in Central Vietnam equals 1.24 acre. In this 
table mau have been converted to acres on a one-to-one basis.
1/ Includes only the three rice provinces of Battambang, Preiveng, and 
Soairieng.
Sources: Henry Yves, Economie Agricole de 1»Indochine- Hanoij 1932,
pp. 66-94;
Governmental Decree of May 30. 1954 concerning landlord-tenant 
relations in Vietnam. Preface to Presentation. Saigon; 1954.
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percent have less than 4.0 acres. In Central Vietnam the situation is
almost as badj 69 percent of the peasant farm families own less than
1.2 acres and an additional 25 percent have from 1.2 to 6.2 acres.
Naturally, all of these small parcels of land are cultivated by members
of the farm family and no outside help is needed. On such small acreage
it is impossible to keep and feed work animals and virtually all land
preparation is performed by hand with the use of a simple hand tool
commonly called a hoe-spade. In some cases, work animals are hired
from the larger landowners for plowing rice land. The most common
rate of repayment for the use of work animals is two man days of work
at either rice transplanting or harvesting time for each day a work
animal is hired during plowing time. This reflects very vividly the
fact that, from the standpoint of economic valuation, the four legs of
a water buffalo are worth four strong arms and two human backs in the
over-populated Red River delta of Indochina.
An example of the extent of the subdivision of land in the Tonkin
delta is cited by Yves who relates that the Forestry Service, wishing
to lease two and a half hectares of high rice land (5 3/4 acres) for
use as plant nurseries, had to deal with 76 owners who shared this land
62and to sign 76 separate rental contracts. Yves is of the opinion that 
the decrease in the size of holdings in the Tonkin delta has not affected 
all land owners evenly, and is somewhat critical of the French adminis­
tration for having made it possible for some owners to increase the size 
of their holdings while the size of the holdings of the vast majority 
of farmers was decreasing. The new trade potentials opened up by
^Henry Yves, Economic Agricole de l’Indochine, Hanoi, 1932,p. 111.
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improvements in transportation and the abundance of credit to those who
could furnish necessary credentials have encouraged the creating of
rather large estates amidst a sea of garden-sized holdings. The revenue
from these estates made it possible for ambitious and clever growers
to supply demands for credit, food and other items needed in production
what were practically unknown in the old system of closed economy, but
which had developed with the economic evolution brought about through
the activities and under the leadership of the Europeans. As a result
of this many large estates have come into existance since French
occupation of the area and many farmers who formerly were owners of
63small plots have now become tenant farmers. ^
In previous studies of land ownership and tenancy in the Tonkin 
delta the proportion of farm families who owned no land at all or of 
those veiy small landowners who had to rent part of the land which they 
cultivated was not determined. According to Gourou, in one province 
about one-half of the rural people registered on the tax rolls owned
64no land. He estimates that in certain areas the number of taxpayers 
either without any land at all or with less than .18 hectares (.41 
acres) is about 63 percent of the total rural population.
The larger estates have been accumulated usually through the 
purchase of land which had been forfeited or on which loans at 
exhorbitant rates of interest had been made. For the most part, the 
cultivation of those lands remained in the hands of small cultivators
^Henry Yves, Economic Agricole de l ^ndochine, Hanoi, 1932,
p. 108.
^Pierre Gourou, L*Uti ~1 -i zation du Sol en Indochine Francaise.
New York, 1945, p. 360.
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(farmers or sharecroppers) whose burden and low standard of living was
usually increased by their debts. Robequain remarks on this subject
that speculation in land, inadvertently encouraged by the French
administration, on occasion has also involved communal lands, through
65the complicity of the mandarins and village head-men.
In some parts of Indochina, the village community owns part of the 
land comprising its territory. The largest part of this consists of 
land originally granted by the state to the village with the right of 
usufruct. Historically, people deprived of rice fields could turn to 
the communal lands for support. The cultivation of communal land was 
shared periodically by the landless peasants of the village. It is 
estimated that prior to World War II such communal lands represented 
approximately 20 percent of the total cultivated land area in North 
Vietnam, 25 percent in Central Vietnam, but only about 3 percent in 
South Vietnam the most recently populated region of Vietnam. In the 
past, these communal lands played an important role in counterbalancing 
the inequalities in private land ownership. However, under French 
administration such importance has diminished. Community-owned lands 
have diminished in area, and speculations in renting communal lands 
by village authorities have caused discontent on the part of the 
peasants. Communal lands are still being purchased by larger land­
owners in the Tonkin delta. Therefore, it is to the interest of the 
peasant landless class to maintain, and if possible, to increase the 
area of .communal lands.
65•^Robequain, op. cit.. p. 83.
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In Cambodia most of the peasant farmers cultivate less than 11.0 
acres if the land is river bottom land, or from 11.0 to 30.0 acres if 
they own land at a distance from a river, or hilly land. Large private 
estates and absentee ownership of land is not a problem in Cambodia. 
Most of the land holdings are owner-cultivated and all of the land 
not cultivated for a period of five years reverts to the Cambodian 
government.
In South Vietnam, or Cochinchina, 72 percent of the rice land 
holdings are less than 12.5 acres in size; 15 percent are from 12.5 to 
25 acres; 11 percent from 25 to 125 acres; and less than 3 percent of 
rice land oxvners have more than 125 acres. (Rubber land holdings are 
purposefully excluded from these figures.)
In Worth Vietnam only 17 percent of the total cultivated area is 
owned by persons holding more than 8.9 acres, which there is considered 
to represent the lower limit of a large holding. By contrast, in South 
Vietnam holdings larger than 125 acres (considered to be the lower 
limit of a large holding in that region) take up 45 percent of the 
total cultivated land area. If the medium-sized holdings from 12.5 
to 125 acres are added to the large holdings, one finds that 87 percent 
of the cultivated area in South Vietnam is owned by persons holding 
more than 12.9 acres compared with only 17 percent of land owners 
holdings more than 8.9 acres in North Vietnam.
There is a very much variation in the size of land holdings among 
the various regions of South Vietnam. Robequain is somewhat critical 
of the French policies in the settlement of the new lands in the Mekong 
delta, which, to him, are responsible for the very uneven distribution 
of land holdings in that area.
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In essence, the following is his explanation for the present land-
ownership situation in the Mekong delta:
"The economic evolution set in motion by the French 
occupation has operated here for a longer time, but the main 
factor has been the rapid expansion of rice growing in the 
vast regions which had previously been waste lands and had 
been made immediately cultivable by canal construction.
Western techniques naturally produced quicker and more imr- 
pressive results from virgin soil than on land that had 
already been cultivated by the Indochinese. This explains 
why in the ’old provinces’ of eastern and central Cochin- 
china, the estates are still relatively small in size, 
although they are larger than those in the northern deltas.
As a rule the owner himself cultivates at least some of 
his fields and supervises the work on the remainder— which 
is entrusted to tenant farmers who are easily recruited in 
the vicinity, as in Tonkin, from among those having no 
property at all or veiy little.
"In the western provinces, on the other hand, new lands 
were not brought into production by small-scale native 
colonists. To be sure this is regrettable, but the French 
administration has some justification; the construction of 
canals was very expensive and it seemed logical to sell the 
land cheaply to the buyer best able to develop it quickly.
Only rich natives and those able to borrow applied. (Mostly 
Frenchmen.) This was the origin of large estates held by a 
single proprietor. While the percentage of landowners with 
from one to five hectares is 80.2 percent in the central 
province of Mytho and 71.7 percent in Cochinchina as a whole, 
it is much lower in the Transbassac provinces; 49.9 percent 
in Rachgia and 33.3 percent in Baclieu. (In these provinces 
it is not unusual for one owner to have 500 or even 1000 
hectares.)^6 Cultivation by the direct family method is no 
longer possible; on this land recently almost uninhabited, 
it is done by tenant farmers, or ta dien. who pay a specified 
amount of paddy as rent each year. Often unstable and rest­
less, these farmers, lacking funds, borrow both money and
rice from the landlord  Usually the landlords do not
live on their land but in the main town of the province and 
sometimes even outside the province; often their contacts 
with the sharecroppers are made only through their managers; 
landowner ship here is mainly speculative.
According to Henry Yves, in Baclieu province farms up to 10 
hectares comprise a total land area of 87,642 hectares; those from 10 
to 50* 93, 547 hectares; and those over 50, 144, 364 hectares. Henry 
Yves, Economic Agricole de lrIndochine, p. 152.
What Gourou, Robequain, or Yves did not mention is that in 
South Vietnam the five largest landowners hold a total of 250,000 acres 
of rice land-—and all five are French citizens.
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".......  Unwittingly and contrary to its own interest,
French colonization has led to the increase of a so-called 
•proletariat’ class in Indochina (although it should be 
pointed out that it is impossible to compare this proletariat 
with the class designated by the term in the Western World).
In this essentially rural society, it might be defined as 
including all those people who either own no land or have too 
little for their livelihood. And to this criterion of insuf­
ficient real property should be added that of uprootedness 
or 'detribalization•, as it might be termed the Annamites have 
not long since outgrown the tid.be.'*67
Systems and Types of Tenure and Tenure Relationships
In general it may be said that South Vietnam is a region of large 
land holdings, absentee landlords, sharecroppers and landless agricul­
tural workers, whereas North and Central Vietnam and Cambodia are 
regions of small peasant farmers who cultivate their own lands.
According to most reliable estimates, 98.7 percent of the agricultural 
holdings in North Vietnam, 90 percent of those in Central Vietnam, and
95.4 percent in Cambodia, but only 64 percent of the holdings in South
68Vietnam are operated by their owners.
It is estimated that in Vietnam there are approximately 4.5 million 
farm families —  but only 2.0 million farm landowners. Thus, close 
to 56 percent of all farm families in Vietnam do not own all the land 
they cultivate. The concluding statement frequently encountered that 
"North and Central Vietnam are areas of exceedingly small individual
67Robequain, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
68Note that this is a classification according to property 
owners, not farming units. Thus, a single large property owner may 
rent out his land to many tenants or sharecroppers who farm them as 
separate units, is still considered in these data as a single holding 
operated by tenants. The figures for the number of farms worked by 
their owners are therefore deceptively large.
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land owners and South Vietnam one of large land estates" is verified 
by the following: In Worth Vietnam, 62 percent of the holdings are less
than one acre in size and 92 percent are less than 5 acres, compared 
to Central Vietnam where 69 percent are less than 1.2 acres and 94 
percent are under 6 acres in size, while in South Vietnam holdings 
above 125 acres in size comprise about 50 percent of the total 
cultivated area. (Rubber plantings located mostly in South Vietnam 
are excluded from these statistics. Since they are all over 125 acres 
in size, including them would materially increase the 50 percent figure.)
Legal ownership of land is frequently one of name only. The 
owner is often practically a tenant, being obliged to make annual 
payments to the money-lender who has allowed him to remain on the 
land holdings. In addition, a large proportion of the larger land­
owners are frequently anxious to conceal the actual size of their 
holdings or actual property relations for purposes of tax evasion, 
concealment of actual wealth, etc. In some areas, inaccuracy in land 
registration and concealed transfer of ownership by special agreement 
often make it impossible to establish the actual dimensions of the 
large estates. An official inquiry into the very thickly populated 
province of Thai Binh in North Vietnam disclosed that 122,000 small 
owners with less than 0.9 acres shared 54,000 acres, whereas 253 large 
owners held 25,000 acres directly and, in addition, controlled 38,000 
acres; the legal, registered owners were in fact sharecroppers of the 
big estate owners. The situation in Central Vietnam is similar to that 
in North Vietnam.
In Cambodia tenancy is not frequent, although there also tenancy 
figures reflect legal more than economic relationship due to the strong
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influence of moneylenders. From the standpoint of legal definition of 
ownership of cultivated land, the Cambodian enjoys a certain prestige 
over his Vietnamese counterpart. In Cambodia all land not cultivated 
for five consecutive years reverts to the kingdom; whereas the govern­
ment grants legal title to a person who cultivates government-owned 
land for five successive years. However, such ownership by virtue of 
direct cultivation over a period of time is limited to five acres to 
any one farm family.
In South Vietnam, holdings above 25 acres are usually divided into 
parcels of from 2.5 to 25 acres and worked by tenants known as "ta dien" 
(Figure XII). The "ta dien" who rents less than 5 acres usually not 
only cultivates with members of his family this land but also works 
as a farm hand for other farmers in the area. Approximately 70 percent 
of the total cultivated area in South Vietnam is said to be cultivated 
by tenants. Under the most common landlord-tenant arrangement the 
"ta dien" has to clear the land of tall grass and brush growth and 
level the land; dig any drainage or irrigation ditches; cultivate the 
land; plant, irrigate, harvest, dry and transport the rice to the 
landlord’s farmstead. Rent to the land owner is usually paid in kind, 
ranging from 40 to 50 percent of the harvest. With very few exceptions, 
tenants have to borrow crop production capital from the landlord.
Interest on this type of loan averages about 10 percent per month.
Loans are usually repaid at rice harvest time, and lenders invariably 
request repayment of the principal and interest in paddy. Therefore, 
in most instances, between 60 and 70 percent of the crop remains in the 
hands of the landowner. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the landlord
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to impose upon the tenant the condition that he must obtain the land­
lord's permission to dispose of his ovm remaining portion of the crop 
to a third party.
The fact that the landowner is usually also a moneylender to
the tenant has had a very bad influence on general agricultural
6bdevelopment in Indochina. According to one source 7 the landlords 
in many cases depend more on the interest they get from the loans 
they make to their tenants than on the production from their rice 
fields. That explains why many large landowners prefer to divide 
their holdings into small, plots and rent them to tenants for primitive, 
traditional hand cultivation.
A system of land utilization based on money interest and not on 
agricultural production must finally reduce the productivity of the entire 
economy. This would appear to be especially the case in a country 
basically agricultural, where 90 percent of the population is directly 
engaged in agricultural pursuits. According to other sources, French 
colonists also shared in the money-lending practices of the native 
landlords.
Uncertainly of ovmership characterizes the land property system 
of Worth and Central Vietnam. Historically, the land ownership system 
in that part of Indochina derives from the fact that the Emperor owned 
all the land in the Tonkinese and Annamese empires and distributed it 
to those who cultivated it and paid the land tax, and also distributed 
that portion of the crop assessed to the Emperor for his "ever-normal
697Erich Jacoby, Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia, Mew York: 
Columbia University Press, 1949, p. 14&.
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granary". Thus, the right to use and own land has been based on entries 
made in the local village register used for land tax and rice collection 
purposes. However, the negligence of the local authorities (mandarins) 
in keeping accurate registers, the absence of accurate land surveys, 
and also the fact that boundary lines, consisting most frequently of 
smqll levees, were often washed away by floods and changing water 
courses have all contributed to disputes over ownership. In Vietnam, 
ownership by virtue of possession over a long period of time is not 
recognised.
In South Vietnam and in the more important provinces of Central 
and North Vietnam, and Laos, a system of land register established by 
the French in 1925 provides the basis for legal ownership. In almost 
all of Laos and in other mountainous areas, land falls into three general 
categories in terms of ownership; namely areas where ownership is 
confirmed by custom, those belonging to the community, and those used 
temporarily in ray cultivation.
The lands granted by the French administration to both French 
citizens and friendly Indochinese were obtained by virtue of an old 
Annamese custom that land remaining uncultivated for a period of three 
years or more reverted to the public domain. Long periods of internal 
wars resulted in a large portion of the land remaining in this category 
when the French administration began in 1875* ln addition to such 
public domain property, those areas of land which had been used only 
for ray cultivation were also alloted as land grants.
On the average, the land concessions granted to French colonists 
and land development companies were larger than those granted to the
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Indochinese. Nevertheless, the concessions granted to Indochinese were 
sufficiently large to have the effect of creating a special class of 
plutocracy among recipients, most of whom have become the •worst ex­
ploiters of the poor peasant farmers not only through high land rental 
rates but also through the exorbitant rates of interest they charged on 
short-term loans.
Farm Land Values
There are wide variations in the value of cultivated land in 
Indochina between different regions and within areas in any one region. 
Such variations range from as low as $30 per acre in some areas in South 
Vietnam to as high as $400 to $500 per acre in some areas in North 
Vietnam. Relative fertility or yield per acre is seldom considered 
a criteria in price determination. Land in some areas in North Vietnam 
is often sold for 10 times the money value of land of comparable fertility 
located in South Vietnam. By order of inqportance, the following factors 
appear to determine the money value of a plot of land in any area: (l)
population density in the area and the extent of the owner*s family 
ties to the land— particularly ancestors’ graves that may be situated 
on the land; (2) location of the land, related primarily to transporta­
tion avenues and facilities, either land or water, available; (3) in the 
case of rice land, irrigation water supply; and (4) fertility or yield 
(rendement).
The Indochinese farm family attaches the greatest importance to 
the presence of ancestors * graves on a certain piece of land. This 
factor is often the reason that farm peasants refuse to move off the 
land, even when in state of starvation and economic opportunities are
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far greater in another area. The pressure of population on the land 
in many areas of North and Central Vietnam, especially close to the 
larger cities, also explains the great importance attached to land by 
the peasants and is reflected in the value of land.
In areas where transportation facilities are not well developed 
(which is the case in many agricultural regions of Indochina), the 
principle that land better situated commands greater value becomes 
apparent. This is particularly true in those areas where there is 
usually an excess of production over what is needed for family con­
sumption resulting in a salable surplus. This largely explains why 
some rice land located in the interior areas far removed from a rice 
storage and milling center, but along a canal or small stream will often 
be priced three or four times more than land in the same neighborhood 
and of comparable fertility and productivity but having the a 11-inport ant 
disadvantage of being located three or four miles away from the water 
course.
For rice production, the availability of irrigation water naturally
has an influential affect on land values, and in some cases this factor
70may be responsible for a 200 percent increase in value.
70Yves, Agricultural Economy of Indochina« pp. 27&-2S0, cites 
the following examples of the effects of the various factors on the 
price of land used for farming purposes in the Tonkin dalta: (l)
Flooding of rice fields by the Mekong River overflowing with rich 
alluvial deposits resulted in increasing the value of the land affected 
by 700 percent. (2) Completion of an irrigation canal resulted in rice 
land price increases up to 200 percent. (3) Land in the province of 
Hadong located near a road or navigable stream is priced at from 3 to 5 
times more than land of equal fertility located some distance away. (4) 
Farm land in the very heavily populated area of Donglien is valued at 16 
times more than farm land of comparable fertility in a neighboring area
10 miles away due to the intensive competition for the available land.
(3) As great a factor was water supply, location and relative population 
density in determing land prices is, the existence or absence of ancestors1 
graves on the land.
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Improvements in buildings, fences, etc., play a very small role 
in land value determination primarily because such improvements normally 
are meagre. A permanent building or a fence on an Indochina farm is a 
rare sight indeed. The average value of such improvements is probably 
not over $10 per farm and consists primarily of bamboo sticks and straw 
thatching. On the contrary, greater value is attached to any dikes, 
levees or other watersretention earthen worksj all of which are built 
by hand, and constitute by far the most important improvement on the 
land.
For the above reasons, the relative fertility of the land plays 
a minor role in determining its value. The importance attached to the 
fertility of land is certainly not as large in Indochina as it is in 
Europe or in the United States.
Wherever irrigation water is available, rice takes precedence 
over all other crops for land use. However, everything else being 
equal, there appears to be very little difference between the value 
of rice and other agricultural land. No money value is attached to 
forest, swamp, and grass or range land since such land belongs to the 
state and normally can be obtained without cost through concessions. 
There is no recorded sale of such land in Indochina.
Farm Income and Level of Living
In general, the productivity, level of living, and farm income 
of the average farm family in Indochina are very low regardless of the 
yardstick used or the comparison made. In the majority of cases, low 
per capita productivity, low per acre yields, uneconomical subdivided 
parcels of land available to cultivate, and sharing a large portion of
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the total output with the landlord and money-lender all combine to 
result in the farm family being able to retain amounts of rice and 
other farm products barely sufficient for human existence.
It is estimated roughly that about 25 million people in Indochina 
are engaged in agriculture and of that number between 82 and 85 percent, 
or approximately 22 million persons, produce rice as the only crop.
Total rice production of the area during good years amounts to only 
slightly more than six million tons. This amounts to about 500 pounds 
per capita of the farm population and 600 pounds per person engaged 
in the production of rice.
Since normally no rice is imported into Indochina, total yearly 
production minus total yearly exports represent domestic disappearance. 
Only an infinitestimal quantity of grain, including rice, is fed to 
livestock and poultry. Therefore, the quantity of rice that disappears 
domestically is almost wholly for human consumption and amounts to 
about 350 pounds per capita annually.
The average farm family probably consumes the same quantity of rice 
as non-farm people which indicates that the yearly surplus, or quantity 
of rice available for sale or exchange is about 250 pounds per person 
engaged in agriculture. This quantity of rice, if sold at the average 
farm price equivalent for 1954 of four cents per pound would bring 
a return of $10. For a family of five persons, considered in official 
statistics as the average size of rural families, this would amount to 
$50 income per year above family rice needs for food. The above figures 
are based on 1954 data for all Indochina. But if the heaviiy populated 
deltas of North and Central Vietnam are considered as a separate case 
the situation presented is quite different. For example, it is estimated
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that the seven million rural people in the Tonkin delta produce normally 
about 1.9 million tons of rice annually, or about 370 pounds per person. 
It is estimated that the amount of rice left for sale or barter each 
year after home food use amounts to only 20 pounds per person, or 100 
pounds worth four dollars per average farm family of five persons.
From this quantity of rice must be deducted, the share of the crop going 
to the landlord as rent which probably amounts to all of the surplus. 
Thus, in the case of sharecroppers this indicates that no rice is left 
for sale or barter after allowing for family consumption and probably 
the only way to obtain cash is to hire members of the family as laborers 
on neighboring farms.
Rice Consumption in Relation to Production
The above calculations are made with the use of data for the year 
1952 and are based upon rice production and population figures with no 
allowances made for the quantity of rice consumed internally by dis­
tilleries, the amount lost through damage by weather and rodents, and 
the quantity of paddy used for seed.
Yves conducted a very intensive study of the internal consumption
71of rice in Indochina in 1932. It is realized that results of this 
study are outdatedj however, it is the only intensive study of this 
problem ever made and is still quoted in official documents and pres­
entations. The economic conditions of the average Indochinese farm 
family have not changed greatly since that time. Production of lice
71Henry Yves, Economie Agricole de l’Indochine, Paris: Ideo
Presse, 1932, pp. 19&-20&.
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and other crops is still done under primitive methods of cultivation 
and harvesting. Yields have not increased. Total crop production has 
increased but only in direct proportion with the increase in the number 
of farm families engaged in agriculture. The results are that the 
average farmer is not more productive today than he was a quarter of a 
century ago, his tenure conditions have not improved and he still has 
to share as large a part of his harvest with his landlord and money­
lenders as he did then. The conclusion is that the conditions reported 
by Yves are still applicable today.
For purposes of analysis, Yves divided Indochina into four regions; 
namely, North Vietnam, Central Vietnam, Cochinchina, and Cambodia. The 
per capita production of paddy was as follows: North Vietnam, 473
pounds; Central Vietnam, 513 pounds; Cambodia, 761 pounds; and 
Cochinchina, 1,433 pounds. (The above and following data are pre­
war yearly averages.)
Tonkin and North Annam Combined:
Total production................. 1.36 million metric tons of paddy
Exports (to large population centers) 250,000 " " " "
Consumed by distilleries . . . . . .  60,000 " " " 11
Seed (at rate of 40 kg. per Ha.) . . 60,000 " 11 " 1
Animal feed and loss...............  60,000 ” " M "
Human consumption................. 1.43 mil. 11 " 11 M
In addition, about 37*000 metric tons of rice flour from rice mills 
are available for human consumption. It is further estimated that the 
1.43 million tons of paddy results in about 900,000 metric tons of 
milled rice at a milling yield of 63 percent. This indicates rice 
availabilities for human consumption in the rural areas of those regions
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of about 209 pounds per person per year, or a little over one-half pound 
per capita per day, plus a small amount of rice flour used mostly for 
thickening vegetable soups.
The paddy movements to population centers and the quantity used 
by the distilleries indicate that about 310,000 tons of paddy leave 
the farms of that region in an average year. This amounts to about 
68 pounds per farm person per year that is available for either barter 
or sale. However, these 310,000 tons that move off the farms come from 
the larger farms for the most part— the farmers with smaller holdings 
seldom, if ever, have any paddy available after harvest for sale or 
barter. Yves reports that in Tonkin only the rich and the relatively 
well-to-do people are able to afford consumption of good quality rice 
throughout the year. More generally, the small peasant farm families 
can afford rice only during the 3 or 4 months immediately following 
the rice harvest. After this period they have normally consumed what 
was left to them after dividing the yearrs harvest with other interested 
parties in production and have to resort to mixtures of yams, other 
root crops and c o m  meal— rice by then being too expensive an item to 
utilize in their diet. Therefore, even amongst the rice-producing 
peasants, rice is considered a luxury food item during part of the year.
The Annamese peasant produce and consume mostly a low-quality red 
lice. This type of rice is preferred by the peasants of that region 
primarily because of the fact that it gains very much weight and volume 
during cooking— thus affording a fuller rice bowl and human stomach from 
a smaller quantity of milled rice. Yves reports that they cannot afford 
higher quality rice even during the best years.
163
Cochinchina: The average yearly pre-war production of paddy in
Cochinchina is estimated at 2.7 million metric tons. Estimated dis­
tribution of this quantity is as follows:
Exports.................. 1.3^ (million metric tons of paddy)
Consumed by distilleries. .06 " " " 1 ”
S e e d ........................ 09 " " " " "
Loss and animal feed . . .  .05 " " " ” "
Human consumption 1.12 1 " " ” ”
To the above availabilities for human consumption should be added 
about 80,000 metric tons of rice flour produced by local rice mills.
This indicates human consumption amounting to about 550 pounds of paddy, 
or 308 pounds of clean rice plus a little rice flour per capita per 
year. The data indicate that the amount of paddy available for sale 
or barter is about 3*000 pounds per farm family or 500 pounds per 
person. Yves considers the consumption figure of 300 pounds per person 
per year "normal” for the rural population of Cochinchina and remarks 
that rice prices are generally lower at the point of production in 
Cochinchina than in North and Central Vietnam due to supply factors, 
differences in transportation costs, and number and tactics of middle­
men engaged in marketing. It should also be pointed out that while 
the average peasant in Cochinchina consumes about two and one-half 
times the quantity of rice that the North and Central Vietnam peasant 
consumes, the use of yams and other root crops and corn in the diet 
is much less extensive in Cochinchina than in other regions of Indochina.
Cambodia: Before World War II the 400,000 Cambodian farm families
produced an average of about 815,000 metric tons of paddy per year. Dis­
tribution of this production was estimated by Yves to be as follows:
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Exports........................ 120,000 (metric tons of paddy)
Consumed by distilleries . . . .  30,000 " 11 " 1
Seed  .................. 35,000 " » " »
Animal feed and l o s s   30,000 " " " "
Human consumption........... . 600,000 " n " ”
These figures indicate a per capita consumption of 4S0 pounds of 
paddy per year or 300 pounds of clean rice. Pre-war per capita con­
sumption of rice by Cambodians, therefore, was only slightly less than 
the indicated consumption of peasants in Cochinchina. However, the 
average Cambodian peasant family is probably better fed than the 
Cochinchina residence since corn, sweet potatoes and other root crops 
supplement the Cambodian rice ration to a larger extent. Average yearly 
movements of paddy into the export and distilleries markets indicate 
that the quantity available for sale or barter amounts to approximately 
820 pounds per farm family or 160 pounds per person. However, this 
should not lend one to conclude that the average Cambodian farmer has 
only one-third as much paddy available for sale as his counterpart 
farmer in Cochinchina. Rather, it must be remembered that since a 
very large percentage of Cambodian farmers own the land they cultivate, 
they do not have to share their output with landlords and probably are 
able to retain a larger portion of their rice production. To this 
extent, the amount of surplus or salable paddy remaining in the hands 
of the average Cambodian farmer after harvest is probably equal to the 
amount left to the average farmer in Cochinchina after the latter has 
divided his output with the landlord in payment for rent of the land.
It should also be remembered that the data used in the analysis 
above relate to total production, disappearance, consumption and exports.
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No attempt is made to isolate the farmers* share of the total produce. 
The portion of the rice crop remaining to the peasant for his own use 
and benefit varies considerably between different regions according to 
the different circumstances relative to individual tenure arrangements, 
landlord relations, credit position and market situation. However, in 
all probability the average peasant rice farmer seldom is able to enjoy 
full use and benefit from more than 50 percent of his rice production 
in any one year. The 50 percent figure is the one most commonly used 
in official documents.
Land Taxation and Land Revenue Systems
Before 1953 land tax laws and the land taxation system of Indochina 
consisted of a wide variety of governmental ordinances and decrees, 
each one applicable to certain regions or areas, to certain categories 
of property owners, and all varying in rates and tax schedules for land 
in a certain productivity or use categories. For example, in Vietnam 
the govenors of each region (North, Central and South Vietnam) had the 
authority to decree the tax laws applicable within their own territorial 
jurisdiction with the result that different rates existed for the 
different regions and there were often wide variations in tax schedules 
even between provinces, depending upon the budgetaiyrequirements and 
political expediency. In many cases French property owners were com­
pletely exempt from Vietnamese-decreed laws but were subject only to 
tax laws instituted by the French Governor General. The multiplicity 
of land tax laws in existence in Vietnam in 1953 is evident from the 
statement of the special commission appointed by the president of the
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country to study possible remedial action. The commission reported 
that it had examined a total of 157 different kinds of taxes before 
making its recommendations for a new law applicable uniformly through­
out the country. The commission made special note of the fact that 
many of the taxes in existence prior to 1953 fell heavily upon the 
laboring classes and peasants least able to pay them. In some cases 
no distinction was made of the fertility or productivity of different 
lands; instead, all land was subject to a f3.at and uniform tax rate.
In other cases tax rates were not based upon the size or area of holding 
nor productivity, but upon the number of families cultivating a given 
unit of land, thus the smaller the holding the higher the rate.
The new tax law enacted in 1953 divides agricultural land into 
two general categories; rice lands, and high lands on which crops other
than rice are grown. The amount of the yearly tax to be assessed against
the land depends upon the fertility, or category of productivity. Rice 
lands are divided into six categories and taxed as follows:
1. High-class land which has an average yield of over 2,000 
kilograms of paddy per hectare; 200 piasters.
2. First-class land which has an average yield of from
1,200 to 2,000 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 160 piasters.
3. Second-class land which has an average yield of from 700
to 1,200 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 130 piasters.
4. Third-class land which has an average yield of from 500
to 700 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 100 piasters.
5. Fourth-class land which has an average yield of from 300 
to 500 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 70 piasters.
6. Fifth-class land which has an average yield of less than
300 kilograms of paddy per hectare; 40 piasters.
The majority of rice lands in Vietnam would fall in categories of 
first and second-class land. During 1953 rough rice prices at the
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farm averaged about two piasters per kilogram which indicates that the 
gross value of the output from one hectare of rice land of average 
productivity amounted to between 2,400 and 3*000 piasters. The land 
tax rates under the new lav/ therefore amount to between six and seven 
percent of the gross value of the produce. The land tax is assessed 
against the legal owners of the land as registered in the local village 
land register. In the case of landowners renting their rice land and 
receiving 40 percent of the crop as rent, the tax schedule indicates 
that about 17 percent of the landowners' share would be paid to the 
government in the form of land taxes.
The law calls for the appointment of special land-classification 
committees detailed to conduct land classification procedures during 
the rice-growing period or at harvest time, and makes provision for 
landowners to request and receive a hearing for a reclassification in 
cases where they believe their lands have been put in a category above 
their actual productivity. Provisions are also made in the law for 
reclassification downward during periods of severe floods, droughts, 
or other catastrophes resulting in reduced yields in an area as well 
as reclassification upwards when public improvements are made in water 
control, irrigation, etc., resulting in increased rice yields.
A different tax rate schedule is established for land on which 
other crops besides rice are grown. Seven different categories of land 
are established, depending upon the types of crops produced. Tax rates 
vary from 300 piasters per hectare for the highest category of land to 
15 piasters for land in the lowest category. With the exception of the 
differences in the applicable rates, the same general provisions apply
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to both rice land and high land on which other crops besides rice are 
grown.
Undoubtedly, revision of the land tax laws was an attempt on 
the part of the government to pacify the smaller landowner-operators 
in the face of increasing Communist activities in the field of land 
taxation in those areas where they were in control. As was the case 
with a large number of governmental decrees during that period, the law 
v;as met with very limited enthusiasm by most landowners. Very few land 
classification committees were appointed and a smaller number actually 
engaged in land classification work, with the result that the law 
remained on the statute books but very little actual implementation 
and enforcement was forthcoming.
A tax on land based on the productivity of the land amounts in 
fact to taxing the produce itself in the final instance. There is 
little doubt that such a tax system, if applied widely in Indochina, 
would result in landowners shifting the burden of the tax back to the 
renters of the land in the form of higher rents, or a larger portion 
of the crop, with the final incidence falling upon the renters and 
sharecroppers least able to bear the burden. In theory, there can be 
no shifting of a tax levied against land or other immovable property, 
and, from a theoretical concept, the owner of the property carries the 
burden of the tax in the form of reduced capitalized value of the property 
because of lower net, or economic rent. However, in a situation such 
as exists in the overly-populated farming areas of Vietnam where the 
supply of land available is. very limited and the demand for a parcel 
of land on which to make a living far exceeds the supply, the competitive
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bidding by landless peasants for the available rice land gives the land­
owner considerable advantage. In most cases where verbal agreements 
stipulate rent payments in the form of a certain portion of the produce, 
land of higher fertility and productivity usually rents for a higher 
percentage of the total output with the result that farmers cultivating 
this type of land are not able to retain a much larger quantity of 
produce than if they were cultivating inferior land.
However, there is still very intensive competition for the better 
land and owners of this type of land are able to obtain a larger portion 
of the crop in their rental agreements. A tax on the landlord’s share 
would immediately result in landowners requiring and being able to 
obtain increases in their portion up to the point where the share 
remaining to the cultivator is sufficient only to afford his family 
the bare means of subsistence. The final result will be greater equality 
of sharecroppers cultivating lands of different fertility, but an 
equality at the lower end of the subsistence level. The conclusion is, 
therefore, that such a system of land taxation, though imposed on the 
landowners in the first instance, would result in shifting the burden 
on the sharecroppers in the final instance. The only possible remedy 
to this situation is the enactment and rigid enforcement of a rental 
ceiling law designed to protect sharecroppers against exhorbitant land 
rental rates on the part of landowners. The Vietnamese government failed 
in this respect and the new land tax system likewise failed to accomplish 
the desired ends.
Viet Minh Land Tax: The Communist Viet Minh instituted a land
tax law of their own, and from all indications rigidly enforce it in 
those rural areas that have come under their control. The tax is
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imposed upon the tenant farmers, land ovmer-cultivators, and landowners 
alike. The yield of the land, or its productivity, and the size of the 
family unit form the basic criterion in establishing the amount of tax 
to be paid. Therefore, yearly production per person in the family 
actully determines the amount of tax a farm family pays, with different 
rates applying for families classified as renters, owner-cultivators, 
or landowners.
Taxes to the Viet Minh authorities are paid in paddy at harvest 
time and range from 17 percent to a maximum of 75 percent of the pro­
duction above a certain amount. The tax schedule treats tenant farmers 
more leniently than it does owner-cultivators and the large landowners.
As indicated by Table 23, the tax schedule is a rather ingenious device 
for extracting heavier taxes on the landowner class. The owner-cultivator 
farm family was selected as the basic unit to which the schedule or 
rate for the other two classes of farmers was related. For ovmer- 
cultivators the tax rate ranges from 17 percent of the produce at a 
level of paddy production of up to 400 kilograms per person in the 
family. The rates for this class of farm family increases by six percent 
for each 100 kilograms of paddy produced per person up to the 75 percent 
level. After this level of production is reached, the amount of the 
tax increases by 75 kilograms for each increment of production of 100 
kilograms per person in the family.
The tax rate assessed against tenant farmers amounts to 75 percent 
of that assessed against the owner-cultivators up to the point where 
the rate reaches 75 percent of the paddy produced after which tenant 
farmers likewise pay 75 kilograms of paddy for each increment of pro­
duction of 100 kilograms per each person in the family.
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: Tax rate for each additional 100 Kg. per person
: Percent : (Kg) : Percent : (Kg) : Percent : (Kg)
Under 400 12.75 17 29.75
400 12.75 51 68 29.75 119
500 17.25 68 23 91 40.25 149
600 21.75 90 29 120 50.75 200
700 26.25 116 35 155 61.85 262
000 • 30.75 347 41 196 71.75 344
900 35.25 182 47 243 75.00 419
1000 39.75 222 53 296 75.00 494
1100 44.25 266 59 355 75.00 569
1200 48.75 315 65 420 75.00 644
1300 53.25 368 71 491 75.00 719
1400 57.75 426 75 566 75.00 794
1500 62.2 5 488 75 641 75.00 869
1600 66.75 555 75 716 75.00 944
1700- 71.25 626 75 791 75.00 1019
1300 75.00 701 75 866 75.00 1094
1900 75.00 776 75 941 75.00 1169
2000 75.00 851 75 1016 75.00 1244
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The rate assessed against the portion of the rice crop received 
by landowner families as rent amounts to 75 percent more than the rate 
assessed against owner-cultivator families up to the point where the 
rate reaches 75 percent for each increment in amount of paddy received.
As the schedule of tax rates indicates, the amount of paddy turned 
over to the Communists constitutes a rather large percentage of the 
crop even at low levels of per capita output. However, it is quite 
evident that the intent was to tax much more heavily the portion received 
by landlords as rent. In very few cases do tenant families receive more 
than 400 kilograms per person in the family as their share of the paddy. 
Therefore, it is very seldom that rice farmers in this categoiy pay more 
than about 13 percent of their share as taxes. The same situation is 
true with respect to farm families classified as owner-cultivators, and 
probably only in very few and isolated cases do they pay more than about 
17 percent of the paddy produced as taxes. However, this is usually 
not the situation in so far as the landowner class is concerned, and 
especially so with the large landowners. Very seldom do they receive 
as little as 400 kilograms of paddy per person in the family. As the 
tax schedule indicates, tax imposed on the landowners class reaches the 
75 percent of increment figure when about 360 kilograms of paddy is 
obtained per capita. Probably most landowner families receive rent 
equivalent to more than this amount each year with the result that the 
share of the rice crop received by landowners is taxed vary heavily. 
Furthermore, there is very little likelihood that landowners are able 
to improve their position very much by imposing higher rent payments 
upon their tenants. There are two reasons for this conclusion: first,
most landowners would be obliged to deliver 75 percent of this increment 
to the authorities in the form of increased taxes; second, the Viet Minh, 
as early as 1949a passed a land rent reduction law stipulating that 
rents, in money or in kind, would be reduced to the point where the 
maximum rental paid by tenants would in no case exceed one-third of the 
average yearly production. ̂  Both Communist civil and military author­
ities were very energetic in enforcing paddy collections to the full 
amount of the tax and in implementing the rent reduction law in those 
areas where they were in control.
This tax on the produce of the land referred to above is known 
as the "general tax" and goes into the national budget of the Communist 
authorities. In addition there is a local tax, also collected in kind, 
which goes to the local authorities to create revenue for local adminis­
tration expenses. This local tax is also levied on a graduated scale 
against the three classes of families and amounts to an additional 15 
percent of the "general tax".
72The Communist rent reduction program is treated an greater 
detail in Chapter VII, Land and Agrarian Reform.
CHAPTER VII
LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM
Land and agrarian reform has been foremost on the minds of peasant 
farmers in most of the Asiatic countries for the past decade. In no 
other country of that part of the world has the need been greater, nor 
the cry louder, than in Vietnam. Agrarian reform programs undertaken 
by a government may be of various types and degrees depending upon the 
need, the willingness of the government to put forth the efforts required, 
and the financial, personnel and other resources available to carry out 
the program. It may take the form of outright expropriation of large 
landholdings, sub-division and sale of the land, consolidation of small 
land holdings, and/or reduction of rent. Land reform programs may be 
accompanied by the provision of short- medium- and long-term agricultural 
credit on favorable terms and public or cooperative ownership of primary 
marketing facilities, such as storage, as was undertaken in Japan under 
the recent military occupation authorities. Reform programs may also 
take the milder and simpler form of government purchase and redistri­
bution of large land holdings, supplemented by a rent-reduction program, 
as recently carried out on the Chinese island of Taiwan. Whatever the 
degree of reform anticipated, there must be careful study and detailed 
planning as well as strong determination on the part of the governmental 
authorities for any such program to be successful and accomplish the 
desired results.
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Meed for Agrarian Refom
The urgent need for reforms in agriculture in Vietnam arises from 
the following: (l) the very unequal distribution of landholdings
resulting in a large percentage of the total cultivated area being 
owned by a very small percentage of the people; (2) the relatively 
large number of landless farm familiesj (3) the very extensive degree 
of parcelization of land holdings in Central and North Vietnam; (4) 
exhorbitantly high land rental rates prevailing in most areas; (5) the 
usurous rates of interest charged by moneylenders and merchants on 
short-term money and food loans to fanners; and (6) the disorganized 
and unsystematic conditions under which agricultural commodities 
(primarily rice) are marketed at the farm level.
These conditions of the rural economy all combine to lead to 
gross inefficiency in agricultural production in general, grossly 
unequal distribution in incomes, perpetual indebtedness and a miserable 
standard of living for a large sector of the rural people at the bare 
subsistence level. The result is social and political unrest on the 
part of the masses.
Conditions of luxurous living and absentee landlordism on. the 
part of a few individuals, and wide stratification of economic and 
social levels can have little effect in promoting stability and general 
economic improvements when surrounded by a sea of misery and poverty. 
These have been the conditions in Vietnam in the past, and it is toward 
remedying them that efforts at agrarian reform should be directed.
Past Efforts at Reform
The first efforts made in the field of land reform in Vietnam
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were initiated in the 17th century by Emperors of Annam and Tonkin who
made use of the available communal, or public lands, to plan their
yearly distribution to landless farm families on an equitable basis.
They also confiscated all the private lands in certain heavily populated
provinces and transformed them into collective farms to be cultivated by
73arny veterans and their families as a reward for military service. 
According to Vu-Van-Hien, communal or public lands were to be re­
distributed every four years to avoid disparity among those already
allotted parcels of land and also to afford an opportunity to those
72families without any land to farm communal land. During the first 
half of the 19th century the Emperors were instrumental in greatly 
increasing the amount of cultivable land coming under public or communal 
ownership. In addition to outright confiscation of large land holdings, 
special ordinances by the Emperors declared as communal property all 
agricultural land in the following categories: (l) New alluvial land
formed by the changing courses of the rivers and sea shore; (2) all 
land that had been cleared and brought under cultivation through the 
use of military labor (prisoners of war); (3) lands abandoned by their 
owners during the war; and (4) lands that belonged to persons who died
rroVu-Van-Hien. Ia. Properiete Communale au Tonkin. (Law Thesis) 
University of Paris, 1939. Most of the information concerning the 
historical aspects of communal lands and early land reform was obtained 
from Vu-Van-Hien1s study.
7 LlAccording to Hien, public lands were distributed to heads of 
farm families. The size of the allotted plot of land depended upon 
the total amount of such land available and the number of landless farm 
families in the village, and also the relative fertility of the land.
Use of public land can be withdrawn from a farm family for failure to 
pay the taxes attached to the land, and for letting the land remain 
uncultivated for one season.
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without leaving direct descendants. The application and enforcement 
of these ordinances resulted in 25 percent of all cultivated land in 
Central Vietnam and 21 percent in North Vietnam being under public 
ownership at the beginning of French administration in 1873.
It was state policy to allocate public lands to villages, but 
the ownership of such lands remained to the state which made redistri­
bution among the villages when deemed necessary. The law prohibited 
the creation of large estates and established protective measures in 
favor of maintaining the extent of public lands by prescribing severe
sanctions against those who "usurp or sell properties belonging to the 
75state". However, with serious political troubles during the latter 
part of the last century the central governments relinquished control 
of the public lands to the local village authorities. Greater autonomy 
was ceded to the villages and state law gave way to local customs. 
Increasing difficulties were, therefore, encountered in the realization 
of a general policy for the whole country. Taxes attached to the land 
by local village notables were increased to such an extent that peasant 
families were forced to abandon the land and become vagrants. As a 
result, a large portion of the public land was left uncultivated. In 
addition, local cliques of village notables tended to ignore all legal 
prescriptions regarding the public land which were contrary to their 
personal interests. Reference already has been made of the fact that 
in many cases the local village notables and their French Administration 
counterparts made profitable personal gains through the sale and/or 
rent of communal lands (see page 148).
75Vu-Van-Hien, op. cit., p. 12.
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As a result of the war culminating in the French occupation of 
Tonkin in 1884, large masses of population had been forced to migrate 
and a large amount of land was left uncultivated. Numerous French 
colonists hurriedly asked for and obtained from the Colonial Administra­
tion large land concessions in those areas where peasants, scattered
by the war, had not yet returned. Vien makes reference to one such
76concession amounting to 11,700 hectares of land made in 1896. Five 
years later when the peasants returned to their lands, serious trouble 
broke out and the Colonial Administration was compelled to recover the 
concession by paying an indemnity to the French concessionee out of 
the public funds. Similar cases occurred in numerous areas and a 
great number of peasants never recovered their lands. Such was also 
the fate of many villages which lost their public or communal lands.
The serious problem of overpopulation of the deltas in North 
Vietnam was never solved by the French Colonial Administration. In 
1933, an official survey revealed the existence of 968,000 landless 
peasant farm families, their living depending upon the periodic 
allocation of communal lands. This problem, together with the fact 
that agricultural production techniques were no more improved under the 
French than under previous local rulers, induced the Colonial Adminis­
tration, after a period of uncertainty, to continue after 1929 the 
traditional policies regarding the communal lands. Since 1935 various 
attempts have been made to subject the villages to the tighter and 
tighter control of the Central Administration.
76Ibid, p. 21
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Social and Economic Importance of Communal lands: From a
theoretical point of view, the part played by the communal lands in
Vietnamese social and economic life would seem undeniable. They form
a major obstacle to the concentration of land-ownership in the hands
of an economic oligarchy and to the formation of a rural proletariat.
In an essentially agrarian economy such as Vietnam, such an order would
lead to political despotism by the land-owning class, and would result
in fierce social conflicts. Hien makes reference to an area comprising
a number of villages in North Vietnam where, except for about 700 acres
of communal land, the total amount of tillable land belong to a small
77number of money-lenders. The existence of communal land means that, 
periodically, a certain portion of the available rice land can be 
distributed among a large number of the population.
However, in practice the system of allocating communal lands 
presents many drawbacksj the most important is that the average share 
of communal land allocated to a farm family does not amount to more 
than one-half an acre, whereas at least twice this surface area of rice 
land would still be insufficient to feed an average peasant family or 
to provide work for all members of the family. It is true that a 
certain number of families comprise two or three "inscribed members" 
(father and sons) who can pool their shares of communal lands and thus 
have a more economical and efficient operating unit. But even under 
such conditions, another set of requirements often make it impossible 
for father and sons to take advantage of pooling their allotted shares
^Vu-Van-Hien, op. cit.. p. 35.
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of communal land. The pool, or its leader, must have certain indispen­
sable agricultural equipment, mainly a water buffalo, and a certain 
amount of capital available to purchase seed and food rice, and to pay 
taxes to the village during the pre-harvest period. Therefore, what 
usually happens in practice is that only those farm families who already 
possess a certain amount of private land, or who own at, least part of 
a water buffalo (i.e., own it in common with someone else) are able to 
cultivate their shares of communal land with the maximum advantage to 
the cultivator’s family. The majority of peasant beneficiaries have 
to "rent" their shares - usually at a very low price - to the large 
landowners and money lenders who, in the last analysis, are the real 
beneficiaries of the system.
Another drawback to the system is that redistributing the land 
every four years prevents many beneficiaries from investing the 
required amount of capital that they have available on long-time 
improvements in the land, because they cannot be sure that at the 
end of the four-year period they will be allotted the same parcel of 
land. This situation makes for inefficient utilization of available 
resources for maximum net returns.
A pre-war study revealed that 12 percent of the communal lands
78in Vietnam were not cultivated. In the delta areas of Worth and 
Central Vietnam all the tillable land always has been cultivated during 
periods of security. Most of the uncultivated communal land reported 
in the study was located in the hilly areas beyond the deltas, where
78Henry Yves, op. cit., p. 67.
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the soil is less fertile and manpower not quite as abundant. Part of 
the communal lands remain fallow, although the local villages are 
obliged to pay taxes assessed against those lands to the central govern­
ment. In some cases enterprising immigrants from the overcrowded^ deltas 
rent these lands and, through hard work, succeed in increasing their 
productivity. However, the usual result is that local village notables 
will reap the greatest benefits from such efforts by increasing the 
rental rates to abnormal levels or through cancellation or refusal to 
renew the peasant’s lease.
Vu-Van-Hien proposes two ways in which reforms can be made in the
79use and allocation of communal lands:'7 First, the communal land may 
serve as a basis for collective cultivation and the village become an 
economic as well as a political and social unit. All the village 
inhabitants would cooperate in the cultivation of the land lumped 
together and would receive equitable shares of the produce. YJriting 
in 1939 he said, "This collectivism presents undeniable economic and 
social advantages, but its realization requires the presence of 
political and psychological factors, as well as a revolutionary change 
in the administrative structure and the mores of the peasants. One
80cannot think of the occurrence of such changes at the present time."
One may wonder whether, with the recent changes in the political structure 
of the country, such a proposal should not be given more serious con­
sideration.
The second reform propsal by the same writer m s  less radical,
79Vu-Van-Hien, op. cit.. p. 184.
^Vu-Van-Hien, op. cit.. p. 186.
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namely, to divide the communal lands into equal lots of two acres each, 
a plot considered of sufficient size to furnish food for an average 
peasant family. Because the area granted at each distribution to an 
individual family would be increased four times, a much smaller number 
of people would receive their shares of land at each distribution.
And, of course, if the land were relatively infertile, the individual 
share would still be larger. Moreover, the rule of four-year periodic 
distribution is not favorable to the cultivation of certain crops and 
does not encourage long-time improvements on the land. The period during 
which the beneficiaries would enjoy their shares of communal land must 
be increased to ten or twelve years. The result would be that each 
individual would find himself less often on the partition roll, perhaps 
not more than once or twice during his lifetime but, on the other hand, 
each time he would have an area of adequate size to cultivate during 
a longer period and thus have a better chance to save some capital with 
which to start life as an independent farmer, instead of living miserably 
on relatively frequent but entirely inadequate relief. With the 700,000 
acres of communal land in North Vietnam, 350,000 such parcels of land 
can be provided for an equal number of peasant families during ten to 
twelve years and, with an improved agricultural credit system, thus 
give them a chance to become independent farmers. However, at the 
present time there are probably one million landless rural families in 
North Vietnam, and the population is increasing at the rate of 100,000 
per year. The reforms along this line would provide help for one third 
of them, but at the next distribution of communal land which would take 
place ten or twelve years from now, only one fifth of the landless farm 
population could have a share in the public land.
Viet Minh and Communist Agrarian Reform
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The Viet Minh agrarian policy in the years immediately following 
their seizure of power in 1945 was often obscure, but generally speaking 
land reform in the early years of the Viet Minh revolution was less a 
clearly formulated program than a propaganda campaign designed to win 
support of the peasants. In some areas where Viet Minh control was 
undisputed, there was a redistribution to poor peasants of land that 
belonged to "traitors” and "colonialists" and for a time an intense 
campaign to win "voluntary gifts" of land from property owners. Early 
in 1947 the Viet Minh authorities undertook a propaganda campaign for 
the reduction of land rents and the suspension of usury. The program 
no doubt won the Viet Minh considerable popularity since high rents 
and usury, together with inequitable land distribution, are among the 
worst evils of the Vietnamese agrarian economy. After 1947 the Viet 
Minh undertook the provisional redistribution of abandoned lands to 
former tenants. This redistribution, much of which was said to be the 
former property of "traitors" and "colonialists", was probably nothing 
more than the legal recognition of the actual state of affairs in the 
countryside, for the peasants had already occupied the best parts of 
abandoned lands.
Rent Reduction: In July, 1949 the Viet Minh government passed
the land rent reduction law. Apparently this was the first time that 
the requirement that land rents be reduced was put on a legal basis.
c*iMost of the material on Viet Minh land reform was obtained 
from United States Embassy Dispatch No. 133 dated October 2, 1954. The 
writer participated in writing that dispatch.
The decree fixed a minimum 25 percent rent reduction, and in the case 
of excessively high rents a 35 percent reduction. The immediate goal 
at this time was to fix a maximum rent that would not exceed one third 
of the average crop. In August, 1949 a Viet Minh decree gave priority 
to veterans and their families in the redistribution of confiscated 
property. A decree in February, 1952 ordered classification of all 
abandoned land in accordance with the owner’s political beliefs.
Lands belonging to those who had collaborated with the enemy were to 
be seized. The state reserved the right to decide later the disposition 
of lands belonging to persons living in enemy zones who did not collabo­
rate with the enemy. In the case of owners whose political status was 
unknown the land was to be returned in whole or in part after expenses 
for management had been deducted. This appears to have been the first 
law that attempted to blackmail landowners living in the controlled 
zone who refused to collaborate with the Central Government. A decree 
in May, 1950 attempted to resolve the agrarian credit program by can­
celling all debts contracted before 1947> those for which unpaid interest 
had already doubled the capital borrowed, those contracted with leaders 
convicted of a crime against the independence movement, and those 
contracted by debtors killed in the line of duty. Another decree of the 
same date declared that all lands that had been fallow for five con­
secutive years or which were not cultivated by the end of 1950 would 
be considered state lands. They were to be distributed afterwards on 
a provisional basis to poor peasants who would acquire the right to 
cultivate them for ten years.
Scope of the Program: During the early years the objectives of the
program were limited in scope (the chief of which were the reduction of
land rent and the redistribution of abandoned or confiscated lands on a 
provisional basis) and outwardly at least the program was relatively free 
of communist doctrines. To be sure there was some emphasis on increased 
production programs and land gift programs, but before 1950> and in some 
respects long afterwards, the Viet Minh land reform program was hardly 
more radical than many such programs that have been carried out in 
other countries under conservative governments. Significantly, it was 
a landownerfs political views and actions, not the extent of his wealth, 
that determined Viet Minh policy with respect to his property. Further­
more, the Viet Minh were interested primarily in production and taxes 
to support their war program, and agrarian policy was largely directed 
towards putting abandoned land back into cultivation, encouraging 
production, and the collecting of taxes under the agricultural tax law 
of 1951 (a graduated tax that penalized unerned incomes from land as 
explained in some detail in the previous chapter). It is probable 
that the Viet Minh land reform program brought little improvement in 
the peasant’s economic status for any gains were probably offset by 
increased taxes, forced labor and conscription. There is abundant 
evidence that rents, at least on good lands, were not greatly reduced, 
that such ancient abuses as usury persisted in clandestine forms, that 
evasion of the provisions of the land reform laws was relatively simple 
and that the disappointing results of the program often expressed by 
Viet Minh leaders did not give an entirely false picture of the situation. 
The Broader Program: The Secretary General of the Communist Party
in Vietnam outlined in detail an ambitious program of land reform in 
1950 that went far beyond the cautious, empherical one that had prevailed
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until then. It was a program that the Viet Minh applied with vigor, 
and with an ever-increasing tempo, particularly since 1953, 'with only 
minor revisions and deviations. Basically, the program as set out was 
to be accomplished in three stages:
1. Confiscation of lands belonging to the French "colonialists" 
and Vietnamese "traitors" for redistribution to needy peasants; 
the reduction of land rents; the redistribution of communal 
lands; the abolition of feudal exploitation; propaganda for 
the cession of land to the state.
2. Partial realization of the slogan, "Land to the Cultivator".
3. Complete realization of the slogan and preparation for the 
socialization of agriculture.
This program, which was to be led by the workers, would, according 
to Viet Minh authorities, increase food production, strengthen the 
resistence movement, and provide excellent propaganda. However, land 
reform had much more important objectives. Not only would land reform 
transform the traditional village social pattern and bring about a 
redistribution of land, but in working towards its achievement the 
peasants would receive training in mass action under proper direction. 
And from land reform to utopian socialism there was only a short stop. 
Thus, while an important goal in the land reform program in the fore­
seeable future was to provide the peasants enough land through despolia­
tion of the landlords to make them economically independent, a long-term 
goal was the coliectivation of the land. Through affiliation with 
cooperatives the peasant farmers were expected to learn the advantages 
of cooperation and eventually to abandon their individualistic ways 
in order to participate in a collective farm.
The mobilization of the masses for the reduction of land rents 
and the application of the agrarian reform program was launched early
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in 1953 and was perhaps the first concerted effort to change the rural 
economy and bring about the long-term goals as expressed by the Viet 
Minh authorities. By comparison, earlier programs had a haphazard 
character, although there had been ambitious attempts since 1951 to 
organize the peasants for the collection of the agricultural land tax.
The objectives of the mobilization of the masses, as defined in official 
statements, were the destruction of the reactionary forces, the weakening 
of the feudal economic power, the weakening of the feudal political power 
and the seizure of power by the proletariat. These objectives were to 
be achieved by enjorcing the reduction of land rents, by seizing all 
land belonging to the French and Vietnamese traitors, by more rational 
use of the land expropriated from those who had evaded their duties as 
citizens by fleeing to the controlled zone, by abolishing forest and 
land concessions, by making a new survey of tillable land and by making 
a more equitable distribution of communal-lands. With some allowances 
for a confusion between means and ends and changing in wording and 
stress, this represented substantially stage one of the program outlined 
by the authorities three years earlier.
The Viet Minh authorities lent great stress to the mobilization 
of the masses under government supervision. This mobilization was 
"class struggle at the hamlet level", and the authorities attached 
great importance to class distinction. According to Viet Minh leaders 
there were eight classes in the Vietnamese rural community:
1. The large landowners— they own much land, do not participate 
in the work in the fields, and live principally from rents. 
Managers of large estates are in the same class.
2. Rich land owners— they do some work in the fields, but live 
principally from the exploitation of labor. If they do not 
own land themselves, they are sub-lessors.
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3. The middle class property holders— this group may have enough 
land and equipment to support itself, but just as often it 
may be obliged to rent part of the land it cultivates. The 
prosperous middle class property owners may sometimes exploit 
others by hiring children to watch the cattle, by hiring day 
laborers, or they may obtain additional income from renting 
land or lending money. However, if income from exploitation 
from land or labor exceeds 25 percent of their family’s income, 
they are considered rich peasants.
4. The small land holders— they have little land and in order to 
make a living they must rent lands from others or engage 
themselves as laborers. Peddlers and artisans belong to this 
class, since their livelihood is dependent upon the poor 
peasants.
5. The small tradesmen and non-agricultural property owners—  
they do not live from the fruit of the landj they specialize
in commerce or have some trade. They do the woric themselves
or may hire one or two apprentices.
6. Professional people— this group includes teachers, doctors,
and lawyers. They may be large land owners but they are not
considered members of the landholding class.
7. Clergymen-a separate class.
8. Vagabonds— this class includes all who have no gainful occupa­
tion— thieves, beggers, fortunetellers.
The Viet Minh document entitled "Classification of Peasant Social 
Groups" gives no explanation for the omission of the landless peasant or 
the agricultural worker. This group, however, which represents a large 
percentage of the total population, is probably the communists* most 
reliable ally in the rural areas, since from an economic point of view 
it has everything to gain by cooperating with the authorities in the 
program.
The objectives of the mobilization of the masses were to be 
achieved in four stages, the definitions of which were never clear from 
the material available. However, under the usual procedure government 
officials encouraged the peasants, particularly the poorest people in
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the village, to join and assume leadership of the local agricultural 
associations (apparently a peasant union under government direction), 
to complain of past injustices they had suffered under the landlords, 
and to demand a reduction in land rents and the return of all rent 
payments in excess of the legal maximum. The landlords who were accused 
of violating the law were brought before the people's court for trial 
and punishment.
Results; The results of the movement for the rent reduction was 
made public during August, 1954. According to the Viet Minh statement, 
the rent reduction movement, which in January, 1953 was applied to 
only nine villages under their control, had by August, 1954 reached a 
total of 826 villages in the Tonkin delta and the northern part of 
Central Vietnam with a population of 3.5 million people. In nine 
provinces the peasants had confiscated 14,200 hectares of rice land and 
2,650 water buffaloes from the reactionaires and notables and had 
obliged landlords to repay 12,300 tons of paddy representing excess 
rent to 137,000 peasant families. In view of the large area involved, 
these data do not indicate a great redistribution of wealth. But there 
are grimmer statistics; in 600 villages the villagers exposed the 
"crimes" of 10,150 landlords who were brought before the people’s 
courts. Of this number about 135 were condemned to death and about
1,200 were imprisoned for re-education. The Viet Minh went rapidly 
to stage two of its reform program— "partial realization of land to the 
cultivator", with the promulgation of a special lav/ in December, 1953* 
Under the provisions of articles 2 and 3 of this lav/ the lands and 
property of French "colonialists" and other imperialist agressors
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are to be confiscated. There is to be total or partial confiscation, 
according to the seriousness of the offense, of the lands, draft animals, 
and agricultural implements that belong to the landlords. VJhat is not 
confiscated will be requistioned. Article 4 states that the lands, 
livestock, and agricultural equipment of landlords who are not reaction- 
aires and who are members of the resistance will be expropriated. They 
will receive compensation in ten years in the form of bonds bearing one 
and one-half percent annual interest. The confiscated, requistioned, 
and expropriated lands are to be distributed to: (l) Landless peasants,
impoverished peasants, peasants who do not have enough land to support 
themselves, and needy middle class peasants; (2) other members of the 
poor rural classes, such as artisans and small retailers; (3) families 
of fallen soldiers and veterans; (4) workers in government factories 
and officials. Other minor groups may also receive land under certain 
conditions. The principal innovations in the new law are the provisions 
for the expropriation of the lands of "loyal" landlords on terais very 
unfavorable to the owner, and the grant of permanent title to the 
beneficiaries of the land redistributed. The measures pertaining to 
the confiscation of lands belonging to French colonialists and Vietnamese 
traitors had been in force for a few years and according to Viet Minh 
reports at least 225,000 acres of land had already been confiscated 
by the state and redistributed. Moreover, redistribution in the past 
had always been on a provisional basis. Following the promulgation 
of the new law there was a strong propaganda compaign around the slogan 
"land to the tiller", and the small independent peasant became the Viet 
Minh ideal.
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However, the law of December, 1953 has been applied only on an 
experimental basis. Early in 1954 it was applied in six villages, and 
by May of that year in an additional 59 villages. Evidently the Viet 
Minh were very careful to apply the new law only in those selected 
villages where there had been a successful movement for the reduction 
of land rent.
In August, 1954 it was reported by Viet Minh authorities that in 
the six experimental villages where the law was first applied, the 
peasants had confiscated, requisitioned, or expropriated and redistrib­
uted 26,000 hectares of land, 352 water buffaloes and 1,062 agricultural 
implements. Another report in September of that year related that 
in the 47 villages where the program had been applied between the 
months of May and September the peasants had confiscated about 9,000 
hectares of land, 2,400 water buffaloes and a large number of farm 
tools. The seized property had been redistributed to some 13,000 
families, representing a total of 50,000 people or 60 percent of the 
total population. There is a large discrepancy between the reports of 
the total amount of land seized in the six villages (26,000 hectares) 
and that of the 47 villages— in which the first six were included—  
(9,000 hectares). One explanation is irresponsible reporting and gross 
carelesness with the data; but probably a better and more accurate 
explanation is that the smaller figure represents rice land only while 
the larger figure represents all land.
Appraisal: With the Viet Minh having undisputed control of all
of Vietnam north of. the 17th parallel they are probably giving yet 
greater attention to agrarian reform. Although no current reliable 
information is available, the program of confiscation and redistribution
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of the land no doubt has been accelerated and applied over most of the 
area under their control. The reduction of land rent and the redistrib­
ution of land will bring some temporary improvement in the poor peasants* 
economic situation. However, the gain will most certainly be short­
lived, for undoubtedly the Viet Minh tax collectors will be just as 
exacting as the former landlords. In North Vietnam the land reform 
program faces two serious problems— the shortage of agricultural land 
available in one of the most thickly populated regions of the world, 
and the state * s great need for capital which it will be able to obtain 
only by exploiting the peasants who are far more numerous than all the 
other classes combined.
According to official statistics landed property in both North and 
Central Vietnam is divided into extremely small parcels. For example, 
in North Vietnam the average farm is less than one hectare (2.5 acres) 
in size. Farmers possessing more than 7 acres (3 hectares) are very 
rare and holdings above 40 acres cover less than 2.5 pei-cent of the 
cultivable area. It is estimated that 93 percent of the small owner— 
cultivators have no more than only one-half hectare of land, and that 
over 300,000 farm families (24 percent of the rural population) own 
no land at all. A large percentage of the latter are only entitled to 
cultivate one-tenth hectare of communal land. The situation is not 
much better in Central Vietnam. The Viet Minh reports indicate that 
where the land confiscation and expropriation law had been applied 
only 9*000 hectares of tillable land had been confiscated in 47 villages 
having a population of about 85,000. The distribution of this amount of 
land among 13,000 families can not result in each family becoming self-
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sufficient. In Tonkin and the northern part of Central Vietnam now 
tinder Viet Minh control there is simply not enough farm land for all 
the farm families.
It is nothing new to Communist governments to extract heavy taxes 
from the peasants to get capital necessary for industrialization and 
war material. But the peasant farmers of North and Central Vietnam 
have been accustomed too long to the agricultural tax to have many 
illusions about the taxes they will have to pay after they are allotted 
an additional parcel of land. The heavily taxed peasant inevitably 
goes into debt to the usurer who, in the absence of a state or cooperative 
creditor, is the only one prepared to lend him money. The Viet Minh 
have spoken loudly of village cooperative funds but it is doubtful if 
their resources are sufficient to meet even the minimum credit needs. 
However, Viet Minh theorists probably argue that it makes little difference 
whether the peasants go into debt again after acquiring new land under the 
redistribution program, since the goal is collectivism. When that goal 
is reached, all debts will probably be cancelled again.
Post-War Efforts at Land Reform
While the Viet Minh leaders were busy formulating their own policies 
regarding land reform and affectuating limited application of those 
policies in the areas under their control, the French and Vietnamese 
governing authorities made only very feeble attempts during the early 
period of internal hostilities. In 1947 an attempt was made by the 
president of Vietnam to draw up an ordinance designed to improve owner- 
tentnt relations and reduce the overall rent paid for the use of farm
land. Basically this ordinance called for written rental and lease 
contracts in all cases, and proposed the organization of tenure com­
mittees in each province to determine the maximum amount of rent that 
should be paid for the use of land for each region, village and type 
of soil. The proposal stipulated that under no condition could the 
rent paid in kind exceed 40 percent of the average annual yield of the 
land as determined by the appointed committees. Rental payments in 
cash for any one crop year could not exceed the average farm price 
during the preceding year of 40 percent of the yield. In case of 
overpayment of rent the courts were to order the land owner to return 
such overpayment to the renter plus interest at 8 percent per year for 
money accounts and one percent per month for paddy-. In case of crop 
failure reducing the yield by as much as one-third of normal, the 
committee was to order a reduction in rent payment to an "equitable" 
amount below the 40 percent maximum. The ordinance also provided for 
maximum rates of interest to be paid by tenants who borrowed either 
rice or money from their landlords during the course of the crop year 
at 12 percent per year for money advances and two percent per month 
for paddy advances. It was also stipulated in the ordinance that 
provincial committees would determine the maximum rental rates for 
draft animals, agricultural equipment and other commodities. Special 
conciliation committees appointed by the Minister of Agriculture for 
each province were to act as conciliary bodies except in cases involving 
foreigners (Frenchmen) which were to be brought directly to the higher 
civil courts. Upon being signed by the French High Commissioner for 
Indochina the ordinance became law, however its application and enforce­
ment was never realized. No provincial committee was ever organized,
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no productivity assessed to any farm land, nor rental contracts entered 
into under the terms of the law. The relationships between landowners 
and tenants continued as previously with no material change or improve­
ment resulting.
About the only serious study of the situation at that time was by
a Frenchman, H. A. C. Moreau, acting in the capacity of advisor to the
82Minister of Agriculture. Primary concern in this study was given to 
redistribution of rice lands in South Vietnam leading toward more 
efficient family-size units. Moreau took into consideration the fact 
that the distribution of rice land ownership in South Vietnam is such 
that there is an average of 8.7 hectares for each land-owning family, 
excluding communal lands. About 6,300 owners with holdings of 50 
hectares or more in 1947 had a total of slightly more than one million 
hectares; 65,750 owners with 5 to 50 hectares had an aggregate of
850.000 hectares; and 183,000 owners with less than 5 hectares had
315.000 hectares. His proposition was to establish 50 hectares as the 
maximum limit of landownership. Therefore, the 6,300 large landowners 
would retain 50 hectares each or 315,000 hectares, leaving 720,000 
hectares of their total holdings available for redistribution. These
720.000 hectares would be distributed to landless farm families and 
those having less than 5 hectares. According to the recommendation,
480.000 hectares would be distributed to 96,000 landless farm families
on the basis of 5 hectares each (no distinction to be made to differences 
in land fertility) and the remaining 240,000 hectares would be divided
S2H. A. C. Moreau, Reforme Agraire et 1’Evolution de la Propriete 
Familiale au Sud Vietnam, unpublished memorandum based upon a study made 
in 1947.
196
among 80,000 of the 183,000 small farmer-owners having less than 5 
hectares (land ownership in this category averaged 1.9 hectares and 
3*1 hectares additional would be allotted). How those fortunate 80,000 
farmers were to be selected was not stated. Thus, the redistribution 
would allow 96,000 landless farmers to obtain land and an additional
80,000 small landowners to increase the size of their holdings to more 
economical units. After redistribution of the land on the above basis, 
the comparative picture of landownership in South Vietnam would be as 
follows:
Size of holding Number of landowners Area (hectares)
Before After Before After
Less than 5 ha. 183,000 279,000 345,000 1,065,000
5 to 49 ha. 65,750 65,750 850,000 850,000
50 ha. and more 6,300 6,300 1,035,000 315,000
Communal land 70,000 70,000
Total 255,050 351,050 2,300,000 2,300,000
The plan proposed an average price of 4,500 piasters per hectare 
for the land to be redistributed. (The exchange value of the Indochinese 
piaster in 1948 was 20 piasters to the United States dollar.) New owners 
would pay for the land over a ten-year period, using about 15 percent of 
the rice crop for this purpose. Owners whose lands were to be distributed 
would be paid a cash indemnity equal to 20 percent of the declared value 
of the land and would be issued state bonds maturing serially in ten 
years and bearing interest at three percent annually. It was proposed
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that the World Bank or some other international credit institution 
be approached to grant the Vietnamese government the credits needed 
to support this original 20 percent cash payment, since the Vietnamese 
treasury was almost empty. It was also suggested that some government 
action (the specific nature of the action was not mentioned) be 
initiated to encourage the former landowners to reinvest the yearly 
proceeds received from the maturing land bonds into "fruitful purposes" 
such as industrial plants.
Since the former large landowners would no longer play the role 
of country banker, rice collector and trader, a vacuum would be created 
which the proposal suggested be filled with farmers cooperatives organized 
at the same time as the land redistribution took place. The plan 
envisioned government control and supervision of these organizations, 
which would be primarily credit and marketing societies. Short-term 
crop production loans amounting to 20 percent of the crop and medium- 
term equipment and draft animals loans amounting to about 15 percent of 
the value of the yearly harvest would be made. Short-term loans would 
be for the duration of one year and medium-term loans would be repaid 
in four yearly installments. Loans to the cooperatives for rice storage 
warehouses and small rice mills would be for a 10-year period. This was 
indeed a grandoise scheme calling for a cash outlay of capital amounting 
to over 2.1 billion piasters, or more than 106 million dollars at the 
official rate of 20 piasters to the dollar. However, like most plans 
drawn up by French technicians for Indochina, this plan was submitted 
to the governmental authorities for consideration but no mention was 
made of means of financing.
The proposal left a great many additional questions and problems 
without answers, including: (l) What method would be used to get
landowners to agree to the established price of 4,500 piasters per 
hectare and to the rate of interest of three percent annually on the 
bonds? (2) By what means would the government make it attractive 
to those farmer landowners to reinvest their money into industry?
(3) How would the loan from the World Bank be repaid and in what 
manner would the benefitting farmers repay the original 20 percent to 
the government? (4) From where would the money come to finance the 
cooperatives and what were to be the procedures under which the 
cooperatives would repay the loans? As could have been expected, the 
plan was submitted to the Minister of Agriculture but it was never 
given serious consideration by either the French-sponsored Vietnamese 
government nor by the French governmental authorities themselves. The 
many shortcomings and defects of the proposed program were probably 
too obvious.
Recent Efforts at Agrarian Reform
In Vietnam the type of reform that the peasant farmers feel the 
greatest need for, and personally attach the greatest importance to, 
is rent reduction and land ownership and redistribution, especially in 
the large land holdings sector of South Vietnam. In 1952-53 a limited 
attempt was made by the Vietnamese government then in power to utilize 
American aid funds to finance the resettlement of farm families dis­
placed by war activities on abandoned and idle rice lands in South 
Vietnam. The aim of that program was actually two or three fold:
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a. Political: 1. To accelerate the pacification of the area.
2. To afford an opportunity to the government to 
help that part of the rural population which 
had suffered under the Viet Minh and thus 
shield them from further Communistic influence.
b. Social and
economic: 1. To give work to refugee farmers.
2. To improve their living condition by affording
them the basic materials needed for the con­
struction of shelters and cultivation of crops.
3. To bring back into cultivation those lands 
abandoned and left idle since 1946, and thus 
increase total rice production.
The program was administered by the South Vietnam Agricultural 
Service and supervised by the regional agricultural agent and the 
respective province chiefs. Farm families were granted loans of rice 
for food and seed at the rate of from 300 to 400 kilograms per hectare
cultivated. Out of 3,500 tons of rice so loaned during 1951-53, over
S3 percent was collected at the first harvest. The rice recovered 
was vised to extend the program to new locations and help new refugees. 
During the first two years of the program a total of 5,600 families 
were resettled on 10,050 hectares of rice land and during the 1953-54 
crop year 3,100 additional families were resettled on 11,ISO hectares 
of land (Figure XIII).
The program was carried out in four provinces in South Vietnam.
The abandoned rice land put back into cultivation belonged either to 
absentee landowners or to the provincial administration (public lands). 
The land m s  divided into plots of from 2 to 5 hectares and allocated 
to families on an equitable basis depending upon size of family. Each 
case took the form of a contract of three years duration between the
200
Figure XIII* Allocating Parcels of land to Farm Families Displaced by 
the War in Indochina,
Farm families displaced by the war greatly aggregate the 
agrarian reform problems in Indochina, In an attempt to 
find a solution the government of Free Vietnam allocates 
on a provisional basis abandoned lands in the Mekong River 
delta to war refugee farm families.
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refugee farmer and the provincial administration who acted on behalf 
of the absentee landowners. Among other things the contracts stipulated 
the size and location of the alloted plot of ground, the amount of paddy- 
advanced, the number of houses or the sum of money advanced for housing 
material, etc. Contracts also stipulated that rent for the use of this 
land would be paid to the provincial administration according to the 
following schedule:
(1) At the end of the first year - 50 kilograms of paddy per 
hectare
(2) At the end of the second year - 100 kilograms of paddy per 
hectare
(3) At the end of the third and subsequent years - 200 kilograms 
of paddy per hectare.
(The average annual yield of paddy on this type of land amounts to about
1,000 kilograms or one metric ton. Therefore, the rent stipulated for
the third and subsequent years amounts to about 20 percent of the total
rice production.)
The rent received by the province was to be set aside as a special 
assistance fund to be used to extend the program in subsequent years.
In the case of private land, if the owner returned to the area by 
the time of the second harvest he could receive the quantity of paddy 
collected from the farmer resettled on his land but he had to adhere to 
the terms of the contract and also resume paying land taxes. At the end 
of three years occupancy and cultivation the resettled farmer is to have 
priority of tenure on the acreage he has brought back into cultivation. 
Any conflicts arising in rental rates are to be arbitrated by the 
provincial administration.
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It is estimated that this program, carried on from 1951 to 1954* 
cost about one million dollars of counterpart aid funds. This amounts 
to about $100 per farm family resettled and about $20 per acre of land 
brought back into cultivation.
The French-sponsored government in power during 1953 drew up a 
series of governmental decrees and ordinances designed to (l) set a 
definite limit to rental payments of 15 percent of the harvest on rice 
land in all Vietnam, (2) return all undeveloped agricultural concessions 
to the public domain, (3) provide for the sale to the government all 
privately-owned land holdings above a certain acreage (size limits 
varying between North Central and South Vietnam) and (4) government 
confiscation of all abandoned lands not put back into cultivation by 
a certain date. According to the provisions of those decrees, lands 
so acquired by the government would be allocated to landless farmers 
who would pay the government for the land over a period of years. 
However, not a single phase of this program ever got started. No actual 
planning was ever done to implement the program, no personnel were 
recruited nor agency created to carry it out, and no enforcement pro­
visions were ever established. Therefore, those decrees became laws 
in writing only and general knowledge of them never went very far beyond 
Saigon. Furthermore, the interior of the country was insecure for 
travel because of increased rebel activities and the program had no 
chance of becoming operative.
Present Land Reform Program and Laws
When the present U. S. backed government of Ngo Dinh Diem came 
into power in 1954* it proclaimed itself highly in favor of a broad
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program of land and agrarian reform. At first a few revisions were 
made to the former land reform statutes, among the more important of 
these were: (l) stipulation of a sliding scale of rent (from 15 to
25 percent of the crop on rice land, depending upon the fertility of 
the land); (2) leasing by the government of all uncultivated agricultural 
land to landless peasants for a period of four years; (3) written land- 
lord-tenant contracts; (4) a comprehensive census of land holdings, 
abandoned lands, absentee ownership, etc. A new Ministry of Agrarian 
Reform was created in the Presidential Cabinet to administer and 
implement the program.
A four-year government lease or tenancy contract at reduced rental 
rates falls far short of solving the problems of landless peasants and 
destitute displaced or refugee farm families unless some means are pro­
vided them to obtain the needed basic essentials of food and shelter 
until the first harvest, and the basic items (hand tools, seed, etc.) 
required to become productive. To meet this need, a total of 6.4 
million dollars of American aid counterpart funds was set aside for 
the purpose of granting short and medium-term loans to these farmers. 
Therefore, the providing of government credit to resettled farmers is 
tied to the government’s land reform program.
Present Statutes:
The body of lav/s presently in existence relative to land reform 
is contained in a set of four statutes which individually are designed 
to: (l) establish the procedures for returning to the public domain
and the redistribution of all uncultivated portions of agricultural 
concessions; (2) establish the regulations governing the relationships 
between landowners and tenants; (3) stipulate and set the limitations
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to the extent of maximum rice-field and agricultural-land holdings; 
and (4) establish the procedures for the enjoyment of the usufruct of 
rice-fields and other agricultural land. The essential characteristics 
of these statutes are summarized briefly below.
The first ordinance provides for the return to governmental control 
of agricultural lands previously granted as concessions which have, 
without good reason, been uncultivated for at least the past two years, 
and their subsequent reallocation to selected applicants from specified 
priority categories or classes. The ordinance further provides that a 
land occupant, who is not the bona fide owner, and who has been culti­
vating the land for the past three years, may be officially confirmed 
as the legal occupier with use privileges the same as a successful 
non-resident applicant. Various articles specify the amount of land 
that may be allocated to an applicant and/or stipulate the conditions 
of occupancy, including the provision that cultivation must be commenced 
immediately.
The second statute defines tenants and sharecroppers and differen­
tiates their relationship to owner-proprietors; provides that tenure 
relations will be governed by a written and recorded lease and stipulates 
the conditions and terms of such lease; establishes the basic duration 
of the lease at five years; fixes the rental rates at a maximum of 25 
percent of the main annual crop, while allowing for negotiation on 
improvements, fixtures, production items, etc.; provides for improvement 
compensation and deterioration indemnities; establishes appointive 
membership review-conciliation-enforcement committees with representatives 
of the interests of tenants, landlords and the government at the pro­
vincial and village levels and stipulates their operation, functions,
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and authority, and specifies uniform measurement units applicable to the 
statute. Appended to the basic statute is a specimen of the prescribed 
Farm Lease Contract.
The third statute specifies the maximum allowable agricultural 
land holdings or retentions by geographic regions (12 to 30 hectares 
for Worth, 15 to 40 hectares for Central, and 30 to 100 hectares for 
South Vietnam, depending upon the nature of the land); provides exemptions 
for industrial uses and certain legal entities and classes of persons, 
and prohibits the acquisition or retention of amounts in excess of 
allowances while authorizing maximum retentions in each of the three 
regions by the same owner. This statute also provides for penalties 
or indemnities to be levied against the person or persons concerned.
Wo schedule of penalties or indemnities is specified, but rather it is 
recommended that the President order the Minister of Justice to establish 
such a schedule.
The fourth statute provides that lands in controlled areas that
have neither been cultivated by the owner nor rented out by him, and
which an occupier has cultivated for at least the three previous years,
may be provisionally allocated to the occupier at his request, and
establishes his priority for the purchase of the land in the event it
is put up for sale by the owner. The statute further proposes that
a schedule of rental payments for all occupiers be established as follows:
1st year - no rent but payment of land taxes 
2nd year - no taxes but 12 percent of the gross annual product
3rd year - no taxes but 19 percent of the gross annual product
4th year - no taxes but 25 percent of the gross annual product
It is stipulated further that the owner or proprietor, unless he chooses
to take back his land after the third year for his own or his adult
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children’s cultivation, would be required to continue to adhere to the 
25 percent rental arrangement commencing with the fourth year of 
occupancy. (There is included in APPENDIX "A” an English translation 
of both the first and second statutes referred to above as well as 
translations of each of the three types of Farm Lease Contracts.)
Adequacy: Despite the fact that the new statutes represent a
definite improvement over those passed by the previous government, 
they are not believed to be administratively feasible or popularly 
acceptable. Not only do the statutes fail to clarify ambiguous and 
undefined terms and phrases, but rather they do in many instances add 
to the already large areas of confusion and uncontrolled administrative 
discretion. Instead of simplifying the task of administrative intea>- 
pretation, they contain additional qualifications and sources of potential 
inequities. There is the additional lack of enforcement requirements 
except such enforcement that could be obtained through the various 
committees appointed to implement the program. It is not believed that 
these committees would prove adequate or appropriate for the large task 
of control, enforcement and policing.
The conclusion is that there is little likelihood of achieving any 
degree of success in the field of landlord-tenant relationships without 
substantial revisions of the basic law designed to make it applicable 
to a wider range of cases that are certain to present themselves at the 
beginning of the program. Such revisions would require the elimination 
of some of the desirable theoretical features, concentrating more on 
the basic essentials. It would mean the adoption of definite, clearly 
defined and understandable provisions in the interest of popular acceptance,
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effective administration and rapid implementation. Experience in other 
countries in Asia where agrarian reforms have been adopted has demon­
strated that such sound and practical measures are an absolute necessity. 
Usually it is only after social and economic systems have become so 
crystallized as to make it very difficult for any government to effectuate 
changes that the need for drastic agrarian reform becomes evident.
Four requisites are usually deemed necessary for effective imple­
mentation of land reform. These are: (l) official acceptance with
the determination to carry it through; (2) technical knowledge and 
administrative ability; (3) sufficient funds for at least administrative 
expenditures; and (4) sufficient time. It is doubtful if any one of 
these essentials are in existence in Vietnam to a sufficient extent.
Land reform experts usually consider certain principles as basic 
for a successful program among which are:
1. Close contact with rural people to insure that the reforms will 
meet "felt needs" and fit actual conditions
2. Within the scope of objectives there should be maximum practical 
equity as among landlords, tenants and government
3. Close observance of the self-help rule that government should 
do only those things that are clearly beyond the ability of 
the individual to do for himself
4. Limited practical objectives with special emphasis on the
step-by-step progress rather than sweeping generalities
5. Simplicity, clarity and exactness in order to promote wide
understanding and facilitate effective administration
6. Use, wherever possible, of existing organizations rather than 
the establishment of new agencies
7. Straight-line administration based upon clearly assigned and 
defined responsibilities and commensurate authority
8. Close supervision, frequent inspection and firm enforcement
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9. Landlord-tenant-owner and farmer-gover nment participation 
through local, intermediate and top level education-imple- 
mentation-arbitration-enforcement committees.83
To present "land reform", a term which relates to improvements in 
the conditions of land tenure and patterns of land ownership, as a 
positive cure for all the ills of the rural peasants of Indochina is 
indeed over-simplifying the problems to be overcome. Especially in 
Central and North Vietnam the small size of holdings and the relatively 
low yields of the land should lead one to caution against the idea 
that all benefits can be derived from land ownership and rent reduction 
alone. Such measures cannot result in materially increasing the amount 
of land available nor in improving the productivity of the soil— two 
conditions that are fundamental to improved living conditions of farmers. 
What is needed to overcome these primary obstacles is for "land reform" 
to be substituted with "agrarian reform", a term which is used to desig­
nate improvements of all economic and social institutions connected with 
the living of farm families.
Examples of land reform programs giving way to agrarian reform may 
be found in both Japan and Formosa, where land redistribution programs 
have been quite successful not merely because the tenant peasants have 
become owners of the land, but more important, because such ownership 
has been accompanied by strong farm cooperative movements, sound credit 
systems, and highly-developed agricultural policies designed to protect 
the agricultural economy. The incentive for increased efforts on the 
land offered by ownership, accompanied by the means of increasing and
®^The above are basically the principles outlined by V/. L. Fippin, 
U. S, Commissioner with the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction on 
the Island of Taiwan, while acting as temporary consultant to the United 
States Operations Missions to Indochina on agrarian reform problems.
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maintaining the productivity of the land at high levels, have resulted 
in making the land reform more meaningful economically, socially, and 
politically.
Under the present conditions in Central and North Vietnam the 
average farmer is unable to increase materially the economic size of 
his holding through increased agricultural production alone. In those 
areas, even if land reform is implemented, there needs to be initiated 
along with it the means for bringing about more efficient utilization 
of the land and human resources. The demands of the marginal farmers 
for more liberal credit, and marketing and irrigation facilities are 
furbher proof that independent, self-reliant farm producers are not 
created simply by shifting the pattern of ownership of the land.
Unless such improvements in land ownership and the land rent situation 
are supplemented by all the other necessary improvements, the peasant 
farm families may not be much better off than they were before the 
implementation of land reform.
Possibilities for Success and Recommendations
Positive reforms leading to improved living conditions for the 
masses of rural people in Indochina is an urgent matter. Farmers are 
demanding a larger share of the produce of the land and a better standard 
of living. Programs of improvement may be instituted under peaceful 
conditions or through a general revolution. It is imperative that firm 
action by the government be taken soon lest armed rebellion again involve 
the country in another destructive civil revolution. However, under the 
democratic form of government presently governing Free Vietnam it appears
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inappropriate to suggest that a broad, all-inclusive agrarian reform 
program be embarked upon immediately. The present government does not 
have the statue, experience, financial resources, stability, or the 
human resources available to launch and administer such an overall 
program at the very beginning. Possibilities for success would appear 
rather to be more certain if the authorities proceeded with a program 
embodying different steps or stages. For these reasons it is suggested 
that the problem be approached in the manner described below.
For Relatively Immediate Implementation:
The first step in land reform should be a practical and effective 
program of rent reduction and firm regulation of landlord-tenant relations. 
This would call for some revisions of the ordinances with closer adherence 
to the basic principles. A more realistic and enforceable rental payment 
ceiling should be specified and made to cover not only bare land and 
local improvements but all accessories and establishments furnished.
From a technical standpoint, an adequate staff should be well 
trained to carry out the program at all the levels of government and be 
given complete orientation before being called upon to function actively.
In addition, detailed regulations should be prepared. Furthermore, very 
wide publicity in simple, readily understandable form should be a con­
tinuing activity. This first phase of rent reduction and landlord-tenant 
relations could and should be started immediately after suitable regulations 
are drafted, implementation committees are formed and sufficient personnel 
are trained.
For Adoption Following Limited Preparation:
To provide the greatest possible opportunity for displaced farmers 
to re-establish themselves on the land with reasonable expectations of
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becoming owners, all unutilized portions of arable lands owned by the 
government, and all unrented portions of arable lands owned by persons 
absent from Vietnam should be taken over by the government and sold to 
occupiers or selected applicants under suitable long-term payment 
arrangements. Only those families who have a farming background and 
wish to continue in agriculture should be selected. The size of the 
operating unit should be fixed on the basis of type of land, location, 
condition, etc., and should not exceed an amount which can be cultivated 
by the farm family's own labor plus very limited amounts of temporary 
hired labor. The deliberate intent should be to establish a pattern of 
family-size farms, owned or to be owned by the operators.
To encourage the incentive for self-interest, families should be 
placed or confirmed on the land under arrangements that will lead to 
ownership within a definite period of time. Full ownership as soon as 
possible should be the aim. In establishing fair purchase prices for 
the land special appraisers should be appointed to actually appraise 
each tract of land with the appraisal subject to review and adjustment 
by the local land reform committees. In addition to the price of the 
land, the final price should cover all necessary improvements, accessories, 
etc., that may be attached to or a part of the land.
Provision should be made for deferring the first payment for a 
stated period of time— perhaps one year— on land which is in need of 
reclamation and other improvement before cultivation can be undertaken. 
Payments in specified commodities that can be readily stored or sold or 
the current cash market value equivalent of basic production items should 
be provided for. All payments should be made to designated government 
offices on the one hand, and by government to absentee owners on the other.
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The original owners should be given the option of receiving installments 
either in the specified commodities or in their current market cash 
equivalent. Purchase payments should be scheduled with the generally 
anticipated ability to pay in keeping with quickest possible attainment 
of full ownership. Provisions for suspension of any installment should 
be made in order to safeguard against disasters or incidents which would 
produce crop failures.
It is realized that a certain amount of preparatory work is needed 
before such a program can be put underway, but since there is a great 
urgency in this reform measure every effort should be made to start 
this program as soon as possible following the initiation of the rent 
reduction and the landlord-tenant relation program.
For Adoption Following More Extensive Preparations:
As a measure to extend the popularly desired security of ownership 
of family-size farms, reduce the area of possible landlord-tenant conflict 
and bring the land reform program closer to realization, it is recommended 
that all lands in excess of prescribed maximum holdings be used to estab­
lish tenants, sharecroppers, and farm laborers on the land under conditions 
that will definitely lead to full and unencumbered ownership within a 
specified period. Exceptions should be made for specified categories of 
land uses which do not lend themselves to family operations (such as 
rubber plantings).
The basic features of the program would closely resemble those 
already contained in the existing ordinance. However, three additional 
problems would need solution. Careful distinction should be made be­
tween excepted and all other uses. Present ownership should not be a 
determining factor, but only the economics and practicalities of family
farm versus large-scale or industrial operations. The matter of 
establishing maximum land retention limits and the various sizes of 
family farm owner-operator units would require careful consideration.
The processes for accurately locating and calculating individual 
owners* holdings and the determining of which portion should be retained 
and which would be purchased by the government for resale would be 
expensive, complex and time consuming. However, that such a program 
can be accomplished is clearly demonstrated by similar reforms firmly 
established in the neighboring Far East countries of Japan and Formosa. 
Complimentary Measures;
In addition to land ownership and tenure reform, effective agrarian 
reform would call for possibly four supporting measures. These are:
(l) a system of rural credit designed to meet the needs of those rural 
families who are working toward the ownership of their land. Such 
credit should be in the form of subsistence, short-term production and 
long-term investment funds at reasonable rates of interest and extended 
through government agencies or cooperative service organizations on the 
basis of government guarantee against loss. Formalities in granting 
loans and in making repayments should be kept to a minimum and include 
the elements of relatively simple use supervision. (2) A system of 
federated or multi-service farmers cooperatives should be developed to 
include wide-spread farmer membership on a democratic basis and essential 
farmer service features. Sale to members of basic farm supplies such as 
fertilizer, improved seed and pesticides] sale of daily living necessi­
ties such as piece goods, and salt and ricej rice storage and milling] 
savings deposits and small loansj and some agricultural advisory service
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are some of the features that would be helpful. (3) Some simple foim 
of agricultural production advisory services should be developed to 
provide help and guidance to farmers. Guidance in production matters 
should be given greater emphasis. (4) In order to meet the require­
ments brought about by war, political readjustments and land reform, 
a more realistic and equitable system of land taxation and schedule 
of land tax rates is desired. The present system of rural taxation is 
in need of careful review and adjustment in order to better meet current 
conditions.
The Refugee Farm Families
Under the terms of the Geneva Convention civilians were given the 
choice of unrestricted movement into the area north or south of the 17th 
parallel— the dividing line between the Communist dominated and the free 
sections of Vietnam. Up until the time that this frontier was closed to 
unrestricted population movement in 1955, a total of about one million 
people crossed over from the Communist area in the North into Central 
and South Vietnam. It is estimated that approximately &5 percent of 
these people are farmers, and the refugee farm families evacuated from 
the North present an additional and grave problem in South and Central 
Vietnam. The government of Free Vietnam finds itself in a peculiar 
situation with reference to those people. At the time they were evacuated 
the government was then not in control over a large part of South and 
Central Vietnam, and immediate resettlement in the interior on abandoned 
lands was impossible. Instead, temporary shelter was provided to them 
in groups and by villages— each one in charge of a village priest— along
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the main roads leading from Saigon to the north, east and southeast.
The areas surrounding these refugee camps are mostly wooded with no 
open land available for cultivation except a few yards along both 
sides of the roads previously cleared by the French Army to improve 
security conditions.
Lacking possibilities to earn, a living in those wooded areas which 
soon became overcrowded, the refugees became destitute and the govern­
ment had no alternative but to provide relief food and clothing obtained 
mostly with American aid funds. In fact, compared with the average 
rural peasants, some groups of refugees were so well cared for that 
they soon lost any inclination they might previously have had to move 
away from the concentration areas into the interior rice lands and go 
to work producing a rice crop. Also, since most of the relief supplies 
and gifts of money passed through the hands of the local priests, they 
were reluctant to persuade refugees to move farther out where farm land 
is available for cultivation.
Some movement of refugee farm families out of the crowded reception 
and concentration areas into vacant rice land has occurred. But the 
majority still remain where they were originally placed, are making no 
great effort to become self-sufficient, and the government, possibly for 
fear of antagonizing them, does not seem in a hurry to force them to 
begin farming. That was the situation as of late July, 1955. Those 
who do move off to farm land and begin farming are eligible for all 
the benefits promised under the agrarian reform laws— should the time 
ever come when these laws are applied and the program implemented.
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Present United States Interest
Realizing the social, economic and propaganda benefits to be 
obtained through affording refugee farm families a chance to earn a 
livelihood, the Vietnamese government, at the suggestion of United 
States authorities, embarked in Januaxy, 1956 upon a very grandoise 
resettlement program designed to place people on abandoned rice lands 
in South Vietnam, In addition to funds already allocated, the two 
governments agreed to utilize a total of over $2,5 million of American 
aid funds to provide the following: (l) one million dollars for agri­
cultural hand tools; (2) one million dollars for mechanical land 
preparation equipment (primarily wheel-type tractors with attachments);
(3) 450*000 dollars for commercial fertilizer; (4) 60,000 dollars for 
vegetable seeds; and (5) 50,000 dollars for insecticides and fungicides. 
It is anticipated that about 77*000 hectares (over 177,000 acres) of 
abandoned rice land will be prepared for rice cultivation and allocated 
to 100,000 refugees on a provisional basis.
Extent of Implementation and Difficulties Encountered
A National Commission, composed of the various interested ministers* 
was appointed to administer a reform program and special legislation was 
enacted directing this government body to take all measures necessary to 
implement the agrarian reform and the "emergency” credit programs. 
According to the law, this National Commission is to exercise its 
functions through special provincial and village commissions and the 
regularly appointed province and village chiefs. However, implementa­
tion of this program has been slow in materializing. Up to July 1, 1955*
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the National Commission existed in name only* Very few communal com­
missions (in which both peasants and landowners are supposed to be 
represented) were organized, and the majority of province and district 
chiefs were paying but lip-service to the program* Very little publicity 
and information was forwarded from the main cities to the rural areas and 
a large percentage of the rural population remained ignorant of existing 
legislation. As of August 1, 1955? no census had been taken of idle 
land and landless peasants, no landlord-tenant or government— peasant 
leases or contracts had been signed and the whole program in general 
was operating only within a few office buildings in the City of Saigon.
As was to be expected in those few cases where landlords and 
peasants were brought.together to agree on tenant contracts under the 
new law the landlords invariably requested the highest (25 percent) 
rent allowed, whereas the tenant would agree only to the lowest (15 
percent) rent payment. Government authorities are supposed to arbitrate 
on the rate of rent but in too many cases government agents themselves 
cannot agree on what rate should apply on a given plot of land— since 
they have little conception of its productivity. Also, over much of 
the rural area— especially those regions formerly occupied by the 
Communists and recently evacuated— the Saigon government has not been 
able to establish firm governmental authority and control. In some 
areas the Communist military authorities had divided up large estates 
and parceled the land among peasant farmers in return for 40 percent 
of the harvest to feed and support the guerrilla army. When the 
Communists left for North Vietnam they left orders to the population 
under their control to continue farming those plots of land, not to pay 
any rent to anyone, and promised that upon the Communists1 return to
the area, clarification of legal ownership and repayment for the land 
would be established. In addition, Communist Cadres were left behind 
to make sure the local population would not comply with any new, con­
tradicting decrees origination from the Saigon Government. To make 
matters more complicated and the law more difficult to enforce, many 
of the provincial and district chiefs are themselves among the larger 
landowners in those very areas where they are supposed to enforce this 
rent reduction and contractual tenure agreements. In fact, the newly 
appointed- Minister of Agrarian Reform is himself one of the largest 
Vietnamese landowners in South Vietnam. Under those conditions one 
can hardly expect progress in the field of needed land and agrarian 
reform in Vietnam. The statutes are on the books and supposedly the 
law of the land, but unless they are applied and enforced they will 
serve only the very limited purpose of face-saving and propaganda for 
the present government but restricted to the city of Saigon and its 
suburbs.
CHAPTER VIII
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND PROCESSING
Traditionally, the major agricultural products of Indochina are 
marketed chiefly through Chinese middlemen who normally take substantial 
margins for their services. These traders and middlemen are often 
usurers as well, who usually take in a large portion of the crop as 
payment for their advances, thus cutting off the producer from most 
free markets in agricultural products.
Generally speaking, there is no organized system of internal 
marketing for any of the agricultural commodities produced in Indochina.^ 
Rice is the only farm product the marketing of which can be said to 
follow established patterns. With the exception of the efforts of 
farmers' organizations in introducing some system of marketing coffee, 
tea, tobacco, and other minor crops, very little has been done by 
either the government or private individuals or institutions towards 
effectuating some systematic marketing arrangement for farm commodities.
As a consequence, the majority of the less-important agricultural pro­
ducts are traded by producers on a barter basis in local village market 
places.
^ A n  exception, of course, is the marketing of rubber. Since both 
the production and marketing of this product are controlled by relatively 
few individuals or syndicates there is a well-established system of mar­
keting. Unfortunately, however, the economies and efficiencies resulting 
from the systematic marketing of rubber benefit only relatively few indi­
viduals, most of whom are foreigners, and the native population, therefore, 
does not share in the advantages afforded by the efficient marketing 
organization.
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The Present Marketing System
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Since rice is by far the most important agricultural commodity 
produced, major emphasis is placed on the marketing of rice because 
much greater benefits to more people are possible through improvements 
in the marketing of that product. Rice also is the only farm product 
that is marketed in large volume in consuming centers at long distances 
from the areas of production, as well as being the product which attracts 
the largest number of outside trader-merchant-moneylenders who engage in 
rice trading as a basis for practicing usury.
Paddv Assembly and Local Processingt
In general a large portion of the paddy produced in the surplus 
rice-producing areas of Cochinchina and Cambodia move in relatively 
well-established trade channels from threshing floors to the mills 
and to consumers or rice exporting organizations. The main harvest in 
the rice surplus areas begins during late October, with the heaviest 
harvesting occurring during the first week of January. Since the 
average rice farmer usually is forced to dispose of most of his crop 
immediately after harvest, the movement of paddy from the interior 
areas of production is at its peak during the months of December,
January and February. During this period the rice merchants and rice 
millers’ agents, usually working on a commission basis, are quite 
active throughout the area traveling from farm to farm, and meeting 
groups of rice farmers whenever possible, in order to collect the rice 
owed them by farmers for credit advances and to acquire as large a 
portion of the available paddy as possible.
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Rice for local consumption within a producing district (Circum­
scription or Delegation) usually is transported by the producer’s 
family from the farm to the local huller-type mill. Custom rice 
milling is usually done on a toll basis, the charge amounting to about 
one-fifth of the quantity of paddy processed, with the mill owner 
retaining the rice bran, flour, very small broken kernels and the 
hulls in addition. Rice hulls are utilized for fuel for the mill 
power plant, while the rice bran is fed to hogs, and the rice flour 
and small shattered kernels sold locally for human consumption. In 
certain cases where millers have a backlog of rice milling orders and 
the farmer is in a hurry to get his rice for family consumption, some 
sort of bartering process takes place. In such instances the miller 
will inspect the farmer’s paddy, determine its milling qualities and 
agree to return to the farmer a specified quantity of the milled rice 
of a certain grade and quality for each unit of paddy brought to be 
milled. Under this system the farmer is assured of a certain return 
in milled rice for his paddy and the local miller usually is able to 
secure a fair return for his services, if he is a good rough rice 
grader. Usually only the larger of the country millers enter actively 
into the clean rice markets of Saigon-Cholon and other large rice­
consuming centers. The majority of the small huller mills dispose 
of their rice in the larger towns, cities and market places within 
the province where they are located. Thus their output of clean rice 
(usually undermilled and of inferior quality) seldom enters the large, 
commercial domestic or export markets for milled rice.
In addition to custom milling of paddy, a very large quantity of 
the rice for home consumption is either hulled by hand in simple
222
homemade rice hullers or pounded by hand (Figure XXV). This is the 
method most prevalent in North and Central Vietnam. Moreover, since 
rebel activities resulted in the destruction of a very large percentage 
of the small country huller mills, a large proportion of rice farmers 
have been forced in recent years to resort to the hand pounding process 
of hulling their paddy for family consumption.
Practically all the paddy going into commercial channels for 
milling and consumption within the country and for export is purchased 
by paddy merchants or millers’ agents. Only a very insignificant 
quantity of paddy is delivered by producers directly to the larger 
commercial rice mills and warehouses located in Saigon-Cholon, Pnom 
Penh, and other large cities.
The local paddy merchant also may be the owner of a local rice 
mill and may deal in production items which he advances to his paddy- 
supplying farmers in lieu of cash loans during the crop production 
season. However, the majority are simply rice merchants operating 
simultaneously as moneylenders at usurious rates of interest, and 
making large profits on both deals.
An exception to the system described above is the paddy produced 
on the larger rice plantations located mostly in South Vietnam. Planta­
tion owners usually supplant the paddy merchants and millers’ agents 
with their own managers and native supervisors. Normally most plantation 
owners are able financially (with borrowed capital) to grant loans to 
their tenants against pledged paddy deliveries, thus usually are able 
to control the whole output from their land holdings and sell directly 
to the large commercial mills. In some cases plantation owners have 
financial interest and hold positions through interlocking directorships
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Figure XIV. Rural Rice Mills in Vietnam.
Rebel activities resulted in almost complete destruction of 
country rice mills in South Vietnam. Before the war, a 
rather large part of the rice produced in Vietnam was milled 
in the interior provinces by small country mills. At the 
present time many farm families resort to hand-pounding or 
home-made rice mills for hulling their daily rice ration.
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in large rice mills and rice export concerns in Saigon-Cholon. In 
other instances, small and medium rice mills are located at the 
plantation headquarters to mill the plantations own paddy as well 
as paddy produced by local farmers. However, recent rebel activities 
have resulted in almost complete destruction of facilities on most 
plantations in South Vietnam.
A substantial quantity of paddy usually is purchased by owners of 
country mills. In most cases these country millers have financial ties 
•with the owners of larger commercial mills in Saigon-Cholon and Pnom 
Penh. Therefore, many of these small rice mill owners also act as 
millers' agents for the larger mills. In addition, the miller repre­
sentative may be a middleman engaged almost exclusively in purchasing 
paddy, or a local village commodity.retailer and business man, who, in 
addition to his regular business enterprise, buys paddy for the large 
mills on a commission basis. The miller representative may lend his 
own funds to the local farmers or receive monetary advances from the 
large millers which he in turn advances to id.ce farmers during the 
growing season.
Whatever may be the business connection of the paddy buyers, 
it is the common practice of most to make advances to rice farmers. 
Usually the credit advance to the farmer is made at the beginning of 
the rice-growing season, either in cash or merchandise, in return for 
which the farmer agrees to repay the loan at harvest time by delivering 
a certain quantity of paddy of a designated grade and quality, and for a 
certain price. Under such a system of credit advances, rates of interest 
are unduly high and also are partially concealed.
Under such a system of paddy assembly it is obvious that the paddy 
speculators and the commission buyers are rather essential elements in 
the system, and that the larger commercial millers would be unable to 
obtain their rough rice supplies without them. This is the reason that 
all the larger mills make use of them almost exclusively. Until some 
improvements are forthcoming in paddy assembly, tied as it is with 
production credit, disorganized rice marketing at the farm level will 
continue to encourage usurious interest rates on loans by paddy merchants 
to farmers. In fact, when one considers the amount of risks involved 
in granting loans to insolvent farmers and the risks involved in buying, 
moving, storing, and holding rough rice, the middlemen^ profits may 
not be so large as they appear to be. In addition to the large risk 
involved in the borrowing farmer failing to deliver his crop at harvest 
time, the merchant must assume the following risks: (l) loss of weight
of the paddy due to drying after delivery; (2) loss in storage which 
may be as high as 10 percent due to rodents and insects; and (3) loss 
in transit from the interior to the terminal mill warehouse. Some 
effort need be made in reducing the possibility of those losses.
Weights and Measures: Paddy usually is purchased by the large
Saigon-Cholon mills on a weight basis, utilizing the metric system. 
However, throughout the farming areas paddy is purchased from the 
farmers in measures of volume. The standard measure used is known 
as the "gia" which may be either a metal bucket or a bamboo basket 
containing 40 liters or from 20 to 22 kilograms of paddy. The weight 
of paddy contained in a "gia" varies with the quality and condition 
(moisture content, weeds, rice straw, etc.) of the grain being measured.
In the retail trade, milled rice is sold by weight using the metric 
system. In the wholesale trade rice is sold in burlap bags containing 
approximately 67 kilograms. Burlap bags used in the milled rice trade 
are supposed to contain a standard measure known as the ’'picul”. In 
the export trade the metric system of weight is used exclusively and 
rice is exported mostly in burlap bags containing 100 kilograms. All 
rice sold in the retail markets of the larger cities is contained in 
metal buckets or baskets, with the purchaser furnishing his own con­
tainer, consisting of either a paper bag, basket, bucket, or banana 
leaves. There is no pre-packaging of rice in Indochina as in American 
markets.
Transportation:
The importance of water in the rivers, smaller streams and canals 
as a means of transporting commodities to and from the interior parts of 
the country cannot be overemphasized. Normally, about 90 percent of 
the paddy and milled rice from the producing areas of South Vietnam 
is transported to the Saigon-Cholon mills in small boats and junks 
through the inland waterways that crisscross the area. The remainder 
of the paddy is transported to the mills in trucks and only an insignif­
icant quantity is transported by the one railroad line from Saigon to 
the city of Mytho on the northern side of the Mekong River. During 
recent years, however, transportation of all commodities by road has 
increased in importance while the proportion of produce moving by 
water has decreased. Rebel activities have made inland waterways inse­
cure for commodity transportation except when accompanied by armed 
naval escorts. Although some of the main highways in the area were also
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insecure, security conditions for land travel were better than for 
river traffic.
Most of the paddy and other farm products move from the point of 
production to the primary assembly point along either the roads or 
canals on human backs or in small canoes. Sometimes a small quantity 
is carried in water buffalo carts.
River junks are of various capacities —  ranging from a few hundred 
pounds to 30 or more tons of paddy. In South Vietnam, almost every 
small village located along a stream or canal is a rice concentration 
point with river junks and small boats lining the banks during harvest 
time (Figure XV). A large percentage of the junks were destroyed during 
the war, but several thousands are still in use. These junks usually 
are owned by individuals or small companies engaged only in the inland 
transportation business. However, many of the paddy merchants and 
Chinese rice speculators own and operate river crafts and derive a 
portion of their income from the transportation of paddy and other 
products from the interior assembly points to the central warehouses 
in Cholon.
The trucks in use for transporting farm products from the interior 
to the cities and supplies from the cities to the farming areas are 
owned mostly by Chinese rice dealers, some of whom own fleets of trucks, 
mostly of United States manufacture.
It is impossible to ascertain the transportation charges for 
either truck or junk carriers, and, therefore, no comparison of the 
relative costs can be made. On the average, however, transportation 
charges from the country assembly points to the terminal warehouses
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Figure XV* Junks Used in Transporting Rice and Other Commodities in 
Indochina*
Waterways transportation is very important in Indochina*
A very large percentage of all interior traffic is carried 
on junks and barges, which are the life-line of many country 
villages and cities*
amounts to from 12 to 25 percent of the assembly point price, depending 
upon the distance traveled. Transportation charges for other commodities 
varies with the bulkiness of the product as well as with the distance.
In recent years of war activities transportation charges are reported 
to have more than doubled, figured on a percentage value of the com­
modities transported. This increase is due to two factors: (l) in
many cases owners of river junks had to furnish their own armed convoys 
or employ armed personnel to accompany the cargo to the terminal point, 
or were requested to reimburse the army and navy personnel performing 
that service; and (2) both the national army (French Foreign Legion­
naires and Vietnamese), the religious sects, and the Viet Minh 
Communists all imposed what was termed "protection taxes" on practically 
all vehicles transporting produce in or out of the interior. During 
the years 1950-54, almost every army guard post along the inland water­
ways and every bridge along the highways was considered a "check point" 
by whichever side was in control. Since a large part of the food 
needs of the armed forces was obtained from the immediate vicinity, 
the most simple way to procure this was to extract a "tax" in kind
rt cfrom transporters of farm commodities. Naturally, this system had 
the effect of greatly increasing the "costs" of transporting the farm 
products to markets.
Storage Facilities:
Host of the rice crop is stored in the form of paddy; stocks of
^While following a truck load of bananas, coconuts and vegetables 
in 1952 from Hytho to Cholon, a distance of 40 miles, the writer noticed 
that after the sixth "check-point stop" the truck operator had paid about 
one-half of his truck load of bananas and coconuts and about one-fourth 
of the vegetables in "protection taxes".
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milled rice are relatively small at any given time, usually only about 
15 percent of the stocks of paddy in the Saigon-Cholon area.
Before the war a considerable amount of paddy storage facilities 
existed in the heavy rice-producing areas. Most of these were owned 
by rice merchants and small rice millers. However, most of those 
facilities have been destroyed and there is now a serious shortage of 
country storage facilities and an urgent need to rebuild local storage 
warehouses. Storage facilities in the Saigon-Cholon area before the 
war were considered sufficient for the volume of activities, and have 
suffered only about 10 percent war destruction. In Pnom Penh, on 
the contrary, both rice storage and rice milling facilities have about 
doubled since 1950 as a result of special efforts by the Cambodian 
Government.
It probably is fortunate that the harvest extends over a relatively 
long season, the movement of the paddy from the farm to the local 
assembly point and to the central mills in the larger cities is slow 
and dry weather invariably prevails during harvesting and the three 
or four months period following. The combined result of these con­
ditions reduces the seriousness of the paddy storage problem in Indochina. 
Hand harvesting methods are vised exclusively by Indochinese farmers, and 
the rice harvest is spread over a long period of time. The average 
farmer plants his crop by small patches at a time, starts planting as 
early as the supply of water will permit, and continues his planting
^Best estimates indicate that before the war adequate paddy 
storage facilities existed in the interior provinces in South Vietnam 
sufficient for about 90,000 metric tons, while the 75 warehouses in 
Saigon-Cholon had a capacity of 300,000 tons. Storage facilities 
utilized in conjunction with rice mills are not included in these data.
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to the latest practical date. In addition, both late and early maturing 
varieties are planted, and variations in climatic conditions and water 
supply by localities also tend to lengthen the harvesting season for 
the country as a whole.
The pattern of paddy movement from the farm to the assembly point, 
to the junks and into the mills is about as follows: the farmer requires
considerable time to harvest and dry his paddy and at all stages the 
paddy is moved in small lots to the assembly point. Heavy deliveries of 
paddy in payment of loans to the merchants are usually stored in local 
warehouses or in junks owned by the rice merchants and millers* agents. 
Deliveries of paddy in payment of loans are anticipated in advance and 
storage space usually is provided accordingly. Very often during dry 
seasons paddy is stored in the open until loaded into junks or trucks 
for transporting to the mills. During periods of heavy deliveries 
there is usually a large quantity of paddy aboard junks, and when 
consideration is given to the large number of such junks in use, it is 
apparent that paddy in transit at any given time represents a sizeable 
portion of the crop.
On-the-farm storage facilities are of the crudest type. Although 
most farm families have some paddy storage space, this consists mostly 
of large bamboo bins placed either inside the family grass house or 
outside in the open. This type of storage is grossly inadequate even 
during periods of diy weather. Losses due to rodents and insects while 
paddy is stored in this type of facilities sometime reach as high as 20 
percent. The Governments of both Vietnam and Cambodia are extending 
some efforts toward remedying this situation and are taking definite
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steps to furnish the credits and materials needed to erect small countiy 
rice storage facilities for the benefit of rice farmers utilizing them 
on a cooperative basis.
Financial Arrangements and Prices at Various Points in the Rice Trade;
As previously stated, the farmer receives money (most of it in 
form of credit advances) for his salable paddy from local rice merchants 
or millers’ agents. The latter are frequently local retailers who 
collect paddy stocks for large rice millers on a commission basis.
These countiy rice merchants and commission agents receive payment 
for the paddy upon delivery to the miller. Generally the two classes 
of paddy buyers bear the cost of transportation from the assembly 
point to the mill. Millers recover their capital outlay through the 
sale of milled rice to the rice wholesalers and rice peddlers, or through 
bulk sales in rather large volumes to exporting firms. Since rice can 
be exported only after obtaining an export permit issued by the govern­
ment, it is not unusual for financial arrangements to be of the following 
order: the government banks furnish the credit to the exporting firm,
the exporter grants credit advances to the miller who supplies the
exporter with..rice, the miller in turn utilizes the funds to grant
loans to the rice merchant who make use of the borrowed capital to 
conduct his operations and pay the farmer for the paddy purchased from 
him. In the case of seasonal capital, the miller often will grant loans
to his agents in the interior who will utilize these credits to lend to
rice farmers against pledged delivery of the rice crop at harvest time.
The large banks operating in Indochina enter actively in the 
commercial credit activities required in the rice marketing system.
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They furnish a large portion of the credit utilized by warehouse owners 
in financing the storage of paddy in the large rice concentration 
centers. They also are very active in furnishing credit to rice millers 
who need loans to finance the rice-milling operation, and to the rice 
exporters. Stocks of paddy in storage usually serve as security for 
storage loans which usually amount to about 75 percent of the current 
value of the commodity. Although warehouse receipts are not in common 
use, unless the banks are dealing with an old customer of good repute, 
they usually keep a first lien on the paddy and order the storage 
warehouse locked.
Prices; Theoretically at least, there are two sets of prices 
prevailing in the milled rice market - the free (black) market price 
and the controlled or official price. Both of these prices reportedly 
approach equality with the free (black) market price only slightly 
higher than the official price. However, in practice, there has been 
very little of any degree of stability in rice prices at all levels of 
marketing during recent years. It is impossible to delineate all the 
various movements in rice price levels in any one market —  and much 
less for the whole country. About the best examples of instability 
in rice prices that can be offered is the price situation and price 
movements that occurred at the time the French government devalued the 
Indochinese Piaster during Hay, 1953 as compared with the situation as 
of July 1st of that year.
Immediately following the devaluating action in Paris, the Vietnamese 
government introduced simultaneously four governmental decrees in an 
attempt to put brakes on the anticipated increase in prices of consumer 
goods. These four decrees were: (l) an order suspending provisionally
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exports of all commodities, but designed primarily to block exports of 
rice and rubber; (2) an order blocking provisionally all salaries and 
renumeration at the level of May 9, 1953; (3) an order blocking the 
price of all products, food stuff, and services at the May 9 level; 
and (4) an order obliging all establishments at all levels of marketing 
and trade to declare the exact quantity of rice and paddy stocks on 
hand. This fourth order also called for the declaration of the nature, 
quality, and quantity of merchandise, as well as the place where the 
stocks were located and the purchase and resale price in effect as of 
May 9. The third order also called for public exhibition in front 
of every establishment of business of the actual resale price of all 
commodities, and stipulated that the government would forcefully close 
and seize all stocks in all cases where there were infractions of this 
order.
Rice prices stood at 390 piasters per hundred kilograms wholesale 
and 500 piasters per hundred kilograms at retail on May 11, but increased 
to 450 piasters wholesale and 600 piasters per hundred kilograms retail 
within 24 hours after the government orders became law. Paddy and milled 
rice marketing at the wholesale level almost came to a standstill within 
a week. The official controlled price of rice (No. 1, 25 percent broken) 
in the Saigon-Cholon market was fixed at 3*7 piasters per kilogram at the 
wholesale level and at 4.4 piasters retail. However, actual retail 
prices in the "grey-market" stood at 4*6 piasters per kilogram for No. 1, 
25 percent broken and 4.4 piasters for No. 2, with no rice of No. 1 
quality available in the market at the official price of 4.4 piasters 
per kilogram. Movements of paddy from the interior to the central 
markets came to an end within two weeks. Furthermore, the retail
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prices of imported commodities increased by 60 to 80 percent during 
this same period.
On July 1, 1953 the government of Vietnam set a new official 
ceiling price for rice at 390 piasters per hundred kilograms at the 
wholesale level (EX-magazine) and 475 piasters at the retail level 
for No. 1, 25 percent broken. While rice prices on the free market 
behaved in a fairly stable manner in the Saigon-Cholon market area 
following this action, they acted quite differently in other parts of 
the country, especially in North and Central Vietnam. Vietnamese 
government officials give two reasons for this: (l) Viet Minh activities
in restricting normal flow of available supplies; and (2) the almost 
complete breakdown of the government’s rice rationing system. An 
additional reason of course is the "traffic" that takes place in rice 
marketing channels in those areas, where rice prices at the wholesale 
and retail levels vary considerably from weelc-to-week, day-to-day, and 
even from hour-to-hour each day. One example of the relationship between 
rebel activities and rice prices in any given area during that period 
is given by the situation at Hue, the capital of Central Vietnam, when 
rice stocks were plentiful both there and at Tourane, the port city. 
However, the rebels demolished a railroad bridge between the two cities 
and within 12 hours rice prices at Hue more than doubled.
In North and Central Vietnam the government attempted to stabilize 
rice prices through a rationing system and by granting rice purchase 
permits to the local population. However, it is apparent that such 
permits had the direct effect of themselves finding their way into 
the hands of black-market operators and of causing increases in rice 
prices, because it is now well-known that anyone willing to pay 100
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to 150 piasters to a government "functionnaire" could obtain a permit 
to purchase up to one metric ton from government-controlled "security" 
stocks of rice.
On July 1, 1953 the c.i.f. prices for No. 1, 25 percent brokens 
were 513 piasters per 100 kilograms at Haiphong and 543 piasters at 
Tourane (higher prices at Tourane reflect the higher port costs).
This same rice was advertised for 650 to 700 piasters per 100 kilograms 
at retail. However, after all the under-counter manipulations, permit 
deals, transportation charges, extra taxes, etc., that this rice was 
subject to before it reached the hands of consumers in centers like 
Hue and Hanoi, the actual retail price was anywhere from 40 to 60 
percent above this figure, and no one in official governmental circles 
could actually determine the exact price of rice to consumers on any 
particular day.
Functions of Supplies and the Whole sale Price of Rice:
Legitimate rice dealers and millers normally are forced, through 
competition, to operate on a more or less restricted profit margin and, 
in a free market, their prices depend primarily upon the purchase price 
of paddy and their costs of milling and/or conducting business. However, 
when a rice merchant is primarily a speculator in either paddy or milled 
rice his demand or sales price may reflect only to a very small extent 
his purchase price and actual costs. Thus, it is mostly in restraining 
the activities of pure speculators in paddy and milled rice that stocks 
on hand and available for consumption can be expected to have direct 
effects upon prices —  i.e., the supplies on hand can control inflation 
of rice prices only if the movement of those supplies can be effectively
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moved and channeled in the distribution system in an orderly manner. 
Evidently, this is not done in those areas of wide and sudden price 
fluctuations and the consumer pays dearly for the breakdown in the 
system mentioned above.
With respect to the cost of paddy delivered to the Saigon-Cholon 
warehouses and the milled rice delivered- to the retail trade there is 
also the taxation system that plays a predominant role in addition to 
the high speculative profits of traders. There are far too many taxes 
(hidden and otherwise) levied on paddy and milled rice in the movement 
from the provinces to the mills, and from the mills to the consumers 
and the point of export, to allow retail rice prices to bear a direct 
relationship to the farm price of paddy and costs of transportation, 
storage and milling. The problem of keeping rice prices to consumers 
relatively low is complex and many-sided and calls for positive govern­
ment control measures in certain sections of the country. However, 
legitimate rice dealers feel that in fiscal policy matters the simple 
act of lowering the surtax on low-quality broken rice, which is exported 
mainly to Dakar, would afford exporters the possibility of obtaining a 
higher price (i.e., greater profits) for this low-quality rice and thus 
contribute to lower internal prices for the better quality rice consumed 
within Indochina. This of course assumes that raw materials and pro­
cessing costs remain uniform over long periods of time, which has not 
been the case in recent years.
Among other possibilities of affording more freedom of movement 
of paddy and milled rice would be a government banking policy of 
restricting credit to speculators for the purpose of stocking and
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holding rice supplies in expectation of higher prices. Such action 
may have the effect of forcing them to release some of the supplies 
to the trade, thus easing up on the tendency of prices to rise.
Except for the temporary and "provisional" measures mentioned 
above, there are no government-controlled export prices for rice in 
Indochina. There are, however, government controls on the quality of 
milled rice that is allowed to move into the export market. No export 
license is granted for rice containing less than 25 percent broken 
grains. The reason for this rule, as explained by high officials in 
the Vietnamese and Cambodian Ministries of Agriculture, is that an 
influential rice milling syndicate operating in both states owns very 
old milling machinery of Japanese manufacture and is unable to produce 
rice with a smaller percentage of broken grains. It appears, therefore, 
that this restriction is designed primarily to make it possible for 
that syndicate to compete in the export market for milled rice.
All foreign exchange earned through the export of rice is retained 
by the government. The exporter receives Indochinese piasters at the 
official rate of exchange. Although there are no official controls in 
the true meaning of the term, the price in foreign currency negotiated 
between the buyer and seller must be approved by government authorities 
for each transaction. This action does not, however, constitute price 
controls or setting of prices per se by the government, but is more of 
a check to insure that the government actually gets the entire amount 
of foreign currency involved in the transaction.
Prices are published by trade journals periodically, and the 
newspapers usually publish daily price quotations. The Government 
Customs Office also publishes a price list weekly which is made available
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to the trade as a guide to the prices that will be approved by the 
government. During periods of rising prices exporters usually are 
able to sell at prices considerably above the minimum price acceptable 
to the government. However, according to government regulations all 
foreign currency earned must be turned in regardless of whether the 
amount received exceeds the current world market price or the price 
of comparable grade and standard in the published list of minimum 
prices.
There is no organised commodity exchange in Indochina and, there­
fore, no organised trading in futures in rice or other commodities* 
However, there is a large amount of trading by individuals and syndicates 
utilising the practice of making current committments for delivery on 
a certain future date. The wholesale price of rice normally is con­
trolled to a large extent by Chinese millers and wholesale rice dealers, 
who also are very influential in controlling the price of paddy. The 
exceedingly strong position of the Chinese in rice marketing is 
explained by the very close adherence and unity among members of the 
Chinese "syndicate" to which practically all belong. The Chinese rice 
men traditionally help one another in time of need. It is permissable 
for a member of the group to be dishonest with an outsider, but if he 
is dishonest with another Chinese he usually is squeezed out of business 
by the other members. It is customary for all Chinese merchants to pay 
the same price for paddy and also to agree on a uniform price for milled 
rice offered for sale. In their paddy purchasing activities in the 
rice-producing areas it is common practice for Chinese merchants to 
divide the territory among themselves and to refrain from engaging in 
paddy buying in an area in which another Chinese is operating. Thus,
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mutual support and cooperation is carried to such an extent that the 
"syndicate" often is able to obtain a virtual monopoly at both ends 
of the marketing system - the paddy buying at the country assembly 
points and in the wholesale market for milled rice.
Taxes in Rice Marketing Operations:
In addition to the special wartime taxes referred to above and 
the other taxes such as property taxes on rice mills, storage facilities, 
trucks and junks, business taxes, sales taxes, etc., there are three 
different taxes levied on the export of rice from Indochina. A special 
duty tax was first introduced in 1933 and modified by the Governor 
General in 1937 and 1939, and again in 1941 and 1946. This special 
tax is a simple revenue earning tax and benefits received therefrom 
accrue to the Federal budget. These export taxes are as follows:
(1) The export duty tax rates are:
Paddy and cargo rice containing over 35% paddy 12$ ad valorem
Cargo rice not over 35$ paddy 10$ ad valorem
White rice 10$ ad valorem
Broken rice 8$ ad valorem
Low grade rice flour 6$ ad valorem
Corn 5$ ad valorem
The values to which the rates apply are not the invoiced values but a
valuation determined by the Director of Customs who takes an average of
the f.a.s. prices for the preceeding three months; thus the values are
subject to change every month.
(2) The exceptional tax (Taxe exceptionne a la sortie des paddys et 
derives) was established by the Governor General in January, 1941 and 
modified in 1946. The purpose of this tax is to gain for the Federal 
budget half the profits which the government considers to be above 
those reasonably to be expected by the exporter. The amount of this
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tax is established as follows: a base price is established from time
to time for each category of rice by order of the government. This 
tax amounts to one half the difference between this base price and the 
actual f.o.b. price received in units of 100 kilograms gross weight by 
the exporter.
(3) The handling tax (tax d’antillage) is a simple tax levied to pay 
charges involved in handling rice and accrues to the benefit of the 
budget of the Saigon-Cholon Port of Commerce. It is determined by a 
formula which averages the ex-mill prices for the preceeding three 
months and which weighs this average so that it does not respond to 
minor price changes. New charges are levied each month.
Milling and Processing:
The rice milling industry of Indochina is concentrated in the 
Saigon-Cholon area and in the city of Pnom Penh. Before World War II 
the total rice milling capacity of the 75 commercial rice mills in 
Saigon-Cholon amounted to 8,400 metric tons of paddy per 24-hour day. 
The daily capacity per mill ranged from 540 metric tons of paddy to 
16 tons. In the interior provinces of South Vietnam there were a 
total of 321 rice mills vdth a combined capacity of 6,000 metric tons 
of paddy per day. Most of the mills in the country-side had a very 
small milling capacity compared with those located in Saigon-Cholon.
The milling capacity of the country mills ranged from 230 to 5 metric 
tons per 24-hour day. The majority of the rice mills in the city of 
Saigon-Cholon had a capacity of over 100 metric tons per day while 
most of the mills located in the country had a capacity of less than 
12 tons.
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Before the war the total milling capacity in Cambodia amounted 
to about 600 metric tons of paddy per day. Most of the rice mills are 
located in the cities of Pnom Penh and Battambang. The effort made by 
the Cambodians in recent years to expand the rice-milling industry in 
that State is evidenced by the fact that in 1951 there were a total of 
47 rice mills with a combined capacity of 700 metric tons per day, but 
by the end of 1953 the industry had increased to 103 mills and a capacity 
of nearly 1,400 tons.
The rice milling industry never did develop to any large extent in 
Worth and Central Vietnam. Before the war there were not more than 100 
mills in these two areas. Most of the plants were small huller-mills 
with a capacity under 20 tons per day per mill.
It has previously been mentioned that a large number of the countiy
mills were destroyed during rebel activities while most of those in
the larger cities escaped war damage. In South Vietnam only 96 of the
321 rice mills in existence before the war were in operating condition
during the fall of 1952. The daily rice-milling capacity of the country
mills decreased to 2,000 metric tons of paddy, while the capacity of the
37mills located in Saigon-Cholon decreased to 5*000 tons.
The consumption of rice in the Saigon-Cholon cosmopolitan area 
is between 20,000 and 25,000 metric tons per month. This indicates 
that the capacity of the mills in the twin cities was about five times 
the amount consumed by the local population even during the period of
87'Data concerning the number of rice mills and milling capacities 
were obtained from the following sources: (l) Bulletin Economique du
Vietnam, October, 1952, p. 512j (2) Syndicat des Exportateurs Francais 
d’Indochine.
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lowest milling capacity. On the contrary, the daily rice consumption 
in the rural areas of South Vietnam amounts to about twice the capacity 
of country mills as reported during the fall of 1952. Rural people, 
therefore, had to resort to home grinding or pounding of their daily 
rice requirements.
The larger mills generally are operated by steam power utilizing 
rice hulls as fuel. The quantity of hulls obtained from the milling 
operations usually is insufficient to furnish all the steam required 
and wood is used as a supplement. Most of the smaller huller-mills 
are powered by internal combustion engines.
The destruction of a large number of small rice mills resulted 
in an increased demand for mills of this type immediately following 
the end of hostilities to replace those destroyed. Commercial import 
establishments in Indochina responded immediately to this demand, and 
since 1954 a considerable number of small rice mills have been imported 
from Japan, England, Germany and other countries. Indications are that 
the milling capacity in the interior rice-producing provinces of South 
Vietnam will soon return to pre-war level.
Grade and Qnal-i tv; No one knows all the many different varieties 
and strains of rice grown in the various rice-producing regions of 
Indochina. After centuries of rice cultivation under different con­
ditions of soil, climate and water supply in the various localities, 
rice growers have become 'fairly well adept at selecting rice varieties 
best suited to the area. In many cases those selected may not necessarily 
be the highest-yielding variety (see page 91 )• In some areas many 
different varieties may be grown by one farm family— such as 5th month
rice, 6th month, 7th month, etc., all maturing at different times and 
having different nailing qualities. The obvious result is that a very 
large portion of the paddy stock is composed of a mixture of several 
varieties of rice before it reaches the primary assembly point. Lack 
of adequate storage facilities and indifference on the part of paddy 
handlers result in additional mixing before the rice reaches the mill.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a large proportion of the milled 
rice in Indochina contains a mixture of several varieties of rice.
Since most rice mills are not equipped with the proper grain separating 
and selecting machinery (Carter disc-separator, or other brands) to 
sort the grains according to length, a large amount of grain breakage 
occurs during the milling process. Furthermore, lacking proper equip­
ment, rice farmers are not able to properly clean their paddy and the 
product usually contains a large quantity of weed seeds, straw, dirt, 
animal manure and other foreign matter. Most of the smaller rice mills 
do not contain the equipment necessary to remove all the foreign matter 
in paddy before it enters the hullers and thus the quality of the milled 
product is decreased yet further. Improper storage and damage to the 
grain due to excessive moisture and rodents and insects also combine to 
lower the quality of rice in Indochina.
Under such conditions it is difficult to produce a high-quality, 
homogeneous product. The economic consequences are relatively low 
milling yields, poor quality rice, and a decrease in the value of the 
total crop. Table 24 shows a comparison of the proportion of the 
various products outturned from rough rice in the milling process 
between rice mills in the United States and the large mills in Indochina.
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Table 24. Comparison of the Proportion of the Various Products Out- 
turned from Rough Rice between Rice Mils in the United 
States and in Indochina
Item U. S. Mills Indochina Mills
Percent of total 
weight














Hulls and debris 20.0 22.5
Total by-products 29.5 32.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Whole head rice is not turned out by mills in Indochina but is 
mixed with the second head to form No. 1, 25 percent broken quality 
rice.
—' A substantial proportion of the rice polish produced by mills in 
Indochina also contains a large amount of rice bran.
Sources: Randall Stelly, An Economic Study of the Rice Industry in
the United States. M. S. Thesis, Texas A. & M. College, 
College Station, Texas, 1947, p. 6l.
Syndicate of Rice Millers of Indochina.
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Most of the rice milled for export in Indochina is subject to 
grading under supervision of the Syndicate of French Exporters of 
Indochina. This is an association of exporting firms, most of whom 
are also rice millers. Contrary to the implication in the name of the 
association, membership is not limited to French-owned firms. The 
members of the association account for about 95 percent of all rice 
exports from Indochina. The association was formed in 1939 to control 
the quality of rice, corn and other products from Indochina in order 
to obtain uniformity of products desired by foreign importers and to 
establish and maintain grades and standards. Member firms cannot 
export rice or other commodities that have not been inspected and 
approved by representatives of the association.
Rice millers and merchants interested in exporting rice or other 
commodities usually arrange to have a representative of the association 
call at their mill or warehouse to inspect the product and advise if it 
meets requirements of the association. The association maintains 
representatives in each port of exit. The expenses of the association 
are supported by a small fee charged on the commodity being exported. 
The association has rather strict inspection rules and supervises its 
members closely, so that products exported by the members generally 
are of the quality and standard they are represented to be.
All clean rice sales for export are bought on sample. A very 
large portion of the rice milled in Indochina is 40 percent broken, 
but the bulk of rice exports is No. 1, 25 percent broken— the lowest 
percentage broken that the government allows to be exported.
The grades and qualities of rice and rice products, as established
by the Syndicate of French Exporters of Indochina (Syndicat des Exportateur
SBFrancais d’Indochine), include a total of 40 classifications.
To ascertain the percentage of broken grains contained in a sample of 
rice the following procedure is employed: A certain quantity of rice
from a sample submitted for analysis is weighed, for instance 100 grams, 
and the whole grains are carefully separated from the brokens. A whole 
grain must be over half the size of the original grain. If doubt exists 
as to whether half grains should be classified as whole grains or 
brokens, the half grains must be divided into two equal portions, one 
half being included in the lot of grains and the other half in the 
brokens. In order to determine the percentage, the whole grains and 
the brokens are weighed separately. Example: A quantity of 100 grams
of rice is found to contain 17 grams of brokens, 75 grams of whole 
grains, and B grams of doubtful half grains. This indicates that the 
sample of rice comprises 21 percent of brokens and 79 percent of whole 
grains•
Defects in the Marketing System:
At the Farm Level: The primaiy defect in the marketing system at
the farm level arises from the fact that the average fanner in Indochina 
is financially unable to retain control of his products after harvest 
time. Invariably, he is forced to sell immediately in order to repay 
financial obligations contracted during the growing season. Too often
88Syndicat des Exportateurs Francais d'Indochine, Le Riz 
d ^ndochine des Rizieres a la Consommation, Saigon, Undated.
The more important definitions of qualities of rice are 
contained in Appendix "B".
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he is at the mercy of the produce dealer, primary the rice merchant, 
who seldom shows any leniency. The result is very poor bargaining 
power on the part of the farmer and he suffers the consequences in the 
low prices he is paid for his crops.
There is also the lack of effective competition among buyers at 
the farm level. The practice of rice merchants of dividing up the 
territory with tacit agreement and understanding of no interference 
greatly reduces the degree of competition among rice buyers that .might 
prevail otherwise, and further reduces the average farmer’s bargaining 
power in the sale of his products. Inadequate storage space on the 
farms and at the priinaiy assembly points is another major defect.
Even though a rice farmer may be able financially to retain his paddy 
for a certain period following harvest, lack of adequate storage space 
imposes additional handicaps upon the farm family wishing to hold onto 
their products in anticipation of higher prices at a later date.
Transportation Problems: Even during normal years the transporta­
tion vehicles available were inadequate to move all the paddy from the 
interior to the rice nailing and storage centers during the peak of the 
harvesting season. Unless more storage space is provided in the interior 
which would tend to remove the urgency of shipping paddy out to the 
central warehouses and mills, better transportation facilities are 
needed, both in water transportation and highways. The problem of 
transportation from the interior to the central milling centers is 
aggravated by the fact that at least 26 percent of the weight of the 
product consists of hulls and bran. This adds to the cost of trans­
porting the rice but adds very little value. The excessive taxation
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on the movement of paddy from the interior to the mil ling and consumption 
centers, begun during \\rartime, has been continued. These additional 
transportation costs all go into the final price of the milled rice 
to the consumer and serve to widen the gap between the farm price and 
the price paid by the consumer for his daily ration of milled rice.
Rice Mills: It is quite evident from Table 24 that the rice
mills operating in Indochina are relatively inefficient. For the 
most part they are old mills using out-dated milling equipment. With 
such equipment they are not able to do a proper paddy-cleaning and 
separating job and the result is a very high percentage of breakage 
of the kernels. This reduces further the value of the milled rice 
obtained from the paddy and has a depressing effect on the price paid 
farmers for paddy.
Storage: Storage facilities at both ends of the marketing system
are inadequate both in capacity and efficiency. The excessive losses 
that occur in all types of storage due to humidity, rodent and insect 
damage is another factor reflecting in relatively low prices paid 
farmers by buyers and millers1 agents who inevitably pass such losses 
backward to the raw material suppliers.
Pricing Mechanism on the Domestic Market: There is little opportu­
nity for rice prices to be set under competitive conditions in the 
domestic wholesale market in Indochina. With x’ice marketing at the 
wholesale level almost completely in the hands of Chinese rice millers 
and traders, there usually is a uniform price at which rice sales are 
made. Dealers form one great selling combine, and there usually is 
tacit agreement that no one will undercut the selling price arrived 
at or overbid the purchase price agreed to.
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Too Many Middlemen: There are far too many middlemen between the
farmer and the consumer consistent with the amount of services performed 
on rice, the major product of the country. There are very few functions 
and very little processing in the rice marketing system in Indochina. 
There is no packaging, no store display, no advertising, nor is paddy 
or milled rice transported great distances between the farmer and the 
final consumer. Yet the farmer is at least eight middlemen removed 
from the consumer. Invariably the following are engaged in the rice 
marketing system: (l) the millers1 agents and paddy dealers; (2) the
primary assembler and local store keeper; (3) the transporter, truck 
owner or junk contractor or owner; (4) the warehouseman; (5) the 
miller; (6) the milled rice broker; (7) the wholesaler (or exporter 
in export sales); (3) the retailer (storekeeper or rice peddler); and 
finally (9) the consumer. The financing agents or moneylenders are 
excluded from this list. All but the consumer make relatively handsome 
profits, each probably as much as what the farmer could theoretically 
term net profits.
Need for Improvements to Increase Efficiency:
There are possibilities for improvements in many sectors of the 
marketing system. Left to itself, however, it is very doubtful if such 
improvements can be expected in the system. Since the farmers, if they 
have to rely upon their own resources, are powerless to bring about 
material remedies it will be necessary for the government to intercede 
in the interest of the farmers and the general economy. Among the 
activities that the government could and should engage in are the 
following: (l) make greater efforts toward organizing farmers on a
cooperative basis and furnish those organizations with basic paddy
storage facilities and short-term credit at reasonable rates of interest, 
and, through an improved agricultural extension service, furnish infor­
mation to farmers and farmer groups designed to improve the quality of 
the products, and improve the handling and cleaning of paddy at the 
farm level; (2) encourage private initiative in the installation of 
more and better country storage and milling facilities through a system 
of extending equipment and facilities credit, special taxation and 
fiscal policies regarding private capital improvements in the interior 
provinces; (3) promote improvements in private and public warehouses 
and storage facilities in the main cities through some government 
certification system whereby minimum standards would be required before 
paddy and rice storage operations can be undertaken and thus lead to 
reducing waste and spoilage of the commodity while in storage; (4) 
extend the quality and grade classification system as established by 
the French Exporters Syndicate to include rice destined for local, 
domestic consumption and thus reduce the practices of mixing varieties, 
adding water, etc., by internal wholesalers and retailers so that 
consumers can buy more according to grade standards and thus have 
consumer prices reflect back, through the trade channel, to the farmers; 
and (5) bring the farmer closer to the consumer by encouraging farmers 
to perform more of the basic marketing services such as assembly, local 
storage, transportation, etc., on a cooperative basis if necessary, 




*In the past farmer cooperatives in Indochina have been very closely 
associated with the agricultural credit movement and most of them were 
financed by the government-sponsored rural credit organizations. Member­
ship contributions never comprised a significant part of the capital.
For the most part, funds for long-term loairs for equipment, medium-term 
operating loans and short-term crop financing were obtained from the 
government which, at the same time, practiced close supervision of both' 
the lending operations and the use of the capital furnished. Short­
term credit to members has been one of the primary purposes of a large 
percentage of the cooperatives formed in Indochina during the relatively 
short history of farmer cooperatives. In fact, the first Mutual Loans 
Association organized in 1913 had as its primary purpose the provision 
of credit to its membership, and this organization is usually referred 
to as the first "modern" agricultural cooperative in Indochina.
History of Cooperatives
The development of agricultural cooperatives, exclusive of credit 
associations, in Indochina is of very recent origin. The first agri­
cultural producers’ cooperative was organized in 1936 in the Province 
of Bac Giang in North Vietnam for the purpose of processing, common 
storage, and sale of members’ paddy, abrasin, and castor oil.
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Prior to this first attempt, the agricultural cooperative movement 
in Indochina consisted only of the ancient programs of "The Rice Gran­
aries" of the Annam emperors which were designed to (l) build a reserve 
of rice for use in combatting starvation of the population during bad 
crop years, and (2) to facilitate the collection of the "agricultural 
tax"— to the extent that this tax was collected in kind and, in fact, 
it was these collections that contributed to filling the imperial 
granaries.
During the five-year period of 1937-41 the French Administration 
undertook a very active program of organizing and financing farmer 
cooperatives in almost every major agricultural region of the country. 
During this time a number of agricultural producers’ cooperatives were 
formed with the financial assistance and under the direction of the 
former Office de Credit Populaire. These cooperatives were organized 
among producers of a wide variety of "specialized" agricultural com­
modities. ■In addition to the Bac Giang abrasin and castor oil producers’ 
cooperative mentioned above, the following are some of the more important 
cooperatives organized during that period:
(1) The two tea producers’ cooperatives of Phuto in North Vietnam 
and Tourane in Central Vietnam whose activities consisted 
primarily of processing and packaging member-produced green 
tea for export to metropolitan France and French colonial 
possessions.
(2) The Agricultural Cooperative Society of Than Hoa (North 
Vietnam) which processed paddy, com, ramie and abrasin and 
sold processed commodities for the account of its members.
(3) The Agricultural Cooperative of Quang Ngai (Central Vietnam) 
whose main purposes were to process members’ sugar cane into 
sugar by the traditional, or local method (open-pan process), 
furnish short-term crop production loans to members and 
common sale of the processed sugar.
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(4) A group of five tobacco cooperatives located at Qui Nhon, 
Pleiku-Kontum, Tuy Hoa, Khanh Hoa and Tourcham. The main 
functions of these cooperatives were to grade and select, 
condition (diy and ferment), pack and sell their members1 
black leaf tobacco to the Saigon-Cholon cigarette factories.
(5) The Agricultural Cooperative of the Bolovens (in Laos).
This cooperative engaged in the handling, storage, and 
packaging of members’ green Arabaca coffee beans and in the 
common sale of this product.
(6) The Anhoa Cooperative in South Vietnam, an organization of 
cocoa producers, which hulled and extracted the fiber from 
coconuts produced locally and manufactured the fiber into 
mats and rope.
(7) The Palm Sugar Producers’ Cooperative in Kandal (Canibodia) 
established to sell on a cooperative basis the sugar pro­
duced by local Cambodian farmers. (The marketing of palm 
sugar in Cambodia has traditionally been a monopoly of 
Chinese commercial interests.)
(S) The Farmers Cooperative of Kompong-Cham in Cambodia which 
was originally organized for the cooperative sale of corn 
produced by local farmers but after World War II engaged 
primarily in drying and conditioning locally-produced black 
tobacco for sale on a cooperative basis to the cigarette 
manufacturers in Saigon-Cholon.
In addition, mention must be made of the Syndicate of Irrigation 
Associations of Central Vietnam. This was an association of fourteen 
small irrigation and water control (sea dike construction and mainte­
nance) cooperatives under the technical control of the Public Works 
Service. In this association, membership was obligatory for all land­
owners benefitting from the water control and irrigation improvements.
The initiative in organizing those cooperatives was taken by the 
Office de Credit Populaire. The primary objectives of this credit 
institution in organizing farmers into cooperatives were to be able to 
better supervise the loans made to farmers in the area, make the col­
lection of those loans easier by establishing centralized delivery 
points for the products and to effectuate some degree of control in the
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storage, primary processing and marketing of the farm commodities 
produced by farmer-debtors.
The management of the government agricultural credit institution 
took notice of the fact that every year small and medium-size farmers, 
being always short of money, are obliged to sell their produce as soon 
as possible after harvest and very often before maturity, while the 
crop is still standing. Prices are at their lowest level at that time. 
It v/as realised by the directors of the credit agency that usually it 
is impossible for small farmers to perform any storage and primary 
processing themselves, and by leaving these functions to traders, do 
not benefit from the higher prices at later sales. Therefore, 
establishing small purchase, sale and primary storage and processing 
cooperatives appeared to be a feasible solution to the situation. At 
the same time these organizations would make it possible to ascertain 
that the funds loaned to farmers would be utilized for productive 
purposes, in addition to increasing the market value of the products 
harvested through proper storage, preparation and packaging.
It was realized also that agricultural cooperatives could serve 
as a medium through which the agricultural technical services, such 
as the Hies Office of Indochina and the Institute of Agronomic Research, 
could transmit information on better production practices to farmers. 
Cambodia:
There is very little to be stated about the history of cooperatives 
in Cambodia. In fact, the only farmer cooperatives that ever existed in 
the history of agriculture in that state were a pepper-growers ’ coopera­
tive at Kampot, a palm sugar cooperative at Kandal, and a tobacco— 
growers’ cooperative in Kompong Cham. These two cooperatives were
256
organized by the French a few years prior to World War II and were 
under the direct supervision and management of the General Director 
of the Office de Credit Populaire. This credit agency took an active 
part in organizing these two groups of farmers, primarily as an attempt 
to consolidate and safeguard its lending operations among tobacco and 
pepper growers. These two organizations obtained most of their capital 
from the Office de Credit Populaire and their basic functions consisted 
of granting short-term loans to member-growers, common storage, basic 
processing and sale of members’ products. These organizations were just 
getting started when World War II disrupted activities. With the 
decrease in production of pepper and tobacco during the war period, 
conditions of insecurity in the areas where they were located, reduced 
trade, and war damage to their facilities, their operations had 
virtually ceased by 1950. The tobacco growers’ cooperative resumed 
operations in 1951, however on a greatly reduced scale.
A forest products cooperative (S0C0F0R) and a fisheries cooperative 
also existed in Cambodia before the war. However, most members were 
Europeans and most of the capital was obtained from the Office de 
Credit Populaire in the form of short-term operating and long-term 
facility loans. These two cooperatives are now defunct and remain 
as heavy debtors to the former government lending agency. The fisheries 
cooperative was re-organized in 1953 by Cambodian interests but is not 
yet of importance.
Reasons for Failure
All the cooperatives mentioned above were short-lived as originally 
established. The reason for their failure, as explained by high officials
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of the former Office of Popular Credit, was that their facilities were 
destroyed and records and capital lost during World War II and the 
accompanying Japanese occupation. However, it is common knowledge 
that the record of agricultural cooperatives and, in fact, all types 
of cooperatives in Indochina, has been discouraging. Not one of the 
agricultural cooperatives proved successful according to usual 
standards of performance. The members were invariably suspicious 
and uncooperative with the management. Farmers were seldom disposed 
to bring their produce to the cooperative warehouses or mills, except 
against full payment in cash at current market price. More often the 
cooperatives soon became ordinary storage, milling or processing, and 
merchandising centers, without close relationship to their members or 
raw product suppliers. What undoubtedly tended to further impede 
success was the fact that a certain portion of the well-to-do members 
made use of the cooperatives to exploit other members. It was the 
common practice of these persons to unload their surplus rice or other 
commodities during period of high prices (at the peak of the seasonal 
price cycle) to the cooperative against money loans, then re-lend the 
proceeds at usurious rates of interest during the periods of low prices 
to other members and specify repayment in produce at harvest time.
These repayments in kind were then sold to the cooperative during high 
price periods.
In addition, the administration of the cooperatives was expensive, 
operational and other costs were very high and all too often total 
costs exceeded total income. All of the organizations became heavily 
indebted to the Office de Credit Populaire and most were disbanded, 
thus fully justifying the misgivings of the members. By 1944 only
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tv.ro agricultural cooperatives were functioning in North Vietnam and 
only three in Central Vietnam. The scale of operation of these re­
maining were, of course, greatly reduced.
When a family in Indochina is able to obtain funds in excess of 
the amount necessary to meet the basic household requirements for 
daily living it is common practice to make loans to less fortunate 
families at high rates of interest rather than to expand production 
capacity. This custom increases the difficulties to be overcome in 
establishing farmers cooperative institutions on an effective and 
permanent basis.
The efforts of the French Administration in establishing an 
institution of farmers cooperatives met with two main types of obsta­
cles. One of these was the moral obstacle constituted mainly by the 
skepticism and abstentionism of the Indochinese "milieux" who go under 
the fatalistic assumption that usury practices are too well fixed in 
the habits of the rural economy to be discarded; some people attempt 
to justify usury by citing the importance of the risks encountered 
by creditors. They maintain that it is a question of loans granted 
to farmers of very doubtful solvency who are most often unable to 
offer the least amount of real security and guarantee and who are, 
moreover, usually unaware of a loan maturity date. Under such con­
ditions it is obvious that no well-informed banker would negotiate a 
loan with such debtors because he would soon be driven into bankruptcy 
due to the absolute impossibility of relying on regular repayments.
It appears, therefore, that the usury practices are actually "insurance 
premiums" paid for covering the very abnormal risks involved. However, 
arguments presented by former officials of the national agency for
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continued efforts in this field are: (l) the importance of the real
risks assumed in Indochina by the usurer-creditors is generalized and 
greatly overly emphasized, (2) had world conditions not disrupted 
internal activities, French efforts in organizing farmers cooperatives 
'would have been successful in both the. lending and storage, and sales 
types, and (3) the practice of usury is not an Indochinese monopoly or 
specialty but one that has ruled for centuries throughout Southeast 
Asia. In fact, usury was common in central and western Europe until 
the iniddle of the nineteenth century and was largely abolished through 
the farmers cooperative movement.
The other major set of obstacles encountered in Indochina were 
the ignorance and disinterest of the j/iass of the rural population in 
the problems and activities of the management of the organizations, 
and the insufficiency of qualified personnel to fill positions of 
management. These continue to be the fundamental obstructions to 
wide acceptance of the democratic principles of cooperation. There­
fore, both the agricultural credit agency and the agricultural 
cooperative organizations affiliated with it have always been con­
sidered by the rural population as state institutions administered 
by civil servants with the conception prevailing that the cooperatives 
were simply other trade organizations in which membership was obtained 
for the primary purpose of reaping the greatest profits possible. Very 
little consideration was given to allegiance to the associations or 
the concept of mutuality on the part of the membership. lack of proper 
education can be cited as one reason for this. The results were that 
most cooperative boards of directors were composed of big landowners 
working in harmony with government-appointed French directors or
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managers most of whom were graduates of agricultural colleges in France. 
Very little efforts were made by the French to train native personnel 
in business management to a degree sufficient to enable them to assume 
positions of directors of farmers cooperatives.
Extent and Adequacy Under the French
The farmers' cooperatives established under the French were in­
adequate to meet the needs of Indochina * s agricultural economy. In 
general, the radius of action was very limited and existed only in a 
few localized centers of concentrated agricultural production of 
"special crops" (coffee, tea, tobacco, etc.). Undoubtedly some of 
the cooperatives were responsible for some improvement in the quality 
of the products they handled. However, the quantity marketed through 
cooperatives amounted to only a very small percentage of the total 
output, and the number of farmers marketing their produce through 
these organizations represented an insignificant portion of all farmer- 
producers.
It should be remembered that short-term production loans to members 
constituted a very important and necessary phase of the cooperative 
program. However, the amount of capital available for this operation 
was grossly inadequate to meet the needs. According to the records of 
the Office de Credit Populaire, the financing agency, the amount of 
capital out on short-term loans to members of cooperatives as of 
December 31, 1944 was only slightly more than 3.0 million piasters.
This explains why the amount of money advanced to members against 
"pledged" crop deliveries never exceeded 25 percent of the estimated 
value of the produce.
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Recent Activities and Government Interest
The governments of Vietnam and Cambodia decided to renew their 
efforts at organizing farmers cooperatives, and in 1950 great emphasis 
was placed on the part farmers organizations could and should play in 
bringing material improvements and well-being to the rural sector of 
the economy. It is on the basis of experience gained from past errors 
noted above that it was decided to embark upon a new and different 
method of approach in organizing farmers into cooperatives.
More specifically, this decision was based upon the difficulties 
encountered by the French Administration, and especially the fact that: 
(l) the agricultural credit system was insufficient and the funds 
loaned to farmers were often misused and misdirected, resulting in 
credit being a "two-edged sword", which, is used unproductively, 
inevitably led to perpetual indebtedness; (2) individual loans, 
calling for real property as security, were beyond the reach of the 
great majority of farmers; and (3) individual loans in themselves 
did not protect the recipients from the disastrous results of specu­
lation in crop trading by middlemen. Complementing the activities of 
the agricultural credit agency with farmers cooperative organizations 
performing the additional functions of crop purchase, grading, storage 
and sale would result in farmers being helped in both the essential 
fields of loans and storage and sale. On the one hand, farmers could 
borrow production capital from their cooperatives at reasonable rates 
of interest and, on the other hand, they could enjoy the benefits 
of marketing their produce through their cooperatives under advan­
tageous conditions for maximum returns. However, in practice, 
coordinated action between the agricultural credit agency and the
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cooperatives proved difficult to establish and confusion was the result. 
Moreover, the existing cooperatives were too few in number to adequately 
complement the functions necessary of a centr-al agricultural credit 
agency.
The experience gained from these difficulties, and those previously 
noted, led to the recommendation of creating a new, decentralized agri­
cultural cooperative institution called the "Centre Rural" which was to 
act simultaneously as a credit organism by granting short-term crop 
production loans to members, and as an instrument for the purchase, 
grading, storage, and cooperative sale of members* produce.
The New Program
In scope, a "Centre Rural" would not encompass more than a large 
village or a group of small neighboring villages. This would promote 
better application of the fundamental principle of collective responsi­
bility, which is, in Indochina, much superior to individual responsibility 
for financial guarantees. Under the new program the typical "Centre 
Rural" would include: (l) as a basic clement, a commodity storage
warehouse, and a primary processing plant or simple rice milling 
facilities; (2) for complimentary functions, facilities for sale of 
basic essentials needed for crop production and home use, such as 
seeds, fertilizers, various kinds of hand agricultural tools, cloth 
goods, salt, etc.; and (3) a credit section designed to grant short­
term production loans to members.
The new program, ’which was started in 1952, brought to light many 
problems to be solved. In the first place, while it is possible in a 
practical sense to conceive of groups of farmers delivering their crops
263
for common storage, processing and sale as well as common use of pro­
duction equipment which they individually possess, it is practically 
impossible to foresee grouping these same individuals to combine their 
personal capital for redistribution among the members because most 
farmers arc seldom in possession of liquid assets. In order to obtain 
capital, farmer groups must, therefore, obtain most of the capital 
needed from an outside source. This outside source of capital can only 
come from the state either directly in the form of loans from the state 
budget or indirectly in the form of guarantees given to loans granted 
by public credit institutions.
It follows, therefore, that while storage and sales organizations 
could possibly resort to private initiative and benefit from private 
legal control, organisations receiving state funds must be subject to 
lac re rigid control by the state which furnishes the capital needed.
It is for this reason that the new program of farmers cooperatives, 
calling for almost 100 percent government financing, made it necessary 
to revise substantially the basic cooperative statutes requiring closer 
government control and supervision of those receiving government credits. 
Furthermore, in view of the important part cooperative organizations 
could and should play in the rural economy of the country, and the 
special privileges, such as certain exemptions from taxation, etc., it 
was deemed necessary to protect the rural population against possible 
abuses resulting from the new organizations reverting to simple trading 
firms or "false cooperatives". It was necessary, therefore, to be 
very explicit in incorporating definite and precise regulations con­
cerning cooperative membership requirements, administrative procedures 
and controls, dividend payments, etc.
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A substantial amount of time and effort vias expended in official
circles, first revising the old agricultural cooperative statutes, then
redrafting new ones in attempts to incorporate in the basic legislation
and interior regulations as many of the democratic principles of coopera-
89tion as possible. Additional time was needed in which to locate 
farming areas meeting the basic conditions (local production.and market 
conditions, tenure relations, communication and transportation, security, 
farmer receptiveness, etc.) deemed desirable and necessary for success. 
Present Cooperative Statutes:
In addition to defining the composition, objectives, radius of 
action, duration, powers and activities permitted, etc., of the organ­
isation, the statutes contain the following basic provisions:
Admission: Membership in the associations is opened to all agri­
culturalists who are actively engaged in cultivating the land themselves, 
but acceptance is effective only upon favorable decision of the Council 
of Administration. Thus, this section of the law renders all absentee 
landowners ineligible for membership.
Capital Stock and Shares: To be admitted as a member of the
organizations each person must subscribe to at least one share of 
capital stock of 100 piasters. A minimum of 200 shares are required 
to organize. No dividend is paid on capital stock, but provisions are 
made for payment of interest up to a maximum of six percent annually, 
as determined by the General Assembly. Sale of stock certificates to
translations of the standard cooperative statutes and interior 
regulations pertaining to rice farmers organizations are presented in 
APPENDIX "C".
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a third party are to be approved by the Council of Administration which 
also approves the new purchaser as a member of the association. The 
Council of Administration reserves the right to refuse admission of a 
new member resulting from the sale of shares, in which case the new 
owner is to be reimbursed the face value of his share.
Administration; The associations are administered by Councils of 
Administration each composed of five members elected by and among the 
membership assembled in a General Assembly. Members are elected for 
two years and each must subscribe to at least ten shares of stock—  
to serve as a guarantee for their actions. Rule is by majority vote 
of the members present at meetings with the president’s vote used to 
break a tie. Members of the Council of Administration do not receive 
a salary but only per diem for their services while on duty.
General Director and Board of Controllers: The General Director
of the organization is named by the General Director of the Agricultural 
Service but only upon the proposal and with the consent of the Council 
of Administration. The association is subject to the permanent control 
of the Director of Agriculture. However, a Board of Controllers is 
appointed, presided over by the Chief of Province and assisted by two 
commissioners, which may or may not be members of the association. This 
Board acts in an advisory capacity, and as a checking body.
General Assembly and Voting: One fourth of the membership duly
assembled constitutes a quorum. Decisions are made by the majority of 
those present and by proxy votes. Each member is entitled to only one 
vote regardless of the number of shares he owns or the amount of business 
conducted with the organizations. The amount of partonage dividends
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to be paid is determined by the General Assembly upon the recommenda­
tions of the Council of the Administration.
Division of Annual Surpluses: If in the annual inventory, after
deductions have been made for general operational expenses, amortisation 
of all material and equipment, provision for equipment and material 
replacement, there exists a surplus, this surplus shall be divided as 
follows: (l) the first three percent of this surplus is retained to
constitute a reserve fund} (2) a sun sufficient to pay owners of shares 
of capital stock interest on their stock in amounts not to exceed six 
percent of the face value; and (3) the division of the remainder shall 
be fixed by the General Assembly wliich, upon the proposition of the 
Council of Administration, can decide to divide it among the members. 
This return to members shall, be made only under the title of dividends 
and shall be proportional to the amount of business done with the 
association by each member.
Adequacy: The statutes were recommended for adoption as the law
governing farmers organizations with full realization of their short­
comings. However, two factors mainly were responsible for failure to 
insist upon a more complete set of regulations. In the first place, 
the governing statutes and interior regulations had to be kept as simple 
as possible in order to be easily explainable to and readily understood 
by illiterate farmers. Secondly, the element of time was very pressing 
and only a limited amount was available in which to begin organizing 
farmers under the new program.
Specifically, it would have been desirable to give the organiza­
tions greater autonomy and more opportunity Cor internal and external
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control by their own membership., such as excluding outsiders from the 
Boards of Controllers and giving the membership greater powers in 
selecting and appointing the General Directors. However, Indochinese 
governmental officials argued that: (1) this way of doing business
and type of organization was new to most farmers, (2) prospective 
members would be totally ignorant of the basic provisions of the law 
and would require much time to understand them sufficiently, (3) at 
this stage it was not possible to find many candidates qualified for 
the position of General Director from among the farming population, 
and (4) since the government was to provide most of the capital, the 
control and supervision of the organization would have to be entrusted 
to government functionaires. The validity of these arguments was not 
contested very vigorously.
It would also have been desirable to be more specific in the 
enforcement provisions relative to Marketing contracts between members 
and the associations. The question of product ownership following 
delivery is another possible source of conflict. As the law is written 
there is no provision forbidding farmers from withdrawing their paddy 
from the cooperative storage for private sale to a third person.
As a means of safeguarding the organizations from the destructive 
activities of rice merchants, millers* agents and moneylenders, efforts 
were made to include in the law special provisions forbidding any person 
to induce any member of an association to breach his marketing contract 
with the association, or who spread false reports about the finances 
or management of the association.^ However, government authorities
^The Non-Profit Corporation Law of Louisiana contains such a 
provision in Section 145, Title 3, Chapter 2, Part II.
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would not agree to include these provisions. The reason for their 
reluctance was never quite clear.
Accomplishments:
VJhen attempts are made to organise cooperatives among illiterate 
farmers with very little conception of the basic principles of a demo­
cratic organization, a large amount of preparation needs to be done 
before satisfactory results can be expected. The limited number of 
competent local government personnel and the destitute condition of 
the fanning population are additional impediments to rapid progress.
In this new program much time and effort was spent in group 
meetings between government personnel and groups of farmers in both 
Vietnam and Cambodia to explain the purposes and principles of 
cooperatives, the conditions necessary for their success, and the 
responsibilities of members and obligations of the government.
The first organization formed under the new program was a ri.ce 
growers cooperative organized in August, 1952, in the province of 
ICompong Cham in Cambodia. By April 1, 1954* this cooperative had 
a membership of more than 9,000 farmers who cultivated over 73?000 
acres of rice* A second rice farmers cooperative was organized in 
May, 1953, in the province of Prey Veng with a membership of more than 
7,000. These two cooperatives were each granted a loan amounting to 
5.3 million piasters by the Cambodian Office de Credit Populaire.
About 3.2 million piasters of these credits are used to advance crop- 
production capital to members, 1.5 miHlion to erect rice storage and 
jialling facilities, and the remaining 600,000 piasters utilized to 
defray operational expenses of the associations. In addition to the 
above loans obtained from American Aid counterpart funds granted to
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the Office de Credit Populaire, a further grant of aid in rice mill 
machinery, trucks, and quonset storage buildings and burlap bags 
amounting to about $133>000 was approved for each of these cooperatives. 
They engage in furnishing crop-production capital to members, common 
storage of paddy, commodity transportation service and loan of rice 
sacks, and in cooperative milling and sale of members’ paddy.
In addition to these two rice farmers’ cooperatives, the Tobacco 
Growers' Cooperative at Kompong Cham, having 1,500 members, also was 
reorganized in 1954 under the principles contained in the new cooperative 
lav; and provided with two small tractors and Land cultivating equipment 
on reimbursable basis. A piaster loan was also granted to this organi­
zation with which to make improvements to the cooperative leaf tobacco 
drying and curing sheds (Figure XVT).
The fourth group of farmers organized in Cambodia under the new 
program consists of corn producers along the Mekong River in the 
Province of ICandal. A small com drying plant and small tractors and 
row cultivatiiig equipment for use by members on a cooperative basis 
also was furnished to this organization of over 2,300 members.
A total of about 20,000 farm families were benefitting from the 
new farmers’ cooperative program in Cambodia at the end of its second 
year. These four cooperatives all received piaster and equipment loans 
from American Aid funds and are all under the general supervision of 
the Cambodian Office de Credit Populaire, through which the funds and 
equipment are made available. They are all organized under the demo­
cratic principle of one-member-one—vote, dividends according to 
patronage, etc. Members of the boards of directors are elected from
270
Figure XVI. Two Methods Utilized in Drying Leaf Tobacco in Cambodia.
There are great possibilities of improving -the quality of 
tobacco produced along the Mekong River in Cambodia through 
cooperative utilization of government-furnished facilities 
for drying and curing leaf tobacco.
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among the membership at large ’which is restricted to land cultivators*
The General managers are appointed by the Director of the Office de 
Credit Populaire but these appointments must be approved by the majority 
of the members in each case.
Money and equipment loans furnished by the Office de Credit 
Populaire to the cooperatives carry interest at six percent per year. 
Operating and crop-production loans from the central lending agency 
mature in 12 months while equipment and facilities loans are for 15 
to 20 years. Crop-production loans granted by the cooperatives to 
their members are secured by title mortgage to the land and by pledged 
delivery of the crop at harvest time. Loans are' granted in amounts 
up to 70 percent of bhe estimated value of the crop. The maximum 
amount loaned to any one member is 6,000 piasters during one growing 
season. A rate of interest of 12 percent per year is charged by the 
cooperatives for these short-term seasonal loans to their members.
The future of farmers cooperatives in Cambodia appears bright. 
However, there is a great need for good leadership exercising extreme 
caution in moulding and maintaining good membership relations in all 
cooperatives. There must be conducted the proper educational and 
cooperative promotion campaigns. There must also be active government 
support and a fuller realization of the masses of farmers of the possible 
benefits to them in becoming members of cooperatives. If carried forward 
in the proper manner the small amount of efforts made so far can well 
prove to be the initial step needed toward solving the Cambodian farmers * 
financial, storage, transportation, and general commodity marketing 
problems.
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Vietnam; The background and history of farmers cooperatives in 
Vietnam has been discussed in preceding sections where notice was 
made of the primary reasons for the failure of those organizations 
formed with the financial assistance and under the direction of the 
former Office de Credit Populaire.
Activities in organizing farmers into cooperative associations 
under the new program in Vietnam were started simultaneously with 
those in Cambodia. The same motives prompt action in this field in 
both states and the same basic difficulties were encountered in both 
areas— with one major difference. In Vietnam there was no established 
governmental credit agency during the initial phase of the program.
In Cambodia, on the contrary, an agricultural credit agency did exist, 
and the fact that the Director General of the Office de Credit 
Populaire was also the Director of the Agriculture Service greatly 
simplified the task. Thus, in Cambodia there was coordination and 
cooperation among government officials and a single, straight line of 
authority with which to work. Such a condition, deemed necessary for 
immediate action and progress, was not found in Vietnam where every 
related service in the national as well as the regional governments 
attempted to retain all technical and financial control possible over 
activities in their respective fields.
The first efforts were made during the fall of 1952 among a group 
of tobacco producers in Central Vietnam, the majority of whom are 
small landowner-cultivators. Traditionally, tobacco farmers in that 
area sell their produce to local merchants and moneylenders who are 
called "manufacturer*s representatives". As is the case with the
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rice merchants, those tobacco buyers usually lend production capital 
to tobacco growers for a few months each season against a lien on the 
growing crop. Tobacco leaves are dried and bundled at the farmstead 
and brought by the grower to the merchant’s storehouse in repayment 
for previous advances. The merchant usually sells directly to a 
cigarette manufacturer's representative. As a rule there is only one 
leaf tobacco merchant in each village since all manufacturers belong 
to a single syndicate.
The main objectives in organizing tobacco farmers into a coopera­
tive were? (l) to improve the quality of the product presented for 
sale through proper cooperative drying, curing, storage, and uniform 
packaging and presentation; (2) to furnish production credit to member 
growers at reasonable rates of interest; (3) to improve the quality of 
the tobacco leaves by producing in the cooperative nursery and distri­
buting to members improved tobacco seedlings; (4) to sell the produce 
of the members on a cooperative basis; and (5) to furnish transportation 
facilities to members in the movement of their tobacco from the farm 
to the central sheds and warehouses.
The cooperative vjas organized under democratic principles similar 
to those of Cambodia with the management entrusted to a General Manager 
appointed by the Governor of Central Vietnam but approved by the Board 
of Directors, of which the Chief of Province was designated as an 
"honorary", non-voting member, and the Board of Controllers.' Considerable 
effort was made to explain the basic principles under which the organi­
zation was to function and to enlist the support of local, provincial 
and regional government authorities. However, these efforts were not
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sufficient to prevent the organization to meet with difficulties at 
the very beginning.
In the first place, the administrative jnachinery required to 
get the funds released and into the hands of farmers was so compli­
cated that most members had contracted loans with local merchants by 
the time the funds were available to the cooperative management. 
Secondly, the person elected as president of the Board of Directors 
was an unscrupulous individual who had been a tobacco merchant and 
usurer, and a former Viet ilinh sympathizer who used his influence as 
a creditor to a number of tobacco growers in the area to get sufficient 
votes to be elected to the position. He immediately used his official 
position to consolidate his hold on local tobacco producers. Further­
more, the Governor-appointed manager, who was also Chief of the 
Agriculture Service for Central Vietnam, completely disregarded the 
established regulations and embarked upon a program of lavish spending 
of cooperative funds for personal travel and per diem. In addition, 
the Chief of Province was indifferent to the success of the organization 
and did not take an active interest in its affairs. Dessention between 
the management and the membership soon became a major problem and 
membership relations were poor. Operating with complete lack of 
direction from the manager and no active support and interest from 
the Chief of Province, members of the Council of Administration lost 
little time in disregarding regulations, with confusion and corruption 
as the inevitable result'. Among the discrepancies in the operation of 
this governing board were: (l) each member procured for himself a
rubber stamp (which in Indochina is used very widely in signing official 
documents) which he used in the name of the cooperative. These were
utilised to verily each other*s expense vouchers, loan applications, 
receipts for expenditures, etc; (2) members requesting and approving 
for each other advances in money for what they expected to receive as 
per diem in the future; (3) prices paid for tobacco deliveries to the 
cooperative warehouses that were much higher than the prices local 
merchants were paying for the same quality; (4) the wife of the 
President of the board, though not a tobacco producer, was admitted 
as a member of the association and purchased tobacco in the local 
Jiiarket for resale to the cooperative at a profit; and (5) members 
delivered their poorest quality tobacco bo the cooperative for storage 
and drying while selling the better grades to the tobacco merchant.
Under such conditions it is not surprising that the first year of
operation was a failure from the standpoint of finances and goodwill 
.among members toward the organization.
Early in the spring of 1954 the government of Vietnam ordered a
complete reorganization of the association. A new cooperative manager 
and a new Chief of Province were appointed, and a new Council of 
Administration was elected. Following this action the cooperative 
progressed satisfactorily; membership increased, administrative costs 
were reduced, and volume of business was increased. The result was 
that during 1954 over 500,000 piasters above costs were realized, 
compared to a net loss of nearly 200,000 piasters during 1953. In 
the 1955 marketing year the association had a volume of business 
amounting to about 800 tons of leaf tobacco, affording a net profit 
of nearly 1.0 million piasters, and permitted the payment of patronage 
dividends to members for the first time.
Another area in which efforts were made to organize farmers into 
cooperatives in Vietnam includes rice storage, milling, sales and 
production credit. Two groups of rice farmer’s were organized in the 
spring of 1953 in the provinces of Cantho and Eentre in South Vietnam. 
Local counterpart currency and dollar equipment from American aid funds 
were allocated to these cooperatives in order to make it possible for 
the Ministry of Agriculture and local authorities to install rice 
storage facilities and milling equipment at the two agreed sites, and 
to afford a source of short-term production credit to members of the 
cooperatives. Rice milling machinery, power units, storage facilities, 
burlap bags and transportation equipment were furnished as a direct 
grant of aid which was capatalized in local currency so as to constitute 
a reimbursable advance to the cooperatives. These "pilot" cooperatives 
were intended to fulfill the several purposes of furnishing badly 
needed short-term credit to members, providing them with facilities 
necessary to store and mill their rice so as to sell at a more favorable 
seasonal price, and to give them the advantage of cooperative marketing 
through association with other farmer members. In this manner it was 
hoped that farmers could escape the demands of the moneylenders and the 
resulting monopoly of the merchants, and thus be able to experience a 
higher income and a better living.
Loans are granted to members in prescribed limitations at a rate 
of interest of one percent per month reimbursable to the cooperative 
at the end of the crop year, and with the growing crop pledged as 
security. Reimbursements of loans made to the cooperative are to serve 
as a revolving fund from which similar advances in subsequent years will
277
be made. These loan funds are reimbursable in equal yearly installments 
over a 10-year period. The rice milling and other equipment and supplies 
furnished as direct dollar aid will be repaid with interest in 15 years. 
Principal and interest payments are to be made to the National Agricul­
tural Credit and Cooperative Service (SNCAAC) and are to be utilized in 
extending loans to other farmer cooperatives in other areas.
Crop production loans are granted to members up to 70 percent of 
the estimated value of the growing crop. Upon delivery of the member's 
paddy to the cooperative storage warehouse the loans are converted to 
storage loans. Two safeguards in particular are taken to guarantee 
loans repayment. First, the Council of Administration takes proper 
steps to verify the acreage of rice under cultivation as declared by 
the borrower. Secondly, loan applications are co-signed by two other 
members who are, along with the borrower, responsible for repayment.
In order to prevent unwise utilization of the borrowed funds, loans 
are made in three installments, at the beginning of the cultivation 
season, during the middle of the rice growing season, and at harvest 
time.
Notwithstanding all precautions taken during the initial phases 
of organizing, special efforts made to enlist favorable membership 
response and cooperation, and the large amount of work done to insure 
proper management-member relations, the first year of operation was 
not successful. During the sxunmer and fall of 1953 the countryside 
in the vicinities of the two cooperative installations was considered 
by government authorities as peaceful and secure from the standpoint 
of rebel activities. This was a primary consideration in selecting
those two '’pilot" areas. Local farmers were very enthusiastic in their 
response and by early fall of 1953 the two cooperatives had a combined 
membership of about 3>000 farmers, however, the Communist rebels soon 
realized that the Vietnamese government was utilizing those two farmers 
organizations as a means of rallying the rural population and they 
immediately s.et out to concentrate their activities in these two areas. 
They harrassed the local population and the Council of Notables of both 
areas had to flee the villages for the safety of the cities. The 
treasurer of one cooperative was kidnapped and leaflets were distributed 
in the area threatening the fanners with death if they delivered their 
paddy to the cooperative warehouses. Consequently, only a tout 700 tons 
of paddy was delivered by cooperators and stored in the organizations' 
warehouses after harvest the first year. Delays in delivery of supplies 
and equipment further handicapped immediate progress. Following the 
cessation of hostilities in 1954, activities were resumed and a total 
of 1,500 tons of paddy belonging to cooperative members was stored 
during the 1954-55 crop season.
A third rice farmers' cooperative was organised during 1954 along 
approximately the same pattern as the first two, with the exception 
that rice milling facilities were not provided. Results of the first 
year of operation of tlis organization were very satisfactory (Figure 
XVII). There were over 650 members who stored a total of 1,300 metric 
tons of paddy in the cooperative warehouse at the end of the first 
year's harvest. The market value of stored rice was approximately 
twice the piaster loans granted to members during the crop production 
season.
Figure XVII* Fanners Cooperative Rice Storage Facilities in Indochina.
There is a great need for more and better paddy storage 
facilities in Indochina at the village level. Organizing 
farmers for cooperative use of government-furnished facilities 
for storing both bulk and sacked rice appear the soundest 
solution to this problem.
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The Current Program, of Activities: The difficulties encountered
with the first attempts at organizing farmers under the new concept and 
trie revised cooperative laws enabled governmental authorities to realize 
that the organisations were too large and actually too impersonal for 
the average Vietnamese farmer to feel a close attachment to them. 
Furthermore, they were endowed v;ith too much capital and equipment, 
and therefore were too complex for local and provincial managerial 
talent to manage properly without extensive training in cooperative 
management. The Vietnamese rice farmer was not able to understand 
the organisation and operations sufficiently well.
For these reasons the current program, begun during the spring 
of 1955, calls for providing additional funds to organize small, simple 
village farmers1 storage and credit cooperatives in 20 rural localities 
in South and Central Vietnam, By the end of 1955 a total of 19 groups 
of farmers were organized under this program. These cooperatives are 
organized at the village level and are provided with simple paddy 
storage buildings, burlap bags, platform scales, and other necessary 
items on a loan basis reimbursable over a period of years. Loans in 
amounts up to 70 percent of their estimated marketable crop are granted 
to members during the crop production season* The loans are converted 
into warehouse loans on paddy placed in storage in the cooperative 
warehouse. Warehouse loans amount to 85 percent of the value of the 
paddy placed in storage. Both types of loans carry interest rates of 
one percent per month.
These cooperatives are "demonstrational" in character in the sense 
that it is hoped they will serve the added purpose of demonstrating to
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other farmers in neighboring villages the benefits of group action on 
a cooperative basis for mutual and community benefit. The amount 
advanced in money and facilities >0.11 be reimbursed to the Service 
Rationale de Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC) or its 
successor agency who will carry out the fiscal management for further 
development of agricultural cooperatives and credit in Vietnam. It is 
anticipated that the loans to these demonstrational cooperatives will 
be repaid in full in 20 years.
Basic Requirements for Success and Recommended Action
Mention already has been made of the fact that apart from the 
conditions of security in the rural areas, one of the greatest handicaps 
in the administration and operation of these government-sponsored and 
financed cooperatives has been the frequent and extended delays in 
disbursement of funds from the counterpart deposits and in the handling 
of funds through the echelon of civil administration on down to the 
hands of the farmer borrowers. In the administrative regulations and 
financing procedures established and agreed upon during the organisa­
tional stage it was stipulated that the "banking" functions and controls 
would be handled by and become the sole responsibility of SNCAAC. The 
role of assuming leadership, furnishing guidance and counsel in orga­
nizing, propaganda and information, as well as responsibility for 
efficient management was left to Agricultural Service and the Ministry 
of Agriculture. However, SNCAAC has never been able to assume fully 
the functions reserved for it. With either the Minister of Agriculture 
or the Director of the Agricultural Service designated as "project
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administrator" in each case, they have been very reluctant to release 
the banking functions to SNCAAC, but instead have preferred to assume that 
role also and thus be in a position to control both operational and 
financing activities.
Disbursement of funds has proven to be a difficult task. Hcwever, 
reimbursements of both the short-term and operational loans, and the 
long-term equipment and facilities loans probably will meet with greater 
difficulties. It is imperative, therefore, that the whole banking 
functions be entrusted to SNCAAC, or some other superceeding agency as 
soon as possible, and that the interested agricultural services restrict 
their activities to the organizational, informational, management, and 
those other phases of the program in which they are more likely to have 
some competence.
A broader program of training local village personnel in management 
activities should be started as soon as possible. The objective should 
be to allow local personnel to assume cooperative management functions 
rather than having government functionaires from Saigon and other cities 
perform them. This would bring about better response and a sense of 
belonging to the' associations on the part of farmers, because it is more 
likely that they would cease to look upon the managers as strangers 
and upon the organizations as being foreign to their interests.
Greater efforts by the Agriculture Service should be made in 
educating l’ural people in the principles of cooperation, and the pro­
motion of cooperatives should be given greater emphasis.
Definite and concerted action should be taken to effectuate close 
and continued supervision and control of farmer associations organized
and financed with government funds and facilities. Great caution 
must be exercised to prevent repetition of the situation that almost 
destroyed the Tobacco Farmeî s Cooperative in Central Vietnam during 
1953.
Government authorities concerned should put all emphasis possible 
toward creating and maintaining strong and amicable relationships 




The continuous need for agricultural credit of all types and the 
frequent lack of it have been the major factors responsible for the 
slow progress in agricultural development in Indochina. Inadequate 
credit facilities and capital is not restricted to agricultural enter­
prises, however, and there is a large place in Indochina*s economy for 
all forms of credit. Robequain, for example, is of the opinion that
healthy credit distribution may be called essential to the country*s
91life and a condition of its growth.
Lacking both foresight and capital the average farmer in Indochina 
often borrows both the seeds and the draft animals necessary to produce 
his crops. During bad crop years the farmer must also find the funds 
■with which to pay his taxes and fulfill his religious and family duties. 
A moneylender will readily advance a loan, but on very harsh terms.
The debt will be repaid with difficulty, most often at the cost of 
mortgaging the harvest and even the land.
The rates of interest are usually very high, and credit at usurious 
rates of interest for commodities which are used by the majority of the 
native population is clear indication of an impoverished population 
living on the edge of its means and often a little beyond. It is not 
unusual, for example, for interest rates to run as high as 40 percent
9̂ Robequain, op. cit., p. 168.
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per annum; and in the case of small loans, rates may even reach 10 or 
12 percent per month or up to 140 percent per year. Domestic savings 
are insufficient for credit needs, and the Chinese and Indian money 
lenders provide the funds for a very large part of the loans.
Every year the rice millers and Chinese exporters in the Saigon- 
Cholon market make loans in order to finance the rice harvest which is 
the cornerstone of their business. Furthermore, professional bankers 
from China and India have long specialized in this type of business.
In every case, the loans agreed upon are personal credits whose repay­
ment involves a good deal of risk. This explains in part the high 
rates of interest which seem exhorbitant at first sight.
One cannot escape the conclusion that one of the major elements 
of agrarian reforms needed in Indochina is the provision of cheap 
credit for the peasant. Whether or not he owns the land he cultivates, 
the Indochinese peasant is generally in debt and, because of usurious 
rates of interest charged, he invariably finds it very difficult to 
extricate himself from this position.
Traditional Sources
In the case of landless farm families the landlord is the main 
source of credit. He furnishes the needed capital and rice to the tenant 
cultivator— who is almost always devoid of cash— at a rate which fre­
quently reaches 100 percent per year, and rates of 120 percent are not 
unheard of.
In Indochina the landlord-moneylender is the worst influence on 
the general agricultural development. The landlords, in many cases,
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depend more on the interest they receive from the loans they grant to
their tenants than on the output from their rice lands. This explains
why owners of large estates often prefer to divide their land into
small farms and lease them to landless peasants for traditional,
primitive cultivation. Gourou emphasizes that usury is the surest and
most economical means of rounding out a domain, that the debtors with
a status similar to servitude often seek escape in flight, and that
indebtedness on this scale destroys stability and reduces the intensity 
92of land use. Certainly a system of land utilization based on money 
interest and not on agricultural production must finally reduce the 
productivity of the entire economy.
In normal times it appears that in the rural areas of Indochina 
everyone borrows and almost everyone is at the same time a lender of 
funds. Enrich Jacoby cites a report from a former French colonial 
administrator in South Vietnam in which the situation was stated as 
follows s
"There is no one who is neither borrower nor lender.
The tenant (tadien) borrows from his landlord, the latter, 
if need arises, from the large capitalist; the coolie will 
establish credit with his foreman; the latter with his 
employer; the fisherman with the fisheries contractors; 
the small trader with the large merchant. Those with an 
independent calling, artisans and officials, contract with 
the Chinese merchant or with the usurer."93
To relate the conditions in 'Cambodia, Jacoby refers to a statement 
9/iby Gourou7H- who states that even in that state where conditions are 
92Pierre Gourou, Land Utilization in Indochina, pp. 345-347.
Jacoby, op. cit., p. 14S.
9/*Ibid, p. 49I Gourou, pp. cit.« pp. 386-387.
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generally more favorable, the absence of equitable credit institutions 
has rendered a tempting opportunity for exploitation of the native 
farmers. The Chinese trader generally takes a rate of interest of 
100 percent for a six to eight-months loan. If the peasant does not 
repay on time, the Chinese creditor takes the whole (surplus) of the 
harvest himself, pays the taxes, and reduces the peasant to a form of 
peonage.
Jacoby is of the opinion that though the French authorities recog­
nized very well the oppressed position of the heavily indebted peasants, 
they still fought usury mainly by legal measures and, therefore, without 
success. Where they tried to combat it indirectly by providing credit
at moderate rates, they also failed because they did not reach the
qclevel of the most urgent need for money. 77
96French Efforts
As soon as trade relations were established between France and 
the Indochinese colonies at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
National Bank of France established a branch office in the country, 
and soon afterward other large French banks helped organize the Bank 
of Indochina which was endowed with the right to issue currency
95̂Gourou, op. cit., p. 149.
96Most of the information pertaining to the history and develop­
ment of agricultural credit in Indochina was obtained from the archives 
and records of the former Office de Credit Populaire. Those records 
are on file in the Vietnamese and Cambodian Ministries of Agriculture 
and National Economy. A very concise presentation is contained in an 
unpublished report by H. A. C. Moreau, formerly General Director of the 
Office de Credit Populaire, entitled Agricultural Credit and Cooperation 
in Indochina. This report is on file in the Economic Section of the 
Haut Commissariat de France en Indochine in Saigon.
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throughout the three states. By the beginning of the twentieth century 
a portion of the funds created by the issuance of bank notes was ear­
marked for agricultural loans. However, not much progress was made 
by the issuing bank in this field. Agricultural loans never did conform 
to the issuing banks’ need for liquid funds. Moreover, they operated 
counter to tradition and aroused the natives' distrust. As a result, 
the distribution of credits from this central bank to the native farmers 
has never reached large proportions and credit to peasant farmers con­
tinued to be obtained from traditional sources. In fact, Robequain 
reports that it should not be assumed that the introduction of European 
credit methods, based on taking real guarantees, such as pledges, 
securities and mortgages, and the relative abundance of money resulting 
from French capital imports, caused the rapid disappearance of usuxy
97in Indochina.
For a long time there have been two types of credit in Indochina, 
one adopted to the natives' mentality and customs, and the other to 
European business firms in their relations with each other and with 
the home country. One is extended by traditional usurers and the other 
by specialized European organizations, both operating in distinct 
spheres.
Mutual Loan Associations:
In 1913 mutual loan associations were organized in South Vietnam 
which landholders could join by subscribing a ten piaster share. Their 
purpose was to facilitate the granting of loans on as easy terms as
^Robequain, op. cit., p. 168.
possible by increasing the borrower’s credit. In practice, these 
mutual loan associations were merely a convenient way to extend the 
issuing bank’s cheap credit policy to European agricultural interests. 
Beginning in 1923* private capital flowing in from France began to turn 
toward rice cultivation. Banks already established in Indochina were 
paralleled by land banks. However, while the mutual loan associations 
had specialized in small loans to medium landholders, the new companies 
granted much larger sums. In theory their loans were guaranteed by 
first mortgages often endorsed by well-known large and solvent land­
owners. The amount of money loaned by these land banks rose rapidly 
and their operations were considered a success from the standpoint of 
amount of business transacted until 1930. But the activities of these 
organizations never did extend much beyond South Vietnam primarily 
because of the fact that this system of credit required the existence 
of rice cultivators owning a few assets, and therefore it was inap­
plicable in North and Central Vietnam where the people were almost 
without resources and the estates unorganized.
Credit Populaire Agricole:
In 1927 the French authorities in Indochina ordered the creation 
of the Credit Populaire Agricole in those regions of the country where 
the land banks were not functioning. The Bank of Indochina was required, 
under government guarantee, to respond to requests for loans made by 
the Credit Populaire. Native rice farmers were eligible for loans from 
the local banks or offices of the Credit Populaire but first mortgages 
on real estate served as the primary guarantee.
With the general depression that followed in 1932 the loans made 
by the newly-organized Credit Populaire were repaid under rather
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unfavorable conditions for, in most cases, the rice cultivators had to 
settle their debts first with their most exacting creditors. In most 
instances, therefore, the Chinese and Indian bankers and moneylenders 
were repaid before the government lending institution. In 1932, 70 
percent of the loans were still outstanding, and it became necessary 
for the government to settle the frozen liabilities of the Agricultural 
Banks by creating a Central Mutual Credit Bank (Caisse Centrals de 
Credit Mutuel) which was further endowed with capital by the government 
and which received a portion of the annual dues of the Bank of Indochina.
Even after absorbing some of the disastrous immediate effects of 
the depression, there still remained the serious problem of the heavy 
debt load of rice farmers. Agricultural indebtedness is widespread 
in most countries during depressions. Since agricultural prices are 
always more affected by depressions than are the prices of manufactured 
goods, it is usually difficult for farmers to meet payment of debts 
contracted during prosperous years. There are two remedies for this 
situation. The first one adopted in the United States consists in 
inflating the prices of agricultural commodities by devaluating the 
currency; the other, preferred by the government of Indochina during 
the last depression, consists in attacking the problem more directly 
by obtaining a reduction or adjustment in the debt of the agricultural 
sector of the population. Undoubtedly this solution, though probably 
more equitable and direct, i3 harder to put into practice because of 
the fact that creditors, feeling dispossessed of their capital and 
assets, will oppose it vehemently.
In order to avoid the brutal dispossession of the indebted land­
owners which could only result in further disruption in the rice
economy, the government of Indochina in 1932 created an office for 
long-term land loans. Its purpose was to build a framework of friendly 
adjustments between creditor and debtor, and the main job was to induce 
creditors to give up their claim to that portion of the loan that had 
been wiped out by the devaluation of the security through falling prices; 
in return the government would then repay the balance to the creditors. 
The debtors then owed the full amount of their debts to the government 
under the new arrangement. Robequain is of the opinion that Chinese 
bankers were not greatly affected by the depression insofar as recovering 
their loans was concerned since those specializing in short-term loans
were successful in most instances in recovering their entire loans
98without resorting to the land loan office. However, the fact still
remains that most of the loans outstanding on the books of the various 
government-financed lending organizations were adjusted in the manner 
prescribed by the land loan office. According to Robequain, as a
result devaluation of capital averaged 47 percent, and interest rates
99were reduced by 75 percent on the average.
Parallel with the activities of the land loan office were the 
reorganizations initiated by the various Indochinese agricultural 
credit groups. From 1933 on the land banks largely gave up long-term 
credit operations, limiting themselves to the management of their 
securities and real estate and entrusting the handling of their old 
loans to the Mortgage Credit Company of Indochina. As for agricultural 
credit, the Central Bank, created in 1932 in order to liquidate the
987 Robequain, op. cit., p. 175*
99ibid.
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liabilities of the Mutual Agricultural Credit Associations, became 
responsible for all the bills which the Bank of Indochina had discounted 
to these institutions*
Credit Agricole Mutuel:
In 1933 a central supervising body, the Mutual Agricultural Credit 
Office (Office Indochinois du Credit Agricole Mutuel), was organized to 
coordinate the activities of the credit organizations. The system 
comprised a communal bank, provincial banks, and a central fund. This 
government lending agency received the "right and privilege" of granting 
short-term production loans to farmers, and was the first attempt by 
the government of Indochina to enter directly into the field of agri­
cultural credit. This government agricultural credit organization was 
financed by the government with funds provided through the Tresorerie 
Generale de L’Indochine, and was under the close supervision and control 
of the French High Commissioner General for Indochina.
Subsequent decrees established in 1940, 1944, and again in 1950 
revised substantially the regulations governing the organization and 
gave it more financial autonomy. The lending activities were administered 
through provincial offices (Caisses Provenciales) which were formed 
throughout Indochina. In January, 1944 there were a total of 46 provincial 
lending offices in Vietnam alone (16 in Tonkin, 11 in Annam and 19 in 
Cochinchina) and 8 in Cambodia.
Internal war activities disrupted both the agricultural economy 
of the country and the operations of the provincial loan offices and 
as a result the lending operations came to an end. By the end of 1944 
only one provincial office, or bank, remained open in Vietnam (in
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Hadong) but this office had ceased lending operations. In Camboida 
the organization survived in name, and when Cambodia received its 
share of the liquidated assets in 1951* lending operations were resumed 
in that state through eight provincial banks.
Inadequacy of the System —  Reasons for Failure
The French attempted to improve the debtor position of the Indo­
chinese peasant in two ways: (l) by establishing a reasonable legal
rate of interest for private loans and otherwise restricting the flagrant 
practices of the native moneylenders 5 and (2) by promoting semi-official 
credit organizations to provide loans at moderate rates of interest. A 
decree of 1926 limited imprisonment for debt to cases where the debtor 
had obviously acted in bad faith. Another decree passed in 1934 
restricted the annual legal interest rate to five percent and the 
maximum rate, by agreement, to eight percent. To close the loopholes 
in this law, another decree in 1936 stipulated that private loan con­
tracts and transactions required official supervision and approval. 
Subsequent legislation provided for the recovery of interest charged 
at an illegal rate and set penalties for lenders who violated the loan 
laws.
Notwithstanding the laws passed by the government setting forth 
certain legal limitations on lending practices and the activities of 
the European lending groups, the Chinese and Indian lending and banking 
business never was greatly hampered, nor their activities materially 
diminished. Legal restrictions on lending operations remained on the 
statute books but were never enforced by the authorities nor adhered
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to by the moneylenders. Far from interfering, the different types of 
credit in fact dovetailed with each other. Frequently, the Chinese 
and Indian moneylenders continued to grant loans without any security 
whatsoever or only on the margin left between the value of the security 
and the amount advanced against it by the European banks. According to 
Robequain, sometimes an Indochinese landowner could turn to the 
Agricultural Credit Funds for money which he would subsequently reloan 
to his fellow citizens on much more stringent terms.
The various credit institutions in the different parts of Indochina 
were all initiated by the government and have all been based more on 
government guarantee rather than on their own resources. The frequent 
losses that occurred were generally supported by the bank of issue.
It is true that in those areas of the country where property rights 
were cleared by a more efficient surveying system, a sounder agricultural 
credit system was in operation for some years, but even there loans 
could be granted only on the condition that land be put up as security. 
Under such conditions, the credit activities of those institutions 
could hardly reach the level of the tenants most in need of credit.
Jacoby is of the opinion that certainly those institutions were 
instrumental in financing the extension of rice cultivation on the new 
rice lands of South Vietnam, but, at the same time, they also fostered 
the process of land concentration. In addition, these institutions 
gave the landlords the opportunity to lend to distressed tenants and 
small, farmers, at exhorbitant rates of interest, the money they had
■^Robequain, op. cit.. p. 171.
101 Jacoby, o]d. cit.. p. 149.
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borrowed at cheap rates. Generally speaking, the credit system in 
Indochina did not ease the situation, but actually aggravated it by 
increasing the tenant farmer*s need for credit.
The excessive dependence on the government of the various insti­
tutions, the large discrepancy between the capital available and the 
loans made, and especially the inability of the system to reach the 
small tenant farmers were the major weaknesses of the French credit 
system. This system, though often called a mutual agricultural credit 
system, was actually based not on mutual aid but exclusively on govern­
ment funds and guarantees. It was not a cooperative enterprise as no 
joint risk was involved, and consequently no cooperative spirit could 
be developed. Since small farmers were not in a position to refund a 
loan because they could not save enough money to do so, the government 
had to come to the rescue, and therefore government control, instead 
of mutual supervision, dominated the credit system. Jacoby quotes a
former French Governor-General of Indochina as having illustrated the
102defect of the credit system in the following manner.
"If only the loans had been granted directly to the 
needy nahque (small owner-cultivators) or the poverty- 
stricken tadien (sharecroppers). The depressing fact is 
that the credit facilities so far granted have had no 
psychological or economic effects. It has indeed proved 
almost impossible to bring these advances within the reach 
of the small farmer, the tadien or the nahque. except through
the large or medium-scale landowners .......  All the efforts
made by my administrative officers to improve the situation 
of these poor people are therefore brought to naughtj any 
attempt to lower the cost of production of rice by reducing 
the interest of loans is doomed to failure in advance. The 
large and medium-scale landowners charge a tremendous com­
mission, equal to the difference between the interest
102Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
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charged on loans by the rural funds and the rates at which 
they lend money directly or which they charge for standing 
security. Their malfeasant influence prevents any direct 
contact between the authorities and the rural masses."
Thus has been the helpless state of dependency of the rural peasants 
of Indochina for agricultural loans of any kind. For years they have 
been forced to approach the landlord or moneylender for advances, and 
always they have had to be at the disposal of their masters for laboring 
services of any kind; always indebted, they have had little chance 
ever to repay the loans, and the accumulated interest did not take very 
long to multiply the capital debt.
Inadequacy of the System:
An idea of the inadequacy of the agricultural credit system in 
Indochina in meeting the needs of farmers is obtained by analyzing the 
operations of the provincial offices of the Office de Credit Populaire 
during the peak of activities at the beginning of 1944. These local 
or provincial loan offices were organized for the most part by private 
individuals and companies or loan societies who made some token con­
tribution to the working capital. However, the greatest part of the 
capital consisted of government loans to those organizations and private 
contributions of capital was very small compared with the total amount 
of money loaned. The total amount of subscribed capital in all of the 
54 provincial offices in operation in Indochina at the beginning of 
1944 was only 652,325 piasters— contributed by 237,382 shareholders. 
However, the total capital in short, medium and long-term loans out­
standing amounted to 7,220,184 piasters— a capita 1-to-loan ratio of 
ten to one. Also, at the beginning of 1944 there were 94,941 individual 
borrowers, of which 94,184 had contracted short-term loans averaging 63
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piasters. In addition, a total of 789 individuals had contracted 
medium-term loans averaging 1,300 piasters each, and four borrowers 
had received long-term loans totalling 253*000 piasters, or an average 
of 63,222 piasters per loan. (The official rate of the Indochinese 
piaster in 1944 was 20 piasters to the United States dollar.)
When considering the total amount of money in loans outstanding 
and the total number of individual loans granted, it is quite evident 
that the lending activities of the Office de Credit Populaire. even 
at the peak of activities, was woefully small in comparison to the 
agricultural credit needs of a country where there are more than three 
million farm families, the great majority of which are in perpetual 
need of credit.
The original Agricultural Credit Office was established for the 
purpose of granting loans only to Europeans. However, a revision in 
the regulations in June, 1940 gave the organization the authority to 
grant loans to Indochinese farmers also. According to the Interior 
Regulations, the Office de Credit Populaire was free to grant short­
term loans to individual farmers with only the growing crop and the 
borrower's integrity as security. This was in principle, but in 
practice all loans— short, medium and long-term— were made on the basis 
of mortgage security, i.e., the pledging of land. In the case of loans 
to cooperatives, syndicates or villages, the pledging of physical 
assets was required as security.
More than 99 percent of the short-term loans were made in North 
and Central Vietnam and in Cambodia, whereas about 85 percent of the 
medium-term and all of the long-term loans were made in South Vietnam.
The reason for this, as explained to the writer by a former French 
general manager of the national office, was that in South Vietnam, 
an area of large landowners, the borrowers for the most part were 
owners of large tracts of land who employed large numbers of tenants 
to cultivate their lands. The inference was that these borrowers 
utilized this borrowed capital in sub-lending it to their tenants at 
higher rates of interest. The reason that the amount of the average 
loan granted by the organization in South Vietnam was very much larger 
than the average loan granted in other parts of the country was because 
agricultural holdings in South Vietnam were very much more extensive.
It was common knowledge that, especially in South Vietnam, a very large 
portion of the medium-term loans were used by landowner borrowers to 
grant seasonal loans to their tenant farmers who were ineligible them­
selves to obtain loans from the Provincial loan offices. It is known 
also that there usually was a tremendous difference between the six 
percent per year interest paid by the landowner for the credit obtained 
at the loan office and the rate of interest paid by his tenants for the 
use of this same money.
Large landowners in Vietnam entrusted their farming operations to 
managers, supervisors and "farmer-generals", and, having no trust in 
their tenants, they lent money to these managers who in turn sub-lent 
it to the tenants on short-term rates reaching as high as twenty percent 
per month. This was the same money originally obtained by the landowner 
at the loan office at rates of one percent per month for short-term 
loans and an average of six percent per year for medium-term loans.
The only conclusions to be reached from this sort of financing operation
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is that this practice was as bad or worse than the usurious practices 
of the moneylenders and merchants that have been going on in Indochina 
for centuries.
Therefore, notwithstanding the efforts of the French Administration 
in the field of agricultural credit, the debtor position of the poor 
peasant farmer has not improved appreciably, and most of the agricultural 
loans are still made by the traditional Chinese and Indian moneylenders 
and merchants and large landowners under very unfavorable terms to 
borrowers. Perhaps the major fault with agricultural credit as it has 
been organized in Indochina is that it has not been really a mutual 
undertaking based on traditional forms of cooperatives. The banks or 
societies administering loans always have been almost exclusively 
dependent on the government which guaranteed the loans, with the result 
that the amount of credit extended greatly exceeded the capital on hand. 
Furthermore, the loans have seldom, if ever, reached the peasant directly, 
but passed through one or more intermediares, increasing in interest 
rates at every stage, before reaching those greatest in need of the money.
History of the Organization and Activities of 
Agricultural Credit Agencies
In order to understand more fully the reasons for the complex 
state of affairs of agricultural credit in Indochina, it appears ap­
propriate to give a rather detailed examination of the operation of the 
various governmental and quasi-govemmental organizations since the 
inception of organized credit agencies. It should be kept in mind 
that, along with extending agricultural credit of various types to 
individuals, most lending institutions established under French
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administration were also set up to grant loans to associations or groups 
of individuals, or cooperatives. For this reason, it is often difficult 
to make the clear distinction between the individual agricultural credit 
sector and the cooperative credit operations.
The first semblence of an organized credit association was established 
in Cochinchina in 1915 when a French Chief of Province helped organize a 
few persons into the Societe Indigene de Credit Agricole Mutuel (Native 
Society of Mutual Agricultural Credit), most commonly referred to under 
its initials of SICAM. It was not until 1927, however, that the Banoues 
Provinciales de Credit Agricole Populaire (Provincial Agricultural 
Credit Banks) were created in the other sections of the country. The 
SICAM in Cochinchina on the other hand continued to operate until 1939 
at which time it was absorbed by the federated credit organization 
known as the Office de Credit Populaire.
Agricultural Credit to Individuals in Cochinchina:
1. SICAM: Following the organization of the first native society
of mutual agricultural credit in 1915, other organizations affiliated 
with it followed suit and by 1930 there-was an organization in each of 
the 20 provinces in Cochinchina. However, the amount of capital sub­
scribed by the membership of these organizations was very small (266,000 
piasters by some 14,000 members in 1930) and it was never sufficient to 
support the amount of money in loans with the result that the Bank of 
Indochina was called upon to guarantee the loans through a system of 
discounting the indebtedness of the provincial associations.
Loans granted to the members carried interest at a rate of ten 
percent per year; the provincial offices paid eight percent to the Bank 
of Indochina and the remaining two percent was utilized to pay
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administration costs and to create a reserve fund (which amounted to 
slightly more than one million piasters in 1930). The Bank of Indochina, 
on the other hand returned two percent to the local governments in 
compensation for the efforts made toward helping in the operation of 
the local or provincial loan offices.
The accounting controls of operations were made by inspectors of 
the Bank of Indochina. Administrative controls were exercised by the 
Chief Inspector of Political and Administrative Affairs who also held 
the portfolio of Inspector-General of Agricultural Credit.
The lending operations of those provincial organizations appeared 
satisfactory until the economic crisis of 1930, when, following a sharp 
decline in rice prices, not one of them was able to reimburse the funds 
borrowed from the Bank of Indochina, with the result that a total of 12 
million piasters was lost by the Central Bank. Following several govern­
mental investigations it was concluded that the provincial associations 
had been too liberal with their loans and that numerous abuses had been 
committed, such as: (l) granting of large sums of money loans to members
of the Board of Directors and to large landownersj (2) renewing loans in 
arrears for no valid reason (for example, in 1929, the year of highest 
rice prices, the value of loans renewed amounted to about six million 
piasters compared to only 3.4 million piasters of loans repaid)5 and 
(3) utilization of borrowed funds to pay for sundry expenses and for 
non-agricultural purposes.
However, what was probably worse, it was established by government 
investigators that the SICAM had not attained the social goals proposed 
by the organizers— such as making it easier for peasant farmers to
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purchase and own land, and improving the living standard of the agri­
cultural working class by granting loans to tenant farmers and small 
owner-cultivators. On the contrary, investigators reported that SICAM 
had helped the large and medium landowners to improve their privileged 
position among the rural masses.
The most that can be said is that the greater portion of the credit 
granted made some contribution toward the expansion of rice cultivation 
in the Transpassac area and that it had some small influence in reducing
i
the amount of money loaned by the Chinese and Indian moneylenders (out 
of a total estimated agricultural debt of 50 million piasters in 
Cochinchina in 1930 the Credit Agricole furnished about U  million 
piasters). So far as the spirit of mutuality was concerned, it. was 
non-existent.
Table 25 gives an indication of the operation of those organizations 
from 1924 to 1930.
Table 25. Lending Operations of the Mutual Agricultural Credit Societies 





» Amount of loans (in niasters)
 New : Reimbursed : Renewed loans : Loans unpaid
1924 1,129,395 843,525 1,177,556 66,520
1925 1,717,925 1,121,530 1,730,103 100,048
1926 2,134,165 1,768,770 -------- 113,890
1927 3,121,140 1,758,950 2,428,060 277,086
1923 5,325,803 2,352,360 3,499,684 234,401
1929 6,195,342 3,444,912 5,967,167 336,475
1930 3,154,067 3,854,628 7,268,965 852,279
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It has already been noted that in order to avoid complete insolvency 
of the organizations, the government decided to take certain definite 
measures, such as: administrative pressure, reduction in the interest 
charges from ten to eight percent, cancel overdue interest to debtors 
who paid their loans, purchase by the local governments of lands 
belonging to borrowers, etc. In 1932 the granting of new loans was 
suspended and that same year a new government organization (the Caisse 
Centrale de Credit Agiicole de Cochinchine) was established to centralize 
and control and activities. The SICAM* s activities were progressively 
taken over by the Office de Credit Populaire of Indochina beginning in 
1939, and, in 1944, the central office was dissolved completely.
2. Provincial Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks of Cochinchina:
The transformation of the SICAMs into Provincial Banks under the control 
of the Popular Credit Office was begun in 1939 and continued until 1943, 
when a total of 19 such banks had been established. However, this 
transformation process was accomplished only with some difficulties.
To begin with, the former managers of the provincial offices were very 
reluctant to see the societies which they had formed and managed without 
much outside control and supervision suddenly become affiliated with, 
and controlled by, a central office located in the country’s capitol city.
Contrary to the system of operation of the SICAMs, the new banks 
directed their efforts toward granting loans to small farmers rather than 
large landowners. Each bank was under close supervision of special 
government controllers who were instructed to make sure that: (l) loans
granted were utilized in conformity with the stated purposes as declared 
by the borrowers, (2) the amount and duration of the loans was designed
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to meet these declared purposes, and (3) those loans granted to land­
owners were not utilized by those borrowers to purchase new estates or 
for purposes of usury. The primary aims of those banks as stated in 
the charter were: (l) to facilitate the granting of loans to landless
farm families, and small and medium owner-cultivators; (2) simplify the 
procedures required in granting loans; and (3) help guide borrowers 
in the choice of loans to contract more in line with their needs (long, 
medium, or short-term). Whatever the good intentions of the government 
in creating the new banks, however, the results obtained during their 
six-year period of life, was very disappointing as is shown by Table 26.
Table 26. Number and Amount of Loans Made by the Provincial Mutual 
Agricultural Credit Banks of Cochinchina, 1939-45
: Short-term : Medium-term •• Total
Year : Number : Amount : Number : Amount : Number : Amount
(piasters) (piasters) (piasters)
1939 1 80 1 5,000 2 5,080
1940 80 81,865 69 62,655 149 144,520
1941 82 19,900 201 200,435 283 220,335
1942 42 23,670 137 124,310 179 147,980
1943 28 25,410 36 4 596,260 393 • 621,670
1944 157 186,355 677 927,585 834 1,113,940
1945 150 231,835 154 210,155 304 441,990
Government reports of the activities and results of these banks 
cite the following reasons for the relatively insignificant progress 
made by these banks: (l) the new institution was too young; (2) the
consequences resulting from the bankrupcy of the SICAM created very
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unfavorable conditions in which the new institution was called upon 
to progress; (3) lack of available credit from the Popular Credit 
Office, especially after 1942; and (4) lack of qualified management 
personnel among the natives whose technical competance was very low.
The destruction which followed the Japanese Army defeat in 1945 
and the rebel activities immediately afterward threw the operation of 
the banks into confusion. Most of the native staff deserted, the 
records were destroyed, safes and vaults opened and plundered and 
most of the buildings burned and destroyed. A few banks attempted to 
resume operations after the "coup de grace" but their efforts were 
directed mainly toward recovering loans. However, recovery efforts 
were poor because most borrowers played the game of intentional 
abstention with the hope that their debts to the banks would either 
be postponed or eventually forgotten altogether.
3. Loans from the Provisory Coordination Commission for Rice 
Production— (COMIRIC): In an attempt to help reactivate economic
activity in the Transbassac area and encourage resumption of rice 
cultivation the French government of Cochinchina created this special 
commission designed to grant short-term loans to French or Indochinese 
rice planters at an annual interest rate of 5 percent, and to furnish 
rice production items at cost to borrowers. The loan fund was obtained 
from two sources: (l) from the Popular Credit Office which had bor­
rowed six million piasters from the Bank of Indochina for this purpose, 
which bank in turn received a guarantee from the French High Commissioner^ 
General and who, in turn, received a piaster guarantee from the Government 
of Cochinchina (a very irregular and roundabout operation indeed and
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contrary to the statutes of the Popular Credit Office); and (2) from a 
direct grant of 350,000 piasters by the Government of Cochinchina. The 
only guarantee requested from those receiving loans from this commission 
■was a written promise to repay the loan out of the proceeds from the 
1946-47 rice crop. As was to be expected, results were very disappoint­
ing. Corrupt practices in granting and receiving loans were widespread. 
Funds received were not applied to the stated purpose of rice cultivation 
and, worst of all, most of the commodities purchased at cost from the 
commission were resold by the recipients on the black market then 
flourishing in the country. Fortunately such operations were stopped 
after one year but not before some 3»& million piasters had been granted 
on loans.
Mutual Agricultural Credit in Cambodia. Annam and Tonkin:
The history of organized agricultural credit in these three states
consists primarily of the activities of the Popular Credit Office and 
the following three organizations which were actually affiliated with it, 
namely: Popular Credit Service for Agriculture (1927-1933)j Mutual
Agricultural Credit Office of Indochina (1933-1940); and Mutual Agri­
cultural and Artisanal Credit Office of Indochina (1940-1942).
These three state organizations were given the responsibility of 
managing and distributing certain funds put at their disposal to agri­
cultural cultivators1 societies and handicraft groups, as well as 
controlling and coordinating the actions of those societies to which 
government funds were loaned.
1. Popular Credit Office (Office de Credit Populaire): The
financial resources put at the disposal of the Popular Credit Office 
during the period of 1927 to 1933 amounted to 4*4 million piasters.
Part of this consisted of a loan granted by the Office of Retired 
Government Officials but the majority was obtained from credit granted 
by the Bank of Indochina. In 1931 this credit institution received 
further grants of aid from two additional sources: (l) a share of the
charges paid by the Bank of Indochina to the government for the right 
and privilege of issuing bank notes as the government Bank of Issue, 
and (2) a special grant from the general government budget. At the 
end of 1949 the convention relative to the transfer of the Popular 
Credit Office was signed and each state received its share of the 
assets. The financial resources of the organization were as follows:
piasters
From shares paid by the Bank of Indochina..............  9,813,000
Special grants from the General Budget .................  12.029.000
Total grants ................................... 21,842,000
Loan from the Bank of Indochina........................  25,000,000
Loan from the Federal B u d g e t ..........................  1,029,000
Loan from the general b u d g e t ..........................  1.100.000
Total loans.....................................  27,129,000
Total financial resources ........  . . . . . .  48,971,000
The above figures are obtained from the archives and records of 
the organization, and the 48.97 million figure is underlined in French 
financial terminology as total financial resources (total general des 
ressources). The balance sheet on the date of transfer at the end of 
1949, however, shows that the assets "owned" by the organization
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(capital, reserves, and deposits) amounted to only 7.3 million piasters. 
This serves to point out the extraordinary large percentage of ''outside 
financing” in the history of all agricultural credit organizations in 
Indochina.
2. Provincial Mutual Agricultural Credit Office for Annam and 
Tonkin: The first such credit office was established in 1927 in the
Province of Hadong in Tonkin. In 1933 the name of this credit institu­
tion was changed to the Indochinese Agricultural Credit Offices and by 
March, 1945* when the Japanese Army made its celebrated attack, a total 
of 27 provincial loan offices were in existence. Within each province 
were a few local village loan committees whose radius of lending 
activities was limited to the territory surrounding the village.
These village offices were under the management of village notables 
and the village mayor whose primary duties consisted of receiving loan 
applications from neighboring farmers, verify the information given on 
the loan application by the hopeful borrower and make recommendations 
for approval to the provincial office. Provincial offices were under 
the management of a Frenchman who himself re-verified the loan applica­
tions before submitting the documents to the Board of Directors for 
final action. Decisions to grant or not to grant a loan and the amount 
of funds loaned to a farmer were supposedly based upon the value of 
the land given as security for the loan. The funds were remitted from 
hand to hand down the echelon of management until they reached the hand 
of the borrowing farmer. This roundabout process of granting loans 
resulted in many delays— often taking months before a loan applicant 
would receive the funds— and the personnel, time and cost involved 
were enormous.
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Special committees were appointed in each province whose main 
duties were (l) to register the potential borrowers* property in the 
provincial land registiy (at that time no land registry service existed), 
and (2) supposedly, to make it possible for cultivators to have some 
representation in the distribution of the available loan funds through 
their local notables.
This institution was very ineffective in bringing needed credit 
into the hands of the masses of the people; in the first place, because 
only those who had clear title to property could qualify for a loan 
and, secondly, many local committees took advantage of their position 
and falsified the documents to get loans for their own benefit or to 
grant loans to their friends and relatives.
3. Mutual Agricultural Credit in Cambodia: The first mutual
agricultural credit office in Cambodia was established in the province 
of Svay Reing in 1927, and by 1939, when the mutual credit offices 
were absorbed by the Office de Credit Populaire, there were a total of 
eight such offices in existence.
In the case of the Cambodian loan offices the French authorities 
requested that the formalities required in granting loans in Vietnam 
be dispensed with for the following reasons: (l) the mentality and
peculiar characteristics of the average Cambodian farmer, his lack of 
individuality, and his very effective integration into the life of the 
local village; (2) the relative insecurity of land ownership and title 
to the land under the government land appropriation system; and (3) 
the great influence of Cambodian government authorities on the life of 
the average farm family. For these reasons the French authorities
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decided to trust the management of the provincial loan offices to the 
provincial governors who were to be assisted by native Cambodian 
provincial officials, with the management being only responsible for 
correct accounting procedures, loans payment and reimbursement. Loans 
granted were secured by having the village mayor countersign each loan 
and thus resulting in obtaining what amounted to a collective guarantee.
Although it is reported that the first year of operation showed 
relatively satisfactory results from the standpoint of the amount of 
money loaned and the loan repayment rate, successive inspections showed 
that native provincial authorities in many cases turned the system for 
their own benefit through such tactics as falsifying the entries in the 
loan account books, establishing non-existency borrowers and direct 
appropriating of funds for their own use. Such abuses by Cambodian 
personnel resulted in the system being discarded in favor of the one 
used in Annam and Tonkin. Table 27 gives an indication of the extent 
of operations of the agricultural credit offices in all three states of 
Cambodia, Tonkin and Annam.
The effects of the depression and decreased rice prices in 1931 
are evident by the reduction in the amount of new loans granted in 
1932, and the loan reimbursement figures. The creation of eleven new 
provincial offices in 1933 was possible only through redistribution 
of the available capital and reducing the average size of new loans.
In 1935 a program of "loan reclassification" was carried out and interest 
payments on a total of 1,255,000 piasters of "uncertain" debts was 
suspended. At the same time these loans were refinanced under a two-to 
five-year repayment plan.
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Table 27. Extent of Operations of the Agricultural Credit Offices in 




No. of : 
provincial: 
offices :
Amount o f : 
paid in : 
caoital :
Amount o f : 
deposits : 
received :
Value of : 
new loans : 
granted :







-------  Thousand piasters ------
350 70 280
1929 10 54 — 2,047 703 1,624
1930 13 69 210 3,330 1,890 3,114
1931 13 116 289 1,553 1,072 3,600
1932 24 143 426 568 1,140 3,607
1933 24 151 625 552 774 3,535
1934 24 162 506 567 815 3,137
1935 26 173 870 864 938 3,063
1936 26 180 1,070 1,133 1,081 3,115
1937 26 194 1,718 1,854 1,286 3,683
1933 27 207 2,072 1,321 1,752 3,252
1939 28 212 3,545 1,211 1,334 2,629
1940 30 251 4,305 2,760 1,888 3,501
Source: Records of the Office de Credit Populaire.
Although all lending activities in Cambodia came to an end after 
1932 and further operations consisted primarily of recovering past loans, 
operations in Annam and Tonkin were resumed in 1935. It is interesting 
that the total amount of deposits received increased from 370,000 
piasters in 1935 to over 4-3 million piasters in 1940. In 1940 an 
additional grant of funds amounting to 5.3 million piasters was made
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by the Central office to the provincial offices. This sum, in addition 
to funds of provincial offices (paid-in capital and reserves) of 1.1 
million piasters, more than doubled the "finances" of the provincial 
offices, which then consisted of 5.4 million piasters of deposits plus 
other resources and the 5.8 million piaster grant from the Central 
Office.
During the period 1938-1940, an exceedingly large portion of the 
lending activities of the provincial offices in Tonkin and Annam con­
sisted of loans to cooperatives— primarily to the rice-land improvement 
and water control cooperative of Annam. Table 28 indicates the amount 
of money loaned to cooperatives by the provincial agricultural credit 
offices in each of the three states of Annam, Tonkin and Cambodia.
Table 28, Amount of Money Loaned by the Provincial Agricultural Credit 
Offices to Cooperatives in Tonkin, Annam, and Cambodia in 
1938, 1939 and 1940
Year Tonkin Annam Cambodia Total






1 1 1 1 1111
1939 258 770 12 1,040
1940 213 836 44 1,094
Source: Records of the Office de Credit Populaire.
Since all the records of the Office de Credit Populaire headquarters 
in Hanoi for the years 1941 to 1944 were lost, it is not possible to give 
a "balance sheet" statement for the operation of the provincial office 
for those years. The only records available relate to the balance of
accounts as of December 31, 1944, which were recovered from the general 
archives of the Japanese occupation government. This information is 
contained in Table 29.
Table 29. Balance of Accounts of Provincial Agricultural Credit Offices 
as of December 31, 1944
Tonkin Annam Cambodia Total
Paid-in capital 266
- Thousand piasters 
152 60 498
Reserves 549 374 74 997
Deposits 5,720 4,040 2,296 12,056
Loans outstanding to individusal 2,768 2,069 669 5,706
Loans to cooperatives 696 2,462 424 3,582
Total 9,999 9,097 3,743 22,639
Source: Records of the Office de Credit Populaire.
In comparing the year-end statement for 1944 with reliable data for 
1940 the following conclusions can be drawn from an accounting standpoint 
(l) deposit accounts were increased in important proportions— from 4*3 
to 12.1 million piasters; (2) likewise, the amount in loans outstanding 
also increased substantially— from 3*5 to 5»7 million during this four- 
year period; (3) an improvement in the condition of the treasury of the 
central office through a reduction of the amount in ,fbad or doubtful" 
loans from 171.4 to 38.6 million piasters; and (4) an appreciable 
increase in the amount of money loaned to cooperatives and/or "syndicated 
associations" from 1.1 to 2.6 million piasters. Thus, there was a new
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orientation in utilization of the loan fund, with loans to cooperatives 
or syndicated associations comprising about 31 percent of the amount of 
all loans granted— 5.7 million to individuals and 2.6 million to coopera­
tives out of a total of S.3 million piasters.
Post-War Situation
The Japanese A m y  "coup-de-grace" in 1945 and the rebellion by 
Communists sympathizers which followed struck a severe blow to the 
provincial loan offices in Vietnam. Most of them were completely 
disorganized, the personnel evacuated the rural areas either voluntarily 
or by force, the records were destroyed, the safes and vaults were 
robbed, and most of the buildings and other physical assets were burned.
As a result, only the office in the province of Hadong in Worth Vietnam 
remained open in 1947* but the extent its lending operations was 
negligible— amounting to only 400,000 piasters.
In Cambodia, on the contrary, the provincial offices suffered only 
slight losses or damages and most of them continued in operation following 
the armed activities of 1945. The amount of money out on loans from the 
Cambodian offices stood at 6.4 million piasters on December 31* 1949* the 
date of the transfer of the popular credit office to each state, compared 
with only 85*900 piasters at the end of 1944. However, those figures can 
be deceiving unless the tremendous amount of inflation that occurred 
between 1944 and 1949 is taken into consideration.
Recent Developments
With France granting semi-independence to the three states of 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in 1949* and the subsequent partitioning of
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the "assets" of the former Office de Credit Populaire to each state 
individually, the problem of furnishing needed agricultural credit to 
both individual farm families and farmer cooperatives became more 
complicated than ever. In order to continue to provide credit to 
farmers, relationships now had to be established with three different 
governments as well as with three government agricultural credit services. 
It is under these complicated conditions that efforts were made to 
encourage governmental authorities concerned to devise ways and means 
of making credit available to peasant farmers at reasonable rates of 
interest. Since short-term production credit is most urgently needed 
by the masses of farmers, it was felt that primary emphasis should be 
placed on furnishing this type of credit.
Cambodia:
In Cambodia, fortunately, the Office de Credit Populaire had 
continued to exist, although operating on a reduced scale. At the 
time of the transfer on December 31 * 1949 the original capital of the 
national association consisting of contributions by the French Colonial 
Government and loans from the Bank of Indochina was as follows:
From the French government ("detted administratives") - 21,304*337 piasters
From the Bank of Indochina ("dettes privees") . . . .  - 25.155.863 piasters
Total capital ................................ - 46,460,200 piasters
Of this capital, the Cambodian share on the date of transfer was:
Government contributions - 6,705*424 piasters 
Bank of Indochina loan - 8.019.355 piasters 
Total capital . . .  - 14,724*779 piasters
Out of these assets transferred to Cambodia* a total of 6,327*93# 
piasters represented long outstanding and unrecoverable loans inherited
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from the old Office de Credit Populaire. Most of this amount represented 
loans to the defunct SOCOFOR Cooperative (Societe Cooperative Forestierre). 
The available capital "was subsequently increased by a five-million 
piaster grant from the Cambodian government in 1951, a ten-million 
piaster grant from the American aid fund in 1952 and another ten-million 
piaster grant in 1955•
Under the present system, the National Cambodian Agricultural Credit 
Service is a government organization administered by a Council of 
Administration presided over by the Minister of National Economy. The 
General Director of the National Office is appointed by presidential 
order and his authority to perform management functions are delegated to 
him by the Council of Administration. Provincial offices of the national 
organization were established in ten of the fourteen provinces of 
Cambodia by the end of 1955*
In the past, the Cambodian credit organization made long and medium- 
term loans to cooperatives and farmers organizations, but had always 
restricted its lending to individual farmers mostly to short-term crop 
production loans. Contrary to the situation in Vietnam, landless peasant 
farmers are not a problem in Cambodia where the tillable land available 
for cultivation is plentiful, where all land uncultivated for a period of 
five years reverts back to the Crown, and where title to a piece of land 
can be obtained by simply cultivating it for five consecutive years. 
Requiring a mortgage on the borrower’s land does not, therefore, create 
a hardship on the rural peasants as is the case in Vietnam.
Under the present regulations, provincial offices are allowed to 
grant short-, medium- and long-tem loans to either individual farmers or 
fanners cooperatives. However, up to the present time individual loans
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to farmers have been of the short-term type only, and medium- and long­
term loans have been granted only to cooperatives. Pledging of owner­
ship title to the land is a prerequisite to receiving individual loans.
In fact, the most common practice consists of the borrowing farmer 
depositing with the organization for "safekeeping" his land title 
papers at the time the loan is granted and getting those documents 
back upon full repayment of the loan. Real estate constitutes the 
principal security for long-term loans to cooperatives, and fajro products 
in storage and equipment usually serve as guarantee for short- and 
medium-term loans. Loans to farmer cooperatives by the national and 
provincial loan offices are treated in detail in the previous chapter 
on Agricultural Cooperatives.
Under the new system the operations of the credit organization 
in the short-term individual credit sector has been fairly satisfactory, 
with non-repayment of loans reduced to a minimum. In 1953 a total of
48,000 Cambodian farm families received short-term loans from the govern­
ment. During the 1954-1955 crop year the additional grant of ten million 
piasters from the American aid fund enabled the credit organization to 
grant loans to 25,700 additional farmers— making a total of 73,700 
farmers benefitting from government-furnished individual crop production 
loans. These loans are reimbursable one month following the harvest of 
the principal crop and carry interest rates of one percent per month.
Although the Cambodian government appears to be making progress in 
its efforts to combat the usurious practices of moneylenders and merchants, 
the amount of capital available to the National Agricultural Credit 
Organization is insufficient to bring material benefits to the majority
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of peasant farmers. It is estimated by Thoutch Thonni that over 75
percent of the 700,000 Cambodian farm families have an average
103indebtedness of 1,000 piasters. This would represent an agrarian 
indebtedness of over 500 million piasters per year, mostly to money­
lenders and merchants. The total capital available to the National 
Credit Organization is only 39»7 million piasters which it has to 
divide between short-term loans to individuals and medium- and long­
term loans to cooperatives. Therefore, a government credit program 
affording credit benefits to less than 74*000 farmers falls far short 
of meeting the credit needs of some 700,000 faim families. The program 
is inadequate not only from the fact that only slightly less than 10 
percent of the farmers are able to receive loans but the amount of 
capital available for loans is so limited that short-term loans granted 
during the 1954-55 crop year averaged only about 400 piasters, or less 
than 15 percent of the value of the land mortgaged as security.
The relatively favorable results obtained tinder the new system 
is too insignificant to have any large-scale effects on economic well­
being of the people. In order to more effectively combat usury, broader 
and more positive governmental action is needed. Among the recommendations 
for a more effective program are:
(1) Increase the capital funds available to the provincial offices 
for short and medium loans in order to reach a larger percentage 
of the farmers with larger loans more in proportion to their 
crop production needs.
103̂Report by Thoutch Thonni, Cambodian delegate to the Inter­
national Conference on Agricultural and Cooperative Credit, Berkeley, 
California, August 4 to September 12, 1952.
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(2) Open loan offices in the remaining four provinces without such 
offices, and establish sub-offices in each province so as to 
reach those farmers living some distance from the provincial 
centers where the main provincial offices are located.
(3) Improve the functions of the Cadastral Service with the 
objective of giving the credit organization officials more 
accurate information on the land holdings and credit needs of 
borrowers•
(4) Undertake a broad program of farmer education and information 
on the democratic principles of cooperation and promote the 
expansion of farmers storage, sales and purchase cooperatives.
(5) Expand, improve and coordinate the activities of the agricul­
tural research and extension systems.
(6) Promote private capital accumulation in the agricultural 
sector of the economy by introducing a system of forced 
capital savings on the part of individual borrowers and 
the cooperative membership, designed to favor long-term 
capital and economic improvements with less reliance on 
government expenditures.
Vietnam:
During the fall of 1951 the Vietnamese government showed a greater 
interest in granting short-term credit at reasonable rates of interest 
to small owner-cultivators and landless peasants. At first, responsible 
government officials were insistent upon reorganizing the defunct Office 
de Credit Populaire under approximately the same arrangements which 
previously prevailed and utilizing the former provincial offices. In 
fact, one of the first propositions made by the Vietnamese was to 
utilize whatever credits the American Aid Mission would put at their 
disposal to retire the old debts of the Office de Credit Populaire,
This action would, of course, serve only useless purpose of repaying 
the Vietnamese Treasury and the Bank of Indochina without resulting in 
directly bringing credit into the hands of peasant families.
Finally, it was agreed to create a new, semi-autonomous organi­
zation. As originally established, this new government lending agency
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was to engage in multiple lending operations. Specifically, it was 
organized to utilize government funds placed at its disposal to grant:
(l) short-term crop production loans to both small landowners and 
landless peasants; (2) medium-term farm improvement loans to the same 
type of farmers; and (3) medium and long-term loans to artisan shops 
and small industries, and farmer cooperatives.'^4'
The urgency of affording a source of short-term production loans 
to farmers at reasonable interest rates was realized at an early date, 
and a ten-million piaster grant of American aid funds was made to the 
new ‘organization during May, 1952 to supplement a five-million piaster 
budget granted to it by the Vietnamese Government. Under the provisions 
of the agreement, loans were to be granted to farmers for one year at a 
rate of interest of one percent per month, payable at rice harvest time. 
Funds established through repayment of these loans were to be utilized 
for the same purpose during the 1953-54 crop year.
To be most effective and afford maximum benefits crop production 
loans must be at the disposal of borrowing farmers in time to be utilized 
by them in obtaining necessary production commodities. Therefore, some 
funds should be granted as soon as possible during the crop production 
season, which in Vietnam means not later than July 1st, the beginning 
of rice planting time. The management of the new organization agreed 
that loans should be made in three installments: at the beginning of
the rice planting season in early July, a second part in late August or
^Sche new institution was given the name of "Service National 
du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif" (SNCAAC). The statutes and 
presidential decrees creating the organization, the conditions for 
control and operation, and the official interior regulations are con­
tained in APPENDIX »D».
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early September, and a third and last part of the loan during late 
October, thus safeguarding and insuring the proper utilization of the 
borrowed funds on the part of recipient farmers. However, as with 
most endeavors, slowness in organizing the new lending institution, 
opening new provincial loan offices, recruiting personnel to operate 
the organization, and creating the necessary provincial and village 
loan committees, all contributed to retarding the target date.
After many delays and drawbacks, the first loans were finally 
granted during early September, 1952. This was actually too late for 
the loans to be of maximum benefit to borrowing farmers. By that time 
many peasant farmers had already contracted debts with and verbally 
pledged delivery of their rice harvest to moneylenders and merchants. 
However, it was felt that, in view of the urgent need for action and 
the large amount of propaganda circulated throughout the villages of 
South Vietnam as to what the government was going to do for farmers in 
this field, the short-term loans program could not be postponed until 
the 1953-54 crop year.
Once begun, this program of activity made very good progress and
by December, 1952 a total of 7*371 individual loans had been granted to
farm families cultivating land in six provinces in South Vietnam. The
total amount loaned reached 7*9 million piasters against which borrowers
pledged delivery of rice production from 18,300 hectares (42,000 acres)
of land under cultivation. These loans, though restricted to the South
Vietnam area northeast of the Mekong River, were quite scattered in the
105territory affected and included a total of 27 delegations.
•̂ '’A "delegation" refers to a surface area of land with a 
separate governmental and administrative unit within a province and 
corresponds closely with a country or parish in the United States.
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Although funds sufficient for a much larger program were available, 
which would cover a wider area of Vietnam and reaching a larger number 
of farmers, it was not realized. The reasons are threefold and bear 
upon conditions of time (late in getting started), a shortage of 
personnel, and conditions of security in the interior, more-remote 
provinces. Though shortage of personnel and tardiness in getting the 
program started were major obstacles to success in this first venture, 
the conditions of security in the interior and remote villages was 
certainly the number one drawback. During 1952 and early 1953 travel 
was safe on only the two main highways leading south and southwest of 
Saigon, and the principal cities and towns located more than forty 
miles from Saigon could be reached only with an armed escort. None of 
the secondary country roads and canals linking the interior villages 
to the main cities and highways were safe for travel during that period.
The first phase of this program was implemented under considerable 
handicaps and getting funds into the possession of farmers proved a 
difficult task. However, recovery of the loans after harvest proved to 
be yet more difficult. Special efforts were made to instruct the 
farmers on the administrative procedures established for granting loans 
and also in the process by which loans were to be repaid. If farm 
families needing credit most were to be reached, it was impractical 
to embark upon a short-term loan program which called for pledging of 
physical assets as collateral. Requesting such security would have 
excluded a very large percentage of the farmers who needed this type of 
credit. The only alternative v;as to grant loans on a "moral guarantee" 
basis. It is for this reason that special loan committees were organized 
in every village included in the program. These village loan committees
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were given as much responsibility as possible in selecting, certifying 
and reviewing the statements of loan applicants and also in controlling 
the proper utilization of the borrowed funds.
As a further safeguard in guaranteeing borrower integrity and 
moral standing, each loan made was required to be co-signed by two of 
the borrower's neighbors— making all three, the borrower and the two 
co-signers, mutually responsible for repayment of the loan. As another 
safeguard for repayment of the loan and to prevent larger farmers from 
borrowing large sums for the purpose of sub-lending to smaller farmers 
at higher rates of interest, the amount of money loaned to any one 
farmer was limited to 2,000 piasters. In order to facilitate repayment 
of loans out of the produce at harvest time, loans were made at the 
rate of 500 piasters per hectare of rice actually under cultivation—  
up to the 2,000 piaster maximum.
In spite of those preliminary precautions, repayments have been 
very disappointing. As of June 1, 1955, only 3 million piasters had 
been reimbursed by 2,5&7 borrowers out of a total of 7.9 million piasters 
loaned to 7,371 borrowers. The primary reason given for this failure to 
recover loans is lack of security in the villages 'where the loans were 
made. Undoubtedly this is the major cause, although not the only one.
It is true that during the early months of 1953 when the loans 
reached maturity, increased Viet Kinh activity in the areas where loans 
were granted reduced security conditions and resulted in disrupting 
civil administration in most rural villages, and in abandonment of 
all governmental and communal authority in others. In many villages 
collection agents of SNCAAC, returning to recover loans could not find
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a single member of the village loan committee, not a single loan co­
signer, much less the borrower.
Following the Geneva Convention and the armistice, security 
conditions improved and civil administration was re-established in 
most villages interested in this program. However,' for the most part, 
local village chiefs and village councils were new and not the same 
individuals who constituted the original loan committees. In many 
villages the new civil, or military, administrators were either not 
interested in loan recoveiy efforts or refused outright to cooperate 
in this endeavor.
Undoubtedly, the fact that the Chiefs of Provinces, provincial 
loan committees, loan office directors, and the personnel of SNCAAC 
have not shown the same enthusiasm in the work necessary to effectuate 
recovery of the loans as they did during the lending period of late 
1952 also has contributed substantially to the poor record of loans 
recovery.
However, due note must be made of the repayment record achieved 
in the province of Giadinh, a province where security was never a very 
important element and where civil administration continued to function 
with almost no interruption. In that province slightly more than one 
million piasters were loaned to 930 farmers. At the end of the first 
year a total of 737 of these borrowers had repaid their loans of
827,000 piasters in full. This amount, plus 56,000 piasters paid as 
interest, made total receipts equal to about 88 percent of the amount 
originally loaned. It is on the basis of that record that SNCAAC was 
authorized to grant loans a second year (1954-35) in that province and 
slightly more than 1.5 million piasters were loaned to 933 farmers.
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Many of these are farmers who had repaid their obligations of 1953 and 
thus have been granted short-term loans a second time.
In addition to the 10-million piaster American Aid contribution 
and the five million from the National Treasury designated for short­
term plans, the organisation has at its disposal five million piasters 
for medium-term loans to artisans and small industries and 20 million 
piasters from the national budget destined for what it chooses to call 
"Agrarian Reform", or long-term land purchase loans. In all, 40 million 
piasters are available for lending.
Besides the short-term credit endeavors, however, very few loans 
have been made out of the funds available to SNCAAC. This fact is in 
evident when an examination is made of the following financial situation 
as of January 1, 1955, showing a total of over 26 million piasters of 
its assets, "existing reserve", remaining in the Vietnamese treasury.
By Presidential ordinance in October, 1954 the whole SNCAAC 
organization was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Minister 
of Agriculture, without abrogating the previous ordinance placing the 
Board of Directors under the jurisdiction of the President of Vietnam.
An ordinance issued by the Minister of Agriculture in November, 1954 
placed SNCAAC under the direct management and control of the General 
Director of Agrarian Reform, Cooperatives and Credit. Thus, the former 
Board of Directors has ceased to function for all intents and purposes. 
As a matter of fact, there is no duly appointed Board of Directors and 
the activities are administered by a Managing Director within the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform. However, besides feeble efforts made 
toward recovering loans already granted, the personnel of SNCAAC and 
the affiliated provincial offices are engaged in very few activities.
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The program of agricultural credit assistance may be summarized 
as follows:
FUMDAIOLNTALS OF THE PROGRAM (Short-Term Loans)
I. Capital Available: 10,000,000 Piasters - American Aid








Six provinces through two offices — Caisses 
Provincials
2,000 piasters per family maximum at rate of 500 
piasters per hectare
At one percent per month
Crop season
(1) Crop season
(2) Mortgage of any real estate owned, and
(3) Moral responsibility and guarantee
(Each loan made with security of pledge of crop 
or moral guarantee was co-signed by two neighbor 
fanners. These groups of three farmers were 
known as "mutual groups of co-signers".
To augment rice production and to cope with usury
VTII. Administration: (l) Technical Supervision and Audit - SNAAC
through provincial offices
(2) Accountability - Provincial accounting 
bureau
(3) Depository - Provincial Treasury, from SNCAAC 
regional office
(4) Commissions:
a. Provincial - Consider and approve,
collection
b. Communal - Receive and investigate
requests, recommend, and 
assist collections.
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Table 30. Source and Disposition of Funds for Agricultural and Other 










Hadong (now closed) 210.000
3,271,296
Artisans & small industries
128,200Giadinh Office 






















liquidating Capital of old O.C.P. 
Advanced amount 2,802,646
Total Cash in V. N. Treasury 
Existing reserve 26.151.128
Total 40,000,000 Total 40,000,000




As related in the previous chapter on Land and Agrarian Reforms, 
■with the cessation of hostilities large areas of abandoned rice lands 
in South Vietnam became secure and available for settlement and 
recultivation while at the same time thousands of farm families in 
South and Central Vietnam had been displaced from their lands and 
thousands more evacuated from the north to the south. Throughout 
the fall and winter of 1954 the Diem Government labored with the task 
of revising the old land reform laws established by the Tam Government 
during 1953* The result of these deliberations was the enactment of 
new land reform legislation— the basic provisions of which are con­
tained in Presidential Ordinances No. 2 and 7 whereby the government 
undertakes to lease idle lands to landless peasants for a period of 
four years; and provides for written landlord-tenant contracts with 
stipulated rental ceilings.
A four-year government lease or tenant contract will not in itself 
solve the problems of landless peasants and displaced refugee farm 
families unless some means are available to them to obtain the basic 
essentials of food and shelter until the first harvest. To meet the 
immediate need for production items, such as tools, seed, and draft 
animals, 225 million piasters and 675*000 U. S. dollars \*ere allocated 
as "emergency agricultural credit". It was the intention that this 
allocation would enable displaced farmers and small owner cultivators 
to become self-sufficient, economic producers, and at the same time 
support the government’s land reform program to which the present plan 
of agricultural credit assistance is basically tied.
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The new program of assistance calls for granting short-term 
piaster loans to farmers in the category mentioned above for the purpose 
of purchasing food and seed paddy and necessary hand cultivating tools, 
and medium-term (5 year) piaster loans for the procurement of local 
housing material. The short-term loans carry interest at one percent 
per month and medium-term loans six percent i:>er year. The dollar 
credits are destined to purchase work animals, largely in Thailand, 
which are to be distributed to beneficiaries in lieu of cash loans.
It was thought that making piaster credits available to farmers for 
local procurement of draft animals would create such an increase in 
demand as to cause an unduly large increase in local prices. In 
addition to loans in money and work animals, the present program con­
templates free distribution of simple hand tools and plows to the 
most needy fanners.
As originally established, this program of emergency credit 
assistance was to be administered by a Board of Governors composed of 
the Ministers of Agriculture, Finance, and of Plan and Reconstruction.
The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC) 
and its several provincial offices was to handle the details of admin­
istration, pending the complete reorganization of a National Agricultural 
Credit Agency.
Priority for receiving loans under this "emergency" program is 
given to signers of Type "B" or "C" contracts under Ordinance 79 the 
basic agrarian reform legislation. Responsibility for receiving and 
processing loan applications is entrusted to the special "village 
commissions" established under the terms of Ordinance No. 2. Responsi­
bility for supervision and control is given to a special Inspection
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Service and a Board of Censors who also operate under the general 
supervision of the Board of Governors.
Rather than utilize the services of SNCAAC to handle the details 
of administration as originally proposed and agreed, government 
authorities proceeded to draft new legislation during the spring of 
1955 3 creating a completely new organization to manage the new 
emergency loan program. A separate ordinance (No. 29-a) created a 
new commission composed of:
a. The Minister of Agrarian Reform - President
b. The Minister of Agriculture - Vice President
c. The Minister of Plan and Reconstruction
d. The Minister of Finance
The Ordinance directs this National Commission to take all 
necessary measures to implement the emergency loans program, control 
the use of the funds and equipment, and to insure the reimbursement of 
the loans. It is also directed to report directly to the President 
of Vietnam with a detailed account of the activities of this program 
every three months.
Following are the basic provisions of the Ordinance:
1. At the national level the organization is tinder the direction 
of a Director General designated by the National Commission but approved 
by the Minister of Agrarian Reform. However, to make matters yet more 
complicated, the appointment to office of this Director General is 
made by arrete of the President of Vietnam. The Interior Regulations 
of the organization are to be prepared by the director and approved 
by the National Commission, but as of January, 1956 no such interior 
regulations had been established.
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2. At the provincial, delegation and village level, the Director 
General is to exercise his function through:
a. The Chief of Province assisted by a Provincial Commission
b. The Chief of Delegation and the Delegation Commission
c. The Communal or Village Council and the Village Commission
3. Control is to be assured by the Inspector General of the 
Vietnam Financial and Administrative Services. A chief controller is to 
be appointed by presidential order upon recommendation of the National 
Commission
4. Interest rates are stipulated at one percent per month for 
short-term loans and at six percent per year for medium-term loans of 
five-years duration.
5. Penalties are provided for non-repayment as v/ell as for misuse 
of the funds on the part of the borrowers - ranging from refusal to 
grant loans to six months in jail. Provisions are also made for 
penalties against government functionaires and other persons who receive 
or attempt to receive services, money or favoritisms from borrowers.
6. Communal Commissions composed of three tenant farmers and 
three landowners are to be elected from among each group listed in the 
village in implementing Ordinance No. 2 of the Land Reform Statutes.
A member of the Village Council constitutes the seventh member of this 
Commission. All members exercise their functions without pay. The 
duties of the Village Commissions include receiving requests for loans 
and transmitting those to the Delegation Commission, supervise the 
granting of loans and distribution of agricultural tools and equipment, 
control the utilization of the funds, and assure recovery of the loans.
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7. Requests for loans are forwarded by the village commission 
to the delegation commissions where they are ‘'verified1' and forwarded 
to the provincial commissions. The Provincial Commission, presided 
over by the Chief of Province, establish a numerical list of loan 
requests by village, and forward the information to the National 
Commission. Funds are allocated and forwarded to each province 
according to the needs as expressed in the loan request lists.
8. Funds are to be deposited into a special account in the 
National Treasury, to be released to the provincial commissions upon 
order of the President of the National Commission. Each Chief of 
Province, as president of the respective Provincial Commission, in 
turn releases funds destined for each village to the village finance 
commissioner who in turn shall transmit to each borrower the sum to 
be advanced.
It can be readily deducted that, even with something approaching 
perfect timing, coordination, and functioning, considerable time will 
elapse between the date of the original application for a loan by the 
hopeful borrower and final transmission of the funds by the village 
finance commissioner. This complicated and roundabout procedure for 
granting loans of an ’’emergency" nature must result in unnecessary 
delays and is indicative of the mistrust and jealousy existing among 
the various branches of government. Because of this, improvements in 
the economic and social well-being of the masses of farmers is a slow 
and difficult process, and the productivity and standard of living of 
individual farm families suffer the consequences. It is suggested 
that decades of colonial administration and subjugation of Vietnamese 
officials to intricacies of colonial rule account in part for the
capacity of Vietnamese functionaires to substitute complicated adminis­
trative procedures for simple expedient action. The emergency agricul­
tural loans program is a case in point, and all efforts and insistance 
that procedures in granting loans be reduced to a minimum and made as 
simple as possible brought no concrete results. Even with the maintenance 
of all possible simplicity and straight line of action it would have 
been difficult to implement a program of emergency agricultural credit 
on time for maximum benefit. Difficulties were encountered soon after 
drafting the basic ordinance creating the organization. In the first 
place,, the National Commission was duly appointed but waited six months 
before meeting formally as a body to consider actions called for in the 
legislation. Secondly, a director was appointed by the Minister of 
Agrarian Reform but was triable to ftinetion due to lack of personnel 
assistance, transportation, and office space. Finally, the personnel 
of SNCAAC (who apparently had few activities) were put at his disposal 
to help in administrative duties, but not before four months had elapsed.
Since priority for loans are given to signatures of land tenure 
contracts types nB" and "C", the success of this program is basically 
dependent upon the application of the existing agrarian reform 
legislation. However, six months after promulgation no official in the 
ministry of Agrarian Reform, those delegated with this responsibility,
i
could give information on the number of tenure contracts signed, what 
type, nor in what area, village or province such activities had been 
in progress. Furthermore, a census of available and cultivable but 
abandoned lands (a prequisite to implementing the program) was begun 
only six months later. It is obvious that, according to the procedures
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formulated., unless there is a list of tenure contracts established, and 
thus giving rise to a list of eligible loans recipients by village, 
there can be no loans granted and, therefore, no program inqplementation.
This is one case where the availability of funds is not a problem. 
Failure to get the program started on time appears to be due to the 
following: (l) Lack of enthusiasm on the part of high government 
officials who appear more inclined to actively support and push self­
propaganda activities than concrete programs designed to bring emergency 
benefits to the massesj (2) Very little response and support from 
provincial officials, where most civilian Chiefs of Provinces are 
large property owners with some side interest in rice marketing, and 
where the military chiefs are more interested in building up their 
military forces and consolidating their positions than in engaging in 
land reform activities; (3) The combined activities of the syndicate 
of rice millers, merchants and moneylenders in their attempts to sabotage 
the program for fear their "system" would be disrupted; and (4) The 
hesitancy on the part of government personnel in the cities to go out 
in the rural areas and actively engage in efforts necessary for 
implementation of the program.
Therefore, unless positive and concerted action is forthcoming 
soon the net results are very likely to be:
1. No program of emergency credit and thus no government loan 
funds in the possession of needy rural peasants;
2. Continued usury practices on the part of merchants and money­
lenders who will probably find displaced and destitute farm 
families easy prey;
3. The return of landowners to the pacified areas intent of 
re-establishing the traditional pattern of land tenure;
335
4. No implementat ion of the agrarian reform program and no 
material benefits to fanners;
5. Landless farmers remaining at the mercy of the three classes 
of people most detrimental to their well being— the landlords, 
merchants and moneylenders, and;
6. Continued agrarian unrest breeding the seeds for another 
disastrious revolution.
Conclusions and Recommendations for an Effective Program:
Undoubtedly, for the past decade, conditions of security have been 
the major factor responsible for limited activities and relatively 
poor results obtained in the field of agricultural credit and other 
related activities, such as land reform and farmer cooperatives organi­
zation, all of which requires frequent visits by government officials 
to remote villages to insure satisfactory progress. However, this 
has not been the only factor. Other, but also very disquieting factors, 
have been: (l) skepticism on the part of the rural population whenever
government officials, wearing city clothes, visit their village to 
discuss agricultural credit or any other program. (This is not too 
surprising when consideration is given to the fact that in many cases 
these visits were probably the first ones made to the villages T̂ y 
Saigon officials in eight or ten years, and that in some areas the 
conditions and results of previous government ventures in agricultural 
credit and related rural activities are still remembered by the local 
population); (2) the activities of rice merchants and moneylenders in 
doing their utmost to sabotage the program in order to continue their 
traditional usurious operations; (3) lack of active support and only 
passive action on the part of provincial authorities, shortage of 
trained and competently qualified personnel in the respective government
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services; and the reductance of the few that would be qualified to 
bring the program to the rural people— where it has to be brought;
(4) dissention, jealousy, and lack of coordination among interested 
government services and ministry personnel whose close cooperation is 
essential; and (5) the complicated administrative machinery tending to 
retard action necessary to bring funds and equipment into the hands of 
recipient farm families when needed.
The shortage of technically qualified foreign personnel to work 
closely with native government personnel and farmer groups can also be 
cited as a reason for past errors and limited activity and success.
Now that peace and security have finally been restored in South 
and Central Vietnam, a most wonderful opportunity exists to increase 
the program of activity to the point where the credit and related needs 
of farmers can be more fully satisfied. This in itself could well be 
the greatest benefit the Vietnamese government— and foreign aid pro­
grams— could bring to the 80 percent of the population that are basically 
farmers.
But in order to carry out a broad program designed to cover the 
needs in this field it is imperative that the conditions noted above, 
which have heretofore greatly hampered activities, be inproved. There 
must be wholehearted cooperation among all government personnel and 
authorities concerned. There must be active support and cooperation on 
the part of provincial officials in any broad program of developing 
agricultural credit and related institutions. The administrative and 
banking machinery must be simplified if funds are to be in the hands of 
borrowers when needed. A program must be established for training
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personnel to carry out the program— personnel who are willing and ready 
to mix with the rural population, "narrow the gap" and remove the 
skepticism presently existing among village farmers toward city 
technicians. Finally, if it is absolutely necessary to utilize foreign 
aid funds in order to have sufficient capital, foreign countries 
furnishing this aid also will have to furnish some of the technical 
advice needed in this field.
CHAPTER XI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Indochina comprises the three states of Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam and forms the eastern portion of the Indochinese peninsula*
The total area of Indochina is approximately 285,000 square miles or 
about 182 mi].lion acres. Vietnam, with 126,000 square miles, is the 
largest of the three states and is con$>osed of Tonkin, Annam, and 
Cochinchina. About 44,000 square miles is included in Tonkin, 57*000 
square miles in Annam and 25,000 square miles in Cochinchina. The 
size of the area ceded to the Communists under the terns of the 1954 
Geneva Convention is about 60,000 square miles and includes all of 
Vietnam north of the seventeenth parallel. Cambodia comprises an area 
of about 70,000 square miles and Laos about 89,000 square miles.
After seventy-five years of French rule the three states of Indo­
china were granted independence within the French Union in 1952, with 
the freedom to choose their own form of government. Cambodia and Laos 
are presently constitutional monarchies, while South Vietnam, through 
popular referendum, recently chose a democratic republic government 
and rejected the former French-imposed Monarchy of Emperor Bao Dai.
Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, Indochina has not 
developed to any great extent economically and industrially under 
French rule and administration. As a result, the economy of the area 
is still based almost entirely on agriculture which is conducted under 
primitive methods of cultivation for the most part. In the agricultural 
economy of Indochina rice production predominates to such a degree that 
it can be referred to as an example of monoculture. About ninety
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percent of the inhabitants are engaged in agriculture, and about ninety 
percent of the total production of the area comes from agriculture and 
forestry. Most peasant farms are small and the farmers and their 
families have a very low standard of living and usually are heavily 
in debt.
Nearly all farming is carried on by native farmers, although 
rubber and coffee plantations and a number of tea and a few rice 
plantations are in French hands. Except on the European rubber 
plantations, yields are low due primarily to the primitive production 
practices followed.
As in most Asiatic countries, the diet of the Indochinese consists 
mostly of plant foods, primarily rice. Since production statistics 
are unreliable and many fairly important crops are excluded from of­
ficial production estimates, it is impossible to prepare a satisfactory 
food balance for Indochina. However, the per capita food consumption 
of the average rural peasant is very low.
Besides the French, the Chinese and Indians play an important 
role in the internal economy of Indochina. The Indians have become 
well established in the retail trade while the Chinese practically 
dominate the internal rice marketing and milling and the forest 
industries, and also play a leading role in the fields of agricultural 
credit and transportation.
Indochina is a hot country] at sea level there is no cold month.
All of Indochina lies south of the Tropic of Cancer and in the northern 
part of the country the coldest month, January, has a mean temperature 
of 63 degrees. Only a few tropical crops are excluded from the extreme
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north, but in all the plains and lower valleys harvests can ripen during 
any month of the year. In general, Indochina receives a large amount 
of rain each year. The amount is conditioned by the monsoons primarily, 
and most of the precipitation occurs during the summer and fall months 
when it exceeds 120 inches in some parts of the country. However, 
there is considerable variation in total annual rainfall from year 
to year, as well as from station to station within the country. In 
most areas there in insufficient moisture during the late winter and 
spring months to permit crop production without irrigation.
Although there has never been a really satisfactory census of 
the population in Indochina, best estimates place the present total 
at about 23 million, with 22*6 million in Vietnam, 1.6 million in 
Laos and 3*5 million in Cambodia. There are approximately 9*3 million 
people in North Vietnam, 7« 2 million in Central Vietnam and approximately 
5.6 million in South Vietnam. It is estimated that over SO percent of 
the population live on slightly less than 13 percent of the total land 
area. Population data available are sufficient to show the extreme 
uneven distribution of the population. The most heavily populated 
areas are the alluvial plains close to the sea. These areas are:
(l) the Red River delta, 5*790 square miles, with 7.5 million people, 
or 1,295 per square mile; (2) the coastal plains of Central Annam,
5,790 square miles, with 4*6 million people, or 795 per square mile;
(3) Central Cochinchina, 6,ISO square miles, with 3»2 million people, 
or 520 per square mile; (4) Western Cochinchina, 7*720 square miles, 
with one million people, or 130 per square mile; (5) southern Cambodia, 
15*350 square miles, 2.4 million people, or 195 per square mile. The
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reminder of the country also shows significant differences in population 
densities. Large areas of Laos, northern Cambodia, and the hilly and 
mountainous areas of Central Vietnam are virtually unpopulated. On the 
other hand, parts of the Red River delta are among the most densely 
populated agricultural areas of the world, having a population of over 
3,000 people per square mile.
The people of Indochina, the vast majority of whom are peasants, 
maintain a high population density in some rural areas only by intensive 
use of the land. Therefore, climate, soil, and agricultural practices 
play a great part in the pattern of distribution of the population.
It is commonly agreed that a further important factor determining 
population distribution is the prevalence of malaria in most of the 
hilly and mountainous areas. For the country as a whole, population 
density, being slightly under 100 per square mile, does not appear to 
be a problem of great significance until the pattern of population 
distribution is taken into consideration. The fact that £0 percent 
of the total population lives on less than 13 percent of the total 
land area, and that between SO and 90 percent of the people are farmers 
greatly intensifies the pressure of population upon the land in certain 
areas.
According to the best available vital statistics, the annual birth 
rate in the principal cities of Indochina is about 40 per thousand, 
while the death rate averages approximately 30 per thousand, indicating 
a rate of population increase of one percent per year. While no infor­
mation is available which would indicate the average population increase 
in the interior, rural areas of the country, it is probable that the
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birth rate is higher than in the cities and the death rate about the 
same as in the metropolitan areas, resulting in a rate of population 
increase probably higher than one percent in those areas* However, 
this is probably offset somewhat by the higher rate of infant mortality 
in the rural areas.
Until 1945 formal classroom education in Indochina was restricted 
to the larger towns and cities, and to the children of the privileged.
It is only during the past few years that government-operated schools 
have been established in the smaller, rural villages and communitiesj 
even these were established only in "secure” areas of the controlled 
zones. There are no official statistics indicating the degree of 
literacy in all Indochina. However, the percentage of illiteracy among 
the rural population is without doubt extremely large, running probably 
as high as 75 percent of the adult population.
The rivers of Indochina, along with the man-made waterways and 
canals, play a dominant role in the economy of the country. In fact, 
from the standpoint of both agricultural production (irrigation and 
drainage) and transportation and communication, the rivers and canals 
can be called the life-blood of the country. In some areas, particularly 
in the Mekong and Red River deltas, river and canal traffic accounts 
for probably more than eighty percent of the total local traffic, with 
local roads and highways and water-buffalo trails carrying the remaining 
twenty percent.
Broadly speaking, the cultivation of crops in Indochina is carried 
on in seven principal agricultural regions or areas. These are: the
Red River delta in Tonkinj the numerous small valleys and deltas along
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the Annam coast; the Mekong River delta; the Great Lake region in 
Cambodia; the plateau des Bolevens in Laos; the red and grey table­
lands north and northeast of Saigon; and the Dalat-Djiring-Ban MeThout 
triangle. Rice is by far the most important crop grown in the Red 
River and Mekong River deltas and in the Great Lake region in Cambodia. 
Com, cotton, sweet potatoes, and vegetables are crops of lesser 
importance in the Red River delta. Secondary crops include sugar cane, 
peanuts, tropical fruits, coffee, manioc and tea. Rubber is by far 
the most important plantation crop and is produced in the grey and red 
tablelands north and northeast of Saigon.
Chiefly because of the wide variation in rainfall from year to 
year and the uncertain seasonal distribution, irrigation is necessary 
to insure stable production of rice and other crops, in spite of the
generally heavy rainfall. In Worth Vietnam, protection of crops against
the disastrous floods has taken precedence over irrigation, and an 
intricate system of dikes has been constructed for that purpose. In
the Mekong River delta in the South an important system of canals has
been built primarily to drain the large area of swamp land sufficiently 
for growing rice. In this area it is estimated that over five million 
acres of farm land have been made cultivable by means of drainage, 
effectuated primarily through a system of over 800 miles of main canals. 
As a result, acreage under rice cultivation increased four times from 
1880 to the beginning of VIorld ’War II, and rice exports from Saigon 
were five times as large before the war as in 1880. Most of the lifting 
of Irrigation water in Indochina is performed by primitive hand methods, 
and only an insignificant portion of the total area is irrigated by 
mechanical means.
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There are no sufficiently complete soils studies to enable a 
detailed description of the various soil types. But the few general 
surveys that have been made indicate that in general the soils of 
Indochina are relatively poor from an agricultural point of view.
For the most part, they are acidic, poor in assimilable phosphates, 
lime, potassium, magnesium, and in humus. Generally speaking, only 
the recent soils of the low alluvial plains of Indochina are able to 
support a crop in the form of wet-field rice year after year. Most 
of these soils are periodically flooded over by the waters of the 
Mekong and Red Rivers containing large quantities of silt which help 
maintain soil fertility. A very small amount of fertilizer is utilized 
by Indochinese farmers in crop production, and this consists primarily 
of human and animal manure, dead fish and mud from rivers and canals.
In many parts of the area commercial fertilizer is virtually unknown.
The fishing industry holds a leading place in the economy of 
Indochina, since fish with its various by-products forms an indispensable 
item in the diet of the people. A large percentage of the fish catch 
is consumed locally and never enters the market channels. Although 
there are no official statistics on the production of fish for the 
country as a whole, all authorities agree that fisheries are second only 
to rice in importance to the native economy, and as an export product 
ranked fifth in the value of the principal goods exported from the 
country before World War II. The production of salt from sea water 
is another important marine resource.
About 74 percent of the total land in Indochina is classified as 
forest land. One third of this constitutes very high-grade timber. 
However, uncontrolled timber cutting has denuded large stands in the
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upland areas and the practice of "ray" cultivation in many regions also 
has devastated large portions of fine tropical forests. The forestry 
exploitation industry is largely undeveloped.
Goal is the most important mineral resource. Other mineraljr 
found in small quantities include tin, zinc, tungsten, gold and precious 
stones. The largest coal mines in the country are located in North 
Vietnam and are now under Communist control.
The largest population center is the Saigon-Cholon metropolitan 
area with an estimated two million persons. Other large cities include 
Hanoi with about 300,000 people, Haiphong with a population estimated 
at 200,000, and Pnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, which has about 
150,000. Other important centers of population are Nam Dinh and 
Haidoung in North Vietnam, Hue, Tourane and Nhatrang in Central Vietnam, 
and Mytho, Cantho and Longxuyen in South Vietnam. In Cambodia, Kompong 
Cham and Battambang also are relatively important centers of population.
The relatively few small industrial, enterprises are located in 
these cities for the most part. Besides coal mining, other industrial 
activities include cotton spinning and weaving, small ship yards, 
rubber processing, the manufacture of paint, shoes, matches, and 
cigarettes, and food processing— primarily rice milling and fish products 
processing. Regulations imposed by France and tariff legislation 
favoring special French interests probably have contributed many of the 
features of Indochina’s present economy, and particularly explains the 
slow development of industries as compared with agriculture.
The basic unit of currency is the piaster of 100 centimes. The 
parity of the piaster is tied to the French franc, and since 1953 this
parity has been fixed by mutual agreement by the governments of France 
and Indochina at the ratio of 10 francs to one Indochinese piaster.
The exchange rates between the piaster and other currencies are based 
on the Paris official franc market rate, presently fixed at 34# francs 
to the United States dollar— or 34.# piasters. The free rate of 
exchange, however, is between 70 and SO piasters to one United States 
dollar. The amount of money in circulation has increased at a tremendous 
rate since 1940 when 2B0 million piasters were in circulation. By the 
spring of 1954 this had increased to S.5 billion piasters. The general 
level of prices kept pace with the increase in the number of piasters. 
Based upon prices in 1939 as 100, the index of wholesale prices in 1951 
was 2,450; the index of food items consumed by natives was 4,280; and 
the index of food items consumed by Europeans was 4,350.
Indochina is primarily an exporter of raw materials and an inporter 
of manufactured goods. The foreign trade of the country has been 
characterised by a substantial excess of imports over exports, by an 
increased tendency for imports to rise and for exports to remain stable 
or fall slightly in recent years. In 1952 the value of exports amounted 
to about $117 million. Three agricultural commodities, rubber, rice 
and corn accounted for 71 percent of this amount. Imports during the 
same year were valued at about $449 million resulting in an unfavorable 
balance of trade amounting to about $332 million. France is by far 
the leading supplier of goods imported into Indochina and the French 
Union also is the primary market for Indochina's exports. Deficits 
in trade payments usually have been balanced by new capital imports, 
since heavy transfers of profits into France prohibited the accumulation
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of capital in Indochina even during those few years that showed 
favorable trade balances.
The most intensive use of hand labor is still the predominant 
way of land cultivation; therefore, labor requirements in crop production 
are extremely high. Mechanical agricultural equipment is relatively 
unknown and the use of draft animals is very limited in the Tonkin 
delta and the Annam coastal areas because they compete with man for 
the meager food supply. Crop cultivation is typically small-scale 
with the farm family furnishing most of the labor required. Due 
primarily to lack of improved seed stock, hand cultivation and the 
absence of proper equipment, and very restricted use of fertilizer, 
the average crop yield is very low by any standard of comparison.
There have been very few efforts made in the past by the government 
to bring about improvements in crop production methods.
The intensity of the problems of land ownership and tenure rela­
tions varies in the different regions and states of Indochina. In the 
Tonkin delta farming area the problem relates primarily to the large 
number of farm families upon the available land supply, the intensive 
subdivision and parcelization of land holdings and the extremely small 
amount of land available to the average farm family. This situation 
improves only slightly in Central Vietnam. The problem of absentee 
land ownership is not as acute in the North and Central parts of Vietnam 
and Cambodia as it is in South Vietnam. In South Vietnam the problem 
revolves around the sharecropper system of crop production, absentee 
landlords, insecurity of tenure, and the fact that only a relatively 
small percentage of the farmers own the land they cultivate. In the
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deltas of North and Central Vietnam, the custom of dividing property 
equally among all the children has resulted in very small land holdings, 
which, in the majority of instances, are divided up into many tiny 
parcels. In general it may be said that South Vietnam is a region of 
large land holdings, absentee landlords, sharecroppers and landless 
agricultural workers, whereas North and Central Vietnam and Cambodia 
are regions of small peasant farmers who cultivate their own lands.
It is estimated that 99 percent of the agricultural holdings in North 
Vietnam, 90 percent in Central Vietnam, and 95 percent in Cambodia, 
but only 64 percent in South Vietnam are operated by their owners.
In Vietnam there are approximately 4*5 million farm families, but 
only 2.0 million farm landowners. Thus, close to 56 percent of all 
farm families in that state do nob own all the land they cultivate.
Legal ownership of land is frequently one of name only; the owner 
often is practically a tenant, being obliged to make annual payments to 
the moneylender who has allowed him to remain on the land holding.
There is an urgent need for reforms in agriculture in Indochina, 
particularly in Vietnam. This need arises from the following: (l)
the very unequal distribution of landholdings resulting in a large 
percentage of the total cultivated area being owned by a small 
percentage of the peoplej (2) the very large number of landless farm 
families; (3) the very extensive degree of parcelization of landholdings 
in Central and North Vietnam; (4) exhorbitantly high land rental rates 
prevailing in most areas; (5) the usurious rates of interest charged 
by moneylenders and merchants on short-term money and food loans to 
fanners; and (6) the disorganized and unsystematic conditions under
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which agricultural commodities (primarily rice) are marketed at the 
farm level. These conditions of the rural econoiqy all combine to lead 
to gross inefficiency in agricultural production in general, grossly 
unequal distribution in incomes, perpetual indebtedness and a miserable 
standard of living at the bare subsistence level for a large sector of 
the rural people. The result is social and political unrest on the 
part of the masses.
There have been only feeble efforts in the past on the part of the
governments toward remedying these conditions. The few laws and decrees
enacted were inadequate to cope with the situation. What few benefits 
could have been forthcoming never materialized because the laws and 
decrees were not enforced and the evil practices of the economic 
oligarchy continued to the detriment of the rural proletariat. At the 
present time the government is showing renewed interest in the agrarian 
reform needs of the country and, with American aid, a more constructive 
program of action is in process of being implemented in that portion of
the country still out of Communist control.
The exodus of about 200,000 refugee farm families from Communist 
controlled North Vietnam into the south has reduced somewhat the 
pressure of population on the land supply in the Tonkin delta but at 
the same time greatly aggravated the agrarian problems in South Vietnam. 
The present agrarian reform program includes provisions to rehabilitate 
those people on abandoned farm lands.
The greatest handicaps to implementing a broad program of agrarian 
reform in Vietnam are: (l) the opposition from landowners, commodity
merchants and moneylenders) (2) shortage of qualified personnel to
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carry the program to the rural peoplej (3) only passive acceptance in 
some quarters and active resistance in others on the part of civil 
and military officials in the rural provinces for personal reasons; 
and (4) obstructive tactics from Communist cadres left in South and 
Central Vietnam by the rebel military forces for that purpose.
Traditionally, the major agricultural products of Indochina are 
marketed chiefly through Chinese middlemen who normally take substantial 
margins for their services. These traders and middlemen are often 
usurers as well, who usually take in a large portion of the crop as 
payment for their advances, thus cutting off the producer from most 
free markets in agricultural products. Generally speaking, there is 
no organized system of internal marketing for agricultural commodities.
The only exception is rubber whose production and marketing are entirely 
in the hands of relatively few foreign corporations or syndicates.
Besides rubber, rice is the only other farm product the marketing of 
which can be said to follow established patterns. With the exception 
of the efforts of farmers' organizations in introducing some system 
of marketing coffee, tea, tobacco, and other minor crops, very little 
has been done by either government or private individuals or institutions 
in effectuating some systematic marketing arrangement for farm commodities. 
As a consequence, the majority of the less-important agricultural products 
are traded by producers on a barter basis in local village market places.
The commercial rice milling industry is concentrated in the cities 
of Saigon-Cholon and Pnom Penh. Most of the smaller rice mills in the 
interior rice-producing areas have been destroyed during the period of 
rebel activities. Practically all the paddy going into commercial
channels for milling and consumption within the country and for export 
is purchased by paddy merchants or millers1 agents. Only a very in­
significant quantity of paddy is delivered by producers directly to 
the larger commercial rice mills and warehouses located in the large 
cities. It is the common practice of most paddy buyers to make 
advances to rice farmers at the beginning of the rice-growing season, 
in return for which the farmer agrees to repay the loan at harvest time 
by delivering a certain quantity of paddy of a designated grade and 
quality, and for a certain price. Under such a system of credit 
advances, rates of interest are unduly high and also are partially 
concealed. Until some improvements are forthcoming in paddy assembly, 
tied as it is with production credit, disorganized rice marketing at 
the farm level will continue to encourage usurious interest rates on 
loans by paddy merchants to farmers.
There is no organized commodities exchange in Indochina and, there­
fore, no organized trading in futures in rice or other commodities. 
However, there is a large amount of trading by individuals and syndicate 
who make current committments for delivery on a certain future date.
The wholesale price of processed rice normally is controlled to a large 
extent by Chinese millers and wholesale rice dealers, who also are 
very influential in controlling the price of paddy.
In summary, the following are major defects in the system of 
marketing agricultural products: (l) farmers are financially unable
to retain control of their products after harvest but are forced to 
sell immediately in order to repay obligations contracted during the 
growing season, and because of poor bargaining power they suffer the
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consequences of low prices; (2) lack of effective competition among 
buyers at the farm level; (3) inadequate and insufficient storage on 
the farms and at the primary assembly points; (4) inefficient and 
inadequate transportation system; (5) excessive taxes imposed on the 
movement of commodities from production to processing and consuming 
centers; (6) relatively inefficient rice mills and milling machinery 
resulting in low quality product of a lower value which is reflected 
back in the form of low prices to farmers; (?) Chinese monopoly in 
rice trading resulting in little opportunity for rice prices to be 
set under competitive conditions; (&) too many middlemen between the 
farmer and consumer consistent with the amount of services performed* 
which tends to v/iden the gap between producer and consumer.
In the past farmer cooperatives in Indochina have been closely 
associated with the agricultural credit movement and most of them were 
financed by government-sponsored rural credit organizations. Membership 
contributions never comprised a significant part of the capital. For 
the most part* funds for short-term crop production loans and aD̂ jo 
long-term loans for equipment were obtained from the government which, 
at the same time, practiced close supervision of the lending operations 
and the use of the capital furnished. Beginning in 193&, when the 
first cooperative was established, the French administration took an 
active part in organizing and financing farmer cooperatives in almost 
every major agricultural region of the country. By 1941 a total of 
13 cooperatives had been organized and placed under the supervision 
and direction of the former Office de Credit Populaire. Not one of 
these agricultural cooperatives proved successful according to usual
standards of performance. The members were invariably suspicious and 
uncooperative with the management, and farmers were seldom disposed 
to bring their produce to the cooperative warehouses or mills, except 
against full payment in cash at current market price. More often the 
cooperatives became ordinary storage, milling or processing, and 
merchandising centers, without the close relationship to their members 
or raw product suppliers. In addition, the administration of the 
organizations was expensive, operational and other costs were very 
high, and all too often total costs exceeded total income. The main 
obstacles in establishing an institution of farmer cooperatives in 
Indochina have been: (l) the moral obstacle constituted mainly by the
skepticism and abstentionism of the Indochinese "milieux'* who go under 
the fatalistic assumption that usury practices are too well fixed in 
the habits of the rural economy to be discarded} and (2) the ignorance 
and disinterest of the mass of the rural population in the problems 
and activities of the management of the organizations; and (3) the 
insufficiency of qualified personnel to fill positions of management.
Farmer cooperatives established under the French were inadequate 
to meet the needs of Indochina’s agricultural economy. In general, the 
radius of action was very United and existed only in a few localized 
centers of concentrated production of "special crops". The quantity of 
produce marketed through the organizations amounted to only a very 
small percentage of the total production, and the membership represented 
an insignificant portion of all farmer-producers. The amount of capital 
available was grossly insufficient and the money advanced to members 
against pledged crop deliveries never exceeded 25 percent of the 
estimated value of the produce.
Present efforts by the Cambodian and Vietnamese governments in 
establishing an institution of farmer cooperatives are intended to 
avoid past errors. Emphasis is being placed on organizing a new, 
decentralized agricultural cooperative institution called the "Centre 
Rural" which is to act simultaneously as a credit organism by granting 
short-term crop production loans to members, and as an instrument for 
the purchase, grading, storage, and cooperative sale of members’ produce. 
Special efforts are made to incorporate as many of the basic democratic 
principles of cooperation as possible in the cooperative laws and 
regulations, as well as in the operation of the cooperatives, consistent 
with proper government control and supervision to safeguard against 
misuse of funds. A special, coordinated program of educating farmers 
in cooperative principles has begun which has the objective of 
obtaining and maintaining proper menibership-management relations.
The present program also calls for training of personnel who will 
become qualified and competent to assume cooperative administrative 
duties. Government financing arrangements are being simplified and 
adequate funds are provided through American Aid to grant loans in 
both equipment and facilities and short-term production and operating 
credit to farmer cooperatives organized under the new system.
The continuous need for agricultural credit of all types and the 
frequent lack of it have been major factors responsible for the slow 
progress in agricultural development in Indochina. Rates of interest 
on loans to farmers usually are very high, often as much as 40 percent 
per annum, and in the case of small loans, even 10 or 12 percent per 
month or up to 140 percent per year. Domestic savings are insufficient
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for credit needs, and the Chinese and Indian moneylenders provide the 
funds for a large part of the loans.
One of the major elements of agrarian reform needed in Indochina 
is the provision of cheap credit for the peasant. Whether or not he 
owns the land he cultivates, the Indochinese peasant is generally in 
debt; and, because of the usurious rates of interest charged, he 
invariably finds it very difficult to extricate himself from this 
position.
In Indochina, the landlord-moneylender is the worst influence 
on general agricultural development. The landlords, in many cases, 
depend more on the interest they receive from the loans they grant to 
their tenants than on the output from their rice lands. This explains 
why owners of large estates often prefer to divide their land into 
small farms and lease them to landless peasants for traditional, 
primitive cultivation.
In the 75 years of French administration of Indochina only relatively 
feeble efforts were made in this sector of agricultural credit. For the 
most part, the agricultural credit agencies established by the French 
were destined to bring credit assistance only to landowners and large 
cultivators since most loans granted under the French system stipulated 
mortgage of the land as primary collateral for loans. A large portion 
of the capital advanced to landowners by the government lending agencies 
at reasonable rates of interest were used by borrowers for sublending to 
their tenants at greatly increased rates of interest. Most organizations 
engaged in rural lending activities under the French administration 
therefore were not designed to bring needed assistance to native small 
cultivators and tenants.
Briefly, the history of French efforts in this field can be 
summarized as follows: (l) Mutual Loan Associations were organized
in 1915 to facilitate credit advances to agricultural entrepreneurs 
against physical assets as security. These failed to assist the 
great majority of the small peasant farmers; (2) the Credit Populaire 
Agricole was organized in 1927 to supplant the Mutual Loan Associations 
however, the depression of 1932 resulted in over 70 percent loss of its 
capital through unpaid loans, and this agency was superceded by the 
Credit Agricole Mutuel; (3) this institution was organized in 1933 to 
coordinate the activities of the credit agencies and to enter more 
actively for the first time in short-term loans to small cultivators. 
The lending activities of the Credit Agricole Mutuel were conducted 
through several provincial agricultural banks and coordinated by a 
central agricultural credit bank in charge of control and supervision. 
Most of the capital was provided by the Bank of Indochina; (4) the 
Office de Credit Agricole Mutuel et Artisanal was organized in 1940 to 
furnish credit assistance mostly to cooperatives; however, the manage­
ment of this agency was very ineffective in bringing financial and 
credit assistance to small cultivators primarily because many members 
of local loan commissions took advantage of their positions to falsify 
loan application documents to obtain loans for their oxm benefits or to 
grant loans to their friends and relatives; (5) the Office de Credit 
Populaire functioned from 1939 until 1949 as a centralizing and 
coordinating agency; however, very little coordinating was forthcoming 
and very few loans to individual farmers were granted up to 1949 when 
the assets of this agency were divided among the three states of 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
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None of the above-named, agencies were effective in bringing needed 
credit assistance to peasant farmers. They all lacked financial auton­
omy and, although they were all closely controlled and supervised by 
the central government banking institution which furnished the capital, 
a large portion of the loans made were misused by the recipients who 
utilized the funds borrowed to relend at usurious rates to their less- 
fortunate neighbor farmers.
A Program of Reform
The major problems in Indochina are concerned basically with low 
productivity of the average worker and the inability of the worker to 
retain a reasonable share of his output for his own uses. These con­
ditions largely are the result of inadequate resources, the improper 
use of what resources there are, and the social and economic struct\ire 
under which the peasant must exist. The results of such circumstances 
are: (l) a widening of the economic and social strata with a small
upper-crust of rich aristocracy and a multitude of poor citizens;
(2) loss of interest on the part of the masses in the functions of 
government; (3) loss of interest in community improvements and community 
life on the part of rural landless people having insecurity of tenure 
on the land; (4) very little contribution from the majority of the 
population toward the economy and prosperity of the nation, or the 
moral and financial support of the government; and (5) further 
disruption of the social and economic order occasioned by the 
practices and selfish interest of merchants, moneylenders and landlords.
Past errors in colonial rule and administration of Indochina 
brought about armed rebellion by a large percentage of the masses and
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resulted in Communism gaining control over a large portion of the 
country. Armed revolution is not the answer, and it should not be 
resorted to as a substitute for positive government action designed 
to bring about improvements in the living of the people.
A program designed to improve the economic well-being of the 
Indochinese peasant and, consequently, the national economy, should 
emphasize increasing the productivity of the land and the worker of 
the land. This objective must be accompanied by steps to assure the 
equitable distribution of the production. These aims can be fostered 
under a program which will:
1. Provide short-term crop production and medium-term land 
improvement and equipment loans to farmers at reasonable 
rates of interest, and thus decrease the reliance of 
farmers upon merchants and moneylenders for this type of 
credit assistance. The administration of the newly- 
organized Agricultural Credit Service should be strengthened 
and procedures for granting loans should be simplified.
2. Inprove the land tenure situation by implementing a sound 
and administratively feasible program designed to: (a) 
immediately effectuate reduction of land rent, greater 
security of tenure and formalizing the rights of squatters 
and displaced fairo families on abandoned farm lands in 
South Vietnam, and (b) eventually redistribute the lands
on a more equitable basis by setting definite land retention 
limits, government purchase of large estates for redistribu­
tion on a reimbursable basis to landless peasants and owners 
of uneconomically small parcels of land.
3. Bring forth greater efforts to improve the system under which 
most agricultural products are marketed. Emphasis toward 
re-establishing local storage and rice milling and other 
primary processing facilities in the rural areas is necessary. 
Basic revisions in taxation and credit policies are needed
to attract more private investment in such facilities closer 
to the points of agricultural production. In addition, the 
new government program of furnishing the capital, leadership 
and guidance necessary to organize fanner credit, marketing, 
and purchase cooperatives at the village level should be 
enlarged and given all support possible. There is great 
need also for more government activities in the fields of
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market information, crop reporting and statistical informa­
tion, and of getting such information to the farmers for 
their own benefit. In connection with farmer cooperatives, 
rural people should be encouraged to perform more of the 
basic marketing services themselves and thus narrow the gap 
between them and consumers.
4* Strengthen the government Agricultural Service to include a 
farmer education, information or agricultural extension 
section designed to acquaint rural people with benefits 
obtainable through improved methods of crop production and 
harvesting, such as use of better and proper equipment for 
land preparation and crop cultivation, improved seed stock, 
proper fertilization and more extensive use of fertilizers. 
Government agricultural credit policies should be directed 
toward helping farmers incorporate these improvements in 
their farming practices and wider cooperative use of small 
stationary rice threshers as well as greater care in handling, 
drying and home storage of farm products, mainly rice. There 
is a great need to make the personnel in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Agricultural and related services more 
conscious of their responsibility toward helping small farmers 
improve their living conditions.
5. Give greater emphasis to the government program of rural 
education and health improvement. Increasing the vitality 
and decreasing the degree of illiteracy of rural people 
would contribute material]y to increasing the interest of 
the masses in and their support of local, regional and 
nat i ona 1 g o ve rnine n t s.
6. In the interest of greater industralization and economic 
development, and moving the excess farming population off 
the farms, provide opportunities for more employment outside 
of agriculture. Proper government fiscal and Monetary 
(credit) policies designed to promote and foster more small 
industries in rural provinces would be a step in the right 
direction.
7. Foster improvements in the field of transportation. Special 
efforts should be made in repairing war damage to existing 
roads, bridges and navigable streams and in building more 
rural, farm-to-market roads and thereby facilitate transporta­
tion of produce to and from the producing areas.
8. Place greater emphasis in improving irrigation methods and 
water-control facilities. Improved water control and drainage 
would bring large areas of land under cultivation and also 
decrease the ravaging effects of periodic floods in the deltas. 
Better irrigation methods would make it possible to increase 
total rice production, reduce the large amount of labor utilized 
in lifting irrigation water and also make it possible to increase 
substantially the total area planted to crops during the dry 
season.
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9. Before any long-term and permanent improvement in the 
general economy and living conditions of the masses in 
particular can be forthcoming there must be greater 
stability in offices of governmental authority directing 
and enforcing action programs leading toward such improve­
ments.
Probably the paramount desire of farmers in Indochina is to become 
owners of the land they cultivate. The evils of absentee land ownership 
and the exhorbitant land rentals and interest rates of landowners and 
moneylenders undoubtedly contribute most of the dissatisfaction expressed 
by farmers, and are the major cause of the extreme misery of most rural 
families. Uncertainty of tenure and otherwise unfavorable tenure rela­
tions also have been major factors causing unrest. There is probably 
no greater certainty of tenure than there is stability in the provincial 
and national governments. The average peasant farmer is little concerned 
about government stability because he does not consider himself closely 
associated with it and seldom gets to know the name of the person 
appointed chief of his province before a new one is appointed. However, 
he is definitely concerned about the availability of a plot of land to 
farm, and in the absence of lease or land rent contracts stipulating 
duration and other conditions of tenure, he often finds himself abandoned 
by the landowner at harvest time, or as soon as his debts to the land­
lord are cleared. When another piece of land is found it invariably is 
obtained only on the new owner's terms.
If the free democratic Vietnamese government had sufficient stability, 
power and determination to actually and forcefully administer and imple­
ment the present agrarian reform statutes over the whole rural area, the 
basic desires of farmers in improved tenure relations and in land owner­
ship would be forthcoming. The present state of agrarian unrest would
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diminish and greater stability and economic well-being of the rural 
population would result.
However, improved tenure conditions and land ownership per se 
will not solve all the social and economic ills of farmers. Lack of 
adequate credit of any type and the present system of unorganized 
marketing facilities or channels also are very effective detriments to 
farmer prosperity. Positive and determined government action is needed 
to remedy the prevailing situation of 10 percent per month interest on 
short-term production credit and of farmers receiving only 40 percent 
of the market value of the crop as their share of the harvest. Such 
usury practices will have to change for the benefit of farmers before 
any material economic improvement can be expected. All efforts possible 
need to be taken by the government. The program of government-sponsored 
and financed farmer marketing cooperatives and the National Agricultural 
Credit System recently started can go a long way toward remedying the 
situation, if they are properly administered and adequately financed.
The presence of foreigners, primarily French, Indian and Chinese, 
in agricultural undertakings, and their predominance in the farm credit 
and agricultural marketing fields, is viewed with distrust by most 
Indochinese farmers. It is becoming absolutely necessary that the 
Indochinese nationals themselves replace foreign interests and assume 
a larger role. It is no longer possible to expect contentment, 
stability, and economic and social improvement for the citizenry of a 
country when there are in that country 90,000 or 100,000 foreigners 
living in luxury but surrounded by 2S-odd million "natives" - 90 percent 
of whom live under conditions of extreme poverty.
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These recommendations and suggestions are presented as ideas for 
consideration by those in position and charged with the responsibility 
of improving the national economy in general and agrarian problems in 
particular. Governmental authorities can present and pursue lines of 
action designed to implement needed improvements, but the final solution 
can be achieved on a permanent basis only if the people themselves are 
properly oriented and given the opportunity to cooperate in the develop­
ment of plans and execution of programs, and become closely associated 
with all reform movements. The rural people themselves must come 
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APPENDIX A
AGRARIAN REFORM ORDINANCE NO. 20
Complete Text of ORDINANCE No. 20 of June 4, 1953 as it 
now reads after incorporating the changes made by ORDI­
NANCE No. 2 of January 8, 1955 and including the new 
specimen contract Type A appended to Ordinance No. 2 by 
Amendment No. 6 of February 5, 1955.
HIS MAJESTY BAO-DAI, CHIEF OF STATE,
In view of Ordinance No. 1 of July 1, 1949, fixing the conditions for 
the organization and functioning of public institutions;
In view of Ordinance No. 2 of July 1, 1949, as modified by Ordinance 
No. 21 of August 4, 1954, relating to the organization of 
public Administrations;
In view of Ordinance No. 19 of June 4, 1953, fixing the procedures for 
return to the regional private domain and the redistribution 
of uncultivated portions of agricultural concessions;
In view of Ordinance No. 20 of June 4, 1953, establishing the regulations 
governing tenant farming;
In view of Ordinance No. 21 of June 4, 1953, stipulating and limiting 
the extent of maximum ric e-field and agricultural land 
holdings.
In view of Ordinance No. 22 June 4, 1953, establishing procedures for 
the enjoyment of usufruct of rice-fields and agricultural 
land;
In view of Decree No. 15 of June 19, 1954, nominating Mr. NGO DINH
DIEM as President of the State Council and in consideration 
of the complete civil and military authority granted to him 
by the Chief of State;
In view of Decree No. 94-CP of September 24, 1954, as amended and com­
pleted by subsequent Decree, determining the composition of 
the Government;
On the proposal of the Minister of Agriculture;
The Council of Ministers being agreed,
378-
379
IT IS DECREED THAT :
Section £
Definitions
Article j.. A rural landowner, or proprietor (Chu-dien) is defined 
as the individual or legal entity who, possessing the ownership or the 
usufruct of rice or agricultural lands, cultivates them himself or rents 
them in part or in whole *
-to a tenant farmer (Ta-dien), by a farming lease, in considera­
tion of an annual rental in cash or in paddyj
-to a sharecropper (Lam-re), by a lease based on payment of ground 
rent, or a sharecropping agreement based on a division between 
the two parties of the crop*
The assignees of the said rural landowners are included with them, 
for purposes of this Ordinance*
Article 2. A tenant farmer, or Ta-dien, is defined as one who, 
having arranged with a rural proprietor a farming lease, based on an 
annual rental in cash or in paddy, cultivates, by himself or with the 
assistance of others, one or more parcels of rice or farming land be­
longing to the proprietor in question.
Article A sharecropper or Lam-re is defined as one who, having 
executed together with a rural proprietor a sharecropping lease based on 
a division or sharing of the usufruct between the two contracting 
parties, cultivates, himself or with the aid of other persons, one or 




Concerning the farm leases
Article 4* The farm lease is a contract by which a rural proprietor 
rents to a tenant farmer (Ta-dien) a rural landed property, in considera­
tion of an annual rental in cash or paddy*
Article A tenant farmer is prohibited from renting from one or 
several proprietors a cultivatable area which, if added to the lands of 
which he may himself be the owner, exceeds the allowable limit of land 
holding as fixed by Ordinance No. 21 cited above.
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Article 6* The duration of a farm lease may not be less than five 
years, renewable by tacit agreement.
Article The farm lease must be a written instrument in three 
copies, of which the original is held by the proprietor, the second 
copy by the tenant farmer and third copy kept in the files of the 
village where the leased rice field and farm land are located.
Within eight days from the day the lease is signed, it must be 
registered at the Communal hall in a special land register maintained 
for that purpose.
No charge is made for registering the lease.
No verbal farm lease is valid.
A specimen contract Type-A is appended to this Ordinance.
Article S. The tenant farmer may not sub-let or assign his lease 
to a third party without the consent of the rural proprietor.
Article The rural landlord cannot request the cancellation of 
a farm contract or refuse to renew it unless he can offer proof :
lo) that he wishes to take back his holdings in order to cultivate 
them himself or have them cultivated by one or several of his lineal 
descendents who have completed their eighteenth year and who are capable 
of ensuring the efficient exploitation of the farm, providing however, 
that the farm contract has been in force for at least three years,
2o) of any other serious and legitimate reason such as non-payment 
of farm rent or excessive and repeated delays in its payment unless due 
to causes beyond the farmer*s control, or activity of the farmer which 
would be detrimental to proper cultivation of the leased rural property 
or refusal by the farmsr to carry out those improvements on the land or 
those cultural practices recommended by the Provincial Joint Committee....
Article 10. In case of cancellation or non-renewal of the lease 
under the conditions provided for in the foregoing article, the pro­
prietor must give at least six months notice to the tenant farmer.
Reciprocally the same period of notice must be given by the tenant 
fanner who desires to cancel, or not to renew, his lease contract.
Article UpL. In case of sale of the land by the rural proprietor, 
the tenant farmer has, within the limits of allowable landholding as 
stipulated by Ordinance No. 21 cited above and subject to the conditions 
of Article 5 above, the right of pre-emption with respect to the rural 
land which he is cultivating.
If, however, he does not avail himself of this prerogative and the 
land is sold to a third party, the latter will be responsible for the
execution of the conditions of the contract, in place and instead of 
the former proprietor.
Article 12, The farming lease is not invalidated either by the 
death of the lessor or that of the lessee. The heirs of the two parties 
partake of the rights and obligations of the (original) principals.
Nevertheless, the lease is (considered as) cancelled without the 
necessity of notice if the lessee leaves no heirs, or if the parties 
at interest sign a written waiver of their holding rights with respect 
to the continuation of the lease.
Chapter 2.
Tenant Farm Rent■ m m w h m b m  m m h m  tmm—mmmmm
Article 13. The farm rental rate may not, in any case, be less 
than fifteen per cent (15%) nor more than twenty five per cent (25%) 
of the value of the annual harvest of the principal crop.
This rate is applicable only to the land itself and, where mutually 
agreed upon to fixed improvements such as : dwellings, fr-uit trees, fish­
ponds, etc.,..
If the proprietor supplies the farmer with seeds or fertilizers, 
these products are paid for by the farmer, after the harvest, at the 
actual purchase price plus an annual interest not to exceed twelve per 
cent (12%) •
When the proprietor leases cattle or farm implements to the farmer, 
the rental cannot exceed twelve per cent (12%) of the value of these 
animals or equipment. This value is determined by the Cantonal Joint 
Committee when the contract is drawn up.
Within the limits set forth in paragraph I of the present article, 
the farm rental rate, for each homogeneous crop area, is determined by 
a Decree of the Governmental Delegate for the Region based upon the 
successive recommendations of the District Joint Committee, of the 
Provincial Joint Committee and with the agreement of the Minister of 
Agriculture.
In no instance can the farmer be obliged to make any payments or 
provide any service either in kind, cash or in labor whatever its 
origin or form over and above the payment of the farm rental rate to 
the landowner.
Article lit. The farm rent is payable annually, either in cash 
or in commercial paddy, at the latest within the month following the 
end of the harvest in the province.
Rental payable in paddy must be delivered by the tenant farmer 
to a place previously agreed upon by the parties, which may not be
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located outside the limits of the province* When payment is stipu­
lated in money, the farmer may always discharge his obligation in 
paddy of honest and marketable quality, at the current rate for pay­
ment of farm rent.
Artiste te- The tenant fanner is not obligated to pay any rent 
if by accident or force majeure the harvest of the leased property 
should be at least two thirds destroyed.
Other risks are shared between the proprietor and the tenant 
farmer under conditions set forth in the contract.
Chapter 2.
Special rights and obligations of the tenant farmer.
Article 16. The tenant farmer shall have use of the leased lands 
under the conditions defined by this Ordinance, and in the manner 
specified by the contract agreed to mutually with the. rural proprietor. 
He is bound to use the rural rented property in the same manner as a 
good and responsible family head would do.
Article 17. The lights of fishing and grazing are'recognized 
as belonging to the tenant farmer within the area leased by him, subject 
however to conditions of the lease, and especially (subject to) the 
possible payment of certain charges or royalties.
Article 16. The tenant farmer is responsible for the upkeep of 
small dikes and other hydraulic works relating to the leased parcels 
of rice or agricultural lands.
He is also responsible for undertaking his contribution in work 
towards agricultural upkeep for the common benefit, and the proper 
maintenance of the leased land.
At the expiration of the lease, in case of non-renewal as well 
as in the case of cancellation, the departing tenant farmer may request 
just reimbursement for his work in improving the land, carried out with 
the previous written agreement of the proprietor.
Article 19. In no case has the tenant farmer to bear the costs 
of any land taxes, which devolve exclusively and entirely upon the 
rural proprietor.
Any contrary provision inserted in the rental contract will not 
be legally binding.
SECTION H I





There is established in each canton a joint committee charged 
with carrying out the preliminary study and investigations of cases 
submitted to the District Joint Committee,
The Cantonal Joint Committee is an advisory body but its opinion 
is in all cases obligatory.
Altlc^e 21
It is composed of *
The Chief of the Canton.......................... Chairman
Two rural landowners, not tenant
farmers, or their alternates .......... . Members
Two tenant farmers, not rural





There is established in the principal town of each district, a 
Joint Committee whose main responsibilities ares
- to make up a list of the land which for no valid reason has 
not been cultivated and to receive the explanations of the proprie­
tor or concessionaire prior to proposing either the return of the 
land to the regional private domain or the grant of the right of 
occupancy.
- to make up a list of the unoccupied State land which could be 
allocated as a concession,
- to investigate the applications for concessions of land in the 
private domain,
- to estimate annually the average yield of land by homogeneous 
crop area,
- to propose the tenant farming rental rate, by homogeneous crop 
area, within the limits set forth in the new article 13 cited above,
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- to appraise losses resulting from accident, crop failure and 
acts of God,
- to propose the maximum holding, by crop area, that a farmer may 
lease,
- to survey and appraise the land and its fixed improvements when 
a new contract is drawn up or a contract cancelled, if such survey and 
appraisal is indicated.
- to give its opinion on claims for damages in case of eviction 
of the tenant farmer,
- to arbitrate, in the first instance, conflicts and disputes 
arising out of the application of the terms of rural leases j the dispute 
is brought before the Provincial Joint Committee when not settled by 
the District Joint Committee.
Article 23
The District Joint Committee is composed of :
The Chief of district .......................  Chairman
Two rural landowners,
not tenant farmers, or
their alternates ........................ Members
Two tenant farmers, not 
rural landowners, or




There is created, in the principal town of each province, a 
Provincial Joint Committee responsible for giving its opinion on the 
District Joint Committee proposals particularly with reference to :
- the return to the private domain of the land which for no valid 
reason has not been cultivated, or the granting of the right of occu­
pancy,
- the survey and appraisal of unoccupied State land which could 
be allocated as a concession,
- the applications for concessions of private domain land,
- the annual estimate of the average yield of land, by homogeneous 
crop area,
m
- the fixing of the tenant fanning rental rate by homogeneous 
crop area, within the limits set forth in the new article 13 cited 
above.
- Estimating losses sustained as a result of crop failure, 
accident or act of God.
- Determining the maximum holding, by crop area, that a tenant 
farmer may lease,
- claims for damages in case of eviction of the tenant farmer,
- the classification of lands by homogeneous crop areas,
In addition, the Provincial Joint Committee makes recommendations 
on land improvement measures and cultivation techniques.
It encourages the setting up of agricultural syndicates, associa­
tions or co-operative societies as a one way of lowering the cost 
price and of increasing the quantity and quality of agricultural pro­
duction.
It studies and proposes to the Chief of province measures for 
implementing agrarian reform.
The Provincial Joint Committee convenes as an Appeal and Adjust­
ment Committee to settle, in the second instance, conflicts and 
disputes arising out of the application of the terms of rural leases; 
the dispute is brought before the civil court with territorial juris­
diction when not settled by the Provincial Joint Conmittee.
The conciliation procedure is compulsory prior to any judicial 
process.
Article 25
The Provincial Joint Committee is composed of
The Chief of province or his 
delegate .......... . Chairman
Five rural landowners, not
tenant fanners, or their 
alternates Members
Five tenant farmers, not
rural landowners, or their 
alternates....... ...... Members




Provisions common to the Provincial. District and Cantonal
Joint Committees
Article 26
The members of the Provincial, District and Cantonal Joint 
Committees are nominated as follows s
Every two years, the Communal (village) Councils will prepare a 
list of the rural landowners and a list of the tenant farmers on their 
villages. Each category of persons listed elects five delegates to 
represent them on the joint committees.
The lists of landowners and tenant farmers elected are then 
successively pooled
- for each canton,
- for each district,
- for each province.
A committee composed of :
The Chief of Province or his deputy................. Chairman
The Chief Justice or a judge
of the provincial Court........................ Member
The Administrative Delegate of the
principal town of the province  ............... Member
draws by lot the names of the listed landowners and tenant farmers who 
will be members or alternates of the Canton, District or Province 
Joint Committees.
The Terra of the joint committee members and their alternates is
for two years and is not immediately renewable.
No one can be a member of two Joint Committees at one time.
The duly constituted Joint Committee must be convened by the 
Chairman and meet at least four times a year, once every quarter.
A Quorum of the Provincial Joint Committee is constituted by at 
least seven of its members, including its chairman. A Quorum of the 
district or cantonal joint committees is constituted by at least three 
of its members, including its chairman.
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The decisions of the Joint Committees are taken by a simple 
majority of their members, present ana voting*
The parties to the dispute may challenge one or several members 
of the Joint C omit tee. The chairman replaces the challenged members 
by nominating one or several alternates in the order in which their 
names were drawn by lot.
Recourse to the Joint Committee is entirely free of charge.
SECTION IV
Penalties ana miscellaneous provisions
Article 27
For purpose of applying the foregoing provisions, tne following 
units of measure are the only one’s recognized:
- For measurement of area:
(the Hectare (mau tay: 10,000m2 
(tne Are (cong) l,000m2 
(the Centiare:. 100m2
- For measurement of volume: (the Gia of ij.0 litres
(the Thung or Tsao of 20 litres
- For measurement of weight: 
Article 28
(the Ton: 1,000 kilograms 
(the Quintal: 100 kilograms 
(the Kilogram: 1,000 grams
Effective as of the date of its promulgation, the provisions of 
the present Ordinance legally apply to all outstanding verbal and 
written tenant faim contracts and cannot, in any case, constitute 
a basis for cancellation or nonrenewal of the said contracts.
Within six months from the date of promulgation of the present 
Ordinance all outstanding verbal tenant farm contracts must be reduced' 
to written contracts.
At the end of this six months period, any verbal tenant farm 
contract will be null and void without prejudice to the application 
of the provisions set forth in paragraphs £, 6, 7 and 8 of the present 
article.
Effective as of the date of the promulgation of the present 
Ordinance, all provisions of current tenant faim contracts must be 
made to conform with this Ordinance and must be therefore amended 
by an additional contract.
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Any rural landowner who enters into a verbal tenant farm con­
tract or who demands or receives from the tenant farmer, over and 
above the yearly tenant farm rental ana such payments as may be pro­
vided for under paragraphs 3 ana U of article 13 (new) above; any 
payment or any service whether in kind, in money or in labor for any 
reason or in any form whatsoever, or who without valid reason forbids 
or prevents, the exploiting of any leased rural property is liable 
to a fine of from One hundred piasters (100$00) to twenty thousand 
piasters (20,000$00) independentJy of any damages to the injured party.
In addition he is liable to a sentence of eleven (11) days to 
three (3) months imprisonment.
Moreover, in case of second offence, a sentence of three (3) 
months to a year imprisonment is mandatory.
These penalties are without prejudice to the application of the 
heavier penalties which may be provided for under criminal law.
Any tenant farmer who enters into a verbal tenant farm contract 
with a rural landowner or who, over and above the yearly tenant farm 
rental rate and such payments as may be provided for under paragraphs 
3 and h of article 13 (new) above; proposes to provide to the latter 
any payment or any service, whether in kind, in money or in labor, for 
any reason or in any form whatsoever or who without a legitimate reason 
abandons or stops the exploitation of any leased rural property, is 
liable to fine, imprisonment and damages as provided for in paragraphs 
5, 6, 7 and 8 of the present article*
Any member of the Communal Council who, at the time the tenant 
farm contract is registered demands or receives from the landowner or 
the tenant farmer, any payment or any service whether in kind, in monqy 
or in labor, for whatever reason or in any form whatsoever is liable 
to the penalties provided for extortion.
Extenuating circumstances and the suspension of penalties may 
be invoked for infringements of the law set forth in paragraph £, 9 
and 10 of the present article.
Article 29
All previous provisions in conflict with the present Ordinance, 
are superceded.
Article 33
The President of the Government, the Minister of the Interior, 
the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Agriculture and the Delegates 
of the Government (Regional Governors) in each Region are charged,
each as he may be concerned, with the responsibility for carrying out 
the present Ordinance*
Signed in Saigon on January 8,
On the Authority of HIS MAJESTX 
CHIEF OF STATE,.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
ORDINANCE No. 7 of February 5* 1955
HIS MAJESTY BAO-DAI, CHIEF OF STATE,
DECREES;
ARTICLE _I.- Witnin tne framework of the Government policy of 
national recovery, the purpose of tne present ordinance is to encourage 
an immediate large scale recultivation of unexploited agricultural land 
and rice-fields belonging to both private individuals and to juridical 
persons.
For the purposes of the present ordinance, unexploited land or 
rice-fields are defined as land or rice-fields not having been cultivated 
during the past crop year.
ARTICLE II.- Until the joint committees, provided for under 
Ordinance No. 2 of January 8j 1955* are in a position to discharge their 
functions, the communal councils are charged with the responsibility, 
within a month from the date of promulgation of this ordinance, of pre­
paring as indicated on the attached form, a list of the agricultural 
land or rice-fields which were not cultivated during the last agri­
cultural season. This provision applies both to land belonging to 
private individuals or to juridical persons and to public land belonging 
to the Regional, Provincial or Communal private domain.
Four copies of the lists of uncultivated land or rice-fields will 
be forwarded not later than March 15, 1955* to the District Chief who 
will keep one. The other three copies will be sent through the usual 
administrative channels respectively to the Chief of province, the Mini­
ster of Agriculture and the Commissioner General for Refugees.
PROCEDURE FOR LAND OR RICE-FIELDS BELONGING 
TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OR JURIDICAL PERSONS
ARTICLE III.- Within thirty (30) days from the date of promul­
gation of this ordinance, all rural landowners must make known to the 
communal council of the place where their holdings are located, their 
present address and their intention to cultivate their agricultural land 
or rice-fields for the next agricultural season. If these formalities 
have not been complied within this time limit, the landowner will be 
considered as absent.
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lo - Concerning the landowner who is present:
ARTICLE IV,- When the landowner is present, that is to say, when 
he or his legal heirs have complied with tne formalities set forth in 
article III cited above, he may agree to cultivate with his own labor 
his land and/or rice-fielas during the next crop season or to have them 
cultivated by a farmer of his choice.
If he chooses to lease his rice-fields and lands, both parties to 
the contract may choose between the model contract Type A appended to 
Ordinance No, 2 of January 8, 19E>5 or the contract Type B appended to 
this Ordinance, In the first instance, the landowner must pay all the 
land taxes 5 in the second instance he is exempted from them under the 
conditions outlined in this ordinance.
2o - Concerning the absent landowner:
ARTICLE V.- When the landowner is absent or is unwilling to bind 
himself to cultivate his land or rice-field during the next crop year, 
these land or rice-fields can be allocated for a period of three (3) 
years to the following persons:
1) tenant farmers who have previously cultivated this land,
2) refugees,
3) legal heirs of soldiers and civilians who died on the field 
of honor,
if.) war veterans,
S>) anyone who desires to cultivate a rice-field or a plot of 
agricultural land with his own family labor
ARTICLE VI,- Anyone in categories 1, 3, H and 5> enumerated in 
article V above, who desires to benefit by tne provisions of this 
Ordinance should register at tne communal hall of the place where the 
lands or rice-fields are located not later than March 1£, 19J?5,
The communal council will study these requests for land and will 
make up the list of persons to whom the land is to be allocated. This
list must be publicly posted in the communal hall for ten (10) days,
and at the end of this period, if no objection has been registered, it 
becomes final.
Any objections raised within this period of time are brought be­
fore the District Joint Committee which wili. make the final decision.
The District Joint Committee wiji also render the final decision 
on all other disputes arising out of the application of this Ordi­
nance,
ARTICLE VII.- A list of land or rice-fields which have not been 
allocated pursuant to article VI above will be sent at once to the 
Commissioner General for Refugees by the Communal Council through the 
usual official channels.
The list of refugees to whom this available land is to be allo­
cated, will be sent through the same channels to the village concerned, 
by the Commissioner General for Refugees.
ARTICLE VIII.- Notification of the fact that his land is occupied 
will be made to the landowner through official channels.
ARTICLE IX.- The area of rice-fields or land to, be allocated to 
each occupant is limited to that wnich can be cultivated by a farmer 
and his family* This area may vary depending upon local conditions in 
the village or in the homogeneous crop area.
ARTICLE X.- The right to occupy the land for three (3) years is 
granted under the following conditions:
The President of the Communal Council or his representative, acting 
on behalf of the Communal Council, w i n  sign a written contract of the 
Type C appended to this Ordinance, with the occupant who has been designated 
in accordance with the procedures set forth in articles VI or VII above.
For this three year period, the allocated land or rice-field is 
exempted from all land taxes.
The first year the tenant pays no farm rental. For the second and 
third year he will pay respectively one-half and three-fourths of the 
faim rental rate as fixed in accordance with the provisions of article 
XIII of Ordinance No. 20 dated June U, 1953 as amended by Ordinance No.
2 dated January 8, 1955.
ARTICLE XI.- The Government is responsible to the absent landowner 
or his legal heirs for the rent. This rent will be deposited in the 
Provincial Agricultural Credit Bank or if there is none, in a special 
account set up for that purpose in the Treasury.
ARTICLE XII.- If the lanaowner is still absent at the end of 
the initial"three years period, the contract will be renewed for a period 
of five years in accordance with the provisions of Ordinance No. 20 of
June U, 1953, as amended by the Ordinance No. 2 of January 8, 19^5, and
all land taxes will be due under this new contract.\
The Communal Council is still required to deposit the amount of 
the rental in the Provincial Agricultural Credit Bank or in Treasury 
after deduction of all land taxes.
ARTICLE XIII.- If the landowner returns and complies with the
provisions of article III above, he is required to carry out the teims
of the current contract in his own behalf.
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ARTICLE XIV.- In case of sale or transfer of the land, the 
occupant will have the right of pre-emption as provided for in Ordi­
nance No* 20 of June U, 1953* as amended by Ordinance No. 2 of January 
8, 19&.
The new l a m  owner is required to comply with the provisions of 
the current contract in place of the former landowner.
PROCEDURE FOR PUBLIC LAND OR RICE-FIELDS BELONGING TO
THE REGIONAL. PROVINCIAL OR COMMUNAL DOMAIN
ARTICLE XV.- The right of occupancy may also be granted for 
unexploited land or rice-fields belonging to the regional, provincial 
or communal domain which were once cultivated or which are suitable 
for cultivation.
The lists of those to whom land will be allocated are prepared 
according to the provisions of Articles VI and VII of this Ordinance.
The right of occupancy on land belonging to the regional or 
provincial domain is granted, by the Chief of Procince acting with the 
special authority conferred on him by this Ordinance.
The right of occupancy is granted by the Communal Council on 
land belonging to the village or to which it has the right of usufruct.
A farm lease contract Type C is drawn up according to the pro­
visions in Article X above.
PENALTIES
ARTICLE XVI.- Any landowner who, after agreeing to cultivate 
his unexploited land or to have it cultivated, fails to do so without 
a good and sufficient reason is liable to a fine as provided for in 
Ordinance No. 2 of January 8, 19f>5.
Any landowner who, without a good and sufficient reason, refuses 
to permit or tries to prevent the cultivation of the rural property 
which has been allocated under the provisions of the present Ordinance, 
is liable to fine, imprisonment and damages as provided for in Ordinance 
No. 2 of January 8, 195&*
In both the cases cited above, the landowner must then be consid­
ered as absent.
ARTICLE XVII.- Any person enjoying the right of occupancy under 
this Ordinance and who, after having signed the farm lease contract, 
either does not pay the rent when it is due or who does not cultivate 
his land or abandons its cultivation without a good and sufficient reason, 
forfeits his right of occupancy and is not entitled to claim any further 
benefits under the present Ordinance.
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
ARTICLE XVIII,- Any land, which on December 31, 1955 has been 
allocated but not occupied, will legally revert to its owner for what­
ever disposition he may wish to make*
ARTICLE XIX.- The provisions of this Ordinance may be made appli­
cable for the year 1956 by a Presidential decree, setting forth new 
procedures for its implementation particularly with reference to time 
limits*
In any event, however the rights and obligations resulting from 
the application of this Ordinance will not be affected*
ARTICLE XX*- Ordinance No* 22 of June R, 1953# determining the 
procedures for the right of usufruct of agricultural land and rice-fields 
is annuled.
ARTICLE XXI*- The President of the Government, the Minister of 
Agriculture, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the 
Delegates of the Government in each Region (Regional Governors), and 
the Commissioner General for Refugees are charged, each as he may be 
concerned, with the responsibility for carrying out this Ordinance*
Signed in Saigon on February 5, 1955 
On the Authority of HIS MAJESTY 
CHIEF OF STATE,




SPECIMEN FARM LEASE CONTRACT
(Ordinance No* 2 of January 8, 19$$, 
and Amendment No* 6 of February $, 195$)
Between the undersigned;
Mr* X  ................. rural landowner, domiciled at •••*.••
• •*•..............  on the one hand;
and Mr* Y*.* . . . . . . farmer, domiciled at  ...... ***.*•
. *.......... •••••*. on the other hand,
it has been, by mutual consent, decided and agreed as follows;
PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT
ARTICLE 1 - Mr* X * •••*••• lessor, leases to Mr* Y .......*
lessee, who accepts, a lot of *.......... parcels of rice-field or
agricultural land covering a total area of •••»••••••*••• hectares*
LOCATION
ARTICLE 2 - This area of rice-field or agricultural land is located at
the village of  ... *.......... ...
Canton of••.••*.•••••..•••..••••*••
District of*.*............. *.....
Province of...... *...... .
and delineated as follows;
1 t t t i *
•Order* Land Registry 'Area' B O U N D A R I E S  * Remarks ti t




i t » * i






t 1 t t t i i i *
t t t t i t t t t
t i i t t t i t t
DURATION OF LEASE
ARTICLE 3 - 
ginning
The duration of the present of lease is
At the expiration of this period, the lease will be renewable 
by tacit agreement for the same length of time*
^At least $ years
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ARTICLE h - The lessor does not have the right to cancel the farm lease
or refuse" to renew it unless, he can offer proof:
lo) that he wishes to take back the rural property in order to 
cultivate it himself or have it cultivated by one or several 
of his lineal descendants who have completed their eighteenth 
year and who are capable of ensuring the efficient exploitat­
ion of the farm, and provided that the farm lease has been 
in force for at least three years,
2o) of a serious and legitimate reason such as non-payment of
excessive and repeated delays in the payment of the farm 
rental unless the non-payment and the delays are due to 
circumstances beyond the farmer's control,
- or of any action of the lessee which could be detri­
mental to the currently efficient exploitation of the 
leased property;
- or of the refusal on the part of the lessee to carry 
out those improvements on the land and those agri­
cultural practices recommended by the provincial 
Joint Committee*
The lessee must be notified at least six months in advance of the 
lessor's intentions to cancel or not to renew the farm lease*
ARTICLE £ - When the lease is cancelled or not renewed, the lessee may 
claim indemnification from the lessor for improvements on the land 
(buildings, constructions and fixed installations, perennial planting 
and other land and agricultural improvements whose effect would continue 
after the expiration of the contract), provided that the lessee has 
received the prior approval of the lessor, or if the latter has refused 
his approval, that the lessee has been authorized by the Provincial 
Joint Committee*
ARTICLE 6 - The annual rental rate has-been fixed by the Joint Committee 
at •'•••.7. ..•% of the main annual crop2 valued at •••••• gia (or kilos)
of paddy per hectare*
However, the lessor and the lessee, in consideration of the parti­
cular characteristics of the rice-fields or land, have agreed to reduce 
this rental rate to • • • • * . of the main annual crop (optional clause)’
2The rental rate is fixed by the Joint Committee at from 1%% to 
2 %  of the main annual harvest of the principal crop*
^The lessor and the lessee may agree on a rental rate less than 
that fixed by the joint Committee but are forbidden to agree upon a 
higher price*
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On this basis the annual rental is gias...» (or kilos) of paddy.
The lessee binds himself to pay this rental during the month 
following the end of the main harvest in the districts
- either by delivering to the lessor at the village of
the.*,.,, gias or kilos of dry commercial 
paddy due,
- or by paying to the lessor an amount in cash equivalent 
to the value of the gias (or kilos) of paddy
due, based on the price of paddy on the day and at the 
place of payment.
RENTING OF AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS AND
LIVESTOCK (optional)
ARTICLE 7 - The lessor places at the disposal of the lessee the follow­
ing agricultural implements:
-  ........... ••«•••.. value: $
and the following animals:
- ...»..................  value: $
The annual rental for these agricultural implements and livestock
is fixed a t .......   piasters (..«..... *•••$) representing.......
of their value. This charge is payable at the same time as the annual 
rental either in kind or in currency in accordance with the provisions 
set forth in article 6.
SEED AND FERTILIZER LOANS (optional)
ARTICLE 8 - The lessor furnishes to the lessee
- •••• gia (or kilos) of ...... seed, value:  ........ ••..••$
- kg of ••••••••••.•••..fertilizer, value: •••.•••••••••$
The lessee must repay to the lessor, the value of these advances 
plus an annual interest fixed at •••••••••«••.. piasters.h
These advances plus interest must be repaid at the same time as 
the annual rental, either in kind or in currency in accordance with 
the provisions set forth in article 6.
kjf the place of delivery is not the locality where the crops 
harvested the transportation charges are the responsibility of the 
lessor.
'’Not to exceed 12%,
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DWELLING, FRUIT TREES, FISH PONDS 
(optional)




within the area of the leased rural property.
ARTICLE 10 - In no instance can the farmer be obliged to make any payments
to the lessor or to provide any service either in kind, currency or 
labor, for any reason or in any form whatsoever, over and above the pay­
ment of the farm rental and those liabilities and obligations cited 
above or in article lU below*
SHARING OF RISKS
ARTICLE 3.1 - In case at least one third (1/3) of the harvest is destroyed 
accidently or .by an act of God, the lessee will pay only two thirds (2/3) 
of the annual rental*
In case at least two thirds (2/3) of the harvest is destroyed
accidently or by an act of God, the lessee is not obliged to pay any
annual rental*
ARTICLE 12 - In case of disaster or theft the lessee is only responsible
for the result of serious negligence or fraud on his part*
MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
ARTICLE 13 - The lessee binds himself not to transfer his right under the 
present lease, or to sublet in whole or in part the lot of rice-field or 
agricultural land which is the object of the present contract*
ARTICLE lU - The lessee is responsible for the upkeep of small dikes, 
b6undary“Tines and other installations on the said lot*
ARTICLE 1$ - The lessee has ihe rights of fishing and grazing on the leased 
area,
ARTICLE 16 - m  case of sale of the leased rice-fields or agricultural 
land, thelesaee will have the right of pre-emption*
ARTICLE 17 “ The present contract is drawn up in three (3) copies, the
first due to be held by the lessor, the second by the lessee and the
third deposited in the archives of the village of  .....
after registration*
^Village where the leased rice-fields and lands are located*
Done at on the m
The Lessor The Lessee
Registered at the Communal Council of 
the village of ••»••«••••••.
under No «.•••••••• on the •«••••••••<
The PRESIDENT of COMMUNAL COUNCIL 
(Signature and seal)
NOTE* The clauses provided for in article 7, 8 and 9 of the present 
contract are optional. The lessor is not obliged toj
- rent to the lessee agricultural implements or livestock;
- lend him seed or fertilizer;
- grant him the use of dwellings, fruits-trees, fish-ponds 
within the area of the lease lot.
Reciprocally, the lessee is not obliged to rent from the lessor 
agricultural implements and livestock, nor to buy from him seed or 
fertilizer, nor to accept the usage of dwellings, fruit-trees or fish­
ponds.
But provided that the lessor and the lessee have agreed on the 
supply of these loans or advances, these must be made in accordance with 
.the stipulations set forth in articles 7, 8 and 9 of the model contract.
koo
TYPE B
FARM LEASE CONTRACT 
for the recultivation of unexploited 
rice-fields or land 
(Ordinance No* 7 of February 5* 1955)
To be used when the landowner is present
Between the undersigned:
Mr* X.........•••••• rural landowner, domiciled at •••••••.•••*••«
•••«*...•«••*••*•«•«•.••«• on the one hand,
and MT. Y *••••••••* farmer, domiciled at  .....
on the other hand,
it has been, by mutual consent, decided and agreed as follows;
PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT
ARTICLE 1 - Hr* X •••.••.••••.•**•••••. Lessor, leases to Hr* Y 
lessee, who accepts a lot of parcels of rice-fields or agri­
cultural land covering a total area of *•*•«•••••••• hectares*
LOCATION





and delineated as follows:
 I 1- - - - - - - - - - f- - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r
i Order* land Regjatry’Area’ B O U N D A R I E S  * Remarks »
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*No* » No* » f* North ’South ’East ’West » Reference) *
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DURATION OF LEASE
ARTICLE 3 - The duration of the present lease is three (3) years, beginning 
••••*•••»•••.•*•.•••«••..and ending «*«******..*.....
koi
At the expiration of this three years period, the lease will be 
renewable for a further fire (*>) years period.
The renewed Haase will be drawn up in accordance with the farm 
lease contract, type A, appended to Ordinance No* 2 of January 8, 1955*
The lessor does not have the right to refuse to renew the lease, 
unless.he can offer proof that he wishes to take back the rural property 
in order to cultivate it himself or have it cultivated by one or several 
of his lineal descendants who have completed their eighteenth year and 
who are capable of ensuring the efficient exploitation of the farm.
The lease must be notified at least six months in advance of the 
lessor*s intentions not to renew the farm lease*
ARTICLE U - Hie lessor does not have the right to cancel the farm lease 
unless he can offer proof:
- of a serious and legitimate reason such as non-payment or excessive 
and repeated delays in the payment of the farm rental unless the 
non-payment and the delays are due to circumstances beyond the 
fanner1 s control;
- or of any action by the lessee which could be detrimental to the 
currently efficient exploitation of the leased property;
- or of the refusal on the part of the lessee to carry out those 
improvements on the Hand and those agricultural practices recom­
mended by the provincial joint Committee.
Hie lessee must be notified at least six months in advance of the 
lessorfs intentions to cancel the farm lease*
ARTICLE 5> - When the lease is cancelled or not renewed, the lessee may 
claim incTeranification from the lessor for improvements on the land 
(buildings, constructions and fixed installations, perrenial plantings 
and other land and agricultural improvements whose effect would continue 
after the expiration of the contract), provided that the leasee has 
received the prior approval of the lessor, or if the latter has refused 
his approval, that the lessee has been authorised by the Provincial 
Joint Committee*
RENTAL
ARTICLE 6 - The annual rental rate has been fixed by the Joint Committee
at *.,*.7.*....% of the main annual crop valued at gia
(or kilos) of paddy per hectare*
■̂•The rental rate is fixed by the Joint Committee at from 15% to 
25% of the main annual harvest of the principal crop.
t a
However, the lessor arid the lessee, in consideration of the parti­
cular characteristics of the rice-fields or land, have agreed to reduce „ 
this rental rate to «.......% of the main annual crop (optional clause)*
On this basis, the annual rental is ••.*•••• gia (or kilos) of paddy*
©ie lessee binds himself to pay this rental during the month follow­
ing the end of the main harvest in the district:
- either by delivering to the lessor at the village of ..... 
the •••••••* gia (or kilos) of dry commercial paddy due,
- or by paying to the lessor the amount in cash equivalent to the 
value of the »•••*.. gia (or kilos) of paddy due, at the price of 
paddy on the day and at the place of payment*
However, during the first year of the present lease, the lessee is 
exempted from paying the annual rental*
During the second year, he will pay to the lessor only one-half (1/2) 
of the total annual rental*
During the third year, he will pay to the lessor only three-fourths 
(3/U) of the total annual rental*
RENTING OF AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS AND LIVESTOCK
(optional)
ARTICLE 7 •• The lessor places at the disposal of the lessee the following 
agricultural implements:
- *•«•••«•••*.o.......***...* value ••••••••••••«•$
and the following animals:
-  ........ *.... value •••••.•••*.•««$
The annual rental for these agricultural implements and livestock is 
fixed at ••••••*•••• piasters representing *••«...•••£** of their value*
This charge is payable at the same time as the annual rental either 
in kind or in currency in accordance with the provisions set forth in 
article 6*
^The lessor and the lessee may agree upon a farm rental rate less 
than that, fixed by the Joint Committee but are forbidden to agree upon a 
higher rate*
^If the place of delivery is different from the locality where 
the crop is harvested, the transportation charges are the responsibility 
of the lessor*
^Not to exceed 12^*
h03
SEED AMD FERTILIZER LOANS (optional)
ARTICLE 8 - The lessor furnishes to the lessee*
- *.••*««•• gia or kilos of • •..... . seed, value* ••••••••••$
- ,..... • • kg of *•••••*••• fertiliser, value*..............$
The lessee must repay to the lessor, the value of these advances 
plus ansmual interest fixed at? «•••••••.*•• piasters*
These advances plus interest must be repaid at the same time as 
the annual rental, either in kind or in currency in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in article 6*
DWELLINGS, FRUIT-TREES, FISH-PONDS 
--------- — (op^onal) ----------




within the area of the leased rural property*
ARTICLE 10 - In no instance can the farmer be obliged to make any pay­
ments to"~£he lessor or to provide any service either in kind, currency 
or labor, for any reason or in any form whatsoever, over and above the 
payment of the farm rental and those liabilities and obligations cited 
above or in article lU below*
SHARING OF RISKS
ARTICLE 11 - In case at least one third (1/3) of the harvest is ruined
accidently or by an act of God, the lessee pays only two thirds (2/3)
of the annual rental*
In case at least two thirds (2/3) of the harvest is ruined accidently 
or by an act of God, the lessee 1b not obliged to pay any annual rental*
ARTICLE 12 - m  case of disaster or theft the lessee is only responsible
for the result of serious negligence or fraud on his part,
MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATION
ARTICLE 13 - The lessee binds himself not to transfer his rights under 
the present lease, or to sublet in whole or in part the lot of rice- 
field or agricultural land which is the object of the present contract*
-*Not to exceed 12£*
UcU
ARTICLE IU - The lessee is responsible for the upkeep of small dikes, 
boundary~Tines and other installations on the said lot*
ARTICLE 15 - The lessee has the rights of shing and grazing on the leased 
area*
ARTICLE 16 - In case of sale of the leased rice-fields or agricultural 
land, thinessee will have the right of pre-emption.
ARTICLE 1*7 - The present contract is drawn up in three (3) copies, the 
first one to be held by the lessor, the second by the lessee and the ^
third deposited on the archives of the village of  ...... .........
after registration*
Done at     on the ••»*...•
The Lessor The Lessee
Registered at the Communal Council of 
the village of
under No*  .........on the ••••••
The PRESIDENT of COMMUNAL COUNCIL 
(Signature and seal)
NOTE: The clauses provided for in article 7, 8 and 9 of the present
contract are optional* The lessor is not obliged to:
- rent to the lessee agricultural implements or livestock;
- lend him seed or fertilizer;
- grant him the use of dwellings, fruit-trees, fish-ponds within 
the area of the leased lot*
Reciprocally, the lessee is not obliged to rent from the lessor 
agricultural implements and livestock, nor to buy from him seed or 
fertilizer, nor to accept -Hie usage of dwellings, fruit-trees or fish-ponds.
But provided that the lessor and the lessee have agreed on the 
supply of these allowances, these must be made in accordance with the 
stipulations set forth in articles 7, 8 and 9 of the model contract*
^Tillage where the leased rice-fields and land are located
FARM LEASE CONTRACT x
for the recultivation of unexploited
rice-fields or land
(Ordinance No* 7 of February 5, 19$$)
To be used when the landowner is absent
Between the undersigned:
Mr. X ..............representative of the Communal Council of
the village of *............ province of ................ acting on
behalf of Mr. T  .... . rural landowner in the said village, absent,
on the one hand,
and Mr. 2 farmer, domiciled at the village of •••••
........... on the other hand,
it has been, by mutual consent, decided and agreed as follows:
PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT
ARTICLE 1 - Mr. X Representative of the Communal Council,
leases to Mr. T ••••••••••• lessee who accepts, a lot of ...••••• parcels
of rice-fields or agricultural land covering a total area of 
hectares.
LOCATION
ARTICLE 2 - This area of rice-fields or agricultural land is located at
the village of ........... .
Canton of
District of  ......... •••••
Province of ...........««.....
and delineated as follows:
1 i t t t
•Order Land Registry »Area» B O U N D A R I E S  * Remarks f
» No.i No. 1 ’North ’South »East » * • *
•West »t * (Land Survey * Reference) *
i T 1' » » t t t
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DURATION OF LEASE
ARTICLE 3̂ - The duration of the present lease is three years, beginning 
 ....7......and ending
UC6
At the expiration of this three year period, the lease will be 
renewable for a further five (5>) year period*
- either by the representative of the communal Council if the 
landowner is still absent,
- or by the landowner himself, if after having made presence known, 
he expresses the desire to take over the lease in his own name.
The lease thus renewed, either by the village representative or by 
the landowner himself, will be a farm lease contract drawn up in accordance 
with the provisions of Ordinance No* 2 of January 8, 1955*
The returned landowner has no right to refuse to renew the lease 
unless he can offer proof that he wishes to take back the rural property 
in order to cultivate it himself or have it cultivated by one or several 
of his lineal descendants who have completed their eighteenth year and 
who are capable of ensuring the efficient exploitation of the farm*
The lessee must be notified at least six months in advance of the 
returned landowner*s intentions not to renew the farm lease*
ARTICLE U - The representative of the Communal Council will have the right 
to cancel the present lease for a serious and legitimate reason such as 
non-payment or excessive and repeated delays in the payment of the farm 
rental unless the non-payment and the delays are due to circumstances 
beyond the farmer*s control,
- or any action by the lessee which could be detrimental to the 
currently efficient exploitation of the leased property;
- or the refusal on the part of the lessee to carry out those 
improvements on the land and those agricultural practices re­
commended by the provincial Joint Committee*
The representative of the Communal Council must give the lessee at 
least six months advance notice of the decision to cancel the lease*
ARTICLE $ - When the lease is cancelled or not renewed, the lessee nay 
claim indemnification from the representative of the Communal Council 
for improvements on the land (buildings, constructions and fixed installa­
tions, perennial planting on other land and agricultural improvements) 
whose effect would continue after the expiration of the contract, provided 
that the lessee has received the prior approval of the representative of 
the Communal Council, or if the latter has refused his approval, that 
the lessee has been authorized by the Provincial joint Committee*
The amount of indemnification will be deducted from the rental 
deposited by the representative of the Communal Council to the account 
of the lessor in the Agricultural Credit Bank or in the Treasury*
U07
RENTAL
ARTICLE 6 - The annual rental rate has been fixed by the Joint Committee 
at ♦V."* *7*.*•••• of the main annual crop valued at ••••••*.* gia (or
kilob ) of paddy per hectare*
However, the representative of the Communal Council and the leasee, 
in consideration of the particular characteristics of the rice-fields or 
land, with the approval of the Communal Council, have agreed to reduce this 
rental rate to ••••••.«»*^ of the main annual crop (optional clause).
Calculated on this basis, the annual rental rate is ••••••• gia (or
kilos) of paddy*
The lessee binds himself to pay this rental within the month follow­
ing the end of the main harvest in the districts
- either !y delivering to the village the •••••»•• gia (or kilos) 
of dry commercial paddy,
- or by paying to the lessor an amount in cash equivalent to the 
value of the ..*•»• ..*• gia (or kilos) of paddy due, based on price 
of paddy on the day and at the place of payment*
However, during the first year of the present lease, the lessee is 
exempted from paying any rental*
During the second year, he will pay to the village only one-half (1/2) 
of the total annual rental*
During the third year, he will pay to the village only three-fourths 
(3/U) of the total annual rental*
DWELLINGS, FRUIT-TREES, FISH-PONDS 




. -v.within the area of the leased rural property
^The rental rate has been fixed at from 1$% to 2$% of the main 
annual harvest of the principal*
2The representative of the Communal Council and the lessee, with 
the approval of the Communal Council, have the right to agree upon a lower 
rental rate than the one fixed by the Joint Committee, but they are pro­
hibited from agreeing on a higher one*
2jQ8
ARTICLE 8 - Over and above the annual rental and the obligations outlined 
in ariicTe 12 below, the lessee is not liable for any payment or any ser­
vice either in kind, cash or labor, for any reason or in any form whatso­
ever.
SHARING OF RISKS
ARTICLE 9 - In case of at least one third (1/3) of the harvest is destroyed 
accidentally or by an act of God, the lessee pays only two thirds (2/3) of 
the rental for which he is obligated under article 6 of the present contract.
In case at least two thirds (2/3) of the harvest is destroyed 
accidentally or by an act of God, the lessee is not obliged to pay any 
annual rental.
ARTICLE 10 - In case of disaster or theft the lessee is only responsible 
for the result of serious negligence or fraud on his part.
MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
ARTICLE 11 - The lessee binds himself not to transfer his rights under 
the present lease, or to sublet in whole or in part the lot of rice-field 
or agricultural land which is the object of this lease.
ARTICLE 12 <• The lessee is responsible for the upkeep of small dikes, 
foundaiy’Tines and other installations on the said lot.
ARTICLE 13 - The lessee has the rights of fishing and grazing on the leased 
area.
s'ARTICLE lh - In case of sale of the leased rice-fields or agricultural 
land, theses see will have the right of pre-emption.
ARTICLE 1$ - The present contract is drawn up in two copies, the first one 
to be heTcT by. the lessee and the second deposited in the archives of the 
village after registration.
Done at on the
The Representative of The Lessee,
the Communal council,
Registered at the Communal Council of
the village of •••••....... ...... .
under N o . .......  on the •••••••




DEFINITIONS OF QUALITIES OF RICE ESTABLISHED BY THE SYNDICATE OF
FRENCH EXPORTERS OF INDOCHINA
1* 'White Rice Choice Quality - whole round grains with 10 to 15 percent 
brokens*
This rice must be fully milled* It must contain not more than 10 
percent long grains, taking into account only the whole kernels. The 
rice must present a very homogeneous appearance*
2. White Rice of Choice Quality - whole long grains with 10 to 15 
percent brokens;
This rice must be fully milled. It must not contain more than 10 
percent round grains, taking into account only the whole kernels.
The rice must present a homogeneous appearance*
3* White Rice No* 1 Long Ordinary Quality, 10, 15 or 20 percent brokens*
This rice is not milled as fully as the choice qualities* It is 
composed of at least 60 percent of long grains taking into account 
only the whole kernels. It represents an appearance definitely 
less homogeneous than the choice qualities.
1*. White Rice No. 1 Round Ordinary Quality, 10, 15 or 20 percent brokens*
This rice is not milled as fully as the choice qualities* It is 
composed of at least 60 percent round grains taking into account 
only the whole kernels* It represents an appearance definitely 
less homogeneous than the choice qualities*
5* White Rice No* 1 Ordinary Quality, 10, 15 or 20 percent brokens*
This rice is not as fully milled as the long or round ordinary 
quality. It may contain grains of all shapes and length*
6* White Rice No. 2 Reunion Quality, 25 to 1*0 percent brokens:
This rice is not as fully milled as that of No. 1 ordinary quality.
It may include an unlimited percentage of yellow and/or tinted 
grains, and may contain grains of all shapes.
7* White Rice No. 2 Japan Quality 1*0 percent brokens*
This rice is definitely not as white as Rice of No. 1 Ordinary 
Quality* Its milling is less complete than that of the Reunion 
Quality. It may include grains of all shapes and contain up to 
5 percent grains with red streaks*
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8* White Rice No. 2 Java Quality, $0 to 55 percent brokens:
This rice, definitely less milled than that of No. 2 Japan Quality, 
may include grains of all shapes and contain up to 20 percent grains 
with red streaks.
9. Brokens 1 and 2 mixed.
These brokens must be derived exclusively from the milling of White 
Rice No. 1, must not contain paddy husks, dust, or straw, and must 
not permit more than 10 percent of fine brokens to pass through 
Sieve No. 16. They must contain less than 2 percent of whole grains.
10. Brokens No. 2 from White Rice:
These brokens must be derived from the milling of White Rice, 
excluding Reunion or Java quality rice] must not contain straw, 
paddy husks, or dust] and must not permit more than 20 percent of 
fine brokens to pass through sieve No. 16. They must contain less 
than 2 percent of whole grains.
11. Brokens No. 2 from Reunion Rice:
These brokens must be derived from the milling of Reunion rice and 
must not contain straw, paddy husks, or dust and must not permit 
more than 20 percent of fine brokens to pass through Sieve No. 16. 
They must contain less than 2 percent of whole grains.
12. Brokens No. 2 from Java Quality Rice:
These brokens must be derived from the milling of Java Rice and must 
not contain straw, paddy husks, or dust and must not permit more 
than 20 percent of fine brokens to pass through sieve No. 16. They 
must contain less than 2 percent of whole grains.
13« Brokens No. 3:
These brokens are derived from the milling of all qualities of white 
rice with the exception of Java rice* They must contain less than 2 
percent of whole grains. They may contain a maximum of 15 percent of 
fine brokens that will pass through sieve No. 18 and 5 percent of 
foreign matter.
The following special terms are used;
1. Tinted grains: The tinted grains are considered as yellow grains.
2. Yellow grains? In regard to the ordinary quality, the tolerance 
observed according to the custom of the market is 3 percent up to 
the end of July and k percent thereafter, provided no special mention 
has been made of a percentage of yellow grains. The Association 
may, however, deem It necessary to modify these percentages according 
to climate or seascual conditions.
Rice of Choice Qualities: For rice of choice qualities, the per­
centage of yellow grains must be a matter of special agreement*
Glutinous grains: The percentage of glutinous grains must not
exceed a maximum of 3 percent in Rice No* 1 and No* 2* In principle, 
there should be no glutinous grains in the choice quality rice*
Brokens from No. 2 rice: The attention of buyers is drawn to the
different tents which may be observed in these brokens according to 










of the Rice Farmers Cooperative Association of ________ •
TITLE I
Composition, Name, Objectives, Duration
Amongst the undersigned farmers directly cultivating the land, 
and those who adhere to the present statutes, there is constituted 
a cooperative agricultural society of variable capital stock 
and regulated according to the rules and regulations of the 
State Civil Code and those that follows
This society takes the name of "Societe Cooperative Rizicol" 
of .
The Society has as primary objectives:
1. Receiving, storing, milling, conditioning and sale 
of rice for the account of its members.
2. Furnishing of advances in money to members in several 
installments over a period of time, through a written 
engagement on their part at the beginning of the rice 
cultivation season, to deliver to the cooperative a 
determined quantity of paddy resulting from their cul­
tivation.
The amount of these advances is calculated upon the 
basis of the quantity of paddy to be delivered to 
the cooperative, the periods during which they will 
be made, and the estimated value of the paddy shall 
be determined each year by the Council of Admini­
stration in agreement with the comparable provincial 
commission.
The objectives of the cooperative can be modified by the General 
Assemblies of cooperators.
Its offices are established at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ aru* radius
of action extends to .





Art. 6 All agriculturists directly cultivating the land themselves are 
eligible for membership. Membership in the association carries 
with it the engagement to conform not only with the present 
statutes but also with all interior regulations (by-laws) which 
could be established.
The admission of members can take place only upon favorable 
decision by the Council of Administration.
Art. 7 All members have the right to retire from the association upon 
presentation of a written request to be registered in a special 
register in the office of the association. This declaration 
shall be made at least two months before the close of the fiscal 
year.
For grave and exceptional reasons the exclusion of a member can 
be pronounced by the Council of Administration— especially if 
the member in question has been found guilty of a crime before 
a court of justice or if he seeks to do harm to the cooperative 
and particularly if he is found guilty of delivering fraudulent 
products to the cooperative.
All members who cease to be a party to the association remain 
responsible for a period of five years for all obligations 
existing at time of his withdrawal.
The contents of this article are also applicable to the heirs 
and beneficiaries of a deceased member.
TITLE III 
Capital Stock, Shares, Payments
Art. 8 The capital stock is composed of shares of 100 piasters each
subscribed to by each member. Each member must purchase at 
least one share at the time of admission to the association.
The minimum total number of shares initially subscribed to is 
200.
Should a member become deceased, is dismissed, excluded, or 
retires, the association is not dissolved but continues in full 
among the remaining members. The widow or heirs of a deceased 
member can be admitted to the association replacing the deceased 
member.
Art. 9 Shares shall always be nominal. The proprietor of the shares
shall be indicated on a special register in the office of the 
cooperative. Each share of capital is indivisable with regard 
to the association and can belong to only one member.
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Art* 10 In no case shall the amount of reimbursement of shares of
capital stock to a member leaving the association for whatever 
reason exceed their original value*
No dividend shall be paid on capital stock*
Interest to be paid on capital stock shall be determined by the 
General Assembly, but in no case shall interest exceed 6%.
Shares belonging to members leaving the association shall be 
reimbursed to them within a period of, five years after the date 
of departure of the member*
No proprietor of a share of capital stock can sell that share to 
a third parly without the approval of the Council of Administration 
which shall also approve the purchaser as a new member of the 
association*
The Council of Administration shall always have the power to 
refuse admission to a new member resulting from sale of shares—
In which case the transferee has the right to be reimbursed at 
face value of his shares*
TITLE IV 
Administration
Art. 11 The association is administered by a Council of Administration 
composed of five members elected by and among the membership 
assembled in a General Assembly, The Council of Administration 
is also revocable by the General Assembly,
Each Administrator shall own at least 10 shares of stock during 
the entire period of his membership on the Council* These 
shares shall serve as guarantee for all the actions, even per­
sonal acts, of an Administrator*
These shares are inalienable and shall be so stamped and deposited 
in the office of the association*
Art, 12 Administrators are elected for two years and shall be renewed by 
1/2 each year. The first to leave are determined by drawing 
lots. Administrators whose terms expire are reelectable*
Art* 13 In case of death, dismissal, or departure, of one or more Admini­
strators, the Council of Administration can proceed to replace 
them on a temporary basis. The Council's choice of a replacement 
must be submitted to the General Assembly for ratification at 
the next meeting* Each member thus ratified serves the period 
of time of the one he replaces*
Art* II4. The Council of Administration shall each year name among its 
members a president, a viee-president, and a treasurer*
Art* 15 Upon convocation of the President, the Council of Administration 
shall meet as often as the interests of the association require* 
Deliberations are valid only upon the majority vote of the mem­
bers present* In case of tie in voting the vote of the President 
is preponderant*
Members of the Board of Controllers, established under Article 
21 that follows, shall have the right to attend sessions of the 
Council of Administration* No one can vote by proxy.
Art. 16 Decisions of the Council are verified by Mi-nutes of the Meetings 
entered in a special register signed by the President and all 
the members who took part* Copies or extracts of decisions to 
be produced before a court of justice or elsewhere are certified 
by the President of the Council and the Treasurer*
Art. 17 The Council of Administration is. charged with the general direction 
of the cooperative and is held responsible for its proper 
functioning. It has, in particular, the following powers which 
are only indicative and not limitative:
1* It represents the cooperative vis-a-vis the govern­
ment of all public or private administration and of 
all third parties and performs all operations necessary 
to effectuate that representation*
2. It establishes the budget of the association.
3* It gives the power to receive payments of debts owed 
the organization as well as to pay those that it owes*
!*♦ It also gives power to subscribe, endorse, accept 
and discharge all commercial affairBo
5* It consents to and accepts all leases, contracts, and 
all sales transactions and manipulates prices under 
the conditions of all contracts up to a period of 
nine years*
6. It accepts all bequests and gifts*
7* It may acquire, exchange or sell all land properties, 
order the construction of warehouses to store agri­
cultural products at any location it deems convenient, 
constitute all mortgages and other guarantees on the 
cooperatives1 properties* However, all loans by the 
cooperative in excess of 100,000 piasters must be 
approved by the General Assembly.
8* It authorizes all withdrawals, transfers and alien­
ation of funds, rents and securities belonging to 
the association*
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9. It enters into and authorizes all agreements and with­
drawals as well as cancellation of notices, seizures, 
oppositions, and other rights with or without payment*
10* It decides upon the exercise of all Judiciary actions 
both as defender and prosecutor*
11. It can issue all sales resolutions, transactions, and 
compromises*
12. It issues financial statements, inventories, and 
balance of accounts which must be submitted to the 
General Assembly; it decides upon and draws up the 
Agenda for all General Assemblies*
13. It manages in a general way all social affairs of 
the Association*
lU* The President of the Council of Administration repre­
sents the cooperative before courts of justice in 
position of defender as well as prosecutor; as a 
consequence it is against him or on his request that 
all judiciary actions should be entered*
Members of the Council of Administration shall 
exercise their services without pay. They have 
only the right to be reimbursed for their expenses*
Art. 18 The Council of Administration can delegate all its powers either 
to one member of the Council or to any other person it so 
chooses*
Art* 19 The direction of the cooperative shall be confided to a Managing- 
Direct or named by the Director General of Agriculture upon pro­
position of Council of Administration and renumerated by the 
cooperative *s budget*
Art* 20 The powersof the Director are defined as follows:
1* He has the personnel under his orders* The expenses 
engaged for paying salaries of the personnel shall 
be authorized by the Council of Administration and 
the Board of Controllers forseen under Article 21*
2* He exercises the powers vested to him and executes 
the decisions of the Council of Administration.
3* He keeps all the accounts and records of the assoc­
iation.








21 The association is held to the permanent control of the Director 
General of Agriculture*
A Board of Controllers is instituted, presided over by the Chief 
of Province and assisted by two commissioners*
The Chief of Province designates one commissioner each year*
The other commissioner, a member or not a member of the association 
but selected outside the Council of Administration, shall be 
designated each year by the Council of Administration* He is 
reelectable*
The Board of Controllers has at all times and at anytime it 
deems convenient in the interest of the cooperative, the rights 
to examine the books of the cooperative and its operation.
Members of this board can attend meetings of the Council of 
Administration without taking an active part but having a con­
sultative voice*
This board can, in case of emergency, call a meeting of the 
General Assembly*
22 The General Assembly is placed under the honorary presidence of 
the Chief of Province and under the effective presidency of the 
President of the Council of Administration who has the duty of 
policing the Assembly and watches that discussions do not stray 
away from their principal object*
23 The Director fulfills the role of Secretary. The role of 
scrutineers is fulfilled by two cooperators designated by the 
Council of Administration.
21* The General Assembly regularly assembled represents the entire 
membership. Its decisions are obligatory for all members, even 
those absent, dissidents or incapacitated*
Each member has the right to only one vote regardless of the 
number of shares of stock he owns*
Meetings are called by means of letters addressed to each member 
at least 20 days before the date set for the Assembly.
The notice of General Assembly shall contain the proposed Agenda*
25 The Agenda i» issued by the Council of Administration* It 
contains only those propositions originating from the Council 
of Administration, and, if need be, the commissioners, or 
those propositions which have been communicated to it at least 
one month before the meeting with the signature of at least 
1/1* of the members.
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The Board of Controllers shall issue the Agenda of the General 
Assemblies which it may call for ter gent reasons*
Only those items carried on the Agenda may be discussed at the 
General Assembly*
Art* 26 No one can be represented at the General Assembly if he himself 
is not a member of the association*
Art* 27 The names, addresses and number of shares owned by each member 
present at General Assemblies shall be inscribed on the roll 
call*
This roll call shall be signed by each member present, certified 
by the officers of the assembly, and added to the Minutes of 
the Meeting* This information shall be communicated to all 
members requesting it*
Deliberations of the General Assembly are certified by the 
officers of the Assembly and entered into a special register*
Copies or extracts of these deliberations to be presented before 
a court of justice or elsewhere shall be signed by two members 
of the Council of Administration*
Art* 28 The General Assembly is called at the place and time designated 
by the Council of Administration in the Notice of Assembly*
Assemblies are called at least once a year during the two 
months which follow the close of the fiscal year*
Notices must be sent out at least 20 days before the date set 
for the meeting*
The General Assembly listens to the commissioners* report on 
the general situation of the cooperative, to the balance sheet 
and the account presented by the Administrators* After due 
discussions it approves the balance sheet and accounting state­
ment*
It sets vthe amount of patronage dividends to be returned to 
members*
Upon recommendation of the Council of Administration it decides 
if the capital stock should be increased*
It deliberates and acts on all propositions presented on the 
agenda*
It pronounces itself on all subjects affecting the interest of 
the association and confers all necessary powers to the Cpuncil 
of Administration.
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Art. 29 The General Assembly can be convened in addition to the annual 
assembly, either by the Council of Administration in case of 
emergency and every time it is deemed useful to have the opinion 
of the cooperators to obtain complimentary powers, or upon pre­
sentation of a written request to the Council of Administration 
for well-defined reasons determined by at least l/U of the coop­
erators, or by the Board of Controllers in case of emergency.
Ten days notice must be given for this assembly.
Art. 30 A General Assembly called to act in cases other than those
stipulated in the following paragraphs must be attended by at 
least l/h of the total number of cooperators— including those 
present themselves or represented by proxy.
The same holds true for an assembly called to act upon the 
question^of modifying the duration or the dissolution of the 
association.
If a General Assembly does not have a sufficient number of 
members to take valid action, according to distinctions estab­
lished as follows, a new assembly is convened in at least 10 
days in the form indicated under Article 29 above.
This convocation relates the Agenda and indicates the date and 
results of the assembly. This second assembly takes valid 
decisions regardless of the number of members present and 
represented.
Art. 31 In General Assemblies called to act upon modification of the 
statutes or on all points in the preceeding Article the vote 
of at least 2/3 of the membership present or represented must 
be obtained in order that valid action can be taken.
In all other assemblies valid action is taken upon the majority 
of the expressed suffrage.
In case of tie in voting, the vote of the President is prepon­
derant.
INVENTORY
Art. 32 The fiscal year begins on of each year and ends
on . Except that at the beginning of the organi-
zation the fiscal year begins as of the date of ratification of 
the statutes and ends on ________________.
Art. 33 A summary statement of the active situation of the association 
shall be issued each quarter. This statement is put at the 
disposition of the commissioners. (Board of Controllers)
Furthermore, at the end of each fiscal year an inventory shall 
be made showing the balance of debits and credits.
1*22
This inventory as well as a statement of profits and loss shall 
be put at the disposition of the Board of Controllers at least 
1*0 days before the General Assembly and are presented at this 
assembly*
Fifteen days before the General Assembly all owners of shares 
of stock can review these documents at the office of the coopera­
tive as well as the list of cooperators and the report of the 
Board of Controllers*
Division of Annual Surpluses
Art* 3U If in the annual inventory, after deductions have been made for 
general expenses, amortization of all material and equipment, 
provision for equipment and material replacement, there exists 
a surplus.This surplus shall be divided as follows:
First 3% to constitute a reserve* Then a sum sufficient to 
pay owners of shares of capital stock an interest fixed in 
accordance with Article 10*
The division of the surplus shall be fixed by the General Assembly 
which, upon the proposition of the Council of Administration, 
can decide to divide it amongst the members. This decision shall 
be made only under the title of dividends and shall be proport­
ionally to the amount of business done by each with the association.
Art. 35 Payment of interest allocated to owners of shares, and payment
of dividends to members shall be made within the three months
which follows the annual General Assembly during periods fixed
by the Council of Administration and in a manner determined by
that Council*
Art. 36 All interest not claimed within five years and all dividends not 
claimed within one year shall return to the cooperative. These 
sums shall revert to the association’s reserves fund.
Pis solution— liquidation
Art. 37 In case of loss of 3/k of the capital stock, the Board of Con­
trollers are forced to call a General Assembly of all members to 
study the question of whether or not to dissolve the association*
The decision of the assembly is, in all cases, made public*
Art. 38 At the expiration of the association, or in case of anticipated 
dissolution the General Assembly shall determine the method of 
dissolution. It shall name one or more liquidators or shall 
confide the liquidation to the Board of Controllers in power 
during that fiscal year. During the process of liquidation the 
powers of the General Assembly continue as during the existence 
of the association*
kn
All the assets of the association are realized by the liquidators 
who have, in that matter, extended powers. After paying all 
social debts and r eimbursement of capital, the General Assembly 
shall, upon the proposition of the Council of Administration, 
decide to cede any net surpluses either to another farmers* 
cooperative or to apply it to other agricultural interests.
Disputes
Art. 39 All disputes which should arise concerning the affairs of the 
Association shall, before any judiciary action is taken, be 
submitted to the officials of the cooperative who shall endeavor 
to settle them out of court to the satisfaction of- those con­
cerned.
In case of failure during the duration of the cooperative, or 
during liquidation, the disputes shall be judged by a competent 





FARMERS COOPERATIVE RICE MILL
I. General Dispositions
Art. 1 Conforming to Article 6 of the statutes these by-laws are hereby
established— to which all members shall submit.
Art. 2 The activity of the cooperative shall revolve around three prin­
cipal operations: furnishing of credit, reception and storage
of paddy, and milling and sale of rice for the account of members.
II. Credit
Art. 3 At the beginning of each rice production season members shall 
be able, on a date fixed by the Council of Administration and 
under conditions that follow, to have a credit opened in their 
name on the books of the cooperative so as to afford them the 
capital necessary for the ordinary expenses of rice cultivation.
Art. h In order to benefit from a credit account members shall form 
amongst themselves mutual groups of co-signers, of at least 
five and at the most ten members,“who shall engage themselves 
to cultivate a certain surface area of riceland, to deliver 
at the cooperative's storage shed a certain amount of paddy, 
and to pledge as security the crop produced on the acreage 
which they engaged themselves to cultivate.
Art. 5 The members of each mutual group of co-signers shall address a 
collective request for loans, signed by all the members of the 
group, at lead; 15 days before the date of the opening of the 
rice cultivating season. This request shall indicate:
a. The names, number and address of the membersj
b. The designation of the rice fields which they 
engage themselves to cultivate individually—
(area, registration numbers on the tax registers);
c. A quantitative estimate of the production;
d. The amount of loan individually requested*
These requests for loans shall be examined by the Council of 
Administration which shall verify them and fix the amount of 
loan to be opened for the account of each member.
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Art. 6 The amount of the loan accorded shall not exceed 70% of the 
value of the expected harvest.
The base price of paddy to be used in determining the amount 
of loans shall be fixed by the Council of Administration in 
agreement with the Council of Controllers and the General 
Director of Agriculture in accordance with the average price 
of paddy for the six preceeding months.
Art.. 7 The members of the groups of co-signers shall be eligible to 
draw individually the funds necessary from time to time, 
according to their real needs, during periods fixed by the 
Council of Administration in agreement with the Board of Con­
trollers and the General Director of Agriculture.
However, only 30% of the amount of the credit account opened 
shall be withdrawn at the beginning of the rice cultivating 
season; a second slice of 30% shall be withdrawn only after 
verification on a "certificate of cultivation** and signed by 
all the members of the group of co-signers and verified by 
the communal authorities thaltThe rice fields in question are 
actually in cultivation.
The remaining \\0f% of the amount of credit account shall be 
withdrawn upon delivery of the crop with reservations being 
made to the possible readjustment of price in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 10 below.
III. Reception of paddy and payment
Art. 9 Each year, before the beginning of the rice planting season, 
the Council of Administration shall establish a tabular 
classification of varieties of paddy by types, and by quality 
depending upon percentage of red rice, yellow rice, green 
grains, weed seeds, etc. This classification shall be dis­
played in the office of the Association and communicated to 
all interested meiribers.
Art. 10 One month before the date foreseen for first paddy deliveries 
the Council of Administration, in agreement with the Board 
of Controllers and the General Director of Agriculture, shall 
fix the base price to be applied to number one quality of each 
type of paddy defined under Article 9 above, as well as the 
percentage reduction in price that each inferior quality shall 
be subjected to. At the same time the Council shall determine 
the amount to be paid the meiribers delivering their paddy for 
milling— provided that this amount does not exceed 70% of the 
value of the paddy as determined by base established above*
Art. 11 At least 8 days before delivery of the paddy to the cooperative»s 
storage bins the cooperator shall give to the Council of Admini­
stration a »*notice of deposit" indicating:
a. The name, surname, and address and number of the member;
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b. The names of the varieties of paddy which he desires 
to deliver and also the quantity or weight of each 
variety}
c. The probable date of delivery}
d« The number of sacks and the means of transportation 
which he believes he will need.
Art. 12 The paddy shall be received by an Evaluation Commission composed 
of three members:
a. The Director— or his delegate}
b. Two cooperators designated by the Council of Admini­
stration*
Art. 13 Paddy delivered by cooperators shall be dry, clean, and of good 
marketable quality. Drying and cleaning of the paddy can be 
performed by the cooperator himself, and at his own expense, on 
the drying platforms and with the material foreseen for that 
function at the cooperative *s installations.
Art. lU For each lot of the same type and same quality the member will
be given a weight receipt written in triplicate and signed by 
the members of the Commission and by the cooperator. This 
delivery weight receipt shall show the following:
a. Name, address and number of the cooperator}
b. The variety of the paddy}
c. The quality of the paddy}
d. The net weight deposited}
e. The dry weight of the paddy.
The triplicate copy shall be left with the warehouseman as a 
document to verify the paddy stored. The first and second 
copies, signed by the warehouseman, shall be given the member 
who delivered the paddy.
Art. 2$ Each member delivering paddy can, immediately after delivery, re-
re ceive from the cooperative a loan up to 70% of the value of
the paddy delivered. In that case he shall turn in the duplicate 
copy of the warehouse receipt and sign a receipt of advance*
Those members who shall have received a previous advance shall 
be eligible upon delivery, to receive further advances under the 
same conditions— deductions being made of the advances received 







IV. Milling of Paddy and Sale of Rice «
16 Rice and rice derivatives produced by the cooperative rice mill 
from paddy delivered by members shall be sold, by the Council 
of Administration and for the account of the meiribers, over an 
extended period (in principle one sale each month) in order to 
obtain the average price of the season, either at the mill or 
on the Saigon-Cholon market. Sales shall be effectuated through 
the submission of bids to the trade by the Council of Admini- 
stration and at least one delegate of the Board of Controllers.
17 limited quantities of milled rice destined solely to feed the 
families of cooperators and by-products of the rice mill for 
animal feed shall be sold to cooperators at prices determined by 
the Council of Administration.
18 Funds recouped drom sales of rice or rice derivatives shall be 
deposited in full by the clients either at the provincial office 
of the Agricultural Credit or at the office of the Provincial 
Paymaster— such deposits shall be carried in a special and 
separate account in the name of the cooperative.
Receipts from direct sales of by-products or rice to meiribers 
themselves can be deposited at the office of the cooperative.
V. Consignment of Sacks and Furnishing 
Transportation to lumbers
19 Members of the Society will be able to take delivery, at the 
cooperative warehouses, of the sacks needed to hold their paddy.
These sacks shall be consigned at twice their purchase prices; 
the consignee shall verify the quality and quantity of these 
Backs in the presence of the warehouseman. The sacks shall be 
returned within a specified limit of time and those sacks which 
have deteriorated will not be taken back. A rental fee, fixed 
by the Council of Administration, shall be retained for the use 
of the sacks.
20 The Association will be able to furnish transportation services 
within the limits of its possibilities to those members request­
ing this service to transportr.their paddy from their private 
storage bins to the cooperative's storage warehouses.
This transportation shall be performed at the risks and perils 
of the member and shall carry a charge determined each year 
by the Council of Administration. BOwever, the reception of 
the paddy can in all cases be made only at the cooperative’s 
warehouses and in conformity with the Articles.
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VI* Bookkeeping and Liquidation of Members1 Accounts
> . r 
Art* 21 All members of the Association shall have an individual account 
where all operations made by him with the cooperative shall be 
entered* Such entries shall show:
(a) Operations in Money 
1* On the Debit Side
a* Amount of advances made;
b* Value of equipment or services furnished 
the member$
c* The quota of the costs of the cooperative 
as determined by the monetary accounting 
procedure*
2* On the Credit Side
a* The value of the sacks returned}
b* The quota of the value of sales of rice
and derivatives produced from milling 
the paddy delivered by the member as 
determined by the accounting records*
(b) Operations in Nature 
1* On the Debit Side
a* The quota of the quantities milled;
b* The quota of weight losses in storage
as determined by accounting procedure.
2* On the Credit Side
a* The quantity of paddy delivered by the 
member*
Art* 22 At the end of the operating season the balance of accounts of 
each member, as it is defined in Article 21 above, shall show 
the position of each member vis-a-vis the Association*
If the account shows a credit balance, the credit— which con­
stitutes the gross profits of the cooperative— shall be returned 
to the member after deducting withholdings for building up a 
legal reserve, and a reserve provided for eventual losses, as 
decided by the General Assembly*
However, without waiting for a General Assembly meeting up to 
90% of the credits can be returned to the members; the remaining 
dividends shall be returned to growers only after approval of 
the General Assembly*
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If the balance of accounts is on the debit side, the deficit—  
which amounts to a debt to the society on the part of the 
member— shall, at the discretion of the Council of Administration, 
be carried over to the following year or be reimbursed to the 
cooperative by the member.
If, however, the total of the accounts is on the debit side—  
the quotas of each member taken into consideration— the total 
amount of deficits shall be liquidated in accordance with the 
statutes of the Association.
VII. Accounting and Bookkeeping
Art. 23 The bookkeeping of the Association and the accounting at the
end of the milling season shall be in accordance with procedures 
and instructions established by the General Director of 
Agriculture.
VIII. Milling of Paddy Belonging to Non-Members
Art. 2h The Council of Administration, in agreement with the Board 
of Controllers and the General Director of Agriculture can 
decide to accept to mill paddy belonging to non-members under 
Conditions to be determined at a future date*
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Arrete No, 561+ of July 8, 1952, creating the Service National DuCredit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC),
THE PRESIDENT OF Tffi GOVERNMENT
In view of Ordinance No, 1 of July 1, 191+9, fixing the conditions 
for the organization and functioning of public institutions.
In view of Ordinance No, 2 of July 1, 19U9, relating to the 
organization of the statutes governing public administrations*
In view of the Decree No, 1+9-CP of June 6, 1952, completed by 
Decrees Nos, 51, 52, and 55-CP of June 23 and June 25, 1952, determining 
the composition of the Government*
The Council of the Cabinet being agreed:
ARRETE (it is ordered)
Article 1* There is hereby created a Service National du Credit Agri­
cole et Artisanal Cooperatif, having for itE objectives:
- to promote in agricultural and artisanal spheres, and the 
field of small industry, a system for extending loans and assistance
to producers in these categories, either to approved mutual or cooperative 
groups or associations of farmers or artisans, or to individual artisans 
and small industries, whose activities are in the national economic 
interest,
- to accomplish, within the scope of Agrarian Reform, the 
acquisition by cultivators of small landed properties*
This Service is placed under the direct authority and control of 
the president of the Government*
Article 2* The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Coop- 
eratif ischarged;
1* with organizing, in cooperation with the Ministers concerned 
and with the Regional Administrations, a (permanent) Office National 
de Credit for Agriculture, artisans and small industry*
2, with undertaking the management and the distribution (of its 
assistance) among and between the provincial agricultural Banks, or 
Caisses Provinciales de Credit Agricole Mutual, and the Cooperative 
Societies of artisans, fishermen or related enterprises, presently 
existing or which may be created by means of the capital funds which the 
Service National has at its disposal in terms of Article 1* below, and
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with coordinating and supervising the functioning of these Banks, Caissesor Cooperatives, as well as of the societies or associations which areaff ilisited with them*
3* with undertaking, on a provisional basis, on decision of the 
President of the Government, the technical control and direction of the 
groups mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, in case of inaptitude on 
the part of their administrators or serious inadequacy in their manage­
ment*
Article 3• The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal 
Cooperatif is administered by a Comite de Direction comprising a Presi­
dent and three members, designated by the President of the Government 
with approval of the Cabinet*
Article U* The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Coop- 
eratif has no capital of its own, and does not derive profits*
It disposes of funds provided by contributions from the National 
Budget and from the Regional Budgets, as well as donations of various 
origin, specially allotted to the Service National*
Article 5* There is opened on the books of the General Treasury a 
special current account for the Service National de Credit Agricole et 
Artisanal Cooperatif*
All operations devolving upon the Service will be done to the 
credit or to the debit of this account, over the two signatures of the 
President of the'Comite de Direction and of the Managing Director*
Transfers of funds between the Service and its affiliated in­
stitutions or its clients will be effected through the medium of the 
Treasury*
Article 6* The personnel of the SerVice National du Credit Agricole 
et Artisanal Cooperatif comprises, aside from the Managing Director, 
various government servants (fonctionnaires) in the service , of the 
Ministries or the National or Regional Administrations, specially de­
tached for this purpose*
Article 7* The appropriate expenses of the Service National du credit 
AgricoleHet Artisanal Cooperatif are temporarily assumed by the 
National Budget*
Likewise, the expenses of maintaining the personnel of the 
affiliated Banks or Caisses Provinciales de Credit Agricule Mutuel 
will also be assumed, provisionnally, by this Budget* They (the 
expenses) will be taken over gradually by these establishments as 
their development permits*
Article 8* Provisionally, and pending the creation of a National 
Statute and Legislation governing agricultural and artisanal mutual 
and cooperative organizations, the former legislation relating to 
these matters will continue in force*
k3J
Article 9• The Minister of Finance and National Economy, the Ministersconcerned and the Treasurer General are charged, each as he may beconcerned, with the execution of the present Arrete.
Saigon July 28, 19J>2 
(Signed)
The President of the Government
(Verified)
The Director of the Cabinet 
The Chief of the Administrative Service
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Arrete of July 28, 1952, setting forth the special conditions foroperating and controls of Societies affiliated with the Service Nationaldu Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC)*
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
In view of Ordinance No. 1 of July 1, 191*9, fixing the conditions 
for the organization and functioning of public institutions*
In view of Ordinance No. 2 of July 1, 19l*9, relating to the organ­
ization of the statutes governing public administrations.
In view of the Decree No. 1*9-CP of June 6, 1952, completed by Deorte*
Nos. 51, 52, and 55-CP of June 23 and June 25, 1952, determining the com­
position of the Government.
In view of Arrete No. 561* of July 28, 1952, creating a Service
National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif.
The Council of Ministers being agreed:
ARRETE (It is ordered)
A - CONCERNING AFFILIATED SOCIETIES AND THE INSPECTION 
” stfeVEiLLANCE) CoMmitTEes .
Article 1. The Scoieties affiliated with the Service National (SNCAAC) 
are administered by their own Administrative Councils, except in exceptional 
cases when they may be directly administered by The Service National, as 
provided in Article 2 of the Arrete of July 28, 1952. All members of the 
Administrative Council must reside regularly in the Province where the 
Societe carries on its activities, and must be chiefly engaged in an agri­
cultural or artisanal activity in that place.
The members of the Administrative Council will be elected by the 
General Assembly of Members from a list previously prepared by the Pro­
vincial Administration and approved by the Regional Governor, containing 
a number of persons at least equal to double the number of seats to be 
filled.
Article 2. The President of the Administrative Council represents the 
Societe 5Tn all its civil activities and relations. He is assisted by a 
Director of the Service National, who is acceptable to or is proposed by 
the Inspection or Surveillance Committee defined in Article 1* below.
Article 3. The Administrative Council may delegate to the Director or 
Manager of the Societe such powers as they deem fitting to confide to 
him, but xinder responsibility of the Council.
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Regardless of the extent to which these powers are delegated, the
Director shall be responsible in each case for the following functions,
subject to the control of the Administrative Council:
a) - the direction of personnel
b) - the maintenance of accounts
c) - the preparation of loan dossiers, and their presentation to
the Administrative Council
d) - the disbursement (paying out of the funds) of loans which have
been approved by the Administrative Council
e) - the collection of loans at maturity dates.
The Director will be present at meetings of the Administrative
Council, but with no deliberative voice. He will fullfil the duties of 
Secretary,
Article U* The Inspection and Surveillance Committee of the affiliated
Societies, provided for in Article 8 of the Arrete of July 28, 1952, will
be composed as follows:
a) - The Chief of the Province  ...............President
b) - A Representative of the members of the Societe,
designated by the General Assembly, who shall 
not be a member of the Administrative Council 
of the Societe, • , • • • • • • • • • • • • •  Member
c) - The Registrar of Landed Property, Member
d) - The Representative of the Chief of Agricultural
Service, or of the Artisanal Service, or of the 
Small Industry Service, as the case may be
, , • • , Member
e) ~ One or two provincial personages, selected by
the Chief of the Province, chosen on the basis 
of their competence and their authority • • . Member
Article 3>, The Inspection and Surveillance Committee of the Affiliated 
3bcletes“controls the activities of these Societes* In particular it 
gives or withholds its consent to all applications involving the expendi­
ture of more than five thousand piasters (5,000$00),
The Members of the Inspection and Surveillance Committee may attend 
the meetings of the Administrative Council and of the General Assembly 
of the Societe, but they shall have no deliberative voice.
They may, however, be privileged to speak and to have their comments
heard.
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In caae of need the President of the Inspection and Surveillance 
Committee, with the agreement of its Members, may exercise his veto 
against any deliberation which might compromise the interests of the 
Societe, or the safety and security of loans or advances granted to 
the Societe by the Service National, and also against any decisions 
which might be contrary to the provisions of the regulations governing 
the Societe, Such difference of opinion will be immediately referred 
to the Comite de Direction of the Service National, who will rule thereon.
The Minutes of Meetings must make mention of any interventions or 
differences on the part of Members or of the President of the Inspection 
and Surveillance Committee#
The Inspection and Surveillance Committee shall also address to 
the Regional Governor and to the Comite de Direction of the Service National 
all suggestions and recommendations which they consider to be in the 
interests of general policy, in respect of Agricultural Credit in the Pro­
vince,
Article 6# All operations carried on by the affiliated Societes are 
subject to the control of the Service National which may, to this end, 
create Inspection Sectors, comprising at least four Provinces, at the 
head of which it may place one of its agents having the title of Inter- 
Provincial Inspector,
Article 7, Loans granted by the affiliated Societes shall be subject 
to the following conditions*
a) - Individual short-term loans may be granted up to a limit of 
twenty thousand piasters (20,000$00) by simple decision of the Admini­
strative Council, on condition that a prompt report thereof be rendered 
to the Inspection and Surveillance Committeeo
b) - Individual medium-term loans may be granted up to a limit of 
forty thousand piasters (U0,000$00) by simple decision of the Inspection 
and surveillance Committee and the Administrative Council.
However, in view of the much smaller areas of landed properties in 
North and Central Vietnam, the limits specified above will be reduced by 
one half for the Societes in those regions.
A H  loans exceeding the limits stipulated above must be approved 
by the Service National, which may delegate a part of its powers to its 
Regional or Inter-Provincial Inspectors.
Article 8. Only the Comite de Direction of the Service National may 
grant- long-term loans. Applications for such loans must be referred to 
the Service National by the Administrative Council of the Societe in 
question, with due justification and under its responsibility#
Article 9. The amount of loans to be granted by the affiliated Societes 
to their individual members will be determined on the basis of the 
gross revenue of their cultivating operations* In no case may the 
amount of short-term loans exceed 2$% of the gross revenue, and for
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medium-term loans the limit shall be an amount of which the annual 
amortization payments do not exceed 15% of this groos revenue* However, 
the amount of short-term loans may be increased from 25% to 30$ of the 
gross revenue on condition that the proceeds of the loans shall be used 
for the purchase of selected seeds or fertilizers*
In case of acquisition by "the same borrower of both a short-term 
and a mediumt-term loan, the total of payments and annual amortizations 
may not exceed 33% or 38$ of the gross revenue, according to the circum­
stances*
B - CONCERNING PERSONNEL
Article 10* (a) The salaries and allowances of personnel in the Service
of the aTTiliated Societes (officers, agents under contract (annual basis) 
and day workers) are calculated on the same basis and are subject to the 
same withholdings and deductions as those of personnel in their same 
categories belonging to the various Administrative Services of the Govern­
ment*
(b) The Directors or Managers of the affiliated Services may not 
claim any reimbursement for their services, nor incidental payment of any 
kind, except when, connected with another Government Service, they under­
take the management of the Societe in addition to their normal duties, with 
due regard for any applicable regulations* However, at the end of the 
operating period they may be allowed a percentage of the net profits 
realized. This percentage is fixed at*
3% on the first 10,000 piasters;
2% on the second 10,000 piasters, or any part thereof;
1% on amounts exceeding 20,000 piasters, (but the total so realized 
may not exceed 10,000 piasters),
(c) The Directors or Managers of the affiliated Societes shall be 
entitled (in any case) to some payment in view of their responsibilities, 
the amount of which, varying according to the turnover of funds, will be 
determined each year by the Service National,
(d) The Directors or Managers of the affiliated Societes will 
travel from post to post as directed by the Chief of the Province*
They are entitled, in case of these transfers, to the same travel 
and lodging allowances allowed to officers in permanent status of their 
same category, and to reimbursement of their transportation expenses*
Article 11* The personnel of the Societes which may be paid out of the 
jfetxonai”!?udget, in accordance with the Arrete of July 28, 195>2, shall 
be the following, (not including the Director):
one Accountant, or bookkeeper 
one Secretary - Typist
1^8
one Messenger - Orderly (planton)
This personnel may not claim any extra indemnity or payment of 
any kind. When they are transferred in the interests of the service 
they are entitled to the lodging allowances provided for regular govern­
ment employees of their same category.
Article 12. No person may be appointed to the management of a Societe 
affiliated with the Service National;
(a) if he is engaged, whether personally or through an intermediary, 
directly or indirectly, as a principal or associate or guarantor, in any 
commercial or industrial activity whatsoever in the same or adjacent pro­
vinces as the Seat, or Main Office, of the Societe.
(b) if he has ever been the object of a legal judgment or sentence 
implying the prohibition or forfeiture of the right to manage or admini­
ster a Societe.
C - CONCERNING REGIONAL COMMITTEES
Article 13. There is established with the Governors of North, Central 
arid SoutlTYietnam a Regional Committee of the Credit Agricole et Artisanal, 
presided over by an appointee of the Governor and composed of;
- The Regional Director of Economic Service s?
- A representative of the Regional Social Service;
- The chief of the Regional Services for Agriculture, cattle- 
raising and Forestry;
- A regional representative of the Service for Artisans and Small 
Industry;
- Three representatives of the Provincial or Regional Croupments 
(Associations) of the Credit Agricole et Artisanal; affiliated 
with the Service National;
- A delegate of the Service National.
These committees, which will receive the reports end balance-sheets 
of the operations of the Regional or provincial Croupments of the Credit 
Agricole et Artisanal affiliated with the Service National will offer use­
ful comments and recommendations. They may intervene with the Comite de 
Direction (Management) of the Service National in order to elicit and stimu­
late control measures for the Regional or Provincial Croupements of the 
Credit Agricole et Artisanal.
Article m < The Minister of Finance and of the National Economy, the 
ffi.nlster of the Interior, the Minister of Agriculture and the Regional 
Governors are charged, each as he may concerned, with carrying out this Arrets
(Signed)
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Arrete of 1st August, 1952, governing the organization and operatingof the Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif* (SNCAAC)
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
In view of Ordinance No* 1 of July 1, 19U9, governing the organi­
zation and operating of Public Institutions*
In view of Ordinance No* 2 of July 1, 19U9, concerning the regu­
lation of Public Administrations.
In view of Decree No* U9-CP of June 6, 1952, completed by Decrees 
Nos* 51, 52 and 55 of the 23rd and 25th of June, 1952, governing the 
composition of the Government*
In view of Arrete No* 56U of July 28, 1952, concerning the creation 
of a Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif* (SNCAAC)
The Council of the Cabinet has agreed:
ARRETE
Article 1* The organisation and operation of the Service National du 
Credit'Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC), established by Arrete 
No* $6h of July 28, 1952, are regulated by the conditions of the present 
Arrete*
A - MANAGEMENT AND GENERAL MANAGEMENT
Article 2* The Comite de Direction shall manage and administer the capi­
tal fund? placed at the disposal of the SNCAAC* The Comite shall have 
the following specific functions:
1. It shall decide and rule on application for affiliation pre­
sented by the Societe1s de Credit Agricole and the Societes Cooperatives 
de Credit Mutuel Artisanal et de Vente*
2* It shall decide and rule upon requests for the opening of 
credits or for loans and advances presented by the above mentioned societes, 
and upon requests for long-term loans on the part of members of the affiliated 
Societes, and also upon applications for loans of short or medium term 
which may be made by Small Industry*
3* It shall confer and deliberate regarding the SNCAAC and the 
accounts of the Managing Director*
il* It shall deliberate regarding recommendations for employing and 
discharging personnel of the SNCAAC, as made by the Managing Director.
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*>* It shall study and consider recommendations to be transmitted 
to the President of The Government regarding:
(a) The allocation of funds between the different Sections of 
the SNCAAC, as defined in Article 7, below*
(b) The proportion of credit to be allotted to short, medium, 
and long-term loans, as well as the rates of interest of 
the different categories of loans or advances*
(c) The allocation of various appropriations and donations of 
funds specially earmarked for the Credit Agricole et Arti­
sanal, as set forth in Article I* of the Arrete (of July- 
18, 195>2) creating the SNCAAC*
6, It makes, to the President of the Government, all recommendations 
or suggestions regarding the general organisation, the capital requirements 
of the institution, and all other questions of a social and economic nature 
concerning the agricultural and artisanal production of the country*
No resolution may be validly deliberated upon by the Comite without 
the presence of at least one half of its members*
The Comite shall permanently delegate to itB President the powers 
to exercise permanent control over the functions of the SNCAAC, and gen­
erally to supervise the due and proper execution of the decisions of the 
Comite and of the President of the Government.*
Article 3* The Managing Director shall carry out the decisions of the 
Comite do Direction, and shall furthermore have the following duties*
1* He shall organize and exercise the permanent control of the
affiliated Societes and Associations.
2. He shall make all decisions concerning the internal administration, 
and shall be responsible for the direction of personnel*
3* He shall engage temporary personnel, within budgetary limits*
U* He shall exercise such powers as are specially delegated to him
ty the Comite de Direction*
B - ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
Article U* The members of the Comite de Direction shall exercise their 
functions free of charge* However, members residing outside the city 
where the Comite meets shall be entitled to travel expenses at a rate 
to be fixed by decision of the President of the Government*
Article £* The offices or departments of the SNCAAC shall comprise:
- The Secretariat
- The General Account in Office
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- The Inspection Department (for agricultural and artisanal 
credit operations)
- The Office (Bureau) of Artisans and Small Industry
- The Office for Cooperative b and Agrarian Reform,
C - FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION
Article 6, The Accounting of the Budget of the SNCAAC shall be conducted 
according to the administrative regulations in force.
The Managing Director of the SNCAAC shall be the administrator of 
the budget of the said SNCAAC*
Article 7* Financial operations relative to the capital which will accrue 
to the several affiliated Societes, will be conducted within the scope of 
the Account provided for in Article $ of the Arrete of July 28, 1952, 
creating the SNCAAC*
This account is divided into three sections:
Agricultural Credit
Credit for Artisans and Small Industry 
Agrarian Reform*
The capital allotted to one or another of these Sections may only 
be used by the Section in question, all transfers from one to another 
Section being prohibited, unless otherwise decided by the President of 
the Government on recommendation of the Comite de Direction of the SNCAAC*
Article 8, The SNCAAC is authorized to conduct the following operation, 
over the"*Account described in Article 7 above:
1* To grant to its affiliated Societes;
(a) credit in current account, with which to extend short­
term loans,
(b) Advances for loans to individuals or collectives, at 
medium term,
2* To grant long-term loans to individual members of its affiliated 
Societes*
3* To grant long-term loans a collective basis to approved Societes 
and Associations of farmers or artisans,
U* To transmit, through the intermediary of the Societes Pro- 
vinciales de Credit Agricole Mutuel, to approved Societes Cooperatives 
Agricole, advances specially designated for community agricultural works 
or projects, or for the repair of damages caused by catastrophes of nature*
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$• To grant individual loans at short- and medium-terms to Artisans 
and Small Industries#
6* To receive for credit of the above-mentioned Account the balance 
of assets resulting from the liquidation of the former Office du Credit 
Populaire*
Article 9* The loans and advances granted by the SNCAAC in terms of the 
Foregoing Article, shall draw interest at a rate to be fixed by the decision 
of the President of the Government, on recommendation of the Comite de 
Direction*
Amounts derived in interest shall be apportioned one half to a 
reserve account against eventual losses, Individually for each one of the 
Sections, (see Article 7 above), and one half to an account to be used 
for amortizing the costs of maintaining the personnel of the Banks or 
Caisses Provinciales operating in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 
7 of the Arrete of July 28, 1952, creating the SNCAAC*
Article 10* The Minister of Finance and National Economy* the Minister 
.of the Interior, the Minister of Agriculture, the regional Governors, 
are charged, each one as he may be concerned, with the execution of the 
present Arrete.
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Letter No* 81h of July £, 1953, by the Minister of Agriculture 
(as President of the Comite de Direction of the Service National) to 
the Governor of South Vietnam, with instructions for setting up a system 
to administer an agricultural small loans program*
PROM: The Minister of Agriculture (President of the Comite de
Direction of the Service National du Credit Agricule et
Artisanal Cooperatif (SNCAAC).
TO: The Governor of South Vietnam.
SUBJECT: Short-term rural production loans*
Monsieur le Gouvernaur,
I have the honor to advise you that I have just received from the 
American Economic Aid a credit of ten million piasters for the financing 
of short term loans, for the development of agricultural production.
On its part, the Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal 
Cooperatif will contribute to the extent of five million piasters, which 
will bring the total credit to fifteen millions*
OBJECTIVES AND BENEFITS OF THE PROJECT
This financial aid to rice cultivation is of great assistance to 
our peasants, small landowners and tenant farmers in the work of cul­
tivating their lands*
In fact, as a result of events, our cultivators are in great 
financial difficulties, and find themselves quite at a loss*
In order to meet the needs of theiF Families and especially to cope 
with urgent expenses (the purchase of seeds, costs of cultivation, replace­
ment of used agricultural equipment) they are obliged to place themselves 
at the mercy of certain usurers, and sometimes to sell their crop before 
harvesting it*
Such is the actual situation in which these toiling masses struggle, 
who now claim our aid both moral and financial*
In helping our farmers to emerge this morass in which they are 
sinking in despair, we contribute our part, not only to the development 
of agricultural production but also to a rapid recovery of the economic 
activity of the country*
Our material assistance will take the form of rural short-term 
loans which will be accomplished through the medium of the' 'Caisse Pro­
vincials de Credit Agricole (Rural Provincial Banks), recently created*
m
DISTRIBUTION OF THE CREDIT
The distribution of this credit will be done in the following 
manner:
1*,000,000 piasters - will be placed at the disposal of the
Caisse Provincial of Giadinh, for the 
Provinces of Giadinh and Cholon.
11.000.000 piasters - will be placed at the disposal of the
Caisse Provincial of K&rfcho, for the 
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In view of their purpose, these loans should not exceed a duration 
of eight months, representing approximately the time of the operations for 
which they are intended, or as an outside limit, ten months only, which 
allows our cultivators to hold their paddy and dispose of it at the best 
price* This (latter) duration is inoperative and must not be exceeded in 
any case*
AMOUNT OF LOANS
In principle each cultivator will be able to borrow *>00 piasters 
per hectare of land, but the maximum amount of the loan is set at 2,000 
piasters per individual, whatever may be the area cultivated*
INTEREST
The rate of interest is fixed at one percent (1$) per month*
SECURITY AND PRECAUTION TO BE TAKEN
There is not, properly speaking, any tangible security for this 
kind of loan. On the other hand, the moral guarantee of the borrower 
is strictly required, the loan being extended with full knowledge of the 
qualities of the borrower, and especially of the use to which the borrowed 
funds will be put.
Nevertheless it would be prudent to take certain precautions to 
secure the sums released*
For the security of amounts loaned, the borrower will pledge him­
self to hold all or part of his harvest, in sufficient quantity to serve 
as security for the loan which is granted to him.
It is understood, however, that if the borrower offers to secure 
his land by depositing land title deeds, we would not refuse such security*
PROVINCIAL LOAN COMMISSION
The rural loan operations necessitate the formation in each province 
of a Committee to be scried "Commission de Pret"# This Commission, whose 
members will be appointed by the Minister of Agriculture on the recommen­
dation of the Chiefs of the Provinces, will be composed as follows:
- The Chief of the Province * • * * • • • • • • • • • •  President
- Two MLnicipal Councillors * • • • • • • • • • • • * < »  Members
- Two Rice Cultivators......... * • • • • • • • • • • •  Members
COMMUNAL (OR VILLAGE) COMMITTEES
The Commission de Pret is charged with studying the loan dossiers 
which will be submitted to it by a'Comite Communal", which will be chosen 
by the Chiefs of the Provinces on recommendation of their Administrative 
Delegates or Representatives*
This Comite which is also composed of five members, will be com­
prised as follows*
The "Chu Tich" or President of the Communal Council • • • President
Two Communal Councillors* • • • •  * • • • • • « « • • • •  Members
One Tenant Farmer (Ta-Dien) • • • • • 0 * * * * * * * o «  Member
One small landowner * o * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  Member
Ifre function of the Communal Committee will be to assemble all loan 
applications emanating from the cultivators* They will examine these 
requests, summon the applicants, and certify as to the accuracy of the 
statements made by the borrowers regarding their identity, the proposed 
use of the borrowed funds, the location of their lands, and particularly 
as to the moral standing of the beneficiaries*
The Committee then gives their opinion as to these loan applications, 
which they therexxpon transfer to the Commission de Pret, which finally 
decides whether to grant the loan*
I emphasize once more that the Communal Committee, additionally to 
its other functions, will exercise control over the utilization of the 
borrowed .funds, to the end that our financial aid shall not be diverted 
from the objectives for which it was granted*
Noxf, therefore, I shall be very grateful, Monsieur le Gouverneur, 
if you will be so kind as to give the necessary instructions to the
Chiefs of the Provinces, to set up, each in his Province, a Commission 
de Pret and Communal Committees,
The formation of a Commission de Pret appeal's to me unnecessary in 
those Provinces already provided with a Caisse Provinciale de Credit 
Agricole, whose Administrative Council may, in cooperation with the 
Communal Committee, adequately fill the role of the Commission de Pret*
On the other hand the presence of a Commission de Pret appears 
indispensable where there exists no agricultural credit organisation*
LOAN PROCEDURE
A* Provinces having a Caisse Provinciale de credit Agricole.
The Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif 
will be responsible for giving the necessary instructions to its affiliates 
(Rural Banks), as to the Procedure to be followed in extending these 
loans,
B* Provinces not having a caisse Provinciale de Credit Agricole*
The procedure will be the following:
1st Step: The Communal Committees will assemble the loan appli­
cations which have been addressed to them by the cultivators* They 
will study these applications, will make, if necessary, an investigation 
on the spot, and will draw up a certified report* They will then trans­
mit all the loan dossiers, together with their opinion thereon, to the 
Commission de Pret*
2nd step? The Commissions de Pret, after studying the dossiers, 
will give the final decision and will return the loan dossiers, duly 
approved, to the Communal Committees, for the drawing up of the loan contract
3rd Step: payment of the loans (disbursement to the borrowers)
will be done by Administrative Deputies (Delegates)*
Upon request of the Chiefs of Province the funds destined for pay­
ment of the loans will be furnished (sent) by the Caisses Provinciales.
All these formalities should be accomplished within a period of 
l£ days at the latest*
ACCOUNTING
A* Provinces having a Caisse Provinciale de Credit Agricole*
Accounts are kept by the Caisses Provinciales in accordance with 
instructions which will be given to them by the Service National du 
Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif*
B * ' Provinces not having a Caisse Provinciale de Credit Agricole#
For convenience, the Commissions de Pret will simply send to the 
Caisses Provinciales once a month or at the end of each week, depending 
on the volume of loans, an abstract statement of the status of the loans, 
on the attached form, A register of the same form must be kept up-to- 
date by the Commissions de Pret.
REPAYMENT OF LOANS
The collection of loans on dates due will be. done by the administrative 
Deputies (delegates) which will pay the amounts so collected to the 
Commissions de Pret, which in their turn will transmit the money to the 
Caisses Provinciales by Treasury.
As for the operation of completed (repaid) loans, the repayments 
must be recorded in an abstract statement, on the attached farm, which 
will be addressed to the Caisses Provinciales.
A register in the same form must be kept up-to-date by the Commission 
de Pret.
I would ask you to be so good as to take steps with the Chiefs of 
the Provinces for a propaganda campaign to be carried out in rural areas, 
in order to give a wide circulation of information among our cultivators 
regarding this new type of loan*
(Signed)
President of the Comite de Direction
(also Minister of Agriculture)
Forma on which the Commissions de Pret shall report the status of agricultural loans to the 
appropriate Caisse Provinciale (branch rural Bank) of the Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal 
Cooperatif (SNCAAC), who in turn will maintain accounting records.
PROVINCE OF
STATUS OF LOANS 
(outstanding on
RURAL SHORT TERM LOANS















of the Commission de Pret
PROVINCE OF RURAL SHORT TERM LOANS
STATUS OF LOANS 
(outstanding o n  )
(2)Nos. of Names of Date Amount of Loans Repayments_______  Remarks
Loans Borrowers Granted Face Amount Interest capital ' interest Dates 
(addresses)
Ul*9
Loan Contract, covering short-term agricultural production loans, to be
granted by the service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif
(SNCAAC)
I, the undersigned, (name and address of
the borrower), tenant farmer (Ta-dien) or small land owner cultivation
hectares of rice lands situated at  ,
Province or , acknowledge by these presents having
received from the caisse Provinciale de Credit Agricole (Rural Provincial 
Bank) of f or from the Chief of the Province of
(President of the Loan Committee), representing 
the Service National du Credit Agricole et Artisanal Cooperatif, the sum 
of which is necessaiy for me in order to cultivate
the above mentioned land•
I promise to repay the stun of , plus interest
thereon at one percent (1;£) per month on ________ the tin©
of the sale of my harvest, of which I solemnly promise to store in my 
possession a quantity sufficient to serve as security for this loan.




The Director of the Caisse
Provinciale de Credit Agricole '
of _________________________
Or
The Chief of the Province 
Pf .
President of the Loan Committee
CERTIFICATION OF THE COMMUNAL (VILLAGE) COMMITTEE
Ws the undersigned, communal Committee of the village of __________
certify that Mr* is in fact a farmer, of smalllandowner,
who has cultivates hectares of ricelands. We certify,
moreover, that this party, who up till now has enjoyed a good moral 
reputation, is deserving of the benefit of the loan which he has requested.
(Or it may be certified that the moral standing of the applicant 
is doubtful, and the application should not be considered#)
VITA
VITA
Randall Stelly was born July 11, 1917* on a rice, cotton, and 
corn farm near Kaplan, Louisiana. After attending several public schools 
in Vermilion Parish, he graduated from the Kaplan High School in June, 
1936.
He attended Southwestern Louisiana Institute from September, 1936, 
until June, 19U0, and received the degree of Bachelor of Science in Agri­
culture from that institution in June, 19l*0*
He served on active duty with the United States Marine Air Corps 
and the u® S* Army Air Force from 191*0 until September, 19U5, with the 
rank of Captain, and experienced action in England, North Africa and 
continental Europe*
Following honorable discharge from the armed services in the fall 
of 191*5 he taught vocational agriculture at the Gueydan High School, 
Gueydan, Louisiana, until January, 191*6* In January, 191*6, he entered 
the Graduate School at Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College and 
received the degree of Master of Science from that institution in 
January, 19l*7*
He was employed as Market Analyst and Statistical Supervisor by 
Converted Rico, Inc*, Houston, Texas, from January, 191*7, until January, 
19l*8 • From February, 191*8, until September of that year he was Editor 
and Advertising Manager of the Abbeville Meridional, Kaplan Times and 
Gueydan News —  three weekly newspapers. From September, 191*8, until 
June, 19l*9, he was Assistant Principal, Science Teacher and Coach of 
Athletics at the Maurice High School, Maurice, Louisiana*
In June, 19l*9, he accepted employment as Research Associate in 
Agricultural Economics and entered the Graduate School at Louisiana State
U52
University pursuing graduate studies leading to the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. In September, 1 he accepted a position as Agricultural 
Economist with the United States International Cooperation Administration 
for employment in the far east. In this capacity his functions consisted 
primarily of helping the governments of Cambodia and Vietnam to establish 
an agricultural credit agency, develop and implement a program of farmers 
cooperatives, initiate a program of agrarian reform designed to bring 
about improvements in the level of living of farm families in Indochina, 
and to supervise commercial imports of agricultural raw products from the 
United States into Indochina under the American foreign aid program.
In September, 195>£, he returned to Louisiana State University to 
complete the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. He 
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